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 Foreword 

The present volume introduces the world’s great civilisations from the 
beginning of their formation to the first half of the twentieth century. The authors’ 
purpose was to go beyond the events and write a book on the history of cultures 
and civilisations that also elucidates the background of contemporary events 
which might sometimes be difficult to grasp. The importance of this endeavour 
lies in that it comprises in one volume all the significant civilisations still existing 
in our days. 
At the same time, the aim was to present regions, rather than modern-day 
countries in a complex way. It is true even if today three of these civilisations 
occupy a country each (China, Japan and India). On the other hand, the three 
monotheistic religions which evolved in the Middle East (Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam) influenced the civilisations of two regions, i.e. the Middle East and 
Europe to such an extent that it necessitated an approach via these religions.  
Although each civilisation is presented according to uniform principles, 
certain differences due to the specific characteristics of the topics and the 
approaches of the authors occur. Where relevant, each region is introduced by its 
geographical and climatic features, followed by the emergence and development 
of social, cultural and religious characteristics described within the given histor-
ical context. This, although briefly, may include the description of major literary, 
artistic trends, and e.g. religious law (in the Islamic world, for example, law per-
meates every aspect of social and political life). In addition, the geopolitical sig-
nificance of the specific region or civilisation is also presented in each chapter.  
The illustrations, maps and chronological tables, as well as the glossary 
form an integral part of the chapters and the whole book. A short bibliography 
accompanies every chapter.  
The book authored by subject specialists from the Corvinus University of 
Budapest and other universities and research centres is primarily aimed at stu-
dents of international relations; researchers and members of the general public, 
however, may also find some areas of the topics stimulating.  
 
 
Budapest, 10 May 2020                                                                         The Editor

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1.1. The New World Order and the Clash of 
Paradigms 
 
LÁSZLÓ CSICSMANN 
1.1.1. Introduction 
 
The collapse of the bipolar world order built on rivalry between the Soviet 
Union and the United States in 1989 posed new challenges for the experts of the 
theory and practice of international relations. Religion, culture and civilisation 
were recognised to play an even more significant role in current international re-
lations than before. The political, cultural and economic analyses of the processes 
outside Europe and the Western world, helping to understand the trends of the 
specific regions based on social science methodology, became greatly appreci-
ated.  
The discipline of international relations traditionally comprises four sub-
disciplines: 
x history of international relations/history of diplomacy; 
x international law;  
x international economics/world economics; and 
x international political theory. 
In the 1990s regional and civilisational studies were added, with special 
emphasis on understanding non-European regions. Naturally, Chinese Studies or 
Middle Eastern Studies (commonly referred to as Area Studies or Regional 
Studies) had already existed in the pre-1989 era as well and was considered par-
ticularly important in the United States in predicting potential Soviet expansion. 
As mentioned before, in the post-1989 international order defined by experts as 
the New World Order the role of civilisation, culture and religion became greatly 
appreciated. Think of the current migration/refugee crisis affecting Europe that 
particularly highlights cultural differences. Indeed, this type of approach impacts 
foreign policy decision making as well (see constructivism as a school of 
thought). 
Civilisational studies present the historical and modern-day development 
of non-Western civilisations, primarily relying on the developmental history of 
Europe and the Western world. Following a theoretical introduction, this book 
aims to present the historical milestones and cultural characteristics that distin-
guish one civilisation from another. The history of Europe and European civili-
sation is used as a point of reference in every case against which other non-Euro-
pean civilisations measure themselves (see later). All this is considered important 
Civilisations from East to West 
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
due to the fact that some of the concepts used by us are often culturally defined. 
Democracy, as a form of government, is used as reference all over the world, its 
substance, however, is interpreted differently by the various communities accord-
ing to their own beliefs, religious faiths and historical recollections. Before ex-
amining some key concepts in more detail, certain important characteristics of 
the New World Order should be highlighted. 
 
1.1.2. The characteristics of the New World Order and globalisation 
 
The term New World Order refers to the end of the Cold War period. It is 
a new era following the Soviet-American rivalry, dominated by the United States. 
It is no mere coincidence that the ‘New World Order’ rhetoric is mostly charac-
teristic for US policy. US President George Bush referred to the New World 
Order, among others, in his State of the Union address delivered in Congress in 
January 1991 as one to be built on peace, security, democracy and the rule of law. 
The distinctive feature of the speech made in January 1991 was due to the simul-
taneous start of the Gulf War launched by US-led coalition forces for the libera-
tion of Kuwait, sanctioned by the UN Security Council. The debate concerning 
the unipolar or multi-polar nature of the New World Order is not addressed in 
this study. 
In his book James N. Rosenau suggests that the New World Order is char-
acterised by contradictory processes taking place at the same time. The concept 
of fragmegration introduced by him describes the simultaneity of fragmentation 
and integration as a key characteristic of the New World Order (ROSENAU, JAMES 
N. 1997). Others, like sociologist Zygmunt Bauman use the term glocalisation 
modelled on the word fragmegration to describe some current phenomena (BAU-
MAN, ZYGMUNT 1998). Thus, globalisation and integration take place in the 
world concurrently, along with the enhanced role of local factors. 
Just think how some accomplishments of Western culture, particularly the 
ones related to consumer culture (e.g. Hollywood movies, McDonald’s, or the 
English language itself) have spread globally. We can get exactly the same Big 
Mac burger in Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia as in New York.  
However, local variations of the global trends also evolve, partly as a form 
of defence. For example, the Indian dialect of English is completely different to 
the language variations used in Africa or China. Similarly, McDonald’s restau-
rants also sell local products globally: kebab sandwiches in the Arab countries, 
spicier variants in India, or seafood-filled in Southeast Asia. Another example is 
the beef ban for India’s Hindus, where these popular meals are made from differ-
ent ingredients.  
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As demonstrated above, another key term related to the New World Order 
is globalisation. The definition of globalisation is beyond the scope of this study, 
certain characteristics should nevertheless be highlighted. According to Anthony 
McGrew, ‘globalisation refers to the multiplicity of linkages and interconnec-
tions that transcend the nation-states in that events, decisions and activities in 
one part of the world can come to have significant consequences in quite distant 
parts of the globe’ (Anthony McGrew, quoted by: ROSTOVANYI, ZSOLT 1999 pp. 
7‒8). As regards the beginnings of globalisation, three different views exist.  
x Some believe that globalisation is a premodern category that precedes the 
development of nation states and world economy. As such, globalisation 
essentially evolved simultaneously with humanity, and has been a scene of 
ongoing global standardisation since the birth of mankind. 
x Others believe, however, that geographical exploration and colonisation 
leading to a single global economy make it a more modern category. Those 
who support this view consider the revolution of communication and tech-
nology in the second half of the twentieth century an acceleration and in-
tensification of globalisation. 
x According to a third approach, globalisation is a postmodern phenomenon 
emerging in the 1970s due to changes in communication (particularly the 
fourth industrial revolution). (For more details see MCGREW, ANTHONY 
2010 p. 23.) 
Generally, the second approach is accepted, considering globalisation 
more like a modern category. In terms of globalisation three areas can be distin-
guished: 
1. Economic globalisation is the area that is most spectacular and advanced. 
Globalisation is essentially driven by the free movement of goods, ser-
vices, people and money. The institutions that evolved due to economic 
globalisation include, among others, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank (IBRD) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
In terms of economy globalisation has both advantages and disadvantages 
affecting the individual nation states. The so-called anti-globalisation 
movements emerged in response to the negative impacts of globalisation. 
2. Political globalisation refers to the possibility of world government inher-
ent in the post-WWII development of the United Nations and its special-
ised agencies. However, the changing power and political structures after 
the Second World War were not followed by reforms of the United Nations 
and therefore it is unable to assume national sovereignty at a certain level. 
As a result, no world government has yet been developed. 
3. Cultural globalisation is the dimension considered most important for the 
purposes of this study. Indeed, globalisation involves not only the move-
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ment of goods between different parts of the world but the movement of 
cultural elements as well. Due to migratory processes the so-called Davos 
culture has spread on a global scale.1 Davos culture refers to a global elite 
in possession of the same elements of culture, essentially based on the Eng-
lish language and Western style consumer culture. The Davos culture 
shares most of the characteristics of Western civilisation. Will the Davos 
culture promote development towards a single world civilisation or global 
civilisation? Amongst the catalysts for the development of global civilisa-
tion the literature mentions four: global economy, international academic 
elite, the so-called hamburger culture or McWorld, and Evangelical Prot-
estantism. These four elements are connected by the English language (cf. 
GOMBÁR, Cs. 2000 p. 28). However, the possibility of a single civilisation 
is seriously limited, primarily due to local identities strengthened as a form 
of cultural defence against globalisation and universalism. 
 
The unique characteristics of the New World Order and accelerating 
globalisation considered important for the purposes of this study are summarised 
below. 
 
1. Changing role of space and time in international relations. The cliché that 
the world has become a ‘global village’ was born out of globalisation. It is 
now widely accepted that time in the world is calculated and marked ac-
cording to Western tradition. Non-Western civilisations have different per-
ceptions of time. Just think of the hijra, which in the Islamic civilisation 
marks the start of the calendar. Also, a year in the Islamic calendar is dif-
ferent from the one used by the West. The worldwide use of the Western 
calendar is associated with colonisation and the development of global 
economy. The second millennium, considered in many respects a historical 
milestone, has no particular significance for the world outside Europe. In-
ternational economy, finance and decisions rely on timely information 
available to the decision makers. The significance of territoriality in inter-
national relations has decreased gradually, constituting an ongoing process 
of deterritorialisation at an international level (See KISS J., LÁSZLÓ 2003 
p. 82). Currently wars are not waged in order to gain new territories as in 
past centuries. For one state to gain influence over another there is now no 
need to occupy territory as national interests can be effectively enforced by 
economic means. At the same time, the significance of territories particu-
larly associated with community identity has not decreased. Sacred places 

1 Davos, Switzerland is the venue for the annually organised World Economic Forum. 
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often become the centre points of armed conflicts (BADIE, BERTRAND ‒ 
SMOUTS, MARIE-CLAUDE 1999). For example, in 2018 the United States 
decided to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in quasi recogni-
tion of the latter as the one and undivided capital of the Jewish state. How-
ever, Jerusalem has a special significance for all three monotheistic reli-
gions. Another example is the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo commemorating 
the victims of internal and external wars since 1869, including the Second 
World War. In China, formerly suffering Japanese oppression, regular riots 
break out whenever Japan’s acting prime minister visits the shrine due to 
unhealed historical wounds.  
2. Industry 4.0. The term is used by literature to refer to the extremely rapid 
changes in technology, and primarily in communication in the early 
twenty-first century. Communication development, the new media, bring 
essential changes to international relations. The World Wide Web facili-
tates access to real-time events, making us quasi involved. We could wit-
ness the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, following the events 
online or on TV. The evolution of Artificial Intelligence may fundamen-
tally transform the identities of cultural communities. Could Artificial In-
telligence ever become emotional, express feelings and develop historical 
narratives suitable to distinguish human communities on a cultural basis? 
Or is it AI that could lead to the development of global identity? Industry 
4.0 and the new technologies will fundamentally influence the culturally 
defined communities. 
3. Widening of the development gap. The development gap between the de-
veloped countries of the North and the developing South is a key issue in 
respect of globalisation. The winner of the globalisation process in eco-
nomic terms is North, or the Western world, the losers being mostly the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The development gap keeps widening as 
a result of the globalisation process; while the North has accumulated even 
more profit and developed welfare systems, the poverty indicators of nu-
merous Southern regions have deteriorated. According to UN statistics, 
one percent of the world’s population holds 50.1% of the global wealth 
(THE GUARDIAN 2017). In the 2000s the UN and its specialised agencies 
recognise a North-South internal fragmentation as well, dividing the states 
into different income categories. The eight Millennium Development 
Goals of the United Nations adopted in 2000 aim to eliminate the develop-
ment gap. In terms of development it is clear that certain clusters (e.g. 
Asia’s Little Tigers) are more successful than others (e.g. countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa). The question is whether civilisation and cultural factors 
have any impact on development. Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that 
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Confucian ethics had a major role in the Little Tigers’ development. But 
how does the growing significance of religion and cultural traditions affect 
the issue of development gap and convergence of the South in particular?  
4. Retraditionalisation. A unique feature of the New World Order is that the 
traditions of certain regions, both religious and cultural, become highly ap-
preciated and manifested both in the community sphere and in politics. Re-
traditionalisation is characteristic for both the Western and the non-West-
ern world. Generally, an underlying identity crisis gives rise to efforts to 
solve community challenges by reinterpreting traditions. Identity crisis is 
often accompanied with modernisation and development crisis. Retradi-
tionalisation in its various forms aims to address the challenges threatening 
community identity and cohesion, combined with a unique ideology (for 
more details see ROSTOVÁNYI, ZSOLT 2005). For example, the far-right 
movements in Europe regularly try to use extreme nationalism to address 
challenges, such as the integration problems of Europe’s Muslim minori-
ties. India’s Bharatiya Janata Party, a self-identified Hindu nationalist party 
aims to revise certain values (e.g. secularism) adopted after British coloni-
alism and introduce the principles of Hindu religion and culture as a solu-
tion. 
5. Intensifying migratory processes. Migration, which facilitates encounters 
between civilisations and cultures, is a phenomenon particularly significant 
to our discussion. According to the United Nations 2017 International 
Migration Report approximately 258 million people live in a country other 
than their country of birth, an increase of 49% since 2000. The 2017 report 
states that 3,4% of the world’s inhabitants are international migrants. Of 
the 258 million individuals currently 164 million live in developed high-
income countries. The primary target of migration is the developed West 
(Europe and Northern America), with similar trends involving tens of mil-
lions in Latin-America, Africa and Asia as well. Currently India has the 
largest number of persons born in the country who are now living outside 
its borders. (UNITED NATIONS 2017) Migration is a complex process with 
a mixture of economic, political and cultural factors. The technical inno-
vations of recent decades have facilitated migration in some respects, but 
at the same time, migration toward the developed West has become in-
creasingly difficult out of defence against cultural impacts, based on polit-
ical grounds. Naturally, the explanation of political, economic and legal 
context is beyond the scope of this study, however, migration resulting 
from war or other circumstances should certainly be treated differently. 
Migratory processes may lead to the settlement of larger ethnic or religious 
groups in certain countries. The number of Muslims living in the territory 
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of the European Union is approximately 30‒40 million, including many 
second and third generation immigrants. The current major debates in 
Europe surround the integration problems of the Muslim community. 
6. Increased terrorist activity. Terrorism is not an easily definable term as it 
has over one hundred definitions. However, the number of attacks carried 
out as a threat to civilian population has increased significantly over the 
past two to three decades. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 fun-
damentally shook the United States and the Western world. According to 
the Global Terrorism Index the highest number of terrorist attacks in 2017 
was attributable to five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and 
Pakistan) (GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2017). Considering the attacks of 
recent years, the civilisational and cultural aspects of terrorism have gen-
erated major debates in Europe. Some analysts speak about Islamic terror-
ism while rejecting the term in regard to attacks carried out in the name of 
defending Christianity (e.g. Utøya 2011) (see later). Thus, the political nar-
rative surrounding terrorism is varied. Labelling certain countries, how-
ever, has an explicit delegitimation element when using the term terrorism.  
7. The increasing role of religion. In the post-bipolar world order religion has 
become vital. Religion is an important factor in everyday global political 
decisions and political discussions (BADIE, BERTRAND ‒ SMOUTS, MARIE-
CLAUDE 1999). Think of the presidents of the United States, swearing on 
the Bible at the inauguration ceremony. For the sake of our discussion it 
can be highlighted that religion is often used as a point of reference in mil-
itary conflicts between states of different cultural backgrounds. For exam-
ple, US President George W. Bush called the 2011 military intervention in 
Afghanistan a ‘long crusade’ referring to the historical role of crusades in 
the Holy Land. Religion as a point of reference appears in the rhetoric of 
the religious fundamentalist groups in particular. Religious fundamental-
ism generally addresses situations of crisis. Indeed, some social groups of-
ten use religious traditions in response to problems. Religious fundamen-
talism frequently occurs alongside radicalism. For example, based on the 
fatwa issued in 1998 by the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews 
and Crusaders established by Osama bin Laden, all Muslims are obligated 
by jihad, in this case disrespecting its various meanings, and translating it 
as holy war.  
8. Transformation of nation-state sovereignty. The acceleration of globalisa-
tion affects state sovereignty as well. In the classical sense, the only inter-
national actors with internal and external sovereignty are the world’s states. 
Some believe that globalisation reduces state sovereignty, but it would per-
haps be more accurate to say that nation-state capacity is transformed by 
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shifting world order (Kiss J. LÁSZLÓ 2003 pp. 225‒248; SCRUTON, ROGER 
2004 pp. 39‒41). During the process the countries rejecting globalisation 
lose out significantly. For example, the autarchic development of North 
Korea cannot be viewed as a successful model either. 
9. Simultaneity of modern, premodern and postmodern structures. Although 
international relations are still dominated by nations (modern category) as 
key actors, the subnational and supranational players are assuming increas-
ing weight. A paradox inherent in the New World Order is the simultane-
ous existence of modern, premodern and postmodern structures. For exam-
ple, the importance of tribalism in Africa is a premodern phenomenon. 
During the Congo War, also nicknamed Africa’s First World War, the sur-
rounding states were drawn in due to cross-border tribal aspects, among 
others. A postmodern structure, for example, is Greenpeace, a non-gov-
ernmental organisation promoting sustainable development in interna-
tional relations with the goal to influence the behaviour of countries world-
wide resorting to its own means. 
 
1.1.3. The competing paradigms of the New World Order 
 
The researchers of international relations in the 1990s sought to find an 
explanatory theory in order to provide a theoretical framework for the above pro-
cesses. The arguments of two scientists from the United States had a vital impact 
on New World Order related ideas.  
An optimistic scenario is described in The End of History and the Last 
Man, a book written by Francis Fukuyama (FUKUYAMA, FRANCIS 1992). Relying 
on a liberal school of thought in international relations theory, Fukuyama ob-
serves global political processes progressing in a positive direction. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted not from a great war but mostly peaceful 
processes. According to Fukuyama, with the passing of the age of ideologies 
Western values (including democracy, human rights and free market economy) 
will conquer the world. At the same time, the spread of democracy will signify 
the end of history, and the inevitable wars of history will be avoidable because, 
according to liberal approach, democracies do not fight one another. Indeed, look-
ing at the process defined by the rival theorist Huntington as the third wave of 
democratisation in the 1990s it can be seen that democracy began to spread not 
only in Eastern Europe but, primarily, in Asia and Africa as well. Fukuyama’s 
views were influenced by the idea that Western values were inevitably universal 
values that would sooner or later spread around the world. According to Fuku-
yama, the end of history is only restricted by intensifying extreme nationalism, 
manifested in the Yugoslav conflict erupting in the early 1990s, among others. 
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As regards the New World Order, a pessimistic scenario is presented by 
American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, whose initial views were pub-
lished in an article in 1993 for Foreign Affairs (HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1993). 
According to Huntington, with the passing of the age of ideologies Western 
values will not conquer, but quite the contrary, the civilisational and cultural dif-
ferences will increase. His theory was later published in a book The Clash of 
Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, making the idea a core thesis 
(HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1996). In Huntington’s view armed conflicts always 
erupt due to civilisational and cultural differences. As an example, the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia is mentioned, in so far as the crisis involved a series of armed 
conflicts amongst three civilisations represented by Yugoslavia’s member states: 
Western Christianity (Slovenia, Croatia), Orthodox Christianity (Serbia) and 
Islam (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Huntington’s theory, to be presented in more 
detail at a later stage, cannot be regarded as a wholly new idea.  
Huntington’s book mentions five possible paradigms, the fifth being civi-
lisational theory, which fundamentally goes beyond the shortcomings of the first 
four (HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1996 pp. 31‒35). The first paradigm called One 
World essentially means the great rival Fukuyama’s concept. Without repeating 
Fukuyama’s ideas, it is worth mentioning that, in Huntington’s view, the theory 
fails to stand up in many aspects. First, just because the third wave of democrati-
sation spread in the post-1989 period one cannot conclude that confrontation 
amongst nations was at an end. Huntington refers to the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
and the tribal wars of Africa as an example which, in his view, contradict Fuku-
yama’s vision built on the concept of perpetual peace. 
The second paradigm, Two Worlds can be viewed as a North versus South 
or East versus West conflict. The theory, which defines the New World Order as 
a conflict between the developed North and the developing South, draws on the 
idea that the acceleration of globalisation marks a new stage in the battle for re-
sources. Those who describe the New World Order as North versus South share 
the view that all global political conflicts, armed or unarmed, tend to include eco-
nomic aspects. According to Edward Luttwak, for example, geo-economic wars 
erupt purely to meet economic needs (LUTTWAK, EDWARD N. 1990 pp. 17‒23). 
The Gulf War erupting in 1990 is an excellent example, with the United States 
setting out to liberate Kuwait, authorised by the UN Security Council. Based on 
this theory, the USA represented the developed North, while Iraq led by Saddam 
Hussein represented the South. The battle itself was explicitly about the control 
of oil resources. The theory can be well simplified, as many wars do not indicate 
economic intent to the same extent, or they themselves provide no explanation 
for the direct cause of military conflict. Oil was undoubtedly an important factor 
in launching Operation Desert Storm, but it would be simplistic to say that the 
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United States went to war only for the sake of oil. Another possible interpretation 
for the Two World paradigm is the East-West conflict. Essentially, the theory 
assumes that the non-Western world wants to win over the West’s current supe-
riority. The already mentioned Gulf War is a good analogy in many ways. Indeed, 
Saddam Hussein aimed to compare the Second Gulf War to historical colonial-
ism, the USA wanting to overpower a third-world state. His goal was to convince 
the general public of the Middle East, and the Third World most of all. However, 
some ‘Eastern’ countries, such as Egypt and Syria, supported the United States 
during the above conflict. According to Huntington, East is in fact everything that 
is not West: The West and the Rest. A study by Géza Ankerl suggests that 
although the Western world has been structured uniformly and developed organ-
ically, it would be impossible to view the East in the same sense. The Eastern 
cultures, with completely different traditions and values, cannot be considered 
homogenous (ANKERL, GÉZA 2000). 
The third paradigm is 184 States. It refers to the so-called realism, the clas-
sical explanatory theory of international relations according to which the nations’ 
interests clash in the armed conflicts of the New World Order. In fact, the starting 
point of realism is that despite the changed international relations the key actors 
are the nations themselves, focusing on their own interests, and engaging in 
armed conflicts. This is an obvious paradigm, but in Huntington’s view it is out-
dated in so far as it disregards subnational and supranational actors, or premodern 
and postmodern structures, among others.  
The fourth paradigm, Sheer Chaos has grown quite popular. Many think-
ers, mostly American, expressed pessimistic views in respect of the New World 
Order. They describe it as one with no international cooperation, and where in-
ternational law fails to prevent conflicts amongst the nations. For example, John 
J. Mearsheimer’s ‘Back to the Future’ theory published in 1990 projected Euro-
pean conflicts more robust than Cold War confrontation (MEARSHEIMER, JOHN 
J. 1990 pp. 5‒56). He considered the role of unified Germany in a negative way 
in respect of European balance of power. Huntington is opposed to the anarchy 
concept claiming that international law and international organisations have re-
tained control over the nations, with signs of cooperation witnessed on a daily 
basis. Rejecting the first four theories Huntington suggests a fifth paradigm, the 
above presented Clash of Civilisations, which fundamentally goes beyond the 
first four. 
In the early twentieth century two historians, working in different language 
environments, studied the civilisational processes. In the German-speaking world 
Oswald Spengler took a pessimistic approach generated by the First World War, 
and his book The Decline of the West is often used as a point of reference in 
contemporary debates about European future (SPENGLER, OSWALD 2006). Ac-
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cording to Spengler numerous cultures existed and ceased to exist in history (e.g. 
Ancient Egypt). In his view civilisational development is cyclical, and Western 
civilisation has reached a decline stage.  
Spengler distinguishes eight high cultures: Antique, Arabic, Western, 
Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, Indian and Mexican. His perception is teleologi-
cal, meaning that as a result of biological laws, decline is inevitable. According 
to Spengler, every high culture experiences the same stages of development: pre-
culture, early culture, late culture and decline, the final stage identified as civili-
sation. In his view the history of Western civilisation began around the first mil-
lennium. He regards industrial revolution, money and urbanisation as the symbols 
of decline. Spengler’s approach distinguishes between high culture and civilisa-
tion. The latter is inevitably part of the decline process. He believes that industrial 
revolution and urbanisation bring about the simultaneous decline of Western cul-
ture, the civilisation stage, which is unstoppable and fatalistically determined. 
In his 12-volume book, A Study of History English historian Arnold Toyn-
bee fundamentally criticises his peer, Oswald Spengler’s work (TOYNBEE, AR-
NOLD 1988). Toynbee considers four stages of civilisation: genesis, growth, 
breakdown and disintegration. Toynbee rejects Spengler’s view of fatalistic de-
termination and criticises the theory concerning the isolation of high culture. 
However, he agrees with Spengler in that Western civilisation has reached a de-
cline stage, although he argues its deterministic nature. Toynbee believes in ‘cre-
ative minorities’ capable of devising solutions to preserve civilisation. Civilisa-
tions have always been influenced by external factors encouraging revival. Con-
sidering the history of Western civilisation, Toynbee’s theory of revival may be 
well founded. 
Bernard Lewis, the recently deceased doyen of Orientalists wrote his thesis 
on clash of civilisations several years before Huntington. Lewis was a historian 
specialising in the Middle East and the Islamic world, whose essay entitled The 
Roots of Muslim Rage published in 1990 in The Atlantic Monthly explored the 
sentiments of anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism in the Islam world. Accord-
ing to Lewis, US Middle East policy is to blame for the frustration that eventually 
leads to religious fundamentalism. The latter is explicitly opposed to the values 
of secularism and modernity (LEWIS, BERNARD 1990 pp. 47‒60). Similarly, to 
Lewis, Tariq Ali interprets the fault line between Islam and Western civilisation 
as a Clash of Fundamentalisms (ALI, TARIQ 2002). 
The clash of civilisations also appears in Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. 
McWorld (BARBER, BENJAMIN 1995). Barber’s work explores the possible spread 
of democracy around the world. McWorld is identified as the forces of globalisa-
tion, ruled by financial and banking sector norms. Jihad, on the other hand, is 
against globalisation, aiming to preserve local identities and defend them from 
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external influence. Barber’s opinion is pessimistic in that neither McWorld nor 
Jihad can be viewed as a democratic force. 
Huntington’s reasoning, therefore, is novel in a way that it connects the 
above views as a coherent whole. Huntington is perhaps the first thinker of the 
New World Order who applies the Clash of Civilisations thesis to international 
political relations. Before we explore the theory in more detail, however, some 
key concepts should be clarified. 
 
1.1.4. Definition(s) and interpretation(s) of civilisation and culture 
 
Few terms have such diverse interpretations as civilisation and culture. The 
terms might have different meanings even within the same language community. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that while certain language com-
munities (English speaking countries) often equate civilisation with culture, 
others clearly distinguish one from the other.  
Iván Vitányi’s study suggests that the common feature in the interpreta-
tions of culture is that culture has a subject, object, action and result (objectiva-
tion) (VITÁNYI, IVÁN 2002). The subject of culture is man, or a wider community, 
who performs the action. Cultures also vary in the sense whether they allow for 
interpretation as an individual on its own or only as part of a community. The 
individualistic Western culture fundamentally differs from non-Western cultures 
generally organised based on communities. Depending on their focus, the inter-
pretations of culture are generally divided into two main categories. The anthro-
pological culture concept focuses on man as an individual or groups of individu-
als, while the objectivational concept of culture focuses on the result of action 
(objectivation). The word culture comes from Latin and primarily means ‘to cul-
tivate’. 
The term civilisation goes back to the age of the French Revolution as op-
posed to barbaric or primitive society, and in everyday language is still used in 
contrast to something negative. For example, ‘back to civilisation’ is often used 
in the context of returning from a backward environment. This study, as also 
Huntington’s theory, is specifically opposed to the use of ‘civilisation’ in the 
above sense. Huntington, who comes from an English-speaking environment, 
perceives no substantial difference between civilisation and culture.  
Culture is ‘a repository of social meaning that distinguishes one commu-
nity from another’ (HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1996 pp. 40‒45). The key ingredi-
ents of civilisation include language, religion, tradition, shared history, etc. Hun-
tington considers religion the most important; in his view every civilisation that 
has ever existed can be best characterised by religion. Civilisation and culture are 
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merely distinguishable in space and time, because ‘a civilisation is the broadest 
cultural entity’ (HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1996 p. 43). 
In certain languages, particularly in German, the concepts of civilisation 
and culture are sharply opposed, which is attributable to contrasts between aris-
tocracy and citizenry. Culture often refers to intellectual achievement, including 
arts as well as sciences. Civilisation is associated with material achievement, with 
emphasis on cultural superiority. In contrast, English speaking communities use 
civilisation and culture essentially as having the same meaning.2 
The term civilisation can be used in singular or plural form. The singular 
form refers to the aforementioned debate whether a single world civilisation or 
global civilisation could evolve, which would eliminate cultural differences. The 
subject is all the more interesting because in the context of New World Order 
characteristics migration is mentioned as a phenomenon in which cultural values 
change countries. How would the different cultures and civilisations affect each 
other if they met? Generally, four models of cultural coexistence are mentioned 
(based on Tariq Modood’s study):  
x Assimilation is a process where a community’s culture becomes integrated 
into the culture of a host country, the former losing its own characteristics. 
Individualistic integration means coexistence at individual, rather than at 
community level. In that case a minority becomes integrated without ap-
pearing in the public sphere as a community. 
x Multiculturalism, in the normative sense, means the parallel existence of a 
host culture and a foreign culture, neither of them wanting to eliminate the 
other. In that case two or more cultures possess equal status in a society. 
x Cosmopolitanism is viewed by many as a form of multiculturalism. The 
essential difference is that multiculturalism involves political and civil 
rights held by a group or community, while in the case of cosmopolitanism 
it is not an important characteristic (MODOOD, TARIQ 2011). 
If coexistence fails, the opposite model is segregation. It means that a mi-
nority is driven to the periphery of society, its rights recognised neither at indi-
vidual nor at community level. Simplifying the above, assimilation, integration 
and segregation can be well distinguished as three models describing the relation-
ship between society and foreign culture (See FEISCHMIDT, MARGIT 1997 pp. 7‒
29). 
These theories generated major debates about which one should be recog-
nised as a desirable model. European discussion is linked with the issue of inte-
grating a Muslim minority of approximately 30‒40 million people. Some 

2 A more detailed presentation of the European philosophical interpretations of culture is 
beyond the scope of this study (for more details see WESSELY, ANNA 2003 pp. 7‒27). 
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European politicians, including Angela Merkel and David Cameron, emphasised 
on numerous occasions that multiculturalism is not a solution, as it leads to par-
allel societies. The question is, however, whether we can speak of a multicultur-
alism model genuinely applied in Europe to integrate minorities. 
The use of the singular form of civilisation raises multiple dilemmas. As 
seen before, cultures defend themselves against the universalising impact of glob-
alisation as a result of fragmentation and localisation. Therefore, while the 
wealthy global elite (see Davos culture) speak the same English language, live 
similar lives and consume similar products, the cultural differences still survive. 
The authors introduced in this study generally use the plural form of civi-
lisation. Spengler, Toynbee and Huntington argue that at any given time several 
civilisations exist in parallel. Yet it is not possible to distinguish them on the basis 
of values. For every individual or community, the superior civilisation is the one 
in which it was born, as perceptions of the world and transcendental matters are 
determined culturally. In Huntington’s view, for example, at present seven or 
eight civilisations, describable by well distinguishable characteristics, exist 
simultaneously. These seven or eight civilisations include the following (the list 
signifies no ranking):  
 
x Western, including two major variants: European and North American, 
x Russian-Orthodox, centred around Orthodox Christianity,  
x Hindu-Indian,  
x Islamic,  
x Confucian-Chinese,  
x Japanese, 
x Latin American, and 
x African. 
 
Huntington argues with himself about the last two, wondering the extent to 
which Latin American or African could be considered individual civilisations. In 
the case of Latin America, Spanish language and Western Christianity (the ‘most 
Catholic’ continent) essentially suggest connection to the West. Nevertheless, 
Huntington argues that something novel evolved due to external impacts: ancient 
local cultures encountering Western influence, importation of African slaves. As 
regards Africa, civilisational determination is left to be decided for his audience. 
The primary reason is that while civilisation is centred around religion, the Afri-
can continent is greatly divided on grounds of religion (Islam, Christianity, Ani-
mism) and language, therefore the existence of a homogenous civilisation as de-
fined by Huntington is debatable (HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1996 p. 47). Con-
trary to Fukuyama and other thinkers (e.g. Amartya Sen), Huntington therefore 
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holds the view that Western values are not universal, but primarily characteristic 
of the West. Furthermore, each of the seven or eight civilisations has its own set 
of values, distinguishing one civilisation from another. Apart from the West, 
however, Huntington provides no itemised lists of civilisational values. 
In Huntington’s view Western civilisation can be defined by the simulta-
neous existence of the following eight characteristics (HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 
1996 pp. 69‒72): 
 
x classical heritage,  
x Western Christianity, 
x European languages, 
x separation of spiritual and temporal authority, 
x rule of law, 
x social pluralism, 
x civil society, 
x government by representation and individualism. 
 
However, Huntington provides no distinguishing characteristics for Latin 
American civilisation as opposed to the West, for example. Ronald Inglehart and 
his team drew up a civilisational map of the world based on comparable data of 
the World Values Survey (WVS) (Figure 1). It depicts closely linked cultural val-
ues clearly distinguishing Huntington’s seven or eight civilisations based on two 
dimensions. The x-axis indicates material (survival) values versus self-expression 
values (e.g. civil and political rights), while the y-axis indicates traditional values 
versus secular values. Farthest from the origin is Protestant Europe, dominated 
by self-expression values and secular values. Closest to the origin is African-Is-
lamic civilisation, dominated by traditional and survival values. 
Naturally, the cultural map is not identical to Huntington’s classification, 
but they share the idea that every civilisation can be characterised by different 
values. The Inglehart-Welzel cultural map is the first empirical manifestation of 
civilisational values. 
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Figure 1: The Inglehart-Welzel cultural map 
Source: WORLD VALUES SURVEY website3 
 
1.1.5. Progress, modernity and modernisation 
 
As regards civilisational theory, the major discussion in literature is fo-
cused on how a civilisation responds to changes and the challenges faced. Most 
thinkers engaged in civilisational theory agree that of the currently existing seven 
or eight civilisations the West occupies the highest level of hierarchy in terms of 
economy and power. For example, Western dominance is apparent in global eco-
nomic processes and in military aspects, although decline has already started. 
Civilisational theorists, including Toynbee, Spengler and Huntington accept the 
notion of civilisational development. Civilisations survive for centuries or even 
for millennia (longe durée). They are limited in time and space, generally impos-
sible to be defined accurately. The history of civilisation can be best demonstrated 
by a product’s life cycle. The stages of the life cycle include birth, development, 
maturity and decline. Toynbee and Spengler suggest that Western civilisation has 
passed maturity and reached the decline stage. According to Huntington it can be 
proved empirically as well. The global share of Western territory and population 
has been diminishing continually. In 1900 Western civilisation made up 30% of 
the world’s population, dropping to merely 10% by 2020. This process can be 

3 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings ‒ accessed 15 
July 2020 
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attributed to decolonisation; in 1990 most of the world’s territories, except for 
Latin America, were under Western control, in a dependent status (HUNTINGTON, 
SAMUEL P. 1996 pp. 84‒91). The question is whether territory, population or 
GDP data provide sufficient grounds to conclude that Western civilisation is de-
clining. Perhaps decline has rather different characteristics that could be proved 
empirically to a lesser degree. One need only think of the current European crisis 
phenomena such as the migrant crisis or sovereign debt crisis which signify iden-
tity crisis on a broader scale. However, as Toynbee reminds us, the ability of the 
Western civilisation to revive is exceptional.  
Western civilisation is distinguished by the emergence of enlightenment 
and faith in mind. The political and social developments of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries brought along the age of modernity, rejecting former tradi-
tions and spreading norms, such as nation state (in the modern sense), secularisa-
tion, democracy, free market economy and individualism (human rights). Moder-
nity at present is only characteristic in the history of Western civilisation.  
The decline of the West occurs with the simultaneous rise of non-Western 
civilisations. In particular, Huntington points out East Asia and China whose ex-
ceptional economic development and military advancement pose a threat to West-
ern dominance. 
The non-Western world aims to catch up with the West as a result of the 
above mentioned economic and political processes. This can happen in different 
ways: 
x The so called unilinear evolution models suggest that there is only one way 
to catch up: to follow the path taken by Western civilisation. The modern-
isation theory dominating twentieth century development studies assumed 
that transition from rural society to industrialisation and the evolution of 
the so called modern societies initially took place in the West (for detailed 
presentation of the modernisation theory see TIPPS, DEAN C. 1973 pp. 199‒
226). 
For the non-Western civilisations the modernisation theory offers West-
ernisation ‒ urbanisation, industrialisation and technological development 
‒ as a solution. Supporters of the theory believe that reaching a certain level 
of economic development (GDP per capita) should induce political 
changes as a first step toward democratic transformation. A great deal of 
neoliberal economic prescriptions in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury were based on presuppositions of the modernisation theory, however, 
they failed to address the modernisation crisis emerging in the non-West-
ern world. The latter primarily evolved due to the logic of Westernisation 
which disregards the local cultural dimensions of development. 
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Cultural context, however, is particularly important to understanding 
that any theory merely promoting Westernisation and Western values is 
inevitably doomed. One need only think of statehood issues. The modern 
concept of nation- state is a major accomplishment of the Westphalian sys-
tem that gradually spread around the world. However, statehood as a polit-
ical form of community development was alien to most non-Western civi-
lisations. Contrary to the organic development of the Western nation-
states, in non-Western civilisations they emerged due to foreign influence, 
practically in the wake of colonisation. Community identity in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa is primarily linked with tribalism, while the role of the indi-
vidual in Islamic society is mainly determined by religion. Several political 
movements today question the existing borders of the non-Western world, 
including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, paradoxically using the idea 
of statehood to gain territorial sovereignty.  
The non-Western civilisations have largely experienced the so-called 
Western development models (e.g. capitalism, democracy and rule of law) 
and adopted numerous political and legal institutions (e.g. constitution, 
parliament). However, Western models are less effective in non-Western 
cultural and social contexts. Modernisation crisis is generally linked with 
identity crisis as grounds for increased focus on religious and other cultural 
traditions. Interpreting modernisation wholly as Westernisation is, there-
fore, a fundamentally mistaken approach. Adapting to local traditions, for 
example, was key to the successful introduction of democracy in civilisa-
tions such as India and Japan. 
x According to the multilinear evolution model modernisation and Western-
isation are not the same. There are multiple paths to development, desig-
nated by the particular sociocultural context.  
Modernisation can only be successful if largely limited to the adoption 
of Western technological achievement in the initial phase, followed by a 
path according to the given sociocultural context. Huntington uses the fol-
lowing graph to illustrate correlation between modernisation and Western-
isation (Figure 2). 
  
1. The New World Order and the Clash of Paradigms 
35 

Figure 2: Correlation between modernisation and Westernisation 
Source: HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1996 p. 111. 
 
 According to the graph there are four alternative correlations between mod-
ernisation and Westernisation (HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1996 pp. 72‒78). 
x Countries progressing along the y-axis equate modernisation with West-
ernisation (AD). Huntington brings African examples, which might not be 
particularly accurate considering that retraditionalisation and Africanisa-
tion are widely supported in the region. Extreme Westernisation generally 
overshadows local religious and cultural traditions. The countries opting 
for extreme Westernisation rely on the presupposition that the only way to 
solve economic and social difficulties is to adopt Western society and in-
stitutions. Using this logic, the other way round, religious and cultural tra-
ditions are seen as an obstacle to development. This model is essentially 
traceable to the unilineal evolution model. The author of this study regards 
pre-revolutionary Iran an apt example, the Pahlavi dynasty aiming to put 
ancient Persian-Zoroastrian religious principles in the forefront by degrad-
ing Islamic traditions. The religious elite (Ulema) joined by the bazaari 
carried out a grassroots revolution, bringing unilateral Westernisation to an 
end. Perhaps Huntington’s African example is appropriate in a way that 
there is an elite detached from the population, focused on its own gains, 
copying Western civilisation to extreme degrees. As mentioned before, this 
leads to modernisation crisis, retraditionalisation and religious fundamen-
talism. 
x The second alternative is complete rejection of Westernisation, represented 
by progression along the x-axis (AC). Interpreting modernisation in this 
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manner involves complete rejection of Western values, and on the whole, 
the globalisation process. An excellent example is North Korea led by Kim 
Jong-un, where Juche represents superior state ideology building on 
Korean traditions. The ideology of Juche is built on self-defence and self-
reliance, i.e. an autocratic development model, trying to eliminate all ex-
ternal influences. The example of North Korea shows, on the one hand, 
that this kind of development model leads to breakaway and underde-
veloped economic structure, and therefore is regarded unsuccessful. On the 
other hand, due to interdependence caused by globalisation it is not possi-
ble to avoid the so-called Western demonstration effect well visible in the 
Kim dynasty’s luxury consumption. 
x The third alternative constitutes progression along the line AB, which Hun-
tington calls Kemalism based on the Turkish example. The author of this 
study holds the view that Turkey should be mentioned as an example of 
extreme Westernisation, rather than a modernisation strategy built on a 
combination of Westernisation and local cultural tradition. The creation of 
modern Turkey in the 1920s occurred with the simultaneous complete 
eradication of Ottoman and Islamic traditions. Modern Turkey embarked 
on a path of historical development relying on a new constitution, French 
style secularism, Latin-based alphabet and adopted surnames. In the mod-
ernisation process Kemal Atatürk disregarded Turkish traditions, in fact, 
considered them an obstacle to progress. Indeed, assuming that every civi-
lisation has its own set of values (see above), the major discussion in litera-
ture is focused on the extent to which these values hinder development, or 
else how to use them to promote progress. According to Bernard Lewis the 
values of Islam and modernity are in conflict. In his view the slogans of 
the French Revolution, such as liberty, equality and fraternity, have histor-
ically different meanings in the Islamic civilisation and therefore are un-
likely to spread. Lewis’s work undoubtedly draws attention to the fact that 
some known concepts, such as democracy, freedom and human rights 
might have different meanings in the non-Western world (LEWIS, BER-
NARD 1990 pp. 82‒95). Others claim, however, that these values are not at 
all conflicting; in fact, some highlight their Islamic roots (cf. MAZRUI, ALI 
1997 pp. 118‒132). According to Amartya Sen, winner of the Nobel Prize 
in economics development is possible only with freedom. Democracies 
and countries respecting human rights are able to develop in the long term. 
He draws on multiple historical examples including, among others, demo-
cratic India (SEN, AMARTYA 2000). 
x Huntington regards the fourth development model (curve AE) a norm 
which combines Westernisation with cultural adaptation. The first stage of 
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modernisation focuses on the adoption of Western technological achieve-
ments, the second stage focuses on cultural traditions. As an example, the 
development of Southeast Asia should be highlighted in particular: the 
Little Tigers took advantage of Western scientific and technological 
accomplishments, while choosing an independent path of development 
built on Confucian ethics.  
 
1.1.6. Huntington and the Clash of Civilisations thesis 
 
For a better understanding of Huntington’s views on the Clash of Civilisa-
tions some of his definitions should be reviewed (HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1996 
pp. 135‒154): 
x Member state: Every civilisation is made up of member states. Hungary is 
a member state of the West; Argentina belongs to Latin America. There-
fore, civilisation is not a politically defined entity but, essentially, it com-
prises the main actors of international orders: the world’s countries.  
x Core state: Every civilisation has a dominant political, economic and mil-
itary regional power responsible for maintaining intra-civilisational order. 
This role can be shared by multiple states. For example, the United States, 
France, Germany and Great Britain share responsibility for setting the di-
rection of Western development. In Latin America the dominant role is 
shared by Mexico, Argentina and Portuguese-speaking Brazil. The major 
problem of the Islamic world is that no such core state exists. In Hunting-
ton’s view, essentially shared by Bernard Lewis, Islam’s ‘bloody’ borders 
are partly due to its current lack of a core state responsible for maintaining 
civilisational order. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring a regional com-
petition emerged, defined by some experts as the new Cold War of the 
Middle East. The competition, primarily taking place between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, is manifested in numerous local conflicts (e.g. Syrian civil 
war). 
x The lone counties are not part of any civilisation. One such example is 
Israel which, within the meaning of this study, belongs to West, yet with 
traditions setting it apart. Huntington’s study mentions Mongolia as a 
country sharing no commonality with others.  
x The kin-country syndrome primarily appears in conflicts where countries 
belonging to the same civilisation are joined together by external threat. As 
a typical example, Huntington mentions the Yugoslav wars and the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. The external powers evidently supported their 
own kind during the conflict; thus, Russia took sides with Serbia, Germany 
and Europe with Catholic Slovenia and Croatia, and Turkey and Saudi 
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Arabia with Islamic Bosnia. Likewise, in the Gulf War erupting in 1990, 
Saddam Hussein tried to call on the Arab/Islamic world opposed against 
the United States and their allies. One weakness of Huntington’s theory is 
precisely that although in the latter case Arab/Islamic public opinion was 
quite successfully turned against the US, it failed at the level of Middle 
Eastern states. On grounds of realpolitik considerations several Middle 
Eastern countries took sides with the United States (e.g. Egypt and Syria), 
raising questions about the theory in general.  
x The so-called torn countries aim to change from one civilisation to another. 
Huntington’s theory pays little attention to interactions between civilisa-
tions. Yet it is important to note those countries which, turning against their 
past, choose to adopt different civilisational values. Generally, it can be 
successful if the idea is shared by the wider society, not just a narrow elite, 
of both cultures. Some concrete examples include Turkey (changing from 
Islam to Western), Mexico (changing from Latin American to Western) 
and Russia (changing from Orthodox-Russian to Western). Australia is 
unique in a way that although it is part of the Western world, it aims to 
develop its own Australian identity. Europe is probably most concerned 
with the Turkish developments. As mentioned before, Kemal Atatürk as-
pired to develop a modern secularist nation-state built mainly on Western 
values. Turkey’s hundredth anniversary will be celebrated in 2023. Cur-
rently in Europe, and also in Turkey, there is a gradually developing con-
sensus that Turkey’s EU accession could be untimely. It seems as if the 
definition of Turkey as a Western state agreed over the past ten-twenty 
years had ceased to exist, which is manifested in the new directions of 
Turkish foreign policy. Providing more details on inter-civilisational inter-
actions is beyond the scope of this study, however, the civilisation with 
dominant global role at a given time (in that case the West despite its cur-
rent decline) becomes a point of reference.  
x Cleft countries belong to two or more civilisations at the same time. These 
countries are bound to break up in the near future due to civilisational fault 
lines putting pressure on unity. A current example of cleft countries is 
Ukraine, where part of the population, mostly the eastern regions, is loyal 
to Russia, while Western Ukraine predominantly embraces European 
ideals. The Crimean conflict is an ample indication of the characteristics 
of cleft countries.  
 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations thesis is based on the assumption that 
all armed or unarmed confrontations of the New World Order arise out of civili-
sational conflicts, erupting along civilisational fault lines. Civilisational fault 
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lines occur in geographical as well as in a virtual sense. On the one hand, fault 
lines appear along geographical borders separating one civilisation from another. 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia emerged at the intersection of three civilisations: 
Croatia and Slovenia (West), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Islam) and Serbia (Rus-
sian Orthodox). On the other hand, fault lines occur not only in a geographical, 
but in an ideological sense as well. The most distinctive fault lines currently 
emerge between Western civilisation and Islam, in both a geographical and an 
ideological sense. The biggest opponent of Western modernity and accelerated 
globalisation is Islam. A future threat raised by Huntington is an alliance between 
Confucian-Chinese civilisation and Islam, which would impact the current West-
ern dominance in a negative way. However, he provides no details of a genuine 
(anti-Western) alliance between these two civilisations. Perhaps close ties be-
tween China and Pakistan, or between China and Iran would pose a threat to the 
West.  
According to Huntington the clash of civilisations occurs at two levels 
(HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1996 pp. 246‒254): 
x Fault line wars erupt mainly along geographically defined fault lines. For, 
the Kashmir conflict emerged between Kashmiri Muslims supported by 
Pakistan and India-backed Hindus. Fault line conflicts are rather common; 
example essentially all armed conflicts occur in this way. 
x Core state wars are fought by the dominant powers of two civilisations 
engaged in armed conflict on a much more serious scale than fault line 
wars. So far there has been no such incident, but in Huntington’s view it is 
a huge threat imminent in the New World Order. For example, an armed 
conflict between Russia and the United States would constitute a core state 
war according to Huntington’s definition.  
 
1.1.7. Criticisms of the civilisational theory 
 
Although the theory seems to have coherent foundations, a great deal of 
criticism can be raised. 
x The major problem concerning terminology is that the definitions of civi-
lisation and culture appear in a static way, with little attention paid to dual 
and multiple identities. Huntington himself attaches importance to the his-
torical interconnections and interactions of civilisations, but he fails to note 
the changes happening to them individually. A major critic of Huntington, 
Palestinian American literary historian Edward W. Said considers the civi-
lisational paradigm unfounded, suggesting that such contrasts and distinc-
tions between civilisations are man-made and lack any basis. As Said put 
it, “Huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make ‘civilisations’ 
and ‘identities’ into what they are not: shut-down, sealed-off entities that 
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have been purged of the myriad currents and under-currents.” (SAID, ED-
WARD W. 2001). 
x Huntington analysed the Islam-West conflicts in multiple studies, provid-
ing summary findings. Elsewhere he suggests, for example, that fault line 
wars mostly involve Muslims, the primarily reason being that Muslims are 
‘difficult to manage’. (HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 2001 pp. 140‒144). In 
his view ‘Islam has bloody borders’, partly due to its highly militarised 
state. Although the empirical finding on large-scale Muslim involvement 
in fault line wars is hardly arguable, Huntington fails to consider historical 
context (e.g. deciding state borders along Western interests). His findings 
on Islam, based partly on Bernard Lewis’s work, are generally arguable. 
x Some unscientific critiques fear that the theory might turn into a self-ful-
filling prophecy. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 seemed to 
justify Huntington’s views. Huntington himself said that the series of at-
tacks carried out by extremist groups should not be interpreted as a civili-
sational conflict, although they could easily escalate into one. (So, are 
civilisations at war? 2001). The explicit goal of the extremist groups (e.g. 
Al-Qaeda, Islamic State) is to generate civilisational conflict. Any kind of 
armed confrontation is fuelled by radicalism. 
x It is questionable how novel the theory is; after all, history is about civili-
sational conflicts. Think of the wars between Islam and the West in the 
early eighth century. Also, civilisations comprise nation-states, meaning 
that clashes ultimately arise out of national, rather than civilisational con-
flicts (see the theory of realism). According to Huntington moreover, civi-
lisation is not a political category, but a culturally defined concept. 
x The theory pays little attention to intracivilisational or intercivilisational 
conflicts defined not necessarily by civilisational, but economic or other 
aspects. The civilisational paradigm is unlikely to fit all of the world’s con-
flicts.  
x Some critics say that the anti-Western alliance between Islam and Confu-
cian-Chinese civilisation is not substantiated by the study. Huntington 
mentions few concrete examples (e.g. ties between China and Pakistan), 
but it does not lead to the conclusion that alliance between the Islamic 
world with its over 50 member states and China would be formed. 
 
1.1.8. Summary 
 
Although the so called civilisational paradigm raises numerous criticisms, 
the theory points out a specific segment of twenty-first century international re-
lations that reflects actual processes. Undoubtedly, in international political rela-
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tions features such as identity, religion, culture and civilisation are growing in-
creasingly important. Think how the current debates on Europe’s migration-refu-
gee crisis take on Huntington’s approach. Social media and European politics 
shifting toward intolerance inevitably contrast Muslim migrants and the Euro-
pean majority in a simplistic manner. The civilisational paradigm might help us 
to understand that the current European crisis phenomena (identity crisis, political 
crisis, debt crisis) inevitably bring into focus discussions on what European iden-
tity actually comprises. At the same time, the multitude of refugees approaching 
from the Middle East represents an external threat against which we need to pro-
tect ourselves.  
The ongoing trends concern not only Europe. It is notable, for example, 
that India’s Hindu nationalist party, the BJP won the 2014 general elections. 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi got caught in the crossfire; as a former Governor 
of Gujarat state, he played a crucial role in stirring up the Hindu-Muslim conflict. 
India has the same debates as Europe. Will India turn against Gandhi’s ‘unity in 
diversity’ concept and openly build an exclusionary Hindu state based on the 
logic of Hindu nationalism? Seeking paths to modernisation is a distinctive fea-
ture of every civilisation; the civilisational paradigm has undoubtedly pointed out 
its context. However, it would be wrong to make it an absolute theory, or rather, 
to bring the Clash of Civilisations thesis into the focus of world politics. 
Moreover, the civilisational paradigm helps us understand the different 
values and concepts upheld by each civilisation. In regard to the latter we should 
note that some concepts associated with Western modernity, such as democracy, 
human rights or free market economy, have quite different meanings in non-
Western cultures.  
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2.1. The Chinese Civilisation 
 
TAMÁS MATURA 
 
China, the ‘Middle Kingdom’ is one of the oldest surviving civilisations in 
the world. It has been a cultural centre and a dominant power of the East Asian 
region for no less than four thousand years. Although historically China has given 
home to a mixture of ethnic groups, dialects and traditions, the role of the Han 
culture has been fundamental in the whole region. Consequently, the inhabitants 
of the Chinese Empire and the subsequent People’s Republic of China have 
looked upon their country and the Sinosphere mainly as a civilisation, not a nation 
state (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Family altar demonstrating a mixture of religions and politics 
(Yunnan province) 
Source: Photograph by JUDIT BAGI 
 
The regional dominance of the Chinese civilisation is easy to understand 
considering its geographical and historical characteristics, which led to a mostly 
isolated development path and the evolution of a unique world with features so 
different from the West or any other great culture. The enormity of the Chinese 
civilisation in space as well as in time makes it impossible to provide a full picture 
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through this study, therefore, through focusing on the aspects of international 
studies, some key features will be highlighted. The following chapters provide an 
overview of various periods from prehistoric China through dynastic cycles to 
the fall of the Empire considered most important for understanding China’s 
worldview and foreign policy behaviour.4 
 
2.1.1. China today in figures 
 
Although our aim is to provide a historical and cultural background to each 
civilisation presented in this book, the characteristics of modern-day China are 
also worth mentioning. China is known to be the world’s most populated country 
with over 1.4 billion inhabitants, which is 140 times more than the population of 
Hungary. Although the population of India is likely to overtake in the 2020s, 
China’s vast manpower will continue to represent a significant resource.  
 
2.1.2. Geography 
 
With an area of over 9.6 million km2, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) 
is the largest country in East Asia and the third or fourth biggest country in the 
world, which makes it over twice the size of the European Union, and a hundred 
times bigger than Hungary. The uncertainty in ranking is due to deliberation of 
disputed territories. Western ranking disregards these territories (e.g. Taiwan, 
some parts of Kashmir), which makes the PRC somewhat smaller than the United 
States of America; China’s raking, naturally mindful of these territories, makes it 
slightly bigger than the USA. Regardless of political standing, the area of the 
continental United States without Alaska measuring 1.5 million km2 is signifi-
cantly smaller than that of China. China’s enormous size and varied topography 
have determined climatic conditions, which in turn have influenced agricultural 
potential, with an ultimate impact on Chinese history and culture (Map 1).  

4 The author hereby wishes to thank Sándor Kusai, former Ambassador of Hungary to 
China for his assistance and advice in finalising this chapter. Special thanks to sinologist 
Judit Bagi for standardising the transcription of Chinese names and providing illustrations. 
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Map 1: The geographical location and natural conditions of China 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The dominant geographical feature that determines the history, progress 
and still standing geostrategic considerations of China is the country’s naturally 
isolated position. For a better understanding, let’s take an imaginary trip around 
the borders of China. Due to the fact that most countries of the Indochinese Pen-
insula had been separated from Northeast Asia by dense rainforest-covered 
mountains, communications between the historical states occupying modern-day 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar respectively the Chinese Empire were 
restricted, except for the Ancient Tea Horse Road that fostered regular trading. 
The only, although significant exception was Vietnam, whose coastal location 
made it easily accessible, leading to lively cultural and political interactions with 
China. As an additional point of interest, the above described isolation is also 
identifiable in the languages and, in particular, the writing systems developed 
across Asia. While the Thai, Cambodian and other Southeast Asian writing sys-
tems differed significantly, Vietnam had used Chinese characters until the nine-
teenth-century French colonisation and changed to the Latin alphabet under pres-
sure from Europe.  
Progressing further in a southwesterly direction, the Himalayan mountain 
range, one of the world’s most spectacular natural borders separates China from 
another ancient surviving civilisation: India. The several thousand kilometres 
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long mountain range proved a highly effective barrier; although the Tibetan 
Plateau fell into Chinese hands on multiple occasions, interactions between China 
and India remained relatively limited, in fact, the two giants had not even engaged 
in war against each other until the twentieth century.  
Perhaps even more obvious is the vast distance, and the enormous wilder-
ness that separates China and the West. From the core territory of the empire, i.e. 
modern-day Eastern China the nearest main civilisations that the ancient caravans 
met comprised Europe towards the west and Persia and the Ottoman Empire to-
wards south-east, each one separated from another by vast barren lands stretching 
for thousands of kilometres dotted with deserts and nomadic tribes. The Silk Road 
itself presented several months’ or even a year’s worth of dangerous journeying, 
which makes it hardly surprising that cultural interactions between the Roman 
Empire and the subsequently evolved European and Western Asian states respec-
tively China were rather insignificant.  
The northern borders were made up of Mongolia’ nomadic tribes and the 
East Siberian wastelands, while China’s eastern coastal position had brought iso-
lation until the start of European invasion in the late eighteenth century, thus lim-
iting civilisational impact to the easily accessible territories, such as Korea, Japan 
and the Southeast Asian islands.  
China’s topography is greatly varied; the Tibetan Plateau at an average 
altitude of 4,000 metres above sea level represents the highest topographical 
level. Towards the east the altitude decreases gradually; the next level includes 
the Kunlun Mountains, the Tianshan Mountains and the Yunnan Plateau, fol-
lowed by the Taklamakan Desert, the Gobi Desert and the Sichuan Basin in Cen-
tral and Northwest China, and finally the coastal lowlands that represent the core 
of Chinese civilisation. The vast expanse and the topographical features deter-
mine the climatic conditions as well; projecting the map of China over Europe 
would indicate the northeastern regions of the PRC overlapping the northern 
range of the Ural Mountains, the western Xinjiang autonomous region overlap-
ping Iceland, and Hainan Island in the south overlapping Sicily. Consequently, 
the northern regions of former Manchuria experience Siberian winter climate, 
while the southerly Canton (Guangdong) and Hainan enjoy subtropical condi-
tions. At the same time, the Tibetan Plateau measuring over one million square 
kilometres in the Himalayan range is often termed the Third Pole of the Earth due 
to its ice fields containing the largest reserve of fresh water outside the polar re-
gions. However, as precipitation fails to spread to Central Asia, the regions of 
Qinghai, Xinjiang, Ningxia and Central Mongolia covering in total almost three 
million square kilometres are dry, bare and often desertlike.  
In terms of civilisational development, the three great rivers crossing China 
have been particularly important. The almost 5,500 km long Yellow River 
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(Huanghe) runs in the north, and the 6,380 km long Yangtze (Chang Jiang), the 
third longest river in the world, runs in Central China. The Pearl River (Zhujiang) 
is another extensive river system in southern China. 
Due to the above presented geographical features the territories suitable for 
cultivation are relatively small and concentrated in the east, particularly in the 
plains of Northeast China. At the same time, the western regions are essentially 
uncultivable, thus resulting in highly varied population density figures across 
China. The East-West divide is complemented with a barrier that separates the 
North from the South. Although rice is believed to be the most important staple 
food in China, it is only characteristic in the south, while the northern regions 
mostly rely on cereal crops suited to drier climatic conditions (rye, and more re-
cently wheat). According to certain theories these differences have influenced 
even the mentality of the population. Terraced rice cultivation and irrigation re-
quired significant community effort, fostering collective thinking and a more 
holistic approach in southern China. On the contrary, wheat farming manageable 
by individual families has led to a more individualistic and analytical approach 
characteristic in the north. Naturally, the internal migratory processes in recent 
decades have greatly reduced the differences but, similarly to Europe, the North-
South divide in terms of mentality and lifestyle still survives.  
 
2.1.3. Population 
 
Historically China has been one of the world’s most populated regions. 
Already two thousand years ago it had an estimated population of seventy million 
people, roughly the equivalent of the Roman Empire. Over the next centuries the 
population increased slowly in a wavelike pattern, coming to a period of stagna-
tion during the bloody years of the nineteenth century. When the PRC was 
founded in 1949 it had approximately 500 million inhabitants, but the stabilisa-
tion of food supply led to unprecedented growth. In the mid-1960s the population 
of China reached 700 million inhabitants, and increased further to over one billion 
in 1982, and to approximately 1.4 billion in 2010. The number of inhabitants in 
certain provinces is nowadays comparable to the population of sizeable countries: 
the provinces of Sichuan, Shandong and Canton each hold more inhabitants than 
Germany. The population distribution, similar to agriculture, is extremely une-
ven; 94 percent of the population is concentrated in the east, occupying 45 percent 
of the total area of China. Consequently, it means that, according to Chinese 
standards, the larger western part of the country is virtually uninhabited. The Xin-
jiang Autonomous Region covering over 1.5 million square kilometres holds a 
population of barely more than 20 million people, while the Tibet Autonomous 
Civilisations from East to West 
52 

Region covering 1.2 million square kilometres is home to less than three million 
inhabitants. 
Ethnic heterogeneity is another characteristic feature; in addition to the 
Han Chinese majority there are 55 officially recognised ethnic minority groups 
in China. Many observers who question the sustainability of the Chinese state 
argue that holding together a country of 56 ethnic groups is impossible, although 
they disregard the ratios within the population. Indeed, while the Han Chinese 
majority constitutes 91.5 percent of the population, the remaining 55 ethnic mi-
norities represent a mere 8.5 percent altogether (Figure 4). The majority of 
China’s society is made up of more than 1.2 billion Han Chinese people; at the 
same time Zhuang, the largest ethnic minority comprises barely 16 million indi-
viduals, while the Tibetan community is officially made up of 6 million people. 
China’s ethnic distribution is also uneven. The vast majority of the Han popula-
tion is concentrated in the core territory, i.e. the eastern provinces most suited for 
cultivation with extremely high population density. At the same time, the western 
regions covering 55 percent of China’s total area are virtually uninhabited; the 
Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols and other ethnic groups have very low population 
numbers compared to the size of their traditionally occupied territories.  
 
Figure 4: Buddhist women of the Bai ethnic community at a festival honouring the 
elders, Yunnan province. 
Source: Photograph by JUDIT BAGI 
 
The ethnogenesis of the Han Chinese people began 4‒5,000 years ago, 
assimilating numerous ethnic groups throughout history. The process is still on-
going; due to technological development the standard Chinese language called 
Putonghua is becoming increasingly prominent, gradually reducing the regional 
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differences between Chinese dialects, and assimilating more and more minorities 
into the mainstream society (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: The sacredness of writing. Outdoor calligraphy in Beijing. 
Source: Photograph by JUDIT BAGI 
 
All this is connected with the issue of national identity as well, built pri-
marily not on a classical ethnic but on a wider civilisational-political foundation 
that also includes minorities. It should be noted that the name of the country 
Chung-hua, Zhonghua (Zhongguo) reflects no ethnic identity either, but a per-
ception of the world: the ‘Middle Kingdom’.  
 
2.1.4. Language 
 
Chinese belongs to the Sino-Tibetan languages; the different varieties of 
Chinese are used by the 1.2 billion member Han community. In truth it would be 
more accurate to speak of Chinese languages; according to some linguists the 
differences in verbal communication across the country are so great that it would 
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be more appropriate to identify each version as an individual member of the same 
language family. The Chinese themselves speak of dialects of the common Chi-
nese language, although the differences between the individual dialects are in fact 
comparable to those between the Latin (Romance) languages. The most widely 
used dialect, Mandarin Chinese is spoken by approximately 960 million people, 
based on a northern dialect which has developed into the standard (Putonghua) 
language. Other main varieties include Wu (80 million people) spoken in the 
Shanghai region, along the lower Yangtze River; Min (70 million people) spoken 
in Southeast China; and Yue (60 million people) used in Canton and the southern 
region. It is important to note that the speakers of different dialects (languages) 
do not understand each other easily. The northern Chinese dialects, although sim-
ilar themselves, greatly differ from the southern dialects, while people in South 
China often fail to understand one another. The special characteristic of these so-
called tonal languages is that there are four major tones to differentiate meaning 
according to the way the words are pronounced. Fortunately, a standardised 
system of writing was created during the Qin dynasty to facilitate communication 
among speakers of different dialects across China, which also explains why the 
television programmes are subtitled. We should also mention pinyin, the official 
Romanisation system developed in the 1950s to transcribe Chinese characters 
into Latin script. One of the linguists developing pinyin, Zhou Youguang died in 
January 2017, at the age of 111. Nevertheless, different transcriptions of Chinese 
writing still exist. 
 
2.1.5. Religious beliefs 
 
Chinese religious beliefs rely on three elements: Confucianism, Taoism 
and Buddhism; the first two are the most widespread of Chinese origin.5 Although 
everyday language generally describes them as religions, it would be more 
appropriate to consider each as a school of philosophy, a way of life and govern-
ing, rather than a classical religion in the Western sense. The three main Western 
religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam share identical roots and characteris-
tics, such as monotheism, exclusivism and (except for Judaism) proselytism; the 
Chinese approach, however, is completely different. Firstly, it is not monotheis-
tic; in fact, the Chinese deities are more like Western saints in that they include 
ancestors who once lived, as well as mythological creatures. Secondly, it is not 
exclusivist: a Christian cannot embrace Judaism or Islam at the same time (and 
vice versa); in the Chinese (Eastern) culture, however, there is no distinct dividing 
line between the individual faiths, and many people follow the teachings and 

5 Buddhism is discussed in the chapter dedicated to India. 
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traditions of several ‘religions’ in parallel. Perhaps it reflects Chinese pragmatism 
that is more focused on the possibilities, rather than voluntarily excluding the 
prospects offered by other religious beliefs. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Wheel of Life. Rock carving reflecting Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism 
from Dazu (Sichuan province). 
Source: Photograph by JUDIT BAGI 
 
Western terminology describes this phenomenon as syncretism: contrary 
to the monotheistic and exclusivist Western religions and categorical thinking, 
the Eastern cultures make way for a combination of different beliefs. Therefore, 
the Eastern cultures are considered intellectually tolerant in so far as they are able 
to adapt various intellectual disciplines.  
This, however, makes the statistics rather complicated, as the number of 
followers of each faith can only be estimated. The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that the PRC officially recognises only five religions: Buddhism, 
Taoism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism (not the Roman Catholic Church 
but the Chinese), while Confucianism has been unofficially re-recognised since 
the dawn of the twenty-first century (Figure 6). Folk religion should also be men-
tioned; according to surveys the majority of the population follow some sort of 
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folk religion (possibly combined with Taoism), while 10‒15% of the population 
is Buddhist, 2‒4% Christian and 1‒2% Muslim.  
 
Taoism 
 
The identity of Lao-Tze (Laozi, sixth century BCE) is uncertain: although 
regarded as the founder of Taoism, his existence and even his name remain a 
matter of debate. According to tradition he was an official at the imperial archives 
who, after leaving the court and travelling for a while, wrote his still influential 
Tao Te Ching (Dao De Jing), ‘The Book of The Way and its Virtue’ considered 
as the main source of Taoism. Lao-Tze’s work described his view of the universe 
in an easily understandable form. Tao (Dao) is a cosmic force behind the work-
ings of the universe that moves spontaneously. According to Lao-Tze, the wise 
man strives to attain naturalness, a state of emptiness through wu wei, which 
means ‘inaction’ or ‘effortless action’. The book depicts an idealised patriarchal 
society spiritually guided by the ‘wise man’. The Tao is not a creation: it is every-
thing and nothing, imperceptible to the senses, yet a perpetual inexhaustible force. 
The Tao exists beyond space and time; the Tao is eternal and absolute and gives 
birth to all beings. (Should the above seem familiar from modern pop culture, it 
is no mere coincidence: Star Wars is believed to have relied on Taoism a great 
deal for describing the ‘Force’.)  
Taoism teaches that everything in this world is relative, or even illusory, 
and asks the question why we burden ourselves with problems and social commit-
ments. At the same time, Taoism provided metaphysical foundation for some 
more practical schools of philosophy, such as Legalism (Fajia). As the name sug-
gests, Legalism is focused on law, i.e. a social order based on rules and laws.  
Chinese legal theory is fundamentally determined by Confucianism and 
Legalism, a key element of which is morality, i.e. the traditional Chinese 
approach that merges social and legal norms. Law and morality were seen as 
inseparable, similarly to the unity of judicial and administrative forces; it is hardly 
surprising that, as a still surviving authoritarian practice, disputes between the 
citizens and the state generally ended in favour of the latter. Chinese people 
developed no confidence in law and legal order, and there was not a legal institu-
tion in which to trust in case their rights were being eroded. It is noticeable that 
the Middle Kingdom had no room for the separation of powers, and the legal 
system was dominated by punishing laws of subordinating nature. In the turbulent 
years of the fourth century BCE the state lost its ability to maintain social order 
relying on former administrative practices and required new principles suited to 
the situation, capable to adapt to the changing conditions. Eventually, this led to 
the adoption of laws. 
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The Legalists came from various schools of philosophy, including Taoism. 
Legalism spread mostly in the third and fourth centuries BCE, initially opposed to 
Confucianism which, at that time, contrasted theory with practice. To the follow-
ers of Confucianism, the proven principles of customary law and morality repre-
sented norm; the Legalists unconditionally believed that law determined behav-
iour. According to Legalist doctrines the law should change with the passing of 
time, in fact, no rules should remain unchanged permanently, but should adapt to 
the particular age. When laws fail to conform, yet remain unchanged, it leads to 
chaos. This should be avoided all the more because the moral foundation of law 
is granted through effectiveness, i.e. the ability to ensure appropriate regulation 
and, consequently, satisfactory outcome. 
 
Confucianism 
 
Another main school of Chinese philosophy is associated with Confucius 
(also known as Kong Qui, Kongzi, or Kong Fuzi, 551‒479 BCE). Nowadays Con-
fucianism is viewed as a religion, although not in the traditional Western sense. 
According to Confucius, changing the family and the individual is a precondition 
for reforming public matters. Moreover, in order to revive social conventions and 
behavioural rules already emptied of meaning, the rulers themselves must behave 
in an exemplary manner.  
In Confucius’s view, a ruler must set an example to inspire people, and that 
makes even governing much easier. On the contrary, inappropriate behaviour dis-
played by a ruler eventually leads to disobedience. This fundamental political 
approach is seen as a still influential universal teaching, which appears to be 
upheld by the leaders of the PRC as well punishing inappropriate behaviour that 
reflects negatively on government (e.g. corruption) by the force of law.  
In the subsequent Han period criticism of administrative ruling was 
replaced by the idea of unassailability. The Confucian worldview originally based 
on humanism turned into an ideological foundation for Chinese bureaucracy with 
significant influence on the country. Chinese perception suggests close relation-
ship between human being and community, and direct links between human 
microcosm and universe, respectively mortal macrocosm and deity. It also leads 
to a vision of society otherwise typical in Eastern Asia, i.e. that the individual’s 
role and interests are subordinate to those of the community (Figure 7). This dis-
tinctive feature, very much unlike the Western egocentric society, fundamentally 
affects Chinese politics in both interior and foreign affairs and provides the philo-
sophical grounds for China’s prevailing effective system. In fact, it even supports 
the argument that Western democracy in this part of the world would be infea-
sible: it would fail to solve China’s problems, and it would not prevent bureau-
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cratic or business abuse and would not protect the interests of ordinary people. 
Consequently, it would be downright counterproductive and could easily desta-
bilise the country ‒ at least in the opinion of the Chinese leaders.
 
 
Figure 7: Ancestral Temple, Tengchong, Yunnan province.  
Source: Photograph by JUDIT BAGI 
 
The forerunner of Legalism 
 
In addition to Confucianism and Legalism, there was also a third approach 
associated with Kuan Chung (also known as Guan Zhong, 720‒645 BCE): the 
theory of balancing the light and the heavy. This approach aimed to administer 
government through economic activity, clearly ranking matters in an order of 
importance (urgency) to improve the effectiveness of problem solving. Similar to 
the Legalists, Kuan Chung’s focus in interstate relations was placed on common 
interest, though unlike the former, he put economic power before law in state 
administration matters. The law’s effectiveness arises not from itself, but from 
the economic environment in which it emerged. A ruler is only able to govern 
state matters if economic control is maintained simultaneously. While Confucian-
ism is focused on morality, Kuan Chung’s teaching suggests that morality arises 
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‘merely’ out of economic interest. He regards economy to be superior in interstate 
relations as well, recognising that conflicts are generally won by the party with 
economic superiority. Therefore, economic power is a key element, and state 
power can be best measured by the extent of wealth, and the speed with which it 
can be mobilised in war.  
 
2.1.6. The history of China and its effect on international relations 
 
This chapter aims to summarise the major milestones of China’s almost 
five-thousand-year-old history. Modern-day China regards the current world 
order to be fundamentally different from the ‘conventional’ world order experi-
enced in the past millennia. During the Empire most of the known world was, on 
the whole, united by a single ruler, and as the wars mainly erupted for imperial 
power, they should be viewed as internal rather than actual international conflicts. 
Prior to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries China had undoubtedly been the 
ultimate economic and cultural power in Asia.  
Despite the numerous external threats faced throughout its long history, the 
sheer size and population of the Middle Kingdom led to the eventual assimilation 
of the invaders into Chinese culture. As a result, the concept of sovereign equal 
states seemed unnatural to China; outsiders were merely viewed as barbarians, 
and the deployment of foreign envoys seemed an unnecessary effort. It was true 
even though China dispatched envoys via the Silk Road from time to time. The 
system and mechanism of European balance of power had been unknown to 
China until Western invasion which ended in loss and humiliation. Our aim by 
outlining the major events and periods of Chinese history is to put into context 
China’s strategic and foreign policy approach. Naturally, providing a full picture 
is beyond the scope of this study; for this reason, the key episodes of Chinese 
history and civilisation still influencing foreign policy behaviour will be high-
lighted. 
The territory of modern-day China has been inhabited since prehistoric 
times; Homo erectus, known as Peking man from fossils discovered in 1965, 
appeared in Northern China over one million years ago. Some archaeological 
finds suggest use of fire as early as 1.2 million years ago. 
Similar to other ancient civilisations, the first cultures in the territory of 
China primarily evolved in the valleys of the Yellow River and the Yangtze 
River, as well as in the coastal regions around 8000 BCE. The earliest evidence of 
agricultural activity originates from the eighth millennium BCE, i.e. the Neolithic 
era; later on, a cultural centre emerged in the Yellow River valley, with the 
establishment of the first permanent settlements. The Chinese civilisation is 
unique for its long history of literacy. The ancient characters carved into rock in 
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Ningxia probably date back to 5000‒6000 BCE, but they only vaguely resemble 
the characters recognised as the earliest authentic Chinese writing. The turtle 
shells with inscribed characters viewed as genuine evidence of Chinese literacy 
originate from 2000‒1500 BCE, and therefore are at least 3500‒4000 years old. 
Even more surprising is the fact that the shape and meaning of some characters 
have not or only minimally changed over the past millennia. 
The Mythical Period of China associated with the emergence of literacy 
comprises the rule of the Three Sovereigns (2800‒2737 BCE) and the Five 
(Mythical) Emperors (2737‒2698 BCE) revered as demigods in later years, and 
still recognised among the ancient ‘deities’ of China (in truth we cannot speak of 
Chinese gods; see the chapter on religion). The Yellow Emperor, one of the 
legendary Chinese sovereigns, is still looked upon as the creator and ancestor of 
the Chinese civilisation and people, though his actual existence has been scien-
tifically debated. He was in all probability a culture hero, taking shape centuries 
later in historical writings.  
 
2.1.7. The age of dynasties 
 
The sequence of dynasties is a primary point of reference in China’s his-
tory. Chinese people dominantly view history in terms of dynastic cycles and the 
periodicity of order and chaos. In crudely simplified terms we can say that the 
European approach to history is lineal with perpetual progress; by contrast, the 
Chinese (Eastern) perspective is more focused on periodicity and repetitive cy-
cles. What is more, each phase of the cycle is associated with a different social 
situation, as the birth, rise, glory and fall of a dynasty naturally influences the 
everyday lives of contemporary people, as well as the future of their children. The 
rise and fall of China’s historical dynasties could be illustrated by a sine wave; 
for the ordinary people upward movement and positive peaks represented good 
times, stability and prosperity, while downward movement inevitably brought 
difficulty and starvation, and eventually war and internal conflict. The founder of 
each new dynasty, usually a talented low-ranking military leader who rose and 
solidified his power, put an end to internal conflict, chaos and division and 
became historically viewed as a great ruler (although contemporaries generally 
regarded him as a powerful autocratic monarch who ruled by blood and steel to 
ensure unity in the country). 
However, with the passing of decades and centuries his descendants grew 
less interested in state matters giving rise to court machination, intrigue, increas-
ing corruption and economic difficulties, aggravated from time to time by natural 
disasters, climate change and the invasion of nomadic tribes. Towards the end, in 
the final phase, the dynasty lost legitimacy and ‘Mandate of Heaven’ to rule the 
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country due to internal or external challenges. Eventually the fallen monarch 
became replaced by a new powerful leader who gained ‘Mandate of Heaven’. It 
is important to note that the interim periods generally comprised domestic con-
flicts, division and disintegration, typically with major losses in population and 
wealth, which explains why Chinese people attach so much importance to ruling 
dynasties and stability, and worry about changes in leadership and regime. 
 
Xia dynasty (from ca. 2200 to 1600 BCE)  
 
The existence of the first mythical dynasty (Xia) has not been entirely 
proven (Map 2); the written sources from subsequent centuries describe it as an 
outstanding example of government and public administration. Indeed, it cannot 
be excluded that the stories describing the Xia dynasty were intended as mere 
parables. However, some archaeological finds discovered in Henan province can 
be associated with this period, necessitating further research in the matter. Mean-
while in Europe the Minoan civilisation of Crete flourished between the twenty-
seventh and fifteenth centuries BCE. 
 
Map 2: Assumed location of the first mythical dynasty 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA  
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Shang dynasty (from 1600 to 1046 BCE) 
 
The earliest records of Chinese writing from Bronze Age Shang dynasty 
include carved oracle bones; later on, a fully evolved system appeared with char-
acters inscribed into bronze, pottery, jade and stone. The last monarch of the 
Shang dynasty killed himself after his army’s defeat at the hands of Zhou. Mean-
while in Europe Mycenae became a cultural centre during the period 1600‒1000 
BCE. 
 
Zhou dynasty (from 1046 to 221 BCE)6 
 
Zhou was the longest reigning dynasty with a semi-feudal system whose 
kings introduced the concept ‘Mandate of Heaven’ to legitimise their power. 
Chinese history distinguishes two periods within the Zhou era. The dynastic kings 
of the first period built their capital in the Wei (Weihe) River valley (Western 
Zhou, from the eleventh century BCE to 771 BCE). The following period (Eastern 
Zhou) began by moving the capital to Chengzhou and ended with the defeat of 
the Zhou in 256 BCE by Jin forces. The period before 221 BCE, i.e. the unification 
of China is known as the Warring States period (Zhangou) due to permanent wars. 
The beginning of the Warring States period is estimated at 451 BCE, the division 
of the Jin state, alternatively at 403 BCE, the year when the partition of Jin and 
the resulting three states (Han, Wei and Zhao) were officially recognised by 
Zhou. The Chinese ‘feudal’ system shows unique characteristics based on close 
ties that led to the political institutions’ dependence on ancestor worship and the 
aggregation of military and religious functions. Thus, the system remained 
closely tied to the archaic monarchy from which it had evolved. It should be 
noted, however, that the term ‘feudal’ in relation to ancient China has lost its 
original meaning due to regular incorrect use. It seems therefore more appropriate 
to disregard the term altogether and describe this era through its unique institu-
tions and political and social systems which, in the long history of China, largely 
resembled European society defined by Western historians as feudal. The 
Chinese ‘feudalism’ was based on land tenure hierarchy and ancestor worship. 
The entire system was focused on the king’s landholding and veneration of the 
Zhou ancestors. The king bore the title Tianzi (Son of Heaven) with power re-
ceived from Shangdi (Highest God), and therefore was the only one to offer sac-
rifice to the supreme deity. 

6 This chapter heavily relies on Jacques Gernet’s fundamental work, A History of 
Chinese Civilisation (GERNET, J. 2005) 
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Land expansion was the result of a ‘swarming’ process. The system of land 
distribution allowed the noble families to exercise religious and military powers 
in their respective domains. As such, royal power virtually manifested itself in 
the extended hierarchy of families and landholdings. The system was held 
together by ancestor worship. The heads of the noble families from the so-called 
great lines were lineal descendants of the founding ancestor worshipped through 
generations. Starting from at least the end of the Shang era, the tradition whereby 
the firstborn son of the principal wife inherited all duties and religious privileges 
was upheld by every noble family. This is why the role of principal wife and 
patrilineal primogeniture was so important. 
The states were structured identically to the royal court: the ruler was 
served by senior officials (daifu) and ministers (qing). The heads of families from 
the highest nobility held functions that sooner or later became hereditary. The 
lesser nobles (shi) served under the ministers and senior officials in the hierarchy. 
Their main duty was to man the war chariots; the infantry was made up of 
peasants (tu) who also farmed the lands the produce of which was taken by the 
nobility. 
The structure of the army was modelled on the administrative and family 
hierarchy; the influential members of the royal court, including the noblemen, 
senior officials and heads of states were required to set up troops of chariots and 
infantry and go to war as commanded by their superiors.  
In the Shang era the cult of kings after their death and the authority of royal 
descendants deeply influenced the then social and political systems. After that a 
much more complex and less stable system evolved, essentially limiting the 
king’s power to an arbitratorial role. Although the functions and privileges 
granted by the king were in principle revocable, the advances of the states and 
the elite families caused these functions and privileges to become hereditary.   
This process further accelerated due to attacks from the Shaanxi province 
and the diminishing size of the king’s landholding from the first half of the eighth 
century BCE. The closest ally of the Zhou kings during the relocation of the 
capital, though only temporarily, was the Zheng state; then some more powerful 
states, such as the Song, Wei, Lu, Cao, Chen, Cai and others also emerged in the 
plains region. In the eighth century BCE dozens of similar small states existed 
alongside numerous smaller cities. This intricate system of more or less powerful 
states was dominated not by the former religious and military autonomy of the 
king, but by ritual ceremony and ancestral knowledge. The relationships of these 
states alternated between alliance and rivalry due to wars, vendettas, marital alli-
ances, pacts and the exchange of goods and services. The Zhou era occurred 
simultaneously with the founding of Rome (753 BCE), the Peloponnesian War 
(431‒404 BCE) and the reign of Alexander the Great (356‒323 BCE). 
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Decline of the monarchy 
The Spring and Autumn period (Chunqiu) saw intensifying conflicts be-
tween the ancient cities and the ‘central states’ of the Chinese plains (Jin, Qi and 
Chu) on the one hand, and the increasingly powerful outlying states on the other 
hand. The attacks from Northern China began in the eighth century BCE and 
intensified toward the middle of the seventh century BCE. The external threats 
encouraged the rulers of Jin and Qi to form an alliance mainly to protect the 
borders of China from external attacks. At the same time, these alliances fostered 
the hegemonic aspirations of the major states. The Hegemony of Qi was declared 
in 651 BCE. The ruler of Jin became the next hegemon. However, from the early 
sixth century BCE the nature and purposes of the hegemonies changed following 
the defeat of the Jin army at the hands of King Zhuang of Chu in 597 BCE. From 
that point on the more powerful states put pressure on the weaker ones, and this 
new political situation was sealed with forced loyalty and oaths of allegiance.  
With the emergence of major political formations within China the charac-
teristics of the interstate conflicts changed too. The former family feuds fought 
with weapons became replaced by wars among the allied yet rival states. Never-
theless, these warring states shared more or less similar cultural background and 
traditions. The southeasterly civilisational expansions led to the formation of two 
new states: Wu and Yue. With the coastal Yue and the riverside Wu gaining 
power, the western neighbour Chu began to decline in the early sixth century BCE. 
All this led to growing military focus within the states, naturally transforming 
social structures and, eventually, pushing them into crisis. The signs of crisis 
within the elite society began to intensify from 600 BCE. The institutions devel-
oped in the sixth century BCE aimed to foster the power and independence of the 
individual states: tax was imposed on agriculture, as well as the obligation of the 
nobility to provide weapons and cereal in contribution to war, instead of man-
power.  
The conflicts among the states escalated from the early fifth century BCE. 
The heads of three powerful noble families called Mengsun, Shusun and Jisun 
took power in Lu state, western Shandong province. The Jin state saw conflicts 
among six elite families in charge of three armies. The fights ended with the 
defeat and partition of Jin in 453 BCE. This led to the emergence of three inde-
pendent political formations under the Han, Wei and Zhao families in the territory 
of the former Jin. The ruling Qi family was finally overthrown by Tian in 386 
BCE. The above described conflicts and power struggles escalated into the War-
ring States period, which inevitably led to the founding of a centralised state, the 
Empire. 
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Warring States period (from fifth century BCE to 221 BCE)  
The Warring States period was a particularly significant era in China’s 
history with the formation of seven major states in the dynastic territory of the 
weakened Zhou, whose ruler had merely a symbolic role at that time (Map 3). 
The prolonged fight for ultimate power represents the last period in Chinese 
history that is comparable to European history: wars waged by several similarly 
powerful states against each other.  
 
Map 3: Chinese territories from the fifth century BCE to 221 BCE 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The wars lasting several centuries finally ended with the strengthening and 
subsequent territorial expansion of the Qin state. Having been reformed and re-
organised, the Qin state achieved its first major military success by defeating the 
northern nomads in 314 BCE, followed by the invasion of Shu, a state in Chengdu 
basin, Sichuan province in 311 BCE and  the occupation of further territories in 
Ba, a state in the northern Sichuan Mountains populated by non-Chinese tribes. 
The invasion of the upper Han River valley led to expansion at the expense of 
Chu in Hubei province in 278‒277 BCE. After that further campaigns were 
launched against the eastern neighbours: Han, Wei and Zhao. The Qin armies 
pushed forward to Handan, the Zhao capital situated in the southeast corner of 
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Hebei province, but were forced to give up on siege in 257 BCE. Finally, the 
occupation of Eastern Zhao, Henan province in 249 BCE brought an end to the 
prestigious Zhao family. 
 
Qin dynasty (from 221 to 206 BCE)  
 
Despite its short reign, the Qin dynasty (Map 4) fundamentally influenced 
China’s history and culture. King Zheng of Qin (259‒210 BCE), who came to 
power in 247 BCE united China through war and established the first Chinese 
empire. A decade of fighting destroyed Han (230 BCE), Zhao (228 BCE), Wei (225 
BCE), Chu (223 BCE), Yan (222 BCE) and Qi (221 BCE). Having completed the 
unification of China in 221 BCE, he assumed the title of Huangdi (His Highness), 
which later on became the traditional name for Chinese emperors. Historically, 
however, he is recognised by the name Shi Huangdi (First Emperor). The 
unification extended beyond the regions inhabited by Han Chinese people and 
reached as far as the South China Sea. More importantly, however, the First 
Emperor standardised Chinese writing (making written Chinese universally 
understood despite its various dialects), introduced standardised units of 
measurement, currency and legal system, oversaw the development of China’s 
imperial road network and the construction of the Great Wall, and became an 
absolute monarch. Meanwhile, he abolished feudalism and introduced a modern 
system of public administration. The First Emperor is particularly remembered 
for his monumental tomb discovered in 1974 containing approximately six 
thousand life-size terracotta warriors (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: The Terracotta Army near the city of Xi’an.  
Source: Photograph by JUDIT BAGI 
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The reign of the First Emperor occurred simultaneously with the Second 
Punic War, when the Carthaginian army led by Hannibal crossed the Alps march-
ing overland from Iberia and attacked the Roman Republic in 218 BCE. 
 
Map 4: China at the end of the third century BCE 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
Han dynasty (from 202 BCE to 220 CE) 
 
The short but influential period of the Qin dynasty was followed by the 
Han era, whose rulers ended the power of local warlords, elevated Confucianism 
to state level, divided the empire into provinces and secured the borders from the 
attacks of the Xiongnu tribes (Asian Huns; some Chinese believe them to be the 
ancestors of Hungarian people, hence the Chinese name of Hungary is Xiongyali) 
(Figure 9). In public administration a civil service examination system was intro-
duced. The importance of the dynasty is signified by the fact that the majority of 
modern-day Chinese society still regard themselves to be Han. Meanwhile, 
Europe saw the fall of the Roman Republic and the rise of the mighty Roman 
Empire. Christianity was born, and Emperor Caracalla reigned toward the end of 
the Han era.  
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Figure 9: The construction of the Great Wall began during the Han dynasty. 
Source: Photograph by ERIKA TÓTH 

The Three Kingdoms (from 220 to 280) 
 
The collapse of the Han dynasty was followed by the period of the Three 
Kingdoms. The three states: Wei in the north, Wu in the south and Shu in the west 
engaged in permanent wars against each other. This relatively short but chaotic 
era deeply influenced China’s historical perspective; the disintegration of the 
country has ever since been associated with turmoil and devastation. Chinese cul-
ture has also been impacted by this period: the Records of the Three Kingdoms 
was written by Chen Shou in the third century (233‒297), the Romance of the 
Three Kingdoms was written a millennium later by Luo Guanzhong (1330‒
1400), and Red Cliff, an epic war film was made in 2008 by director John Woo 
based on the most famous battle of the period and the fall of the warlord Cao Cao 
(155‒220). 
 
Tang dynasty (from 618 to 907) 
 
The Tang dynasty extended the borders of the empire to protect the core 
territories, thus captured parts of the Silk Road towards the west and conquered 
the Korean Peninsula and Northern Vietnam. However, the Islamic expansion in 
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the eighth century led to serial defeats and reduced China’s influence in Central 
Asia.  
 
Figure 10: Inscribed stone tablets at Yunju Temple, near Beijing. 
Source: Photograph by JUDIT BAGI 
 
The numerous technological developments of the Tang era include the dis-
covery of gunpowder, porcelain and an early version of printing (Figure 10). 
Meanwhile, Europe experienced the turbulent centuries of the Middle Ages: 
while the plague had destroyed half of its population by the sixth century and the 
Muslim army set out to conquer Iberia, revival was brought by the reign of 
Charles the Great (742‒814). 
 
Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (from 907 to 960) 
 
Similar to the period of the Three Kingdoms, China experienced another 
short but turbulent episode of its history after the fall of the Tang dynasty. 
Although the north of the country remained under imperial rule, five dynasties 
succeeded one another in a matter of decades, while Southern China was split 
into a dozen states (including ten major ones). All this led to anarchy, corruption, 
starvation and constant military conflicts which fostered desire for unity in the 
country yet again (Map 5). 
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Map 5: Chinese states in the first half of the tenth century 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
Song dynasty (from 960 to 1279) 
 
The chaotic period of the Five Dynasties ended with a coup led by Zhao 
Kuangyin (927‒976), a military commander who became emperor and changed 
the name of the country to Song aiming to unify the whole of China. He only 
succeeded in part and only for a limited period; the Jurchens invading from the 
north ended the unity of Song in 1127 and extended their power over Northern 
China under the name Jin. Southern Song survived until the Mongol conquest in 
1279. The Song dynasty, although less powerful and stable, represents a glorious 
period of medieval Chinese culture (Figure 11).  
The Song era saw the establishment of China’s first navy and various in-
ventions such as the compass and the military use of gunpowder. The develop-
ment of Chinese society, art, literature and printing were also characteristic of 
this period. 
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Figure 11: Folk play performed in Kunming, Yunnan province. 
Source: Photograph by JUDIT BAGI 
 
Yuan dynasty (1271‒1368) 
 
The Chinese approach to international relations could be perceived through 
the history of the Yuan dynasty (Map 6). Although Chinese people are generally 
proud of this period due to the sheer size of the empire and the invention of paper 
currency and other technological accomplishments, the Yuan dynasty was in fact 
the result of Mongol invasion. It took several decades for the Mongol armies led 
by Kublai Khan to invade the whole country; realising the difference in the size 
of the population, i.e. between the almost eighty million mostly peaceful settled 
Chinese people and the few hundred thousand Mongol warriors, the Great Khan 
introduced numerous reforms to placate the Chinese and established Dadu, the 
‘great capital’, what is now Beijing.  Mingling between the conquerors and the 
Chinese was initially forbidden, but it could not last long; due to the size and 
cultural superiority of the local population the invaders became finally absorbed 
and assimilated, and the Yuan emperors gradually turned Chinese in every aspect. 
This phenomenon repeated itself numerous times throughout history: the foreign 
enemy China was unable to subdue in battle sooner or later became absorbed and 
assimilated. This, however, failed to work on the European invaders at the end of 
the eighteenth century. 
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Map 6: China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
Eventually the Mongol Empire penetrated European territories as well, and 
Batu Khan’s armies pushed as far as Hungary and Poland in the thirteenth cen-
tury. The Black Death occurred towards the end of the Yuan era and wiped out 
half of Europe’s population.  
 
The Ming dynasty and Admiral Zheng He (1371‒1433) 
 
The Ming dynasty (1368‒1644) represents an outstanding period in Chi-
nese history when the technological, economic, social and cultural advancement 
of the Middle Kingdom achieved superiority over contemporary Europe. The 
economic and domestic political challenges faced by the Yuan dynasty led to re-
bellions across the country; Zhu Yuanzhang (1328‒1398), a peasant turned into 
military leader gained control over the southern regions, then pushed towards the 
north and brought an end to the Yuan reign of Mongolian origin. Zhu declared 
himself Emperor, established the Ming dynasty in 1368 and set up its capital in 
Nanjing. He gradually strengthened his power in the Han periphery regions, 
crushed the ethnic rebellions of South-Southwest China and demolished the 
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remaining Mongolian forces in the northern region of Manchuria. His successor 
relocated the capital to what is now Beijing and built a new settlement in the years 
from 1407 to 1420 centred around the imperial palace complex, the Forbidden 
City. A recurring element of the studies written on China is the global superiority 
of the empire over the past two thousand years and its civilisational and techno-
logical advancement in comparison to Europe in the centuries following the col-
lapse of the Roman Empire. So, the question is: why did not China become a 
world superpower? Due to the colonisation process starting in the 1600s there 
was hardly any part of the world not controlled by Europe in the early twentieth 
century. There are several explanations on the matter, and each one of them is 
likely to have influenced the course of world history. Although the theories based 
on geographical determinism rather simplify the picture, comparing China with 
Europe may lead to some interesting conclusions. An obvious difference is that 
while the core territory of China constitutes a vast homogenous, almost continen-
tal region (i.e. the eastern‒north-eastern plains suitable for cultivation and the 
southern region with the greatest concentration of population), Europe is rather 
varied geographically. Think of Africa: although it is three time larger than 
Europe, its coastline is actually shorter. The territory of Europe is divided by 
many seas forming peninsulas and islands, as well as mountain ranges such as the 
Pyrenees, the Alps, the Carpathian Mountains and the Scandinavian Mountains. 
This might have contributed to the fact that Europe has never been organised into 
a single state despite the efforts of numerous military leaders, monarchs and dic-
tators in recent centuries; in fact, the last permanently successful attempt in this 
regard was that of the Roman Empire. The geographical and topographical bor-
ders contributed to the formation of independent nation states and hindered large 
scale conquests. The map of modern-day Europe shows that most of its geograph-
ical units represent individual countries, and this structure led to permanent inter-
state conflicts and wars in an era when land and territory were viewed as the 
major source of state power and wealth. For the European monarchies the only 
way to expand territory was to engage in zero-sum machinations at the expense 
of one another; according to some estimates there was not a single peaceful year 
in Europe in the four and a half centuries between 1500 and 1945. War is also 
viewed as a contest fought with ultimate weapons resulting in technological de-
velopment in military as well as in any other aspects. In terms of international 
order, it led to the evolution of the Westphalian system and the concept of state 
sovereignty, a European invention which spread in the world as a result of colo-
nisation and globalisation, or else by use of force.  
Meanwhile, China’s perception of world order was completely different; 
since its unification in 221 BCE China had not seen an international system com-
prised of similarly powerful entities opposed to one another. Remember China’s 
Civilisations from East to West 
74 

geographical isolation and its core territory consisting of easily unifiable larger 
plains. Thus, China experienced no challenges posed by foreign enemies (or else 
assimilated them) and required no new territories to support its population. Ac-
cording to the theoretical aspect of the explanation, China had no equal competi-
tors and thus viewed the world as a set of concentric circles, the centre point 
representing the Emperor surrounded by the court, the capital and imperial terri-
tories. This mentality is also reflected by the name of the country, which is com-
pletely different in Chinese than in any other languages: Zhongguo, or Middle 
Kingdom. Theoretically it implies that the territories actually situated outside the 
borders of China also belong to the Empire. This concept is called tianxia, which 
means that the entire world ‘under heaven’ formed part of the Empire, but the 
people living outside the actual borders were less advanced and thus not worthy 
to share Chinese wealth, culture and standard of living. This concept fundamen-
tally influenced the Chinese world view which, contrary to Europe and the West-
phalian system, regards the world not as a liberal community of sovereign equal 
nation states, but as a set of concentric circles. The centre of this world represents 
China, surrounded by hierarchical circles made up of periphery states, that is the 
tributary system. 
All this probably contributed to the fact that the imperial fleet of 317 enor-
mous vessels commanded by Admiral Zheng He set out from South China in 
1405, almost 90 years before Columbus carrying 28,000 crewmen towards South-
east Asia, India and perhaps as far as East Africa, and returned without conquer-
ing any of them. The purpose of the altogether seven expeditions lasting until the 
1430s was merely to inform the local population of the Emperor’s message re-
garding the future collection of symbolic taxes or tributes. China’s subsequent 
rulers strongly believed in imperial superiority and regarded the fleet unnecessary 
as the ‘barbarians’ had nothing to offer to the mighty Empire, while the threat of 
another northern Mongol invasion was imminent. According to Angus Deaton, 
Nobel laureate in economics, the imperial court viewed these expeditions and the 
resulting increase in maritime trade and merchant prosperity with jealousy, and 
eventually put an end to exploration, in fact, attempted to erase all documented 
memory as an outstanding example of protectionism, machination and intrigue. 
This decision was guided by faith in the mighty Empire and determined China’s 
fate for the next five hundred years. While China chose voluntary isolation, 
Europe’s technological advancement and situation necessitated the start of colo-
nisation, leading to European economic and military superiority over China in the 
coming centuries. The bitter awakening came in the nineteenth century, bringing 
a hundred years of humiliation, devastation, death and partial colonisation for 
China. 
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The Ming era was concurrent with the start of European colonisation and 
the early phase of industrial revolution. The age of Reformation and Renaissance 
significantly contributed to the greatness of Europe and the evolution of global 
trade and world order. Further points of reference include the work of Machiavelli 
and the expansion of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Qing dynasty (1644/6‒1911) 
 
The last Chinese imperial dynasty came to power as a result of the northern 
Manchu invasion, after defeating the Ming dynasty (Map 7). The ruling Qing 
elite, invariably assimilated into Chinese society, extended its power over current 
day Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia and some parts of South Siberia. China’s failing 
dynastic power in the mid-1800s as a result of internal processes coincided with 
the arrival of the European (and subsequent American and Japanese) invaders. In 
economic terms this weakening process was mainly attributable to the so-called 
high-level equilibrium trap. According to the theory developed by historian Mark 
Elvin, in spite of China’s centuries long economic and social superiority over 
Europe it never underwent an indigenous industrial revolution, as the Chinese 
economy had reached an equilibrium point where supply and demand were well-
balanced within the empire due to its highly efficient systems.   
 
Map 7: The territory of China during the last dynasty 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA  
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Thanks to the enormous size of China’s economy and its highly developed 
road and canal networks local shortages could be easily balanced with surpluses 
produced elsewhere. At the same time, labour was very cheap; farming had been 
extended to all cultivable territories by the seventeenth century which, consider-
ing the sheer size of China, was sufficient to supply the steadily growing popula-
tion, and as agriculture was unable to absorb more workers, the increased supply 
of labour at repressed wages. Due to the combination of these factors investment 
in capital to improve technology and efficiency would not have been profitable. 
In Elvin’s view a philosophical change at the time also contributed to the situa-
tion, including a shift from Taoism and interest in natural sciences and the natural 
world to Confucianism focused on social philosophy and morality. This trans-
formed intellectual environment failed to promote technological development. In 
addition, the wealthy merchants exercised control over state officials, and made 
them change laws for their own benefit with the result that the actual producers 
were left with no accumulated profit, and thus had no capital to improve technol-
ogy and efficiency. Moreover, we should recall the already described geograph-
ical features, and the fact that China had no opponent on a similar scale to pose 
challenge and competition for several millennia. In other words, high-level equi-
librium trap means the kind of situation where relative welfare, lack of competi-
tion and protectionist measures by a selfish elite prevented further progress and 
improvement. Stopping Zheng He’s expeditions inflicted similar damage on 
China.   
The above processes happened to take place at the worst possible time; no 
matter how far from Europe, the Western powers eventually reached the shores 
of China and set out to partially colonise the Heavenly Kingdom. 
In 1793 Lord Macartney, the envoy appointed by King George III ap-
proached the imperial court in Beijing in order to open new ports for British trade, 
relax trade restrictions, establish a permanent embassy and obtain a small island 
for British use off the coast of China. The Canton system gradually developed in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries controlled Western trade through thir-
teen appointed factories until 1757, when Emperor Qianlong (1711‒1799) intro-
duced trade restrictions out of concern for changes in Chinese society as a result 
of foreign influence. The Chinese subjects were not permitted to teach the Chi-
nese language to foreigners, and European traders were forbidden to bring women 
into China. Frustration with the system increased, along with a growing deficit in 
balance of trade; in exchange for tea, porcelain and silk the British had to make 
payment in silver. Finally, the traders convinced the king to send a mission led 
by George Macartney to Beijing. The journey lasted almost a year, and the huge 
differences between Chinese and Western thinking became apparent already in 
ceremonial matters. While the imperial court considered Macartney’s mission as 
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a tributary visit, the British viewed it as an exchange between two sovereign and 
therefore equal monarchs. The Emperor expected Macartney to perform the kow-
tow (koutou), a ceremonial greeting (made by an inferior by kneeling and touch-
ing his head to the ground nine times to show respect), which shocked the British. 
After lengthy debate the Emperor graciously conceded to Macartney perform the 
act only once instead of nine times; however, the British suggested that a high-
ranking Chinese official did the same before the portrait of King George. The 
idea was unthinkable: no one could equal the Son of Heaven. The Emperor was 
about to cancel the meeting, but eventually agreed that Macartney greet him the 
British way by getting down on one knee. Eventually, the letter from King George 
was delivered with the British requests, but like his predecessors, Emperor 
Qianlong saw no benefit in trading with the barbarians, despised the products of 
British industry provided as gifts and rejected the idea of opening an embassy. 
Instead of deliberating the requests, the Emperor sent a message demanding the 
British monarch to kneel before the Son of Heaven in Beijing. The humiliated 
delegation returned to England without achieving anything; the war with Napo-
leon in the following years left no room for worries about China.  
With Europe’s stability restored, however, the Western powers turned their 
attention to the East once more. Although China was much farther than India, its 
precious goods including tea, porcelain, silk and spices made it a highly attractive 
target. Eventually the Chinese facilitated trade with the West through a number 
of ports, but the situation turned out to be rather one-sided. The Europeans pur-
chased a great deal of luxury items, with hardly anything passed the other way 
round ‒ a bit like today. This led to significant deficit in the British balance of 
trade, and the increased use of silver accepted in payment caused financial diffi-
culties. Assessing the situation, the British decided to introduce a new product to 
the Chinese market relying on its Indian colonies and labour. The British East 
India Company began to ship opium from South Asia to China with immediate 
popularity, which improved the balance of trade and facilitated the flowback of 
silver into European economy.  
Naturally, the court quickly realised the threat posed by addiction among 
the population and banned the importation of opium into China by imperial 
decree. These measures remained in place despite Britain’s protests; the situation 
escalated, and eventually the First Opium War broke out in 1839. Faith in the 
mighty Middle Kingdom was immediately crushed when a handful of British ves-
sels destroyed the imperial fleet without suffering major losses and moved along 
the coastline bombarding Chinese ports. The balance of power is well illustrated 
by the fact that while the British lost 69 men, the conflict cost almost twenty 
thousand lives for China. Aware of its powerless situation, the empire concluded 
the unfavourable Treaty of Nanking with the British in 1842. Hong Kong (Xiang-
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gang) came under British control as a result of the treaty. The Second Opium War 
broke out in 1856 when the Chinese seized a British smuggling craft, and the 
British soldiers besieged the city of Canton (Guangzhou). The following year the 
English and French warships destroyed the Dagu forts at the mouth of the Hai 
(Bei) River near Tianjin on the way to Beijing. In 1858 the Qing government was 
forced to sign the Treaty of Tientsin, which ended the first phase of the war, 
opening ten additional ports to European trade with concessions and requiring 
China to pay war reparations. The Second Opium War ended with the signing of 
the Convention of Beijing in 1860, which granted further concessions to the 
Western powers, including the opening of the port of Tientsin and additional repa-
rations. In economic terms it was extremely beneficial: the British were finally 
able to sell textile products to China free of duty and the foreign warships were 
free to navigate China’s rivers. Europe’s modern manufacturing industry soon 
became influential thanks to China’s compliance with the terms of the Conven-
tion. China lost control over tariffs and customs to the benefit of the British.   
Western invasion and the serial humiliating defeats and treaties shocked 
the Chinese society convinced of its own superiority. The foreign powers had far 
more advanced weapons than China, and Christianity was also used as a means 
to conquer the empire. The foreign privileges obtained by force had disastrous 
effects on China’s economy. Although the open ports attracted capital and labour, 
this led to simultaneous inequalities in contrast to the inland territories. The goods 
imported from the developed industrialised countries and the introduced subsi-
dies afflicted China’s industry in many ways, and China became increasingly de-
pendent on imports, and consequently on world economy and world trade domi-
nated by the West. 
Western dominance had a similarly negative impact on China’s society. 
The conflicts between the newly arrived or settled foreigners and the local popu-
lation became increasingly frequent. As a secondary consequence, the enmity to 
the Westerners gradually extended to Western values as well, leading to a dis-
missive attitude towards innovation and reform. Moreover, the frequently 
observed arrogance and richness of the foreigners further increased the sense of 
inferiority among the Chinese population developed as a result of military defeats 
inflicted by the Westerners. Due to a combination of these impacts China found 
it difficult to accept the inevitable and necessary changes. Although the foreign 
military, economic and cultural pressures certainly had some positive effects on 
China, its several thousand year old social structure and cohesion began to 
crumble in the late nineteenth century, and eventually collapsed with far more 
severe consequences than in any other colonised country owing to the sheer size 
of the empire. 
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Frustration among the Chinese elite and the population in the middle of the 
nineteenth century increased, demanding reforms and progress for the country. 
The internal turmoil led to a series of rebellions, each one with terrible conse-
quences. An outstanding example is the Taiping Rebellion (1851‒1864), a Chris-
tian movement of the Heavenly Kingdom which caused devastation to a third of 
China and claimed up to thirty million lives. A number of other rebellions fol-
lowed (e.g. Nian Rebellion, Muslim religious war). The civil disturbances and 
the defeats suffered at the hands of foreign powers reflected the helplessness of 
the Qing administration. In 1899 the Boxer Rebellion (initiated by the Militia 
United in Righteousness known as the Boxers because many of their members 
practised martial arts) opposed foreign influence; the Boxers set fire to the em-
bassies in Beijing, lynched foreign diplomats and killed two hundred missionaries 
and over thirty thousand Chinese Christians. In response an Eight-Nation Alli-
ance (Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan, Russia and the 
United States) launched a revenge campaign against Beijing. The fifty thousand 
strong allied forces disembarked at Tientsin (Tianjin), marched to the capital, de-
feated the imperial army, and finally liberated the besieged diplomatic quarter 
and ransacked most of Beijing and the Forbidden City. 
Nevertheless, even more shocking was the defeat inflicted on China by 
Japan. Japan, a feudal tributary despised for hundreds of years underwent funda-
mental changes in the second half of the nineteenth century; the Meiji Restoration 
in 1868 led to rapid Western style industrialisation and modernisation across the 
country. Consequently, the demand for natural resources increased, which was to 
be met by territorial expansion dictated by the spirit of the age. The obvious target 
was China; the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and 1895 ended with Japan’s 
spectacular victory, and the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded the Liaodong Penin-
sula, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan. In addition, the Qing Empire was 
to pay war reparations on a staggering scale: 260‒340 million taels (10‒15,000 
tons) of silver to Imperial Japan. 
The serial defeats naturally led to numerous attempts to modernise China. 
Military improvements began after the First Opium War, but the purchased West-
ern weapons and warships proved insufficient. The aim after the Second Opium 
War was to modernise China’s government introducing the Hundred Days of Re-
form by Emperor Guangxu (1871‒1908). These measures included the abolition 
of the traditional civil service examination system, the establishment of the Uni-
versity of Beijing and agricultural schools across the country, a shift from abso-
lutism to constitutional monarchy, the introduction of a capitalist economic 
model and further industrialisation. However, real progress was prevented by the 
conservative forces within the court. The dynastic empire’s inability to revive 
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became increasingly apparent with a growing need for modernisation represented 
by Sun Yat-sen’s movement (born Sun Wen, 1866‒1925). 
 
The Wuchang Uprising 
 
The fall of the Qing dynasty was finally brought about by another wave of 
uprising. The Qing government planned to nationalise local railway companies 
and transfer control to foreign banks. The proposal was met with anger and re-
bellion. The military forces deployed against the armed rebels of Sichuan left the 
city of Wuchang in the neighbouring Hubei province unguarded, where an upris-
ing broke out and the locals managed to expel the Qing government functionary. 
The imperial court dispatched a modernised army unit led by General Yuan 
Shikai (1859‒1916) to crush the uprising, but the General had different ideas and 
engaged in secret negotiations with the rebels instead. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen, 
an emblematic figure of the Chinese revolutionary movement returned from the 
United States, having sought to find wealthy Chinese supporters for the fight 
against imperial power. Due to rapidly escalating events eighteen southern and 
central provinces voted to secede from the Qing dynasty in December 1911, and 
shortly afterwards Sun Yat-sen was elected as provisional president of the repub-
lic. The seceding provinces proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of 
China on 1 January 1912 supported by Yuan Shikai’s army. The then six-year-
old emperor was forced to abdicate on 12 February 1912, ending 2,000 years of 
dynastic rule in China.  
 
2.1.8. Traditional Chinese strategic culture and its sources 
 
China’s traditional strategic culture and international political approach 
have been deeply influenced by ancient Chinese philosophy and historical expe-
riences. The Seven Military Classics (Wu jing qi shu) is a major study of warfare 
compiled in the eleventh century that represents the most important sources of 
Chinese military and strategic knowledge. The Seven Military Classics comprise 
Jiang Ziya (Taigong)'s Six Secret Teachings, the Sima Rangju Art of War, Sun 
Tzu’s (Sunzi) The Art of War, Wu Qi's Wuzi, Wei Liaozi, the Three Strategies of 
Huang Shigong, and Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Li 
Weigong. The work of Sun Tzu and Wu Qi is discussed below. 
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Philosophical foundations ‒ Confucianism and Legalism 
 
In order to understand China’s current strategy and international approach 
it is important to be familiar with Chinese philosophical tradition and thinking. 
This philosophical tradition, which, in a sense, has turned into religions, is so 
ingrained in everyday life and thinking that it often influences China’s (foreign 
policy) decision making in an almost unnoticeable way. That is to say, it is a most 
fundamental and most profound aspect of Chinese culture. The two most wide-
spread and most influential philosophical schools are associated with Lao-Tze 
(Laozi, sixth century BCE) and Confucius (see above). 
 
Sun Tzu and The Art of War 
 
Sun Tzu (Sunzi) (544‒496 BCE) was a highly successful, still influential 
Chinese military strategist in charge of the Wei king’s army. His expertise and 
instructions were collected in The Book of War (alternatively translated as The 
Art of War), which has grown to be a fundamental work not only in a military 
sense, but in every aspect of decision making, whether business or political, all 
over the world. According to Sun Tzu, knowledge wins wars without fight and 
overthrows governments without prolonged military operation. 
It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of Sun Tzu’s work; 
his book is now considered a major study not only for the military academies, but 
also for all major Western universities and institutes of economic management 
and training. This is primarily due to Sun Tzu’s fundamental principles which 
can be successfully applied to all kinds of strategies. The instructions of the book 
written in the sixth century BCE are still recognisable in modern Chinese leader-
ship principles. Think of the famous quote from Deng Xiaoping (1904‒1997): 
‘Observe calmly; secure your position; cope with affairs calmly; hide your ca-
pacities and bide your time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never 
claim leadership’ (quoted by Kissinger, H. 2014, p. 458). 
 
Wuzi 
 
Wuzi is a major classic Chinese work on military strategy written by Wu 
Qi (440‒381 BCE), a talented military leader and politician of the Warring States 
period. The opposed forces of the Warring States period tried to form vertical and 
horizontal alliances as a means to balance power among the states and to tempo-
rarily pacify the affected regions. As seen above, the solution was finally brought 
about by creating a unified empire in 221 BCE led by the Qin state. Although Wu 
Qi was educated by Confucian philosophers, he turned out to be one of the earliest 
Civilisations from East to West 
82 

major Legalist thinkers. His work contains revolutionary ideas on warfare, di-
rectly opposed to the military techniques of patriarchal Confucianism.  
Wu Qi’s book follows the process of transition from Confucian terminol-
ogy, with all major concepts gaining new meaning and wider interpretation in 
military aspects. 
These changes laid the foundation for subsequent terminology applied in 
political philosophy. The surviving stories on Wu Qi’s life contain numerous ref-
erences characteristic for a very powerful legalist-minded individual. Wu Qi, who 
similarly to Cao Cao (155‒220) displayed some Machiavellian qualities, did not 
shy away from any means to achieve his ambitions. According to some research-
ers a much more substantial original version of the Wuzi written by Wu Qi him-
self may have got lost and the currently known version comprising six chapters 
is a summary originating from the Han era. Others believe, however, that certain 
parts of the text describe the Warring States period with such accuracy that they 
are more likely to be contemporary. The truth probably lies somewhere in the 
middle; the original work recovered in fragments during the Han era must have 
been completed according to contemporary military science and technology. 
Studying the book used to be mandatory for all military leaders and statesmen for 
many centuries; in fact, the Wuzi was selected as a major source for the Seven 
Military Classics compiled in 1080 during the Song dynasty.  
 
The concept of tianxia and the tributary system 
 
Throughout its history China preferred to think of itself as the centre of 
civilisation, with all outward entities considered barbaric and therefore neces-
sarily inferior to the Middle Kingdom. This view is represented in urban planning 
as well; think of the Forbidden City, the centre of Beijing. According to China’s 
concentric approach the power and influence of the Middle Kingdom is radiated 
from this centre point. 
The holistic perspective of tianxia (‘all under heaven’) is an important 
element of Confucianism that provides the philosophical foundation of the tribu-
tary system. All under heaven in traditional Chinese thinking means not only the 
physical world; it is a cultural concept that also incorporates morality and the 
workings of the universe. The tributary system is essentially based on inequality, 
with a simultaneous aspiration towards ‘Great Harmony’ (Datong). Although dif-
ficult to explain in Western terms, it essentially means that the beings in the world 
(in this case individuals, peoples and countries) are unequal: 
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 China is at the centre point, surrounded by all else arranged in concentric 
circles.  All under heaven form part of a great hierarchy which, by definition, is 
without any conflict and comprises every country dominated by China. Thus, 
nothing is far away, and there is nothing to be conquered; everything is part of a 
single whole, with the Middle Kingdom at its centre. Datong, the aspiration to-
ward harmony of man and nature is another important element of the Chinese 
world view. Hierarchical order, on the other hand, is essential for the survival of 
society, and it forms the basis of the tributary system as well. However, this hier-
archy is not based on ‘strong versus weak’ in the Western sense but resembles 
more like a father-son relationship. Administration and authority based on bonds 
and relationships within Chinese society (father-son, emperor-minister, elder 
brother-younger brother, husband-wife, friends) was termed ‘Li Zhi’, essentially 
the equivalent of government based on morality and ethics. 
As seen above, traditional Chinese thinking distinguished no individual 
sovereign states, but considered all under heaven to be part of a single whole, 
which is why it lacks the concept of international relations in the classical sense. 
The countries within this system (the Korean Peninsula, Japan, Vietnam and parts 
of Central Asia, their status changing from time to time) were all tributaries, or 
taxpayers loosely connected with China, comparable to satellites orbiting around 
a bigger and stronger entity. International relations were viewed according to the 
principles and rules applied to society and the relationships of individual people. 
This sort of universalistic approach, very much unlike the Western one, was fur-
ther encouraged by China’s geographical conditions. Indeed, China resembles a 
vast remote island in many aspects. As discussed previously, the country is diffi-
cult to access due to numerous characteristics including dense rainforests and the 
Himalayan mountain range in the south, the coastline in the east, the Siberian and 
Mongolian wilderness in the north, and the Taklamakan Desert and the Central 
Asian Mountains in the west. The enormous distances are to blame for China’s 
low-level intercultural relations and lack of experience with an international sys-
tem of equally powerful entities until the start of European invasion in the nine-
teenth century.  
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2.1.9. Chronological table7 
 
Date Event 
8000 BCE Emergence of the earliest Chinese cultures 
2207‒1766 BCE Xia dynasty 
2000‒1500 BCE Emergence of literacy 
1765‒1122 BCE Shang dynasty 
1122‒256 BCE Zhou dynasty 
604 BCE Lao-Tze 
453–221 BCE Warring States period 
551‒479 BCE Confucius 
544‒496 BCE Sun Tzu 
440‒381 BCE Wu-Qi 
221‒206 BCE Qin dynasty 
221 BCE Unification of China by Qin Shi Huangdi 
206 BCE‒220 CE Han dynasty (Eastern Han and Western Han) 
220‒265 The Three Kingdoms 
618‒907 Tang dynasty 
907‒960 Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms 
960‒1127 Northern Song dynasty 
1127‒1279 Southern Song dynasty 
1279‒1367 Yuan dynasty 
1367‒1644 Ming dynasty 
1407‒1420 Construction of the Forbidden City 
1405‒1433 Expeditions by Admiral Zheng He 
1644‒1911 Qing dynasty 
1793 Mission led by Lord Macartney 
1839‒1842 First Opium War 
1856‒1860 Second Opium War 
1851‒1864 Taiping Rebellion 
1894‒1895 First Sino-Japanese War, Treaty of Shimonoseki 
1899‒1901 Boxer Rebellion 
1911 Wuchang Uprising, fall of the Empire 
1 January 1912 Proclamation of the Republic of China 

7 The historical dates associated with Ancient China are rather varied; this brief chrono-
logy relies on the dates established by Jacques Gernet. 
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2.2. The Japanese Civilisation 
 
MÁRIA ILDIKÓ FARKAS 
 
2.2.1. Japan as an independent civilisation? 
 
The existing civilisations of the world today are units of varying size over 
time and space, covering larger areas and multiple nations, ethnicities, languages, 
and cultures, among which the Japanese civilisation of a single country, nation, 
and culture seems rather unusual. What factors justify comparative civilisation 
history studies viewing Japan as an independent civilisation? 
Where does Japan belong? Undoubtedly one of the most advanced indus-
trialised countries in the world, with its highly developed industrial ‒ or even 
post-industrial ‒ economy, society and democratic political and institutional sys-
tem, it is part of the group of most developed countries (G7). At the same time, it 
is very different from the West in terms of its location, its cultural identity, its 
religions, its writing system and many other cultural traditions, and is linked to 
Asia, where some elements of its civilisation come from. 
The latter may suggest that Japan is in fact the periphery of Chinese civili-
sation, which has had a great and significant influence on Japan throughout 
history. Japan was geographically and politically located on the fringes of 
Chinese civilisation for millennia, occasionally adjusting to and adopting the 
results of the China-centred East Asian order, but at times closing itself away, 
remaining outside the scope of the Chinese civilisation, with its development tak-
ing a different direction. Although, it moulded the adoptions to its own image 
until they were ‘Japanised’, and more in tune with Japanese characteristics and 
the internal conditions created by development that varied widely from those of 
China. It is a bold statement, but we dare to state that Japan has never been an 
integral part of the China-centred East Asian world order. 
The island nature of the country and the possibility of isolation (from Asia) 
is likely to play an important role in this. Located alongside the Asian continent, 
it has taken on many elements of Chinese culture throughout its history (which 
were then transformed according to its own traditions to create Japanese 
Buddhism, Japanese Confucianism, and many art genres), but Japan differs sig-
nificantly from Chinese civilisation, in its religious and cultural life, and 
especially in its history. Shintō as an independent Japanese religion, Japan's 
unique family system, medieval feudalism, the successful nineteenth-century 
modernisation, the modern statehood in Asia before 1945 and the democratic 
statehood after 1945 are all elements that are significantly different from the 
Civilisations from East to West 
88 

characteristics of Chinese civilisation, and more closely resemble those of 
Europe. 
This comparison is particularly valid from the mid-nineteenth century, 
when Japan became the periphery of Western civilisation. Japan lived in isolation 
until the 1850s and, after the invasion of Western powers (from 1868), was 
successfully modernised, avoiding a colonial fate. Japan thus achieved a unique 
position for itself as a country which joined the West: from some aspects it is 
considered ‘western’, but in some important dimensions it is clearly not, therefore 
in relation to Japan the terms of ‘dual civilisation’ and ‘mix of two civilisations 
(western and Chinese)’ have been used. 
The success of Japanese modernisation during the nineteenth century, and 
its unparalleled existence in Asia, has raised the possibility that Japan is not a part 
of the Asian (Chinese) civilisation, but is an independent civilisation due to its 
uniqueness (EISENSTADT, SH. N. 1996; HUNTINGTON, S P. 1998). For Japanese 
traditions and characteristics have always broken through in any system of 
foreign influence and takeover, whether Chinese or European. The geography of 
the Japanese islands and the way of life it defined (cultural ecology), Shintō, 
Japanese feudalism, Bushido, special ethnic and cultural homogeneity, combined 
with the adoptions, ensured the unique nature of Japanese history: the strange 
unity of permanence and change. Japan's difference from Asia is not the result of 
modernity (that is, the influence of Western civilisation), but it has much deeper 
roots. The unique development of Japan has always taken a different direction 
from that of the continent and the West, even in the case of Chinese and Western 
adoptions, facilitated by the cyclical phenomenon of Japanese history: periods of 
isolation. All this together rightly raises the possibility of an independent 
Japanese civilisation that explains the peculiarities of Japanese development. 
So we can say that Japan is an independent civilisation, which is a very 
unique phenomenon, because in this case one country, one state, one people (98 
percent Japanese), one nation, one culture and one language has created one of 
the world's civilisations existing today. Although related to Chinese civilisation 
(adopting cultural elements such as Tao, Buddhism, Confucianism, writing sys-
tem), it has taken an independent path in its historical development (medieval 
feudalism, successful modernisation in the nineteenth century) and cannot be 
considered part of Chinese civilisation. However, it is neither an integral part of 
Western civilisation, mainly due to its cultural heritage and identity. This is 
explained by the fact that the creation of modern Japan followed the then 
European development pattern of the second half of the nineteenth century, but 
that it was based on the Japanese cultural tradition that preceded western-style 
modernisation. With this cultural identity, Japan took the ‘non-western’ path of 
modernisation, first and for a long time (until the mid-twentieth century) alone. 
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2.2.2. Sources and foundations of the Japanese civilisation 
 
How, when, and under what circumstances was Japanese civilisation 
established? From what elements, on what basis and based on the effect of what 
factors was it established? How did the natural environment shape the way of life 
and consequently the culture of the population living here? What kind of beliefs 
and world views were generated from it? What external influences prevailed in 
the cultural changes? How did the specific nature of the culture that emerged 
influence historical changes? 
 
Natural environment 
 
Obviously, the formation of an independent Japanese civilisation was 
greatly influenced by the country’s island nature, which was an obstacle to posi-
tive or negative influences from outside, and to some extent and at times kept the 
population of the Japanese islands isolated. 
Japan is actually a volcanic archipelago that stretches over the Eastern 
border of East Asia for a length of 2,400 km (Map 8). Today’s Japan is made up 
of 4 main islands (Hokkaidō, Honshū, Shikoku, Kyūshū) and more than 3,000 
inhabited and uninhabited islands, covering an area of 377,923 km2, which in 
Europe represents a territory larger than Germany, similar to Norway. (About 
four times the size of Hungary.) The difference in the data from some sources (a 
few km2) is explained by the fact that the number of small islands is constantly 
changing, due to tectonic movements they continue to sink into the sea or rise 
above the water level. There is a significantly larger difference due to the so-
called ‘Northern Territories’ (part of the Kuril Islands, about 5,000 km2), which 
is currently occupied by Russia (with the Soviet Union occupying the Japanese-
owned islands in the Second World War) but which Japan considers theirs and 
counts as its official territory. 
The natural environment is characterised by the fact that 72 percent of 
Japan’s territory is mountainous, and the islands are made up of a chain of moun-
tains, practically rising from the sea, with a mountain chain extending throughout 
the country (its highest point above sea level is the peak of Mount Fuji, at 3,776 
metres). Due to the high mountains, steep hillsides and narrow valleys, almost 
three quarters of the country's territory is unfit for human settlements and 
agricultural cultivation. In addition to very few cultivated areas, they have also 
attempted to use the hillsides with terraced cultivation, the creation and mainte-
nance of which has meant and continues to mean additional work for agricultural 
cultivation. The country has a small inhabitable area, which means that people's 
living space is tight and crowded, with 127 million people living in an area 
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equivalent to only one quarter of the country (i.e. the approximate area of 
Hungary). Even if calculating with the entire territory, the population density of 
Japan is still part of the world's leading countries (18) with a number of 337 
persons/km2 (Belgium has one of the highest population densities in Europe, 339), 
but this population is very unevenly distributed on the islands: over half of the 
country's population (57%) lives on less than 2.2% of its territory, with 90% 
living in cities. With a population density of more than 5,000 persons/km2, the 
metropolitan Tokyo Region ranks below the most densely populated cities in the 
world (Monaco, Macao, Singapore and Hong Kong) and is the most populous 
urban agglomeration by population (34.5 million). 
 
Map 8: Japan’s topography, major volcanoes and cities 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
In terms of natural resources, Japan is an extremely poor country, and it 
seems rather contradictory that it still has the world’s third largest economy 
(behind the US and China if the European Union is not considered a single 
economy, because then it is ‘only’ the fourth). This means that Japan’s economic 
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success was not due to favourable natural conditions (such as areas with oil or 
rich coal and iron ore deposits), but other factors may have played an important 
role. Japan has virtually no raw material, minerals or energy sources, even if there 
is a small amount of coal, iron ore, copper, zinc, gold, silver, lead, gas, sulphur, 
because of the natural environment it is either completely impossible to extract 
and mine, or it would be very uneconomical. Thus, the country has been in need 
of imports of all important commodities since the beginning of the modern indus-
trialised era, and the ever-threatening foreign trade deficit has created (and still 
creates) a strong incentive to establish and sustain an export-oriented economy. 
What impact did this natural environment have on the characteristics of the 
human culture emerging here? Throughout history, unfavourable and difficult 
natural conditions for maintaining human life have meant that continuous, hard, 
and persistent work was required to survive. The small cultivated area required a 
lot of difficult human labour in order to utilise the land: the construction of dams, 
canals and irrigation systems, the terraced construction, continuous maintenance 
of the hillside, and the constant maintenance of the system. 
Japan is in the temperate zone, but has a vastly variable climate, ranging 
from cold temperate to subtropical. The reason for this variability is the large 
north-south extent of the islands (equivalent to the distance between Montreal 
and Miami on a map of North America, or the distance from Kiev to Cairo setting 
off from Europe) as well as the climate and water drainage effects of the mountain 
chain running along the centre of the country. Because of the latter, the climate 
differs on the Pacific Ocean and the Japanese Sea: along the Sea of Japan the 
influence of the continent can be felt (there is no monsoon in summer, but it is 
cold during winter with significant snowfall), while on the Pacific coast in winter 
there is little snow and milder weather due to the oceanic influence, but in summer 
there is rainfall and hot, humid weather. With the exception of Hokkaidō, the 
islands are in the monsoon zone, the summer rainy season (6 weeks) means high 
rainfall, heat and high humidity. At the same time, ocean currents are also 
affecting the islands: cold from the North and warm from the South are cooling 
or warming the islands, further increasing the temperature difference between the 
North and South. For example, Sapporo is located on the same latitude as Milan, 
but its climate is much colder due to the effect of the cold current, but Tokyo’s 
climate is warm, similarly to that of Athens but, due to the ocean current and the 
monsoon, it is a lot more humid. 
Climatic differences and, not infrequently, extreme weather (heavy rains, 
floods, snowfall, typhoons) have created the need and ability for continuous 
adaptation in the human communities that live here. One particular example of 
this is traditional Japanese architecture, which has favoured non-solid materials 
(wood) over solid (stone), since a wooden building (and an entire village) was 
Civilisations from East to West 
92 

more easily destroyed by the natural disasters described below, or as a result of 
extreme weather, but it could also be rebuilt within a few days permitting a return 
to everyday life. 
 
Natural disasters 
 
The natural environment also has catastrophic effects on the population of 
the islands. 
1. Volcanoes: The territory of Japan is actually a volcanic arch, which was 
the result of volcanic activity due to the collision of earth-moving plates, 
the Eurasian plate containing the Japanese Sea, the Pacific plate in the 
north and the Philippine plate in the south (Figure 12). The islands are 
divided approximately in the middle by a break line, along which the vol-
canoes are located. In Japan, besides the 150‒200 extinct volcanoes, they 
have recorded 36 active volcanoes. Ten percent of all active volcanoes in 
the world are located in Japan. 
 
Figure 12: The still active sulphur vents of the volcanic Mount Hakone 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
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2. Earthquakes: Japan is one of the most active and volatile areas in the world 
from a tectonic point of view. Due to the movement and collision of the 
tectonic plates, this area is the most vulnerable to earthquakes. Every year, 
1,500 earthquakes, usually earthquakes between magnitude 4 and 7, are 
recorded, which means that small earthquakes are commonplace in Japan 
and that the earth is always moving somewhere. Unfortunately, devastating 
earthquakes regularly afflict the population of the islands and a tidal wave 
(tsunami) can be the catastrophic consequence of an earthquake in the sea. 
In the twentieth century, the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923 claimed more 
than 100,000 lives and almost completely destroyed Tokyo (today’s city is 
the result of subsequent reconstruction). Japan is the most prepared country 
in the world for earthquakes, and thanks to special construction, monitor-
ing, security and alarm systems, human and material losses can be signifi-
cantly reduced, but devastating natural disasters cannot be completely 
prevented. In 2011, along the north-east coast of Japan, there was one of 
the largest earthquakes ever recorded in human history (with a magnitude 
above 9), triggering a massive 40 metre tidal wave that hit the Japanese 
coast. As a result of the earthquake, the island of Honshū shifted two and 
a half meters to the east, and the axis of the Earth swung 10 to 25 cm. The 
disaster claimed some 24,000 lives (we have to add, that the major earth-
quake in Indonesia, which triggered a similar tsunami in 2006, claimed 
more than 300,000 lives). The worst consequence of the disaster was the 
damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Although in Japan, nuclear 
power plants are built with serious safety systems that shut down the power 
plant in the event of an earthquake, the tsunami’s waves of more than 30 
metres could not be stopped even by the several metres of shore-side 
concrete defences, and the tidal wave travelled almost 10 km into inland 
Japan, destroying everything in its path and damaging the nuclear power 
plant. 
 
In addition to major catastrophes, other, less devastating, but sometimes 
very serious, natural phenomena endanger the lives and well-being of the 
Japanese population. From August to October, typhoons from the South Pacific 
can reach the south-eastern part of the country, and in the winter, heavy snowfall 
from Siberia can reach the north-west, causing severe floods and landslides as the 
snow melts. Except for Hokkaidō, the islands are in the monsoon zone, and heavy 
rainfall in the early summer can also cause flooding, but it is also not good to 
have low rainfall, which could threaten the crops with drought. 
The harsh natural environment had consequences for people's livelihoods 
and relationships with the world: the constant uncertainty and emergency made 
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the ability to adapt to the circumstances, and flexibility, the constant, hard and 
persistent work in everyday life, and the naturalness of a repeating start vital. 
Humans have learnt to live with unpredictable and often dangerous environments, 
exposed to nature. Communities have emphasised the importance of organisation, 
collaboration, emergency preparedness from the early ages, and have maximised 
the use of resources and human labour. 
 
Religion 
 
Beliefs, world view and religion play a decisive role in shaping the nature 
of a civilisation. Japan is unique in this also, because the coexistence and even 
syncretism (the certain degree of merging and intertwining) of several different 
religious traditions has defined ‒ and defines ‒ Japanese religiousness, which, 
moreover, does not manifest itself in religious (theological) teachings, but rather, 
it shows an approach to life, tradition and lifestyle for the Japanese people. The 
internal, own tradition (Shintō) and the religious and philosophical tendencies 
adopted from outside (Tao, Buddhism, Confucianism) coexisted, complemented 
and influenced each other to a certain extent, and practically constituted a unified 
system for the Japanese, which embraced religion, the world view, morality and 
ethics. Community religious practice also determined the individual’s life. 
Exposure to natural conditions may have resulted in the Japanese having a 
special relationship with their environment and the formation of their own nature-
loving religion, the Shintō. Because they were so vulnerable to geographical and 
weather elements, the Japanese saw the leaders of their lives in nature, in its gods 
(kami), who are almost innumerable, and reside within natural phenomena. One's 
life depends on them, the kamis can help or become angry, but they can be recon-
ciled with rituals, sacrifices and prayers. The Shintō is thus an archaic nature-
loving world of beliefs; a set of ceremonies, spells, local cults, originally without 
moral teachings and metaphysical sayings (Figure 13). It was characterised by 
the reverence of the ancestors, the adoration of natural phenomena, and the belief 
in the immortality of the spirit, with millions of kami. 
Buddhism came to Japan in the sixth century, but did not displace Shintō, 
instead it complemented and broadened religious life by caring for the dead, the 
concept and image of the afterlife, Buddhist philosophy, theology, and morality. 
To this day, it is common for the Japanese to feel that Shintō deals with this life 
(birth, children, weddings, agriculture-related rituals, ceremonies, and 
celebrations in shrines), and that Buddhism deals with the soul and the afterlife 
(that is, according to our concepts, more religious matters). The Japanese practice 
the rituals of both and visit a Shintō shrine or Buddhist temple at different stages 
of their life and in connection with different celebrations of the year. The rituals 
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and celebrations are very important in today’s world, even though they are no 
longer closely linked to religious beliefs, still, on the one hand, they represent 
important turning points in an individual's life and, on the other hand, celebrations 
are major community events and manifestations of community belonging. 
 
Figure 13: The row of gates of one of the biggest Shintō shrines, the Fushimi Inari 
Shrine 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
Also, in the fifth and sixth centuries, Tao and Confucianism were intro-
duced into Japan and became part of the Japanese religious tradition. From the 
Tao tradition, the yin and yang doctrine, the astrology, the habit of divination and 
magic, the doctrine of the arrangement of space (predecessor of today’s feng shui) 
and the five elements, the belief in fortunate and unfortunate places, times, 
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actions, signs etc. (according to the stars), i.e. the elements of the Tao, were 
deeply embedded in the system of popular religiousness. 
Confucianism had more of an influence with its ethics and moral message, 
by which it provided guidance to life, defined relationships between people 
(hierarchy), the functioning of society (harmony), the duties of the individual 
(respect for authority, moral and disciplined life, importance of self-education). 
Buddhism in Japan has undergone a unique development, emerging and still 
operating today, with its own message (Figure 14). Based on the Amida (Buddha) 
faith, the Jōdo Shinshū direction is the most powerful and most followed branch 
of Japanese Buddhism to date; Japanese Zen Buddhism is the dominant spirit of 
the arts, aesthetics and philosophy considered to be the ‘Japanese’; and the 
Nichiren (Hokke-shū) direction, founded in the thirteenth century, which 
emphasises ‘Japanese’ (national) Buddhism (it also has a cultural association, 
several schools and a political party), are still practised today. 
 
Figure 14: Garden designed according to the principles of Japanese Zen Buddhism 
(Kōmyō-in, Kyoto) 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
Society 
 
Japanese society is fundamentally regarded as a collectivist society (as is 
generally the case with East Asian societies), as opposed to individualist 
‘Western’ societies. In collectivist culture, the basis of social existence is the ‘we 
consciousness’, the individual can only define themselves in the community. 
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The interest of the group takes precedence over the interest of the 
individual, because the individual depends on the group, the well-being of the 
group ensures the well-being of the individual, therefore the well-being of the 
community is paramount. The relationship between the individual and the 
community is bidirectional: the individual shows loyalty to the group and the 
group cares for its members (paternalism), and that is the benefit of the 
collectivist culture for the individual: protection for life. In contrast, in 
individualistic societies (Europe, North America), the foundation of the 
individual’s prosperity is seen in individual abilities and performance, with 
freedom and independence emphasised. Society rewards individuality, individual 
challenges, competition and performance, whereas in a collectivist culture, the 
individual is almost non-existent, merely a member of a group and less valued in 
their individual excellence, but rather based in their value within the group. 
Human relationships and the system of relations is important within the group, 
which is usually hierarchical and designates the position and tasks of each 
individual, the fulfilment of which provides the basis for the individual’s 
perception (this is also called a ‘duty-oriented’ society, as opposed to the western 
‘goal-oriented’ society). One of the foundations of community survival and 
proper, successful functioning is intra-group harmony, cooperation, conflict-
freeness, collectively referred to as ‘harmony’, and its sustaining is considered to 
be an important task for individuals, which even includes the restraining of their 
own emotions and suppressing their own interests. East Asian Confucianism 
emphasises precisely these values: collectivism, harmony, respect for hierarchy, 
loyalty, care, suppression of individual interest and cooperation. Is it possible to 
trace a common origin to the similar organisation of these societies, formulated 
by a common set of values, Confucianism, which still strongly determines the 
world view of these countries? There is a theory that the difference between 
collectivism, which is mainly ‘Eastern’ (Asian) and the more ‘Western’ 
individualism, is rooted in the diversity of agricultural production, primarily 
under the conditions of rice production (the difference between ‘rice culture’ and 
‘wheat culture’). In East Asia, basic food grain, rice, is produced by irrigation, 
flood management, which requires organised, managed, disciplined teamwork 
(construction and maintenance of dams and canals, shared and simultaneous work 
on planting, flooding, etc.) and a high degree of cooperation from group 
members. And working together requires a leader who everyone obeys and who 
is responsible for the community as a whole. Individuals experience that they can 
only achieve their goal, a good harvest, by working together, and that the common 
goal is in the interest of them all. In contrast, wheat (and rye, barley, oats, which 
are the most common cereals in Europe) do not need to be flooded or irrigated, 
and the different producers do not have to coordinate their work processes, which 
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means that there is no need for teamwork in production. Farmers could cultivate 
their land individually. Rice cultivation spread to the Japanese islands during the 
period of the third‒second centuries BCE, became a major agricultural activity and 
had a decisive influence on the community organisation of the Japanese people. 
The system of Japanese community organisation thus established has become the 
model for the functioning of society as a whole (not only agricultural production), 
and in fact still defines the social organisation and collectivism of the Japanese. 
At the same time, measured by East Asian standards, Japanese society is 
‘more individualistic’ than the surrounding cultures, the reason for which is 
rooted in history: in the Samurai tradition. The independent small landowners, 
hereditary private ownership of the land, the personal nature of feudal relations 
(overlords and vassals), and individual combat capabilities all reinforced the 
importance of the individual in an otherwise truly collectivist society. The 
traditional Japanese extended family was not a large extended family, but only a 
paternal descent hierarchical family with a father-to-son inheritance and wealth. 
In other Asian societies, loyalty to a group was more a ‘birth right’ (as defined 
by the family or the local community), whereas in Japan it was often a matter of 
choice (choice fidelity, adoption in families), which in today’s Japanese society 
also explains the importance of the loyalty shown (or expected) for the (chosen) 
workplace. The Japanese society is also considered ‘masculine’, not only because 
the roles of men and women are still sharply distinguished, but because tradi-
tionally considered values of masculinity are of primary importance: competition, 
performance, workmanship, success are the main motivating factors, with 
‘conditioning’ beginning in infancy and lasting a lifetime. However, coupled with 
Japanese collectivism, this does not mean individual competition, but 
competition between groups, which in fact puts a greater burden on individuals, 
because if one member of a group falls behind because of their inferior 
performance, that member is not confronted with their own failure (as in Western 
societies) but with the failure of their entire group. And the fact that they failed 
because of them is a great shame that an individual can wash off themselves and 
their group by committing suicide according to the old system of values. Japan is 
also called ‘shame society’ (as opposed to the ‘sin-oriented’ views of western 
culture), which means that society does not judge individuals' actions by general 
moral norms, but by fulfilling its obligation to its group properly and, if that does 
not happen, they bring shame onto the entire group. So, the individual does 
everything they can to prevent unsuccessfulness due to them, often much more 
than they would for their own good (this is the basis of the notorious Japanese 
“workaholism” and unhealthy overtime work). 
The use of collective praise and punishment is a very effective motivation 
from an early age. This is accompanied by the need for excellence and perfection 
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in Japan every day (cleanliness, packaging, behaviour). In a hierarchical society, 
everyone performs a function appropriate to their position, with responsibilities 
in terms of behaviour, etiquette and even language. 
Japan's individual civilisation has built a strong sense of unity within the 
population, a sense of a ‘homogeneous society’ (in to some opinions, this is only 
an illusion), according to which Japan is an ethnically, linguistically, culturally, 
globally unified country with less inequalities in society, wealth, education and 
lifestyle, and where societal discipline is very high, precisely because of shared 
values and homogeneity. It is especially significant that Japan is one of the 
world's most secure countries with a very low crime rate. Reasons for this include 
not only the values (social exclusion of the offender) of a homogeneous, 
disciplined collectivist society, harsh punishments and a very strict ban on arms 
(i.e. crime prevention and fear of retaliation), but also the low level of 
unemployment, poverty and drug abuse (i.e. social factors contributing to crime). 
 
History 
 
Despite the external adoptions, the individual development of Japan has 
always taken a different direction from that of the continent, facilitated by the 
cyclically recurring phenomenon of Japanese history: periods of isolation. Japan's 
history shows a peculiar mixture of continuity and change with the cyclical 
alternation of opening-related adoptions and the internal development of the 
periods of isolation. The periodisation of its history does not fully correspond to 
the periods used in European historiography. 
 
Prehistory 
Jōmon period (13000‒300 BCE): 
The Japanese islands are practically made up of a mountain chain that rose 
up along a fault line, which was connected to the Asian continent during the Ice 
Age. The earliest findings of human presence are approx. 130,000 years old. 
There are finds proving the existence of prehistoric and Palaeolithic cultures from 
32,000 years ago. Today’s Japanese archipelago was formed 13,000 years ago as 
a result of the warming following the last Ice Age. Then, in the Holocene period, 
a larger, more sophisticated, hunter-gatherer society emerged. The Jōmon culture 
got its name from its distinctive braid pattern decoration on clay pots. The people 
of the Jōmon period (from the fourteenth millennium BCE to the beginning of the 
third century BCE) made the world's first earthenware and clay figures (Figure 
15). The uncovered settlements have the characteristics of a semi-settled 
Mesolithic ‒ or, in some opinion, Neolithic ‒ lifestyle. Stone tools, dating back 
to this period, are the world's first polished stone tools. Based on all of this, there 
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is an opinion that the Japanese civilisation, with the establishment of a settled 
lifestyle, use of advanced tools and the very first clay pots, preceded the 
emergence of the Middle Eastern civilisation. 
 
Figure 15: Ceramics from the Jōmon period 
Source: Photograph by MÁRIA ILDIKÓ FARKAS 
 
Whether this population ‒ or populations ‒ are the ancestors of today’s 
Japanese people, or whether they are related to the Ainu living on the islands 
(who have been recognised by the Japanese state as ‘indigenous people’ from of 
2008, with a population of only 20,000 in Hokkaido), are issues that are still being 
debated. Scientists disagree about the origin of the Japanese people, and these 
questions are still fundamental to Japanese prehistory research. According to 
some, the first inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago, including probably the 
ancestors of today’s Ainu, came from North Asia and East Asia to this area 
through the then existing earth bridges, approx. 35,000 years ago. Other research 
suggests that some ethnic groups also came to this area by boat from South-East 
Asia during the great migration period in the Pacific. According to the most 
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widely accepted opinion, the Japanese people were formed by a mixture of ethnic 
groups coming from several directions. 
 
Yayoi period (300 BCE ‒ 300 CE): 
During this period, a new type of man came from the continent to the 
islands and the modern Japanese people began to form as a result of mixing with 
the Jōmon period population. Owing to the rice cultivation and irrigation 
techniques from Asia and the knowledge of metalworking, we can now speak of 
an established farming society. This agricultural society began to expand, its 
internal structure became more and more complex, and as a result of regional 
organisation territorial units were formed under the leadership of powerful 
landowner families (clan, tribe). The heads of the local communities were buried 
in huge burial mounds (kofun). Wars and emerging alliances opened the way for 
larger and more organised units. 
 
Heritage: rice cultivation, metalworking, strong continental influence, migration, 
new types of people on the Japanese islands, the formation of today’s 
Japanese nation. 
 
Ancient history 
Yamato period (300‒538): 
The first state formation was established in the Japanese Islands during the 
third and fourth centuries, a tribal-clan organisation based on the alliance of the 
strongest clans, led by the most powerful tribe, the Yamato clan. The tribes (ujis), 
as warrior aristocracies (Figure 16), owned their own territories, cultivated by the 
working and tax paying common people. The heads of the clans held ranks in the 
court of the great king (ōkimi). Due to the continental influence, strong parallels 
can be seen with the culture of the Korean Peninsula (tombs, costumes, 
architecture, spread of equestrian combat tactics, weapons). 
 
Heritage: armed aristocracy, hereditary private ownership of lands, sacred nature of 
the ruler, clan system. 
  
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Figure 16: Terracotta statue (haniwa) showing the contemporary warrior costume 
Source: Photograph by MÁRIA ILDIKÓ FARKAS 
 
Asuka period (538‒710): 
The emerging state made contact with the continent and became acquainted 
with the power centre of its surroundings, the even then millennia old Chinese 
Empire, whose culture, civilisation, and well-organised state served as a model 
for the Kingdom of Yamato (Figure 17). 
During the seventh century, this relatively loose state alliance, the King-
dom of Yamato, was transformed into a centralised, strictly organised state on the 
Chinese model. New state offices were created, they introduced the concept of 
the emperor as the absolute ruler, the system of state-owned lands instead of 
private property, a new tax system, and they established court ranks. The founders 
and supporters of the reform (members of the Imperial House and some of the 
more powerful clans) felt it important to create a strong centralised state, partly 
to end internal power struggles and partly because of external threats from China 
and the Korean Peninsula. Owing to Korean and Chinese relations, every element 
 
 
2.2. The Japanese Civilisation 
103 

of continental culture appeared in Japan: Buddhism, Confucianism, Tao, Chinese 
writing system, sciences (astronomy, medicine, and architecture). 
 
Figure 17: The Haruna Shrine, founded in 586 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
Heritage: large burial mounds (kofun), adoption of elements of Chinese civilisation, 
close relationship with the states of the Korean Peninsula and with China, 
the influence of continental culture. 
 
Nara period (710‒794): 
The eighth century legal collections (Ritsuryō) defined the structure of the 
new state and regulated its operation. According to these, the ruler, then called 
the ‘heavenly emperor’ (tennō) based on the Chinese example, ruled over the 
whole territory and the people of the country with absolute power, like a god. He 
exercised his power through the law, through institutions and appointed officials, 
and all land became his property as state land (thereby eliminating private 
property, as in China). The Nara period was a period of transposition and Chinese 
culture in Japan (Figure 18). This system was thus the adoption of a foreign 
pattern: the Chinese Empire, as the region's most powerful power, was counted 
as an example in its political structure, ideology (Confucianism, Buddhism), 
culture (Chinese writing system), art, and even fashion. During this period, 
Buddhism, following the continental pattern, also developed into a highly 
advanced theological and philosophical trend in Japan. 
 
Heritage: Nara Buddhism 
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Figure 18: A woman’s dress from the Nara period 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
Heian period (794‒1185): 
The Ritsuryō State (a state structure based on the Chinese-type legal 
system) was not rooted in Japanese development of the time, and therefore there 
was also nothing that would have really sustained the sense of foreign threat at 
the time it was introduced, and as a result, the centralised monarchy remained 
only an ideal in Japan. Inheritance, private ownership of land and the clan 
principle did not disappear, and sooner or later it guided the movement of society. 
With hereditary titles and court ranks, the lands also became privately owned, 
thus creating a court aristocracy. In order to increase tax revenues, the state 
allowed the formation of tax paying private estates. Estates, such as wealth and 
power, were transferred from the central government to large landowners in the 
countryside. With the decline of state lands ‒ and the taxes coming from them ‒ 
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the law enforcement power of the central power was increasingly weakened, and 
by the tenth century the central army had virtually disappeared, therefore the 
organisation of defence and law enforcement began in the countryside, i.e. they 
began to arm themselves. Some smallholders armed themselves, and some larger 
landowners hired armed men, thus creating an armed warrior class, the Samurai. 
By the end of the tenth century, power was based on private ownership, and the 
various classes of landowners were linked by a complex system of dependence, 
most characterised by a feudal hierarchy and the formation of feudal relations. 
 
Figure 19: A woman’s dress from the Heian period 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
With the weakening of the Chinese Empire, interest in the culture of the 
continent diminished over the course of the ninth century, and Japan did not react 
to changes in East Asia ‒ the emergence of new states on the Korean Peninsula, 
the emergence of a new Chinese Empire ‒, did not establish official relationships 
or deal with the continent until the second half of the twelfth century. This 
provided an opportunity for the birth and development of the individual Japanese 
culture. During the Heian period, the dominance of the Chinese model in all 
aspects of state life gradually disappeared, national culture emerged and special 
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genres of Japanese language and Japanese writing reflecting the Japanese taste 
appeared (Figures 19‒20).  
The Heian period can be considered the epoch of the emergence and one 
of the highest standards of representation of Japanese national culture. 
 
Figure 20: Dolls depicting the emperor, the empress and three ladies-in-waiting 
in Heian period costume for Hinamatsuri (Doll’s Day) 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
During the ninth and eleventh centuries, the situations in the provinces be-
came increasingly turbulent. The central power was less and less able to play its 
law enforcement role, and large estates, temples, and provincial offices were in-
creasingly relying on the emerging armed forces for self-defence and law enfor-
cement. Soldiering clearly became the task of the rural elite warrior, samurai or 
bushi (Figure 21). This process then led to the end of the twelfth century, when 
the Samurai, under the leadership of a distinguished family (Minamoto), formed 
their own ‘government’ and took the political power out of the hands of the court 
aristocracy. 
 
Heritage: Chinese influence, then Japanisation ‒ birth of national culture, great period 
of national culture, the emergence of feudal relations, the establishment of 
the samurai. 
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Figure 21: Samurai costume 
Source: Photograph by MÁRIA ILDIKÓ FARKAS 
 
Middle Ages 
Kamakura period (1185‒1333): 
In the Kamakura period, the shōgun, the supreme overlord of the Samurai, 
with the (militarily forced) authorisation by the emperor, built a nationwide 
executive and control system with its headquarters in Kamakura. The basis of his 
power was land ownership and the feudal hierarchy built upon it, in which 
personal loyalty linked the overlord and the vassal. With the institutions ‒ the 
Shōgun State Council, the treasury, the provincial patron (actually the shōgun 
governor of the province) and the shōgun administrator assigned to the private 
estates(!) ‒ he was able to manage and control all provinces, private estates, the 
land owners, the samurai, the court noblemen and the imperial court. The emperor 
and the supremacy of court aristocracy became nominal, and their main activity 
remained the practice of the arts. The Bushi empire prevailed in Japan up until 
1868. The appearance of the class of warriors not only brought about a change in 
the political structure, but also a change in artistic taste, the emergence of new 
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trends in philosophy and religion (zen) (Figure 22), and the formation of the new 
forms of social organisation (the so-called ie, the Bushi family model and the 
feudal system). 
 
Figure 22: The Great Buddha of Kamakura 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
The Mongol attacks on Japan (1274, 1281) were repressed by the Japanese 
(with the help of the ‘divine wind’, the  kamikaze), but the many years of unprofit-
able war preparedness put the Samurai into financial difficulty, thus weakening 
loyalty to the central power and lords began to become independent of the 
shōgun, which led to the fall of the Kamakura military government (bakufu) in 
1333. 
 
Heritage: samurai, shōgun (military government), Japanese feudalism, ie society, 
Zen Buddhism. 
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Muromachi period (1333‒1573): 
The attempt of the imperial court to regain actual power failed (1333‒
1336) and the domination of the samurai continued, but the Ashikaga family 
receiving the shōgun title was unable to bring the entire country under its control, 
therefore the power of the bakufu in Muromachi was limited to the central 
provinces, but that also weakened over time. From the fifteenth century onwards, 
more provincial unrest and local warfare erupted, and the central power slowly 
lost its management and control power. During the almost constant warfare in the 
provinces, a lord eventually became the sole ruler of the area, and the samurai in 
the province became his vassals. The lords of the area were independent of the 
shōgun and ruled entire provinces as kings (daimyo). Part of the period is also 
called the ‘warring states period’ (1467‒1560), implying that the independent 
estates thus created were in a constant struggle for territory and often there was a 
struggle for power within the provinces also. By the first third of the sixteenth 
century about 250 independent provinces had emerged, each with its own ruler. 
The fifteenth‒sixteenth centuries were the ‘classical’ period of the samurai. 
However, the period of fragmentation did not only mean warfare for the country. 
In addition to commercial articles, new knowledge and cultural flows came from 
the continent. Agricultural productivity increased, and individual products from 
different areas changed hands in steady markets ‒ in the emerging cities ‒ through 
a growing number of merchants. Larger cities were formed around the central 
castle of the provincial rulers in particular, with a large population of craftsmen 
and merchants, as a significant independent class. In the countryside, which was 
forced to become independent ‒ but left to pay its taxes ‒ rural communities 
began to form, which included the lives of peasants in closed, hierarchical and 
self-governing units. 
At that time (1543), the first Europeans (first Portuguese merchants and 
Jesuit missionaries, then Spanish and Dutch) arrived in Japan, and although the 
rifles and tobacco they brought soon became established, their effects could not 
be lasting and significant because, after several decades of presence, the 
foreigners were expelled from the country, along with the Christianity they 
spread. 
 
Heritage: feudalism, samurai warfare, cultural flourishing, castles, castle towns, 
merchants, urban culture, village communities, Europeans and Christianity 
in Japan. 
 
Unification of the country (1573‒1600): 
The time of fragmentation was inevitably followed by a period of 
unification. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the three great leaders 
had succeeded in uniting the country within fifty years and, the last unifier of the 
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country, Tokugawa Ieyasu and his successors, the Tokugawa Shōguns estab-
lished the most solid power structure in Japanese history, which stood for two 
and a half centuries (Figure 23).  
 
Heritage: moving from the conditions of the middle ages into those of the early 
modern age, organisation of a militarily, administratively, eco-
nomically and politically united state. 
 
Figure 23: The Osaka castle and garden originally built in the sixteenth century 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
Early Modern Period 
Edo period (1603‒1867): 
The Tokugawa (or Edo) period (1600‒1868) was the most peaceful period 
in Japanese history, with the completion of unification after medieval anarchy 
and the gradual exclusion of the outside world (Spanish, Portuguese missionaries 
and merchants) there was an opportunity for peaceful development without 
external influences. 
The Tokugawa ruled the country from the centre of their estates (Edo, 
today’s Tokyo), with their stable power based on their vast private estates 
(military force) and the vassal system with land redistributed on the basis of 
loyalty, in which the lords were personally dependent on the shōgun (Figure 24).  
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Stability was also served by a hierarchical, strictly regulated social system, 
with classes also separated by place of residence, strongly emphasised by the 
Neo-Confucian ideology, as well as the high-level institutional system and 
administration. The task of the samurai in peacetime, could not be fighting, but 
they still had a duty to practice their fighting skills and to continue their cultural 
and artistic training, which, along with the development of the townsmen, 
resulted in a high level of education. In the long peacetime, the samurai class 
virtually became civil officials. 
 
Figure 24: Castle built at the beginning of the Edo period in Himeji 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
The compulsory alternate residence of the court nobility (and their house-
hold and companions) in Edo gave a strong impetus to urban development, which 
was also supported by the development of trade and the moving of the samurai to 
cities (Figure 25). While the vast majority of the thirty million people (approx. 
85 percent) were basically part of an agricultural society, the autonomy of the 
villages, the wealthy farming class, and the rent system provided an almost 
unparalleled rise in living standards in Asia, and produced a large surplus of 
labour. Existing sophisticated financial management (trading houses of city 
merchants acting almost as banks) had also gone beyond the framework of 
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agrarian economy. People living in cities created their own genres of art (theatre, 
puppet theatre, urban popular literature, famous Japanese woodblock prints), 
which also became part of the national cultural tradition. 
Isolation did not only mean disadvantage to Japan (a lack of technical 
progress), it also resulted in a high level of undisturbed internal development that 
created the financial and material conditions for transformation, while creating a 
homogeneous national culture with strong traditions. A strictly controlled 
hierarchical society, a strong central state organisation, an agricultural economy, 
advanced financial management, significant urbanisation, an independent urban 
culture, a high level of legal understanding, statutory regulation and education. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the literacy of the Japanese population 
was at the same level as the most advanced areas of Europe at that time. In the 
midst of intellectual development and the emergence of new ideological and 
political concepts, the emergence of Japanese traditions 
(especially Shintō) helped to define Japanese cultural identity. Together with 
economic development, this laid the foundations for modern Japan. 
 
Figure 25: Interior of a house from the Edo period 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
By the nineteenth century, however, internal problems and external threats 
threatened the stability of the Tokugawa system. The financial situation started 
to worsen due to natural disasters, a series of bad harvests and other problems, 
causing general discontent. Social order also began to disintegrate, besides the 
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impoverishment of samurai and the enrichment of merchants, money and wealth 
stratification also penetrated into traditional villages. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the disadvantage of isolation was apparent: 
Japan was lagging behind in technical development. When the American, 
English, French and Russian ships calling for the opening of the country appeared 
on the Japanese coasts in the 1850s, the West’s technical superiority became 
apparent, and Japan could not go against them. In 1853, the US forced Japan to 
open the country, who were then followed by the great European powers. The 
discontent with the Tokugawa intensified after the appearance of foreigners and a 
strong anti-Tokugawa coalition was established coupled with the idea of an 
emperor-centred state in Shintō tradition, whose members recognised the 
dominance of the West and acknowledged the need for opening. After 
approximately one and a half decades of internal power struggles the samurai 
group, which gained power in 1868, declared a new era of openness and 
modernisation through its ‘restoration of imperial power’ programme (i.e. the 
abolition of military rule over the emperor that had existed for centuries). Meiji 
(‘Enlightened Governance’). 
 
Heritage: foundations of Modern Japan ‒ homogenisation of elements of Japanese 
culture, Japanese identity formation. 250 years of peace, peaceful internal 
development free from outside influences. Proto-industrialisation, 
economic development. 
 
Modern period 
Meiji period (1868‒1912): 
In 1868, a group of court noblemen and anti-Tokugawa samurai, with 
imperial support as their legitimacy, announced the transformation the country’s 
economic and state structure in a western pattern. The primary purpose of the 
reforms was to avoid becoming a colony or semi-colony, to remain independent, 
and to strengthen the country to become an equal power with the West. After the 
‘opening’ of Japan, it began a tense, controlled modernisation to eliminate its 
technical backlog and to build a modern state that occupies the same position in 
the world as all other powers at that time. 
The new government enacted fundamental reforms in all areas of life, with 
the help of foreign experts and consultants in the early years. Social restrictions 
and privileges were abolished, paving the way for the transformation of society. 
The feudal provincial system was abolished, and a modern administrative system 
was introduced, and, with the abolition of large estates, an extensive land reform 
was implemented. They also organised a modern public education system, 
announcing general compulsory education, with the establishment of secondary 
schools and universities. The introduction of general military conscription served 
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as the basis for setting up a new, modern, regular state army. The first measures 
included the construction and development of infrastructure: the establishment of 
a postal and telegraph network, the construction of railways and ports, and the 
establishment of the first industrial facilities (mines, textile factories). In 1871, 
the national currency (yen) was unified and the Japanese banking system was 
established. 
The Japanese Industrial Revolution began in the 1860s with the mechani-
sation of the textile industry and increased productivity. The period from 1868 to 
1884 laid the foundations for industrialisation, and the next period, from 1884 to 
the end of the First World War, became a period of rapid economic growth. After 
the surge of the light industry (1887‒1896), the main objective was to establish 
and develop the heavy industry (1897‒1906). The first iron and steel works were 
founded in 1890, when shipbuilding, including mechanical engineering, and min-
ing began. The first 30 km line between Tokyo and Yokohama opened in 1872 
and was followed by the construction of 7,800 km of railways by 1905. 
The development was mainly through public investment, i.e. most of the 
industries were set up as state-owned enterprises (light industry, railways, mines, 
shipbuilding, heavy industry), which were privatised after a decade, and therefore 
industrialisation was largely realised by the private sector. However, the govern-
ment continued to play an active role in economic development and directly sup-
ported Japanese business and industry in the emerging private economy. The Edo 
period provided a good foundation for economic development, with a large, edu-
cated population, an agricultural surplus, a monetarised economy, a financially 
strong trading class, and an educated samurai class performing managerial and 
organisational work. 
At the beginning of the Meiji period, there was intense Westernisation, 
Japan trying to adopt everything from the West, including ideas, cultural currents, 
and artistic styles. The advanced knowledge of the West fascinated the Japanese, 
and they wanted to learn everything: delegations travelled to Europe and America 
to study the relations, laws, economies, and political life of developed countries. 
Foreign experts were invited to Japan to conduct the transformation and Japanese 
students flocked to European universities. The knowledge accumulated in this 
way was put into practice immediately. However, from the 1880s, the issue of 
Japanese identity and the importance of traditional values came gradually to the 
foreground. Based on Confucian ethics, important documents and guiding decla-
rations of the period named traditional Japanese virtues as the most important 
principles: subject loyalty, filial piety, striving for harmony, modest and moderate 
conduct, diligent study and work, living morally, respect for the law, self-sacri-
ficing love for the homeland. This was accompanied by the elevation of the Jap-
anese national mythology and emperor cult to an official ideology, defining 
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Japan’s unique identity, while retaining its national character, spirituality, cultural 
traditions and heritage. 
The transformation of the political system accelerated in the 1880s. The 
constitution, largely based on the Prussian model (1889), stated that the emperor 
was the supreme power, but at the same time created a parliamentary system: the 
responsibilities of the bicameral parliament, the cabinet, ministers and the prime 
minister. The parties were formed in the 1880s, and in 1890 the first election was 
held in Japan. On the basis of limited voting rights (1.6 percent of the total pop-
ulation could vote), however, for the first time in Japan (and virtually in the whole 
of Asia for the first time), parliament could be convened on the basis of the prin-
ciple of popular representation. The parties underwent several transformations, 
renamed themselves, but represented certain interests, thus influencing political 
development with their voters. True, they were closely associated with some eco-
nomic interest groups from the outset, and this interweaving of politics and busi-
ness (and corruption) became a feature of Japanese public life. However, despite 
all its faults, the Japanese parliamentary system became operational in less than 
a decade, having completed a journey that took centuries in other countries. 
By the turn of the century, the establishment of the modern state structure 
and economy was complete, and this was where the golden age of modern Japa-
nese history began and continued until the end of the First World War: with con-
tinued economic development, prosperity and victories. 
However, the country's lack of raw materials caused difficulties. Japan was 
self-sufficient for centuries, but for the creation and development of modern 
industry it became heavily dependent on foreign trade. At the beginning of the 
Meiji period, it could only export agricultural products (tea, rice, tobacco, silk) in 
limited quantities, thus, the value of imports always exceeded that of exports. It 
was only after 1890 that the export of finished products began, but the shortage 
of raw materials remained a serious problem, the solution for which was increas-
ingly seen in expansion and external conquest. The economic question, the equi-
librium of the foreign trade balance, became a question of national security, 
which was partly solved by peaceful trade and partly by land acquisitions, i.e. by 
military means. The closest solution seemed to be China, with its vast area, raw 
materials, minerals, and outlets. This led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894‒1895, 
in which Japan had a seemingly smooth victory in ten months, and in addition to 
recognising its estates (Taiwan, Okinawa) and its interest (Korea) with China, it 
also received a huge indemnity and Chinese territories. Japan defeated the former 
civilisation centre and, in its place, became the great power of Asia. Japan was 
already, by international standards, clearly considered a conqueror and not one to 
be conquered. The island country’s distant goal was to replace China by estab-
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lishing a Japan-centred East Asian world order, called the Great East Asian New 
World Order. 
However, its expansion on the continent collided with Russian expansion, 
and this conflict lead to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904‒1905, in which Japan 
was once again victorious. This placed Japan on an equal footing with the West-
ern powers and concluded a series of equal treaties with them. The main area of 
interest for Japan was Korea and Manchuria, with the establishment of a protec-
torate in Korea in 1905 and the annexation of the country in 1910 without any 
international complications. From then on, Japan regarded itself as the eighth 
power of the world, which was also published in the contemporary international 
press. From this time on, European newspapers began to write about the ‘yellow 
peril’, stressing that other Asian countries could follow the example of Japan by 
modernisation and ‘self-awakening’, which could become a serious threat to the 
rule of the ‘whites’. In Asia, the victory of Japan was welcomed with ambivalent 
feelings: on the one hand, the victory of Japan was indeed encouraging for Asians, 
confirming that the West can be defeated, while, at the same time, Japan’s 
conquest was rightly regarded as the same imperialist aggression as of the 
Western superpowers. Japan already behaved as a colonising power in Asia, and 
this conduct of modern Japan (1890‒1945) and its memory, heavily burden the 
relationship between Japan and its East Asian neighbours to this day. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Japan had clearly become a Western type 
modern state, it belonged to the great powers, and Asia considered it to be 
Western (imperialist). 
By the turn of the century, Japanese society had also changed. Society, 
though remaining hierarchical, opened up and equal education, in principle, 
ensured equal opportunities for all. Learning (just as it is today) and the education 
of children played a central role in the life of society, especially that of the middle 
class, because careers and all later life were dependent on exams (just as it is 
today). Although the samurai status and practically its entire class ceased to exist, 
their spirituality and legends (authoritarianism, loyalty, self-sacrifice, heroism) 
became an integral part of Japanese national consciousness. In spite of western 
ideas, which mainly affected the lives of intellectuals and upper classes, Japanese 
society remained fundamentally collectivist. The Japanese family system, which 
had existed for centuries, continued to exist not only in the countryside and not 
just among the peasants ‒ the urban population, the former samurai, the economic 
elite all followed the traditional pattern, and even the newly formed companies 
were built on the family model. Japanese society itself is based on this pattern, 
and the state emerged as the highest level of community. 
 
Heritage: rapid modernisation, westernisation, modern nation state, industrialisation, 
urbanisation. From a feudal system to a modern industrial state, from 
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seclusion to catching up with the western powers. Westernisation AND 
a strong Japanese national identity based on Japanese tradition. Japan as a 
western power in Asia, nationalism. 
 
Taishō period (1912‒1926): 
The death of Emperor Meiji in 1912 marked the end of an era. The great 
transformation was complete, the great generations that had gone through it were 
extinct, and there were generations living in Japan, who were already born into 
the new world. Power was held in delicate balance by various elite groups (court 
officials, civil servants, the army, the fleet, parliamentary parties, economic 
elites). 
The parliamentary system in Japan was barely a few decades old at the 
time, and for that reason it lacked the ‘roots’ of centuries-old systems: the broad 
social embeddedness, stable voting base and background of the parties were not 
yet established. Although the parliamentary system seemed to work well, the 
parties had an intellectual circle, an ideology and a consistent political agenda, 
but did not really have a broad social base and support behind them, making 
political life virtually an arena of rivalry between elite groups. The various 
government crises, changes and transformations (no government lasted more than 
half a year) were inconceivable to the average person and they saw politics, which 
were increasingly intertwined with economic interests, as being useless, with 
subsequent serious consequences. The power of the parliament was not yet solid, 
the power of the emperor was absolute, which, however, could be taken 
advantage of at any time, not by him, but by the groups acting on his behalf 
(which did occur). 
For the new generations, the western form was natural in political life, in 
the structure of the state, in the economy, in foreign policy, and even in society. 
The successes achieved so far were attributed to westernisation, therefore the 
worshipping of the West was inevitable. The Taishō period, from 1912 to 1926, 
was referred to as the ‘liberal twenties’, a period of western-type parliamentary, 
civil governance. It is true that economic development decreased, slowed down 
compared to its flourishing during the World War, with bank failures and ‘rice 
riots’ also occurring, but these did not yet seem to be a threat to stability. The 
period saw the appearance of the western lifestyle, style, fashion and feeling in 
Japan, and the old norms began to loosen. Still, we can say that it was rather 
superficial because the core values remained intact: family model, hierarchical 
society, Shintō. All these later reappeared prominently in the life of the society 
after turning away from the ‘West’ as a result of the global crisis. 
The First World War also provided an opportunity for Japan to further 
expand its territories in East Asian. He used the war that broke out in Europe for 
his own purposes and made his own conquests under the pretext of the British 
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alliance. Japan attended the Peace Conference ending the World War, on the side 
of the victors, as one of the five great powers. It could retain his Chinese 
conquests and unquestionably became the leading power in the Far East. 
However, this was not a clear success for the country. The end of the 
wartime boom (1918) was a major blow to Japanese industry. After the war, 
Europeans returned to Asian markets, making it difficult for the growing war 
industry to adapt to the changed circumstances. Japan’s modern-day economic 
development (between 1880 and 1945) was the slowest in the 1920s, and 
moreover, serious crisis situations emerged on several occasions, even before the 
global economic crisis. Increasing dependence on foreign markets and 
commodities was a growing problem for the emerging Japanese industry. All this 
became a matter of national security, that is, military expansion and land 
acquisition clearly served the purpose of obtaining raw materials and markets. In 
the 1920s, however, the international situation based on peaceful negotiations and 
agreements was not conducive to aggressive foreign policy, and within Japan 
advocates of peaceful solutions prevailed (for the time being), therefore the 
Japanese economy was based on open world trade (globalisation), which then 
collapsed in 1929. 
Despite all its success, Japan was not treated as an equal party by the 
victorious powers, which led to growing anti-westernism in Japanese public 
opinion. Its former allies, especially the English, followed Japan's growing 
conquest of the Far East with increasing suspicion and fear, and they no longer 
viewed them as an ally but as a major rival. In particular, US behaviour became 
threatening to Japan, making it clear that in the Pacific, Japanese expansion was 
contrary to US interests, and a number of restrictive measures were introduces 
against the Japanese (restricting the Japanese fleet, suppressing Japanese interest 
in China, prohibiting Japanese immigration in the US). Japanese public opinion 
was not only dissatisfied with the government because of the inadequate 
management of the internal crisis, but also because it felt that the government did 
not sufficiently represent Japanese interests against the superpowers. 
Dissatisfaction with the government was accompanied by frustration from the 
West and a return to Japanese values, which led to a strengthening of nationalist 
tendencies. 
 
Heritage: Taishō democracy: new democratic, liberal trends in politics and society 
AND: the roots of radical nationalism, expansionism and anti-liberalism. 
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Shōwa period (1926‒1989) 
Before 1945: 
From 1926 a new era began: the reign of Emperor Shōwa (up until 1989). 
In 1930, Japan was hit hard by the crisis, foreign markets were lost, banks 
collapsed, production slumped, and Japan’s exports abroad protected domestic 
markets with high tariffs. In addition to the economic collapse, this also created 
a crisis of consciousness in the country: disillusionment with the West. 
Japanese values, national characteristics, elements of self-development 
came to the forefront, and western ideas and practices were increasingly rejected. 
Extreme political ideologies emerged and conquered that uniquely blended 
Japanese tradition with modern radical, extremist ideas (e.g.: the ‘Shōwa 
restoration’ theory, in which they wanted to achieve state socialism by a military 
dictatorship, and according to which the rich should sacrifice their wealth for the 
benefit of the public, and the politicians should return power to the emperor). The 
delicate equilibrium of the twenties was disrupted, and the increasingly powerful 
army began to fill the gap in power. During the 1930s, military leadership gained 
control of the civil government and by 1940 established a military dictatorship. 
In 1931, Japanese troops launched an offensive in China, initiating a nearly 
15-year long battle between China and Japan. In 1932, the Japanese puppet state 
Manchukuo was established in the occupied territories of Manchuria, which was 
not recognised by the League of Nations, in fact, it even excluded Japan from its 
members. In 1936, Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, which 
made it part of another federal system, but regardless thereof, it was fighting its 
own war. In 1937, the Japanese Empire occupied parts of China, launching the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. Internal politics became increasingly dictatorial: 
persecution of political opposition, nationalist and militarist propaganda, and a 
ban on parties (1940). The European War broke out in 1939, in which Japan did 
not interfere, but as a result of the German successes, in 1940 it became general 
opinion in Japan that Germany would be victorious, which led to the conclusion 
of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940. 
Japan’s strategic goal was to gain naval supremacy in the Pacific, followed 
by beneficial peace deals with the United States and Great Britain by acquiring 
strategic raw materials deposits. On 7 December 1941, Japan attacked the US 
Naval Base at Pearl Harbor and sent a message of war to the United States. Japan 
expanded continually in the Pacific region and reached the largest expanse of its 
empire by 1942: controlling most of China, Korea, almost all of South-East Asia 
(Indochina, Malaysia, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia) and the 
Pacific archipelago all the way to the coast of Australia. The Americans initiated 
a counterattack and, during 1943‒1944, reoccupied the Japanese territories. In 
February 1945, the US Air Force began a systematic bombing of Japanese 
military sites and cities. After the US deployed the atomic bomb against Japan 
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and the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, Japan surrendered 
unconditionally to the Allies on 15 August. The war in Japan claimed millions of 
lives and destroyed the country’s economy and infrastructure. 
 
Heritage: Militarism, wartime expansion, ultranationalism, war atrocities, kamikaze. 
 
American occupation (1945‒1951): 
The country was in ruins, the war devastation was greater than in Germany, 
the industrial districts were completely bombed, and industrial production 
stopped. The number of war casualties was over two million. During the Second 
World War, the country lost 26 percent of its national wealth, all its major cities 
were destroyed, and agriculture did not work due to lack of equipment and 
manpower. The country was facing famine and the status of its healthcare was 
catastrophic. However, the imperial speech (14 August 1945) announcing the war 
defeat contained an important inspiring thought and the programme for the 
Japanese was set out already among the ruins: ‘endure the unbearable’. Surviving, 
rebuilding, enduring humiliation, American occupation, and changing everything 
that led the country in the wrong direction. 
After the World War, Japan was essentially occupied by the US. Six and a 
half years of military occupation and guardianship followed, running smoothly 
without incident. The main goal was Japan’s transformation, i.e. to create a 
country that poses no threat to the US or to world peace and operates according 
to the principles and practices of Western democracy. The Americans initially 
expected resistance to reform efforts, but the Japanese enforced the invaders’ 
orders. By this time, the collective purpose of the Japanese people, which had 
always been able to mobilise society, was to rebuild and recover, and the 
Americans helped with that. This motivated Japan’s willingness to cooperate. 
The occupation was aimed at demilitarising and democratising Japan and 
meant reform and transformation of the same scale as the Meiji period 
modernisation. Land reform, human rights in the constitution, universal suffrage, 
limiting the emperor to a symbolic role, administrative decentralisation reform, 
education transformation, demilitarisation, political purging, secret free elections, 
parliamentary reform and renunciation of war. Today’s democratic Japan was 
created under this American leadership. The new Constitution, which came into 
force in 1947, and was written by American occupiers, is still the fundamental 
law of Japan. Its renowned Article 9 is the only one in the world to contain a 
provision for the renunciation of war, which, at the time, reflected the goals of 
the Americans with Japan (‘to become a peaceful state’) and coincided with the 
Japanese situation assessment (‘no more war’), but after a few years it started 
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causing problems (‘Is Japan allowed to have a defence force?’), with this problem 
still persisting today, as Japan has not yet amended its Constitution. 
However, in 1948, a change in world politics highlighted the value of 
Japan’s role for the US, which made it take an interest in Japan’s economic 
strengthening. The US partly released Japan’s war reparations, and partly helped 
with reconstruction with financial stabilisation policies and specific aid ‒ opening 
the US market to Japanese goods, transferring technology, granting loans and 
providing machinery. On 8 September 1951, 48 states signed a peace treaty with 
Japan in San Francisco, which recognised Japan’s full sovereignty, but withdrew 
Japan’s territorial claims in Asia and recognised Korea’s independence. The 
peace treaty entered into force in 1952 and marked the end of the American 
occupation. At the same time, Japan was defenceless and in need of US defence. 
Thus, at the end of the occupation, a bilateral security agreement was concluded 
between Japan and the United States, under which American bases remained on 
Japanese territory with troops stationed there. Japan is still the cornerstone of the 
US military system in East Asia. 
 
Heritage: formation of modern-day Japan, democratisation, demilitarisation, Ameri-
can alliance. 
 
The 1950s ‒ beginning of the ‘Japanese miracle’: 
Japan regained full sovereignty and set about adapting its transformed 
economy and its entire organisation to its national characteristics. The Korean 
War between 1950 and 1953 boosted the Japanese economy, Japanese commod-
ities were in demand, and the pre-war heavy industry could be re-launched. State 
control played an important role in the rebuilding of industry, pushing for the 
development of key sectors in the first phase of industrialisation, such as steel, 
shipbuilding, coal mining and the chemical industry. These industries were also 
supported by tax breaks, well-considered lending, soft government loans, and 
export incentives. The Japanese economy grew more than 10 percent annually, 
with GNP growth of 8.6 percent between 1951 and 1955, and 9.1 percent between 
1955 and 1960. Japan rapidly increased its exports, the main characteristic of 
which at that time was its cheapness and not its quality. 
In the 1950s, Japan became an independent, sovereign state within the US 
security system (UN member from 1956), with parliamentary democracy, a 
booming economy, and a clearly positive national strategy: now by peaceful 
means (strengthening the economy, increasing foreign trade), but Japan once 
again wanted to become one of the most advanced states. In this, the government 
was a worthy partner of a well-disciplined, hard-working Japanese society that 
was well mobilised for the common cause, which made the achievement of 
economic success all the more important, as it hoped not only to strengthen the 
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country ‒ and, of course, to improve its own living conditions ‒ but also to regain 
the prestige and favourable image of the country lost in the World War. 
 
The 1960s and 1970s: 
At the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the world marvelled at the rapidly 
developing country (Figure 26). It was then that it became clear that Japan was 
to be counted on as an economic power. The competitiveness of Japanese goods 
on the world market continued to increase with the improving of their quality. In 
the second half of the sixties, the production and export of cars started off at a 
tremendous pace and the electronics industry began to boom. Thanks to the export 
promoting policies and the still stable, low exchange rate of the yen, Japanese 
products flooded the world. The growth of the Japanese economy exceeded 10 
percent annually. 
 
Figure 26: Skyscrapers in Tokyo 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
By 1965, Japan was one of the most advanced industrialised countries, and 
by 1968, it had become the world’s third most advanced market economy, with 
virtually no mineral resources or energy sources. High economic growth was 
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facilitated by the role of the state in increasing, stimulating and managing the 
economy (providing favourable loans or subsidies, investments that are 
important for industrial development; export subsidies to increase Japanese 
exports) and industrial development activities of the Japan National Bank 
(utilising household savings). It played an important part, that Japan kept its 
military spending low (under 1 percent, while other countries spent more than 10 
percent of GDP on military spending) thanks to its ‘peace constitution’, and that 
the thus ‘remaining’ financial resources could all be spent on industrial 
development. Most of the profits were reinvested and used in innovation and 
technological development, which kept the Japanese industry steady and able to 
use the latest technology. This was the time when the ‘Japanese-type’ 
management and employment system was solidified, which, based on collective 
(Confucian) values ‒ cooperation, workplace harmony, loyalty and paternalism ‒ 
was able to manage and reconcile the interests of employers and employees 
without conflict, thus ensuring a consistently high level of production. The large 
number of well-educated, well-trained, diligent and hard-working population also 
contributed to the success, since after the war there was virtually a social 
consensus on the importance of economic development as a way to make Japan 
successful again, and to regain its good reputation and positive international 
image lost during the war. There is no doubt, however, that the state kept social 
spending low, meaning no welfare state was established, and although the 
standard of living of Japanese workers increased with the enrichment of the 
country, their quality of life (social welfare system, housing quality, 
infrastructure, leisure, health, pension, working time) was far lower than that of 
the population of similarly developed countries. 
In response to the energy crisis of the 1970s, Japanese industry responded 
by restructuring: launching industries that are less energy intensive but require a 
high degree of technical development and expertise: high technology, electronics, 
computing etc. The special Japanese management system and the employer 
system, which followed the traditions of Japanese community and family 
organisation, also played a significant role in the success. From the 1970s 
onwards, the government treated the improvement of living standards and then 
the quality of life for the Japanese population as a programme. Strict 
environmental laws were enacted from the 1970s to offset, halt and reverse 
serious environmental pollution. 
 
Heritage: economic growth, development, establishment of the post-industrial 
economy, ‘high-tech’ industries, Americanisation, unique Japanese culture 
and lifestyle.   
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Japan today 
Japan is now the world’s third largest economy, representing 14 percent 
of the world’s GNP. 7 percent of goods traded internationally on the world market 
come from here. More than 10 percent of all foreign direct investment in the 
world is owned by the country. 
The development of Japan after the Second World War is clearly 
dominated by elements of Western democracy, not only in the institutional 
system but also in everyday life. Changes have occurred in dressing and eating 
habits, housing conditions, and everyday life is also aided with the use of modern 
tools, and, of course, the forms and means of entertainment have also become 
‘Westernised’. By the turn of the millennium society had begun to change, with 
the behavioural habits and the language also changing; nowadays, the traditional 
framework of the Japanese lifestyle also seems to be changing. Social changes 
have resulted in the transformation of traditional living conditions, with large 
families disbursed due to internal migration and urbanisation, and small families 
taking their place; the ageing of the population is becoming increasingly 
worrying. Popular culture (fashion, film, entertainment, media, pop culture) 
became clearly Americanised (Figure 27). Today, Japan is most often described 
as follows: a modern (or even postmodern), highly developed, high-tech, 
democratic, pacifist and rich country. In this sense, Japan is part of the Western 
world. 
 
Figure 27: Advertisement in the Dōtonbori district (Osaka) 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
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At the same time, in today’s Japan we can see that traditional elements of 
Japanese culture are still important today, Confucian values (diligence, hard and 
persistent work, loyalty, respect, responsibility, paternalism) are decisive in work, 
education and social life (behaviour, etiquette and language use determined by 
hierarchy). All this continues to show the importance of the Japanese cultural 
tradition and thus the uniqueness of Japanese culture, the existence of an 
independent Japanese civilisation (Figure 28). 
 
Figure 28: Traditional yet modern Japanese serving 
Source: Photograph by ANDREA PÓR 
 
Based on its own cultural tradition, Japan was able to carry out modernisa-
tion in a ‘non-Western’ way, and thus pioneered the possibility of a ‘non-
Western’ modernity, the existence of a non-Western development model. In the 
second half of the twentieth century, the development of the ‘little tigers’ (several 
East Asian states began to develop economically, then socially and politically) 
was also realised similarly to the Japanese model by following, in part, the path 
of Western modernisation and partly, in a very different way. All this proves, 
quite convincingly, that there is a ‘non-Western way’ of modernisation, which 
was already mentioned in connection with Japan’s development. It is now widely 
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accepted that these states did not simply replicate the ‘Western model’, but, 
through their own system of social and cultural traditions, they implemented a 
modern form of capitalist development, thus demonstrating a new form thereof. 
Today, we can clearly speak of the existence of Asian capitalism, in which the 
Japanese example, explicitly or implicitly, played a major role in the region. 
‘Asian capitalism’ (based on Japan’s example, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and partly Vietnam) is a non-individualistic version of capitalist 
modernity, based on Confucian values such as collective solidarity and discipline, 
reinforced by the characteristics of network capitalism and family values. 
Economically, it means the control of public finances, the dominance of state-
owned companies in the strategic sector, the support of large ‘national’ private 
companies, heavily dependent on the export market, with a high proportion of 
retail savings (the latter is necessitated by the underdevelopment of the welfare 
state and the shortcomings of the social system). 
As a result of economic successes, Japan’s diplomatic prestige increased 
by the turn of the millennium, and there was a demand both domestically and 
abroad for a more active foreign policy and, possibly, for its military power, 
which would be more proportionate to its international significance. In recent 
decades, Japanese culture has become an ‘expanding’, exporting culture, mainly 
from the inclusive culture, which after the Second World War, in particular, saw 
the influx and often unrestricted spread of American mass culture. This 
phenomenon is known as soft power, which is an influence on the consciousness 
(culture, sports, science, fashion) of the people against the hard power of military 
and economic power. However, soft power is no less important, in fact it is 
economically significant. This was also recognised by the Japanese government 
when it announced the Cool Japan programme, Japan’s programme to become a 
cultural superpower. Elements of Japanese traditional and modern culture ‒ 
fashion, music, history and philosophy, martial arts, pop culture, trends, design, 
manga and anime, modern electronic devices and forms of communication ‒ are 
increasingly appearing in Western culture, creating trends and finding followers. 
Once considered an isolated, exotic civilisation, Japan has become a part of 
everyday life for today’s generations. 
The main question going forward is how Japan, after the Second World 
War, clearly committed to the West (and primarily to the United States), defines 
its current and future position, task and identity in Asia and the world. 
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2.2.3 Chronological table 

Date Event 
13000‒300 BCE Jōmon period: prehistoric cultures 
300 BCE ‒ 300 CE 
Yayoi period: Rice cultivation, metalworking and metal use, settled 
lifestyle, agricultural production, social stratification, regional 
organisation 
300‒538 Yamato period: the first state formation, a tribal alliance, with close ties with the Korean Peninsula and China. Kofun culture 
538‒710 
Asuka period: adoption of the Chinese civilisation ‒ Buddhism, 
Confucianism, Tao, writing, sciences, legal system, state 
organisation, concept of absolute imperial power 
538 (according to 
some 552) Introduction of Buddhism in Japan 
645 
Taika reforms: introduction of a new governmental and 
administrative system based on the Chinese model. New state offices, 
the concept of the emperor as absolute ruler, state land system instead 
of private property, tax system, court rank system 
710‒794 Nara period: the era of the centralised bureaucratic monarchy built on the Chinese model 
794‒1185 
Heian period: the emergence and development of Japanese national 
culture, the flourishing of court culture. With the transformation of 
the land tenure system, the formation, strengthening, empowerment 
of the samurai class, the emergence of feudalism 
1185‒1333 Kamakura period: the emergence of samurai power, feudalism 
1232 New samurai legal system 
1274, 1281 Mongol attacks on Japan 
1333‒1573 
Muromachi period: feudal fragmentation, ‘age of warring states’, 
flourishing of the samurai culture. Trade and urban development. 
Formation of village communities 
1543 The appearance of Europeans in Japan 
1573‒1600 Unification of the country 
1603‒1867 
Edo period: Early Modern Period. Internal unity, peace, confinement, 
economic and cultural development. The establishment of the 
foundations of modern Japan 
1853 The USA forces Japan to open the country ‒ internal controversy over its opening 
1868‒1912 
Meiji period: Announcement of the opening. Rapid modernisation, 
westernisation, creation of a modern nation-state, industrialisation, 
urbanisation. From a feudal system to a modern industrial state, from 
seclusion to catching up with the western powers. 
1889 Western type constitution 
1894‒1895 Sino-Japanese War (Japanese victory, Taiwan becomes part of Japan) 
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   
Date Event 
1904‒1905 Russo-Japanese War (Japanese victory, further acquisitions in East Asia and China) 
1910 Annexation of Korea 
1912‒1926 Taishō period: Taishō democracy: new democratic, liberal trends in politics and society. AND: the roots of radical nationalism, 
1926‒1989 Shōwa period 
Before 1945 ‘Dark valley’. Militarism, wartime expansion, nationalism (‘Japanese fascism’) 
1929 Global economic crisis results in a huge crisis in Japan, the rise of radical movements, the army gradually takes over 
1932 Occupation of Manchuria 
1937‒1945 Sino-Japanese War (Japan occupies territories in China) 
1940 Japanese-German-Italian Alliance ‒ Establishment of the ‘Axis Powers’ 
7 December 1941 Japan attacks US (Pearl Harbor, Hawaii) 
6 and 9 August 1945 US drops nuclear bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan surrenders unconditionally in a few days 
1945‒1951 American occupation: the formation of modern-day Japan, democratisation, demilitarisation, American alliance 
1947 
New (modern day) Constitution: the Emperor is only a symbol. 
Fundamental human rights, general secret ballot, the principle of 
popular sovereignty. Democratic political system. Article 9: 
i i f
1952 
Treaty of San Francisco: Japan regained its sovereignty but requires 
US military defence, Japan is strategically important to the US: US-
Japan Security Treaty. Japan is an important member of the US 
i
1950‒1953 Korean War: Economic benefit for Japan: its heavy industry could be revived, followed by other industries 
1950s 
The beginning of the ‘Japanese miracle’. Economic growth, 
development, Americanisation, unique Japanese culture and way of 
life. GNP growth: 1951‒1955: 8.6%, 1955‒1960: 9.1% 
1968 Japan is the third largest economy in the world 
1970 Japan is the leading manufacturer in the world: ships, radio, television 
1973 Oil crisis ‒ Japan: successful transition, restructuring to less energy-intensive, high-tech industries. Post-industrial economy, 
1980 Car, high-tech electronic products 
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3.1. The Indian Civilisation 
 
ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
 
3.1.1. Introduction 
 
The Indian civilisation is one of the oldest civilisations in the world which, 
unlike other ancient civilisations, still exists today. It was established and formed 
in the Indian subcontinent as a result of the diverse socio-economic-political 
processes that took place here. It includes the specific Indian phenomena of 
society and culture, Indian religions (Hindu, Buddhist, Jain and Sikh), Indian 
languages, philosophy, literature, architecture, fine arts and sciences ‒ all the 
material and spiritual values that the peoples living here created during the 
existence of civilisation. Although essentially unique to the geographical region 
of the Indian subcontinent, from the fifth century India also spread to much of 
Southeast Asia. Its cultural radiance is even broader: it has had a lasting impact 
through Buddhist religion and art in Central Asia and the Far East. Indian 
philosophy has found its way into the West in modern times, and its popularity is 
now experiencing its renaissance. 
After the prehistoric antecedents lasting to the middle of the second 
millennium BCE, the early period of almost a millennium of Indian civilisation 
included the appearance of the Aryans and their dispersal on the Indian 
subcontinent (from about 1500 to 600 BCE). Its typical features evolved between 
600 BCE and 1200 CE. The beginning of the thirteenth century was a milestone in 
the history of the subcontinent when the Islamic conquest and the ensuing Islamic 
statehood of India put an end to the exclusivity of Indian civilisation on the 
subcontinent. In the long term, this new situation has perpetuated the problem of 
coexistence, interaction and conflict between Indian and Islamic civilisation. 
Although the Indian civilisation did not cease to exist, with the expansion of 
Islam, its regional kingdoms were integrated into the political organisation of the 
subcontinent’s sultanates with the exception of the southernmost part of the 
subcontinent. With colonisation, another civilisation, the West, also appeared in 
the region. Between 1858 and 1947, the British Government of India first 
politically united the whole of the subcontinent, exercising its power partly 
directly and partly through semi-sovereign Hindu and Muslim principalities 
under the authority of the British Crown. Although colonial politics did not 
intervene in religious matters, it brought about so much change in economic, 
social, administrative and political terms that the foundations of civilisation could 
not remain intact, either. Indian civilisation survived but continued to bear the 
traces of coexistence with both Islamic and Western civilisation. 
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Independent India has a large part of the subcontinent and the heritage of 
all three civilisations. Its constitution states the complex nature of Indian culture. 
The traditional Indian civilisation exists within the geographical-political 
framework of the Republic of India, forming a majority but not a single culture. 
The destruction of the subcontinent’s self-sustaining economy and the deepening 
of Hindu-Muslim conflict under the British is a major legacy of India’s colonial 
past. At the same time, the political system, the use of the English language and 
the subcontinent’s basic communication system (train, post, roads, telecommuni-
cations) inherited from British India proved to be a significant resource in the 
modernisation efforts in which India achieved significant success. 
India is today the world’s largest functioning democracy, a dynamically 
developing economic power. By 2050, its per capita GDP is projected to be close 
to that of the United States. At the same time, its explosive population growth, 
which has tripled the country’s population since 1947, represents a huge burden. 
Other major problems include social inequality, rural poverty, environmental 
degradation and illiteracy (27.9% according to UNESCO data in 2011), which is 
particularly high among women. Due to the coexistence of the Hindu majority 
and the Muslim minority, the definition of being Indian is constantly on the 
agenda, and the enormous increase in the Indian diaspora also calls for new 
approaches to the concepts of being Indian and being Hindu. 
 
3.1.2. The role of geography and climate 
 
The geographical environment in which Indian civilisation emerged and 
evolved is the Indian subcontinent or, in present-day terms, South Asia. This vast 
area, which is about the size of Europe, is now shared by several countries: India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives; sometimes 
north-eastern Afghanistan which played an important role in the history of the 
subcontinent is also considered part of it (Map 9). It is separated from the rest of 
the Eurasian continent by natural frontiers: the 2,500-km stretch of the Himalayas 
to the north, the Hind Kush to the north-west, the extensive, almost impassable 
tropical forests to the northeast, and the Arakan Mountains. The peninsula is 
surrounded by seas: the Arabian Sea in the west, the Bay of Bengal in the east, 
and the Indian Ocean in the south. These geophysical features of the subcontinent 
provided for the distinct but not isolated development of the subcontinent. River 
valleys and high passes through the Himalayas, crossed by Tibetan ethnic groups, 
were a link with the Tibetan Plateau. In the northeast, the Manipur river valleys 
provided links to China, Burma (Myanmar) and Southeast Asia. In the west, the 
Bolan Pass opening on the Indus Valley on the edge of the desert mountainous 
region of Balochistan was used as a trade route and population movements also 
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took place there. But the most important link with the outside world was the 
Haibar (Khyber) Pass in the north-western corner of the subcontinent, in the 
Kabul River valley, the main transportation route for peoples and ethnic groups 
to the subcontinent, where most conquerors: Aryans, Persians, Greeks, Parthians, 
Scythians, Kushans, Afghans, Turks, Pathans entered Indian soil. 
 
Map 9: The Indian subcontinent 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The Indian branch of the Silk Road, the main continental trade route 
beyond the subcontinent, which proved to be crucial not only for trade in 
commodities but also for the spread of ideas, also led there. This was the 
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direction of the spread of Buddhism to the north and with it, the authoritative 
forms of Buddhist art that had evolved in India. 
The peninsula surrounded by seas has been involved in preserving relations 
with the outside world from prehistoric times through longitudinally passable 
beaches and maritime shipping and trade. The Indus Valley Civilisation had 
already established a maritime trade relationship with Mesopotamia by coastal 
shipping. The Indus Valley merchants transported their goods to Oman and 
Bahrain, from where they were transported by local merchants to the cities of 
Mesopotamia. Subsequently, there was regular traffic between the eastern 
provinces of the Roman Empire (primarily Egypt) and Indian ports. The 
emergence of early Southeast Asian kingdoms ‒ Suvannabhumi in today’s 
Myanmar, Mon Kingdom in southern Thailand, Funan and Chenla in Cambodia, 
Champa in Vietnam, Srivijaya in Sumatra and Java ‒ was largely facilitated by 
the development of maritime relations. Early connections were made from the 
port on the west coast, Bharukachcha (now Bharuch, Gujarat), and this role was 
later taken over by the ports on the east coast. 
The interior of the subcontinent is divided by rivers and mountain ranges, 
and archaeology has shown that the main cultural regions have closely followed 
these natural geographical boundaries since prehistoric times. The northern 
region, bounded on the north by the Himalayas, to the south by the Narmada 
River and the Vindhya Range, covers the vast plains of the Indus and Ganges. 
The Indus Basin was the cradle of the Indus Valley Civilisation, and then its upper 
stream region, the Punjab (“five rivers”), was the first settlement area of the 
Aryans arriving on the subcontinent. Historically, the alluvial plain of the Ganges 
and its tributary, the Yamuna, played a key role. This fertile river valley is India's 
most prolific region, creating favourable conditions for the emergence of large-
scale states due to both its economic strength and the better accessibility to the 
lowlands. The central region is the difficult-to-cross mountainous forested area 
of the Deccan Plateau divided by ravines, stretching between the rivers Narmada 
and Krishna. It was a scene of strong regional kingdoms and prominent dynasties, 
where the political and cultural influence of the northern and southern regions 
prevailed to varying degrees, and the indigenous tribal culture survived until 
recently and even to this day, in closed spots. The region south of Krishna carries 
the typical South Indian cultural features that have established and still maintain 
the traditional distinction between North and South. Longitudinal zones have 
formed in the coastal strips have developed longitudinal zones, which are defined 
by the cultural features of the narrow coastal strips with the hinterland of the West 
and the East Ghat behind them. 
In addition to the physical geography of the subcontinent, there is a sacred 
geography in Indian tradition where the hills of India are celebrated, primarily the 
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snow-capped peaks of the Himalayas (Sk. ‘the land of snow’), where Indian 
mythology places the heavenly abode of the gods. 
The rivers that ensure the fertility of the earth are religiously honoured and 
personified by goddesses. Their water is also closely related to ritual purity, so 
immersion in rivers and scattering of the ashes of the dead into the river are 
among the best-known Hindu rites. The holiest river, the Ganges or Gangá, 
originates in the Himalayas and flows into the Bay of Bengal. Its course is 
accompanied by a chain of pilgrimage sites: Haridwar, where it leaves behind the 
Himalayas and enters the plains; Prayagraj, formerly known as Allahabad and 
still earlier as Prayag, where it meets the Yamuna, and where the great Kumbh 
Mela pilgrimage takes place at the confluence every 12 years (it is estimated that 
120 million pilgrims attended it in 2013); and above all, Varanasi or Kashi, the 
holiest Hindu city, the centre of Hindu culture (Figure 29). To the conceptions of 
the sacred geography of the subcontinent, as old as the Hindu religion itself, a 
new one was added during the nineteenth-century independence movement, when 
the whole of India began to be regarded as the holy land of Hinduism and 
personified by the Hindu goddess Bharat Mata (Mother India). This symbol was 
fraught with political overtones and provoked protest from religious minorities 
due to the association of Indian land with the Hindu religion. 
The subcontinent's climate is warmer than its geographical location would 
justify it, as the Himalayan mountain range hampers both northern winds and 
monsoon winds from the south-west. The monsoons drive heavy rain clouds over 
the subcontinent for three months. After months of scorching heat, people rejoice 
at the arrival of the much-awaited, life-giving rain. The lakes and ponds, now 
filled with water, are covered with lotuses, lands turn green, trees bloom, and 
intoxicating scents float in the air. Traditional topoi in poetry and painting: 
screaming peacocks, the beautiful young lady hurrying in the rain or doing her 
make-up before meeting her beloved indicate that this is the season of love in 
India. 
However, precipitation is not evenly distributed across the subcontinent. 
Most of the rain falls on the southern side of the Himalayas and the coastal side 
of the Western Ghats and the heavy rainfall may cause devastating floods, while 
there is a tropical savannah inside the Deccan Plateau and hot desert climate 
prevails in the Thar Desert of the north-west. Due to the imbalance of climate and 
rain, a major duty of kings in the Indian civilisation was to ensure the fertility of 
the lands. In the royal capitals, artificial water reservoirs and the construction of 
dams on the rivers provided the necessary amount of water between monsoon 
periods. Their design and operation required a high level of technical knowledge 
and was among the fundamental achievements of civilisation. Wells served as an 
additional source of water. Most villages had a simple dug well from where 
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women carried the water. At the same time, large stepwells specific to Indian 
civilisation were built in the driest western parts of the Indian subcontinent. These 
multi-storey underground palaces provided access to groundwater throughout the 
year, cooling during the hot season, and the opportunity to thank the gods for all 
of this, so their socio-religious significance was not negligible either. 
 
Figure 29: Morning rite on the Ganges in Varanasi 
Source: Jorge Royan. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India_-_Varanasi_ 
ba%C3%B1o_Ganges_-_0072.jpg 
 
Routes across the subcontinent played a huge role in the settlement of the 
region, the development of Indian civilisation, trade and the spread of religions, 
especially Buddhism. The main trade route was the ‘northern road’ connecting 
the Ganges Valley with Gandhara and further with Silk Road in the north-west, 
with branches in the east to China and the old port of the Bay of Bengal, Tamra-
lipti (now Tamluk, West Bengal). An important land route connected the royal 
capital Pataliputra (now Patna, Bihar) in the eastern Ganges basin, with the west 
coast port city, Bharukachcha, from where merchants headed to the Arabian and 
East African coasts. 
Inside the peninsula, the “southern route” initially led through pre-Aryan 
areas. However, land roads could only be used during the dry season as they 
became impassable during the monsoon. The traveling monks sought shelter in 
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caves until the end of the rainy season. These were the places where the first rock-
cut Buddhist caves were established and the shrines themselves the first 
manifestations of this form of sacred architecture so characteristic of Indian 
civilisation. There were many dangers to land trade, therefore, gaining control 
over trade routes and junctions was a major driving force behind the expansion 
ambitions of the kingdoms in the subcontinent. 
The physical conditions of the subcontinent persisted, although this does 
not mean that there were no changes. In the last two and a half millennia, the 
rivers that irrigated the plains of the subcontinent, which are still unregulated, 
have changed their course from time to time, and have thereby profoundly 
influenced the existence of early cultures and state formations established on 
flood-based economy. Due to the deposition of large amounts of sediment, shifts 
have also occurred in the river estuaries. The significant change in the direction 
of the Indus and the desiccation of the Sarasvati River, coupled with the change 
in the direction of the monsoon wind, played a decisive role in the decline of the 
Indus Valley Civilisation. The eastern shift of the monsoon may have contributed 
to the gradual expansion of the Thar Desert and the drying up of the forests sur-
rounding the lower Indus. The great Indian epics, Ramayana and Mahabharata 
testify that most of the subcontinent was once covered with dense forests. In 
ancient literary works, the forest, as an abode of hermits, forest animals and 
demons, as a scene of wars and battles, appears symbolically in contrast to the 
sacred world of cities and villages involved in civilisation. 
 
3.1.3. Languages of the subcontinent 
 
Among the language families present in the Indian subcontinent, the Indo-
European languages, which have been present since at least the second millen-
nium CE, are the predominant languages through the Indo-Aryan languages, 
which are part of the Indo-Iranian languages. This includes Sanskrit (‘complex’, 
‘ornamented’), the archaic form of which was spoken by the Aryans coming from 
the north-west on the subcontinent. Aryan (meaning “noble”) is the self-
designation of the speakers of the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European 
language family; it does not refer to ethnic belonging. India’s oldest sacred texts, 
the Vedas, and the vast religious, philosophical, scientific literature of ancient 
India were written in Sanskrit. Sanskrit grammar and phonetics were described 
in the world's first regular grammatical work (Astadhayayi) by Panini, who lived 
in the fifth century CE.  
With the spread of the Aryans, the Sanskrit language became widespread 
throughout northern India, and as they continued to spread, simplified local 
variants, the Prakrit languages developed. The best known of these is Pali, the 
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sacred language of Southern (Theravada) Buddhism and the Pāli Canon. The 
Indo-European languages spoken today in the subcontinent originate from the 
Prakrit languages: Hindi in North and Central India, Gujarati and Rajasthani in 
the west, Punjabi and Sindhi in the north-west; the Dardic languages including 
Kashmiri in the northernmost corner, Pahari languages in the Himalayas, Bihari 
Bengali, Oriya and Asami in the East, Marathi in the South and Singhalese in Sri 
Lanka. The Iranian languages are represented by Balochi and Pashto in the west 
and north-west, and Kafiri or Nuristani in the far north-west of the subcontinent. 
The official language of the Mughal Empire was Persian. Among the Indo-
European languages used on the subcontinent, the widespread use of English as 
an official language and modern lingua franca is worth mentioning. 
The languages belonging to the Dravidian language family, which have 
inscriptional evidence from the beginning of our time, are concentrated in the 
southern part of the subcontinent, but their remains can also be found in Central 
India (Gondi) and Balochistan (Brahui). The South Indian Dravidian languages 
include Tamil, Kannada, Malayalam and Telugu, in all of which rich literature 
has been produced. We know very little about the early history of Dravidian 
speakers. It is believed that the population of the Indus Valley Civilisation was 
made up of Proto-Dravidian speakers who migrated there around 4,500 BCE from 
the Iranian plateau and were gradually pushed south by the settling Aryans. 
However, since the Indus Valley writing remains undeciphered as yet, this 
question cannot be answered with certainty based on our current knowledge. 
What is certain is that the Dravidians, like the Aryans, have no clear ethnic 
characteristics, which virtually excludes their archaeological identification. At 
the same time, Dravidian names and loanwords in Sanskrit confirm the presence 
of the Dravidians from the earliest stages of Vedic literature, suggesting that they 
had arrived in the subcontinent earlier than the Aryans. 
The Austro-Asiatic languages (Munda in Central and Eastern India, Khasi 
in Assam) have written evidence only from the last few centuries. Judging from 
loanwords, however, their speakers are likely to have arrived in the subcontinent 
before the Dravidian and Aryan language groups. Ethnic groups representing the 
Tibeto-Burman branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family crossed the 
Himalayas into the northern and north-eastern peripheries of the subcontinent. 
Their presence is indicated by inscriptions in the Kathmandu Valley since the 
fourth century CE. Tibetan and Newari of the Tibetan-Burmese branch are spoken 
today in the Himalayas. 
 
  
3.1. The Indian Civilisation 
141 

3.1.4. Chronology of the History of Indian Civilisation 
 
Concept of time, chronology, sources 
 
Establishing the historical dates of Indian civilisation has been difficult 
since the beginning of the research. In Indian tradition, there was no systematic 
historiography such as in Europe, China, or Islamic culture. Little or no 
importance was given to the timeliness of the events and the historical role of the 
individual. Although there is a historical tradition, mainly in the form of royal 
lists and ancestry lines (genealogies), which, however, are embedded in the myths 
and legends of the Puranas (“old stories”, encyclopaedic works of the Indian 
cosmological, mythological and historical tradition), often contradictory and 
rarely relate to specific persons, dates, events, or locations. The reason for this 
lies in an approach that relativises the earthly world of phenomena. There is a 
cosmic logic in the narratives of Indian civilisation about the past, which places 
terrestrial time and man on earth in the perspective of the operation of the 
universe, so it is understandable that its significance becomes relative or dwarfed 
from this point of view. In the world conception of the Indian civilisation, time is 
not linear, but cyclic, where the cycles of existence and destruction (withdrawal 
or dissolution) of the universe are eternally interchanged. Cosmological time is 
measured in the days and years of the gods. A cycle of existence (Sk. kalpa, ‘eon’) 
corresponds to one day of the god Brahma, which is equal to 4.32 billion earth 
years, followed by Brahma’s night of the same length (cycle of dissolution). A 
kalpa is made up of 1000 great periods (mahayuga), each of which consists of 
four epochs (yuga). They (Satya, Treta, Dvapara and Kali Yugas) are not of equal 
length, but gradually decreasing duration, and are characterised by the gradual 
deterioration of order, law, and morality. The longest is Satya Yuga or the Golden 
Age when people were closest to the divine laws, and the shortest and morally 
most corrupt is Kali Yuga when the world is ripe for renewal. The latter occurs 
as a result of divine intervention and is followed, after an interval of dissolution, 
by a new cycle of the four yugas. In one single day of Brahma, the four yugas 
revolve a thousand times. The events that take place in them ‒ including the 
incarnations of the gods, the appearance of Buddhas and Jinas, the great wars and 
the turning points in history ‒ are identical, so the events that the man on earth 
experiences in his or her life had already taken place infinite times in the past and 
will occur again in future world epochs. One year of Brahma consists of 360 such 
days, and his life, however long it may seem, is finite with 311 trillion and 40 
billion years of earth time, a mere flash for the universe as a whole. Brahma, 
however, is not alone, in the worlds of the universe, a multitude of Brahmas are 
born and disappear subject to the causal relationships of the material world. 
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The traditional Indian view of history is primarily shaped by the Puranas 
and the great epics. The formation of the Puranas in the first version is estimated 
to have taken place from the fourth to the tenth centuries CE, but much of the 
stories goes back to ancient times. The epics and other literary works also contain 
historical references, but the dates of most of them are difficult to establish and 
their period of creation often spans hundreds of years. Historical research, the 
most important sources of which are dated inscriptions and coins, seeks to 
compare data extracted from Puranic and epic literature with dated persons and 
events, which, however, is only successful in some cases. Archaeological 
research has been ongoing since the establishment of the Archaeological Survey 
of India (1861), but the vast expanse of Indian civilisation and the continued 
habitation and cult use of holy sites hinders the full exploration of even the most 
important sites. It is estimated that most of the material and artistic heritage of 
Indian civilisation is still buried underground today, so any major discovery may 
profoundly change our view of civilisation in the future. 
 
Periodisation 
 
There are no universally followed periods in the history of the Indian 
civilisation. Its main phases used to be described earlier as Hindu, Muslim and 
British periods. However, this was misleading because it may have seemed as 
though the periods of Hindu, Islamic and British civilisations were consecutive 
eras in the history of the subcontinent, yet the Indian civilisation did not cease to 
exist with the advent of either the Islamic or the European civilisation. The 
division of antiquity, medieval times, and modern times is also widespread and 
is still partly used today, despite the fact that the Indian socio-economic features 
associated with the great historical periods differ significantly from those of the 
West. Another common method is periodisation by royal dynasties, the main 
disadvantage of which is that no period in the history of Indian civilisation can 
be linked to any single dynasty since the whole of the subcontinent was first 
united by British India (official English name: the Indian Empire). Therefore, 
recent and present historiography usually apply periodisation with a mixed set of 
criteria, taking into account the tendencies of social and economic processes that 
span dynasties. However, in the absence of a generally accepted system, 
periodisation can vary from one school of history to another, or even from one 
historian to another. The major periods in the history of Indian civilisation, using 
a mixed set of criteria, are: 
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Prehistory until c. 1500 BCE 
• Indus Valley Civilisation c. 2600‒1900  
Antiquity 
• Vedic period c. 1500‒600 BCE 
• Second urbanisation c. 600‒200 BCE 
• Early classical period c. 200 BCE ‒ 320 CE 
• Classical period c. 320‒650 
Middle Ages 
• Early Middle Ages (Hindu dynasties in the north) c. 650‒1200 
• Late Middle Ages (Delhi Sultanate) c. 1200‒1526 
Modern history 
• Early Modern Age (Age of the Mughal Empire) 1526‒1858 
• Modern Age (British Empire in India and Independence) from 1858 to 
the present 
 
The main features of the historical periods 
 
Human settlement has left archaeological traces on the Indian subcontinent 
since prehistoric times. The first significant civilisation was the Indus Valley 
Civilisation, one of the great river cultures of the ancient East, besides 
Mesopotamia and Egypt. Its immediate antecedents were the Neolithic 
settlements on the eastern side of the Bolan Pass, dating back to around 7000 BCE. 
The prehistory of the Indus Valley Civilisation began around 3300 BCE, and its 
mature urban phase dates back to 2600‒1900 BCE. In its vast territory, comprising 
areas of today’s Pakistan (Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan), north-western India 
(Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat, Rajasthan) and north-eastern Afghanistan, more than 
two thousand cities have been detected. Its total population is estimated at two to 
five million. The decline of the civilisation is probably due to climatic reasons, 
with its cities abandoned by 1700 BCE. 
The decline of Indus Valley Civilisation coincided with the emergence of 
Indo-Aryan speaking ethnic groups on the subcontinent, followed by the rise of 
Vedic culture (c. 1500‒600 BCE) parallel with the expansion of the Aryansin 
northern India. 
At the time of the Second Urbanisation that took place in the Ganges 
Valley (c. 600‒200 BCE), the Buddhist and Jaina religions emerged, Hellenistic 
and West Asian impacts could be felt as a result of Greek and Persian conquests 
and contacts, the first great empire of the subcontinent, the Maurya Empire was 
created (Map 10) and the Tamil culture fist flourished in South India. 
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Map 10: The Maurya Empire c. 250 BCE 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The early classical period (c. 200 BCE ‒ 320 BCE) added Central Asian 
impacts to Hellenistic influences and the second period of prosperity for 
Buddhism under the auspices of the Kushan Empire. The classical period (c. 320‒
650) witnessed the first imperial flourishing of Hindu religion and culture within 
the Gupta state (Map 11).The period hallmarked with the Gupta-Vakataka 
dynasties is also known as the Golden Age of North India, which brought the 
unparalleled flourishing of science, fine arts and literature within a sophisticated 
urban culture. In South India, the Pallava dynasty gained power by establishing 
maritime relations with Southeast Asia.  
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Map 11: The Gupta Empire and its neighbours c. 400 CE 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The early Middle Ages (c. 650‒1200) were characterised by political 
fragmentation and the rise of Hindu dynasties, with increasing invasions of 
Islamic conquerors in the north. The late Middle Ages (c. 1200‒1526) bring the 
foundation and expansion of the Delhi Sultanate and its successor states as well 
as an increase in the proportion of Muslim population. Hindu religiosity was 
characterised by the spread of the bhakti movement which focused on a personal 
devotion to god. The rise of the Sikh religion in Punjab was partly related to the 
bhakti movement. In the South, the Chola Empire emerged as a dominant power, 
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whereas during the spread of Islam in North India, Vijayanagar became the 
representative of Hindu statehood. In the north, the Rajput principalities fought 
against the expanding Islamic power. 
 
Map 12: The greatest expansion of the Mughal Empire 
(late seventeenth, early eighteenth century) 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
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In the early modern age (1526‒1858), new Islamic conquerors, the 
Mughals, created an Islamic empire that was more powerful than its predecessors 
stretching over almost the entire subcontinent (Map 12), against which, however, 
resistance emerged in the form of the Sikh and Maratha states. 
 
Map 13: British India in 1906 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
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This was also the age of colonisation: this is when European traders set 
foot in the coastal areas. The British emerged victorious from the rivalry of West-
ern powers here, leading straight to the formation of the British colonial empire 
in India. The suppression of the Indian Rebellion in 1858 was a milestone as the 
British Crown took over the colonial government from the East India Company 
(Map 13). The unfolding independence movement led to the proclamation of the 
independence and the partition of India and Pakistan after World War II in 1947. 
 
3.1.5. The main chapters in the history of Indian civilisation 
 
Material culture of the Indus Valley Civilisation 
 
Known for its large and well-planned cities, the Indus Valley Civilisation 
represents the first period of urbanisation in the history of the subcontinent. 
Although the connection between the achievements of this civilisation or its 
creators and the later civilisation of the subcontinent is not known, the large 
number of comparable phenomena allows the assumption of some continuity that 
has not yet been clarified. Answering the open questions is hindered by the fact 
that our knowledge is based almost exclusively on the interpretation of 
archaeological evidence. The Indus script is still undeciphered, and there are 
contradicting views even about its nature. According to one hypothesis, it is 
pictographic and syllabic and was used to record an early Dravidian language, 
while according to another assumption its symbols do not constitute a writing 
system. Although the number of known symbols is over four hundred, they are 
inscribed on seals, small tablets, and ceramic pots, and the average length of the 
inscriptions is only 4‒5 characters. Thus, the question of whether the Indus Valley 
Civilisation had a writing system to record a language cannot be answered beyond 
any doubt. Many researchers believe that a civilisation of such size and 
organisation could not have existed without writing, and they presume that some 
perishable material was used for writing, as a result of which all written records 
have been destroyed. 
Across the whole expanse of the civilisation, we can observe a high degree 
of planning and regulation, indicating the existence of strong central power. 
However, we have no information about the nature of that power. The most 
important cities (Mohenjo Daro, Harappa, Lothal, Kalibangan) were divided into 
a citadel and a lower city, both surrounded by walls. It is assumed that the citadel 
may have served as the residence of the elite, but no trace of a ruler’s palace or 
large tomb was found. The most famous structure in the citadel of Mohenjo Daro, 
known as the Great Bath, a brick-covered tank made water-resistant with 
bitumen, triggers an association with South India’s temple tanks for many. We 
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can probably assume that the builders of the Great Bath were driven by some 
ritual goal. Tiny cells surrounded the tank that might have been used by priests. 
However, no building was found in any of the cities that could be clearly 
identified as a temple. 
In the lower town, the streets running north-south and east-west formed a 
regular mesh and intersected at right angles. This kind of urban planning, and 
even the hierarchy of streets, can be recognised much later in the descriptions of 
the Vastu Shastras (architectural manuals) and the urban planning based on them. 
In the lower city stood most of the residential buildings, often two-story buildings 
and almost closed to the street, with living quarters built around an inner 
courtyard, much like the typical medieval and early modern dwellings of wealthy 
North Indian urban merchants (haveli). The water supply and the drainage system 
unmatched in the era are striking. There were public wells in the cities, but the 
larger houses had their own wells inside the gate (a medieval example for this is 
the old city of Ahmedabad, Gujarat). Many houses had bathrooms, and sewage 
was drained into covered underground sewers on the main streets. The flat roofs 
of the houses were used for various purposes, like today. The lower town was 
inhabited primarily by traders and craftsmen who lived in well-defined 
neighbourhoods. The crowded residential quarters of craftsmen, shopkeepers, 
workers, and peasants were located in the outer parts of the cities. Occupational 
(caste) organisation is a typical feature of South Asian urban morphology in 
historical periods, as are city walls and the city gates at the end of the main roads. 
In Harappa, workshops of various craftsmen were discovered: potter’s kilns, 
textile dyers’ vats, metalworkers’ smelters, shell carvers’ workshops and bead 
drills. Jewellery recovered from burials ‒ belts, necklaces, etc. made from 
multiple rows of beads – closely resemble jewels depicted in female figures of 
early Buddhist art (e.g., on the balustrade of the Bharhut stupa in Madhya 
Pradesh). Among the figurative representations, the humped bull (zebu) was very 
common, which is also of great importance in the later cultures (zebu was 
domesticated on the Indian subcontinent). A small number of bronze figures 
unearthed in Indus cities testifies to the knowledge of the lost wax method of 
bronze casting. 
The Indus Valley Civilisation was highly advanced in measuring height, 
weight, and time. A uniform system of weights and measures was in the entire 
area of civilisation throughout its 700 years of existence. The massive walls 
surrounding the cities, the huge brick platforms, large grain storages, warehouses 
and dockyards on the riverbank reflect the advanced level of architecture and 
construction technology. The design of port buildings testifies to an accurate 
knowledge of tides and currents.  
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Despite the high degree of urbanisation, most of the population lived in 
villages. The dominance of the countryside and the role of the villages as the main 
promoters of Indian civilisation continued in the historic period. Based on the 
excavated human skeletons, the anthropologically mixed population was 
dominated by the Proto-Australoid and the Mediterranean types. The primary 
source of living was agriculture, with wheat, barley and legumes as the main food. 
Domestic animals included cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, pigs and possibly 
poultry. The harvested crops were transported on ox or buffalo-drawn two-
wheeled carts, similar to what we see in India today. The annual flooding of the 
Indus and Sarasvati water systems, as well as the water from the wells, were used 
in farming. The plough had been known before the urban phase of the civilisation. 
Trade played a key role. This ensured the connection of the towns with the 
hinterland and the supply of the necessary raw materials ‒ soapstone (steatite), 
lapis lazuli, carnelian, copper, tin, gold. The cities of the civilisation were linked 
by the rivers, as evidenced by the granaries built on the banks of the rivers, where 
the produce of the land for urban consumption was delivered. Judging from the 
occurrence of the Indus Valley finds, land-based trade relations were established 
with the interior of the subcontinent, Afghanistan, the coastal region of the 
Persian Gulf, and Mesopotamia. 
 
Figure 30: Male figure sitting in yoga pose. Indus Valley seal, Mohenjo Daro 
(Pakistan), 2600‒1900 BCE 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shiva_Pashupati.jpg 
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The religion of the Indus Valley Civilisation cannot be reconstructed, but 
it is certainly noteworthy that many elements of Indus Valley culture reappear in 
the later religions of the subcontinent. The striking presence of water in the cities 
and the “Great Bath” may suggest that water may have played a ritual role already 
at that time. The terracotta female figurines can be related to the mother goddess 
figures of the farming communities in Balochistan. The female figures depicted 
in of some of the seals ‒ the female figure among the branches of a tree or the 
group of seven female figures ‒ indicate the Indus Valley roots of the Mother 
Goddess, who was to play a major role in later Hindu cult, and the Indus Valley 
origin of the ancient symbolism based on the parallelism of female fertility and 
the reproductive capacity of nature. Phallic representation, the basic symbol of 
the later Shiva cult, and ring stones indicating female fertility appear already in 
the Indus Valley. The figures of the seals sitting in yoga posture suggest the 
ancient roots of the mode of sitting, and perhaps the meditation technique, used 
in later Indian religions (Figure 30). Representations of the seals include the 
short-stemmed cross and the swastika. The broken or angled cross, or swastika in 
Sanskrit, (from the words su + asti, ‘well-being’), is an ancient symbol of the sun 
and fertility in Asia, a sacred symbol used in the religions of Indian civilisation, 
Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism; its original meaning had nothing to do with 
the racist power symbol in twentieth-century Nazi Germany. The Indus Valley 
people initially buried their dead, and later cremation and placement of the ashes 
in urns spread. 
 
The Vedic Aryan lifestyle, religion and literature 
 
The Aryans ‒ tribes, clans, ethnic groups ‒ arriving in the Indian subcon-
tinent brought radical changes: horseback riding, shepherding and fighting with 
horse-drawn carts, which secured their superiority over the local population. In 
their religion, brought with them from outside India, they worshipped many gods 
and goddesses. Hymns, prayers, songs addressed to their gods as well as magical 
formulas and commentaries to the sacred texts resulted in extensive oral poetry 
and prose literature, which was later organised into and handed down in 
collections. These literary works are the main source of reference to the Vedic 
age, i.e., the age of the Aryans appearing in India and their dispersion of North 
India. The loose tribal alliance of the Aryans covered a mixed population which 
only had its language in common, so their anthropological identification is not 
possible from archaeological finds. Apart from this, their archaeological traces 
are small, as they were nomadic shepherds and did not build cities. Their main 
occupation was cattle breeding, initially, they left farming to the local population. 
Their round or rectangular huts were built of bamboo and straw, and their houses 
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and pens were surrounded by walls built from a palisade and rammed earth. Texts 
dating back to the period of settling the Ganges Valley already refer to larger, 
wooden, multi-room houses surrounded by gardens and settlements fortified with 
ramparts. However, there is no archaeological evidence to support this data. 
The textual sources of the Vedic age are the Vedas (hence the name), the 
oldest and most sacred religious and literary works of the Aryans. The core of the 
four Vedas — Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda, and Atharvaveda — consisted of 
a collection of hymns, to which later extensive commentary literature was added. 
Some of this included the rules and explanations of sacrificial rites (Brahmanas), 
others explained the symbolism of the sacrifices (Aranyakas), still others 
contained theoretical and philosophical speculations (Upanishads). The oldest 
hymns of the Rigveda were composed around 1500 BCE in the Punjab, while the 
geographical horizon of the three later Vedas reflects the process of settlement of 
the Ganges Valley. The Vedas originated and preserved in the oral tradition, and 
their most authentic versions are still passed on verbally. While manuscripts were 
written since the Middle Ages, the continuity of oral tradition has ensured the 
preservation of the over three thousand years old texts in their unaltered form. 
Complex recitation systems were created that provided for the literal 
memorisation of texts, including precise pronunciation of sounds, pitch, and 
accent. This system, which is unique in the world, was declared by UNESCO in 
2003 as part of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity. Even later well into 
the historic period, orality remained a deeply rooted tradition of the Indian 
civilisation. 
At the heart of Aryan religious practice were sacrificial rites that involved 
the sharing of sacrificial offerings with the gods and members of the community. 
During the fire sacrifices, animals or other sacrificial offerings (milk, purified 
butter) were offered to the Vedic gods (devas). There were other types of 
sacrifices, such as the rite of consecration of the ruler, or the great horse sacrifice, 
which strengthened or extended the ruler’s power, or the ritual of soma pressing 
and consuming. The sacrifices were accompanied by a recitation of hymns 
addressed to the gods. The members of the populous world of gods and goddesses 
embodying natural forces and abstract notions inhabited the three spheres of the 
hierarchically structured world: the earth, the atmosphere, and the sky. Among 
the gods of the earthly sphere are Agni, the fire god, the embodiment of the 
sacrificial fire and mediator between men and the gods; Brihaspati, advisor of the 
gods and heavenly prototype of the earthly brahman priests; and Soma, the god 
of the intoxicating fermented drink used in ceremonies. The gods of the air are 
the warrior Indra, king of the gods; Vayu, the wind god; the unpredictable and 
destructive Rudra and the violent Maruts embodying storms. The heavenly gods 
include the celestial god Djaus, the Vedic equivalent of the Greek Zeus; Mitra 
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and Varuna, the guardians of cosmic order; Surya the sun god and Ushas, the 
goddess of dawn moving before the sun; and Vishnu, personifying the pervasive 
power of the sun, who had not yet risen to the rank of chief god. Some of the 
sacrifices were extremely complicated and took several days or weeks to perform. 
The details of the construction of the sacrificial altar, the setting of auspicious 
times, the exact performance of the rites, the texts to be recited required 
knowledge, which was possessed only by the Brahmin priests, who gained great 
power by their indispensability. Among the patrons on whose behalf of the 
sacrifices were performed were Kshatriyas (warriors, kings) and wealthy 
Vaishyas (free commoners), who prayed for childbirth, wealth, or fertility of the 
land. Some of the sacrifices have survived in modern Hinduism, but the Vedic 
gods were replaced by later gods of Puranic mythology (primarily Vishnu and his 
incarnations, the manifestations of Siva and the various forms of the Goddess). 
The Vedic gods live on in an altered role as guardians of the directions. 
 
Formation of the characteristic social structure of Indian civilisation 
 
The supremacy of the Aryans soon led to the emergence of the distinctive 
Indian social structure, the Varna system, which strengthened and conserved their 
dominant position. Four hereditary social classes (Sk. varna, ‘colour’) evolved: 
priests (Brahmins), warriors (Kshatriyas), farmers, merchants (Vaishyas) and 
servants (Shudras). The members of the upper three varnas were Aryans, whereas 
the fourth varna was made up from members of the majority substrate population. 
At the top of the social hierarchy stood the Brahmin priests, the exclusive 
custodians of the sacred texts and sacrificial rites, and later the main practitioners 
of all spiritual activity. The kings came from among the Kshatriyas who held the 
leadership of the army and thus the actual power. While the Kshatriyas created 
the state power that protected the Brahmins and endowed them with donations, 
the Brahmins alone were called upon to ensure the sanctity and legitimacy of the 
royal power. As a result, as early as the late Vedic age, an interdependence 
developed between the two upper varnas, and their rivalry for leadership in the 
social hierarchy can be traced throughout the history of Indian civilisation. The 
Vaishya class was much more populous than the previous two and included those 
occupied with commerce, agriculture, and crafts. The members of the three upper 
varnas were the so-called ‘twice-born’ who underwent an initiation ceremony as 
they reached adulthood and received the sacred thread as a token of their ritual 
status. By this, they were born a second time and became full members of Aryan 
society: they could study the sacred texts and attend ceremonies and feasts. The 
task of the Shudras was to serve the other three classes. They were economically 
subordinate labourers or servants who were excluded from the ritual privileges of 
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the ‘twice-born’. Subsequent laws sought to prevent the intermingling of the 
varnas by prohibiting marriage between them, thus preserving the hierarchy 
formed during the Aryan conquest. 
Manusmriti (Laws of Manu), which originated around the first century CE, 
already reflects a much more complex social system that emerged with the 
differentiation of the varna system. In this structure, there were a large number 
of jatis (later known as caste, a word of Portuguese origin), which were hereditary 
occupational groups or guilds practising endogamy (intra-group marriage). The 
caste to which the individual belonged by birth not only assigned his place in the 
hierarchy, but also his life task and opportunities. In addition to the four varnas, 
a large stratum emerged from the untouchables outside the varna system, which 
was associated with the development of the concept of ritual purity or impurity, 
which was not yet present in the Vedas. The untouchables (also known as Dalits, 
or Harijans, the children of God, a name given by Mahatma Gandhi,) pursued 
ritually unclean occupations and also included tribal ethnic groups, and nomads, 
who were subject to strict restrictions on contact with the dominant groups in 
society. The leader of the struggle for their rights during the independence 
movement was B.R. Ambedkar, a lawyer, politician, social reformer, who himself 
came from an untouchable caste. The caste system and untouchability were 
abolished by the constitution of independent India, but both still exist to this day. 
 
Late Vedic Age: Conquest of the Ganges Valley 
 
The Rigveda tells how the Aryans burned and destroyed the forests of the 
Ganges Basin to obtain cultivable land. In addition to the fire, horses, buffaloes, 
carts, wagons, vessels, bronzeware, and from the twelfth century BCE, iron tools 
contributed to the expansion. The late Vedic age (approx. 1100‒600 BCE), the 
conquest of the Ganges Valley, archeologically corresponds to the Iron Age. In 
addition to cattle breeding, agricultural activity became increasingly important in 
the economic life of the Aryans. As it is mentioned in the Yajurveda, they used 
dozens of oxen to plough their land. Rice first appears in the Atharvaveda, 
geographically in the central Ganges basin. It seems likely that it was 
domesticated in China or Southeast Asia, from where it was transferred to the 
Indian subcontinent as a crop. In some of the centres in the Ganges Basin royal 
dynasties emerged (eighth-sixth centuries BCE). Four states: Kuru, Panchala, 
Kosala and Videha existed during this period. Along with the Ganges Basin, the 
Aryans were expanding south of the Jamuna River in what is now Madhya 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa, but in these regions, there seems to have 
been a closer interaction with the settled pre-Aryan farming population. 
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The memory of the wars and conquests of the Vedic era is preserved in 
India’s great epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. Their text as known 
today was formed much later, between 400 BCE and 400 CE, but, according to 
some researchers, the core of their story goes back to the Vedic period. In the 
focus of the Mahabharata is the great battle of the Kaurava and the Pandava 
tribes, which according to tradition may have taken place in the upper Ganges-
Yamuna Doab, around 1000 BCE. Through the exile of King Rama and his 
recapture of the throne of Ayodhya, the Ramayana narrates the conquest of the 
peninsula by the Aryans, all the way down to Sri Lanka. During the long period 
of their formation, the original length of both epics considerably increased due to 
the bardic tradition that allowed for amendments, interpolations and updates 
according to the current situation. In the process, the two epics grew into a 
veritable encyclopaedia of Hindu tradition and culture, a repository of examples 
of religious duty and morals to follow. Their historical authenticity is not 
questioned by Hindu tradition, although research has so far failed to substantiate 
this with archaeological data beyond any doubt. 
Towards the end of the Vedic period, exponents of philosophical thinking 
formulating in the latest explanatory texts on Vedic sacrificial rites, the 
Upanishads, sought a connection between the microcosm of man and the 
macrocosm of the world. Upanishads have continued to be composed hundreds 
of years after the end of the Vedic period, but the oldest works of the genre, the 
Brihadaranyaka and the Chandogya Upanishads (between 800 and 600 BCE), are 
the most important from the point of view of the essence of Upanishad 
philosophy. The new thoughts emphasise the possibility of individual cognition, 
and the ultimate unity of all phenomena, which are only seemingly different. The 
supreme doctrine of the Upanishads is the identity of the absolute reality 
(brahman) and the inner soul of the individual (atman), which laid the 
foundations of later Indian philosophy of religion and mysticism. Many of the 
sages who appeared in the Upanishads were Kshatriyas, and the esoteric doctrine 
of rebirth (reincarnation) is also explained by a Kshatriya teacher. Experiencing 
identity with the divine essence can put an end to the chain of rebirths ‒ this hope 
expresses the ultimate goal of every Indian religion. The birthplace of 
Upanishadic philosophy is the eastern Ganges Basin, Videha, the new centre of 
Vedic culture in which the religion of the substrate population in all likelihood 
had played a role. The ideas formulated here later gained their final synthesis in 
the highly influential philosophy of Sankara (eighth century CE). The diversity of 
the philosophical search in the late Vedic age is indicated by the fact that the 
doctrines of Sankhya and Yoga, two of the later Hindu philosophical systems, 
which were only written down as late as the first centuries CE, had already 
formulated by this time. Sankhya derives the creation of the world from the 
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duality of two creative principles, Purusa (consciousness) and Prakriti (matter) 
whereas the philosophical and practical system of Yoga strives to eliminate this 
duality through meditation. Sankhya, Yoga and Vedanta are among the six 
orthodox schools of ancient Indian philosophy (darshana). 
 
The Age of Second Urbanisation: Jainism and Buddhism 
 
In the period between 600‒200 BCE, the central Ganges basin, called 
Madhyadesha, the ‘middle country’, became the central area of Indian 
civilisation. An increasing proportion of the water-rich, fertile regions was 
brought under agricultural cultivation; rice cultivation expanded, and the 
population increased in both number and wealth. One millennium after the 
demise of the Indus Valley Civilisation, another process of urbanisation began. 
At the same time, in the region of the former four states, sixteen so-called Maha-
janapadas or ‘great countries’ emerged which extended beyond the central 
Ganges Valley to Gandhara in the north-west and Bengal in the east and 
penetrated peripheries of the Ganges Valley and the areas to the south between 
the Jamuna, Narmada and Tapti rivers. The flat regions of the river valleys 
favoured the formation of kingdoms, while the typical state form in the 
mountainous areas was the oligarchic tribal republic. Roads between the cities 
were full of lively trade, as a sure sign of which minting began. 
While from the Late Vedic Age but especially from the Second 
Urbanisation period society reached a higher complexity, the old Vedic religion 
became stiffened into excessive ritualism and the religious monopoly of Brahmin 
priests became unquestionable. Townspeople, particularly their affluent groups 
(merchants, officials) increasingly felt the need for a more personal religious 
experience. Some of the Kshatriyas were also receptive to non-mediated religious 
teachings precisely because of the excessive power of the Brahmins. In the 
forests, hermits, mendicants and self-mortifying ascetics proliferated whose 
religious ideals denied the ritual orthodoxy represented by the Brahmins. This 
religious fermentation is referred to as the Shramana movements (from the word 
shramana, ‛ascetic’). In these were born the ideas that are among the popular 
concepts of later Indian religiosity, including emerging Hinduism: renunciation 
of the world, the chain of rebirths (samsara) imbued with suffering and liberation 
from it (moksha). Among the shramana movements, Jainism, which still exists 
today, and Buddhism, which has become a world religion, stood out and became 
independent religions. 
Jainism is somewhat older of the two religions. Its founder, Vardhamana 
Mahavira lived between 599‒527 or 540‒468 BCE. He did not consider himself 
the founder of Jainism, but the twenty-fourth in the line of the Tirthankaras (Sk. 
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‘path-maker’, ‘ford-maker’). Like his younger contemporary, Siddhartha Gautama, 
he was born into a royal Kshatriya family. Resigning from the rank of a prince, 
he became a wandering monk, and after twelve years of self-mourning asceticism, 
overcoming the constraints of the body and the senses, he attained a state of 
enlightenment and was freed from the chain of rebirth. Henceforth, he was called 
Jina (‘Conqueror’). During the three decades of his teaching, he organised his 
disciples into a strict monastic order and laid down the rules of conduct for lay 
believers as well. The cornerstone of his teaching is the perfection and perfect 
purification of the soul from the material impurities that cling to it as a result of 
deeds and bind it to the physical body through a multitude of rebirths. 
Consequently, eliminating such impurities also means escaping rebirth. The soul 
(jiva) from then on exists in a state of eternal splendour of omniscience. It may 
take a long time, probably a series of rebirths, however. Therefore, the purpose 
of earthly existence is not to seek direct enlightenment, but to practice a 
disciplined, meritorious, moral way of life and the supreme principle of non-
violence, with respect for all life, human and animal. Monasticism was 
accompanied by the observance of monastic vows and an ascetic lifestyle. In the 
latter, Jina set an example: he died at the age of seventy-two by starving himself 
to death.  
Later, two main sects of the Jain monastic order emerged: the Digambara 
(Sk. ‘sky-clad’, i.e., naked), whose members went so far in suppressing the needs 
of the body as to give up clothing; and the Shvetambara, i.e., ‛white-clad’, whose 
monastic regulations are less stringent than those of the Digambara. Both sects 
still exist today. The Jain religion forbids all forms of violence and harm. The 
monks sweep the path at their feet so as not to extinguish life by stepping on some 
tiny creature and wear a mask in front of their mouths to prevent creatures from 
being inhaled inadvertently. For the same reason, lay followers avoid farming 
occupations, as animals in the ground may be injured during ploughing. Both 
monks and lay believers follow a strict vegetarian diet. Due to the ban on 
agricultural occupations, it was primarily the city dwellers, including many 
traders, who became followers of the Jain religion. The religious confirmation of 
the aspiring, active life may also have contributed to making the Jain trading 
community one of India’s most successful trading communities. Their donations 
contributed to the maintenance of monastic communities and the flourishing of 
Jain temple architecture and art. Jainism has many important monastic centres 
and sites of religious pilgrimage, concentrated in the West and South of India. An 
image of Jina is placed in the main sanctuary of Jain temples, often built of white 
marble and abundantly decorated with carvings. The Jain religion also has a vast 
literary heritage whose works were written in Magadhi Prakrit, Sanskrit and New 
Indo-Aryan languages. The canonical texts of Jainism are called Agamas. The 
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Jain religion did not engage in missionary activities but remained within India for 
a long time, and only expanded beyond the borders of India with the emergence 
of the diaspora. In India, it has a firm standing despite the relatively small number 
of its followers (less than 0.4% of the total population, around 4.5 million). In 
2014, it was granted national minority status. 
The founder of Buddhism, Siddhartha Gautama, later known as the Buddha 
(the ‘Enlightened’) (Figure 31), supposedly lived between 563 and 483 BCE. 
(There are considerably differing Buddhist traditions and scholarly opinions 
regarding the exact dates of his life.) There is little definite information about his 
life. His biography (Buddhacharita) interwoven with legendary and miraculous 
elements was written by Ashvaghosha in Sanskrit in the first century CE. He was 
a historical figure, born in Lumbini, on the border of present-day India and Nepal, 
as the son of the king of the Shakya clan. The latter is indicated by his later titles 
Shakyamuni (‘Sage of the Shakyas’) and Shakyasimha (‘Lion of the Shakyas’). 
Miraculous signs accompanied his conception and birth, and, on the basis of his 
bodily signs, the visionaries predicted that he would become a world ruler or a 
prophet who saves the world. He received an education worthy of the heir to the 
throne; he studied, married, had a son, but was not satisfied. According to 
tradition, in the face of old age, sickness and death he realised suffering as the 
true nature of worldly existence, whereupon he became a monk to find a way out. 
He joined various monastic schools and pursued an ascetic life until he realised 
that excessive asceticism leads nowhere. As a consequence, he rejected the 
extremes of both self-mortification and worldly pleasures, seeking to follow the 
‘middle way’ instead. After seeking the answer to the problem of suffering in 
vain for a long time, he decided to sit under a tree and meditate until he found a 
way out of suffering. After seven times seven days of fasting and deep meditation, 
he recognised the cause of suffering and found a way to be liberated; that is, he 
attained enlightenment. 
The Buddha delivered his first sermon at Sarnath, near Benares, where, in 
the words of tradition, he ‘turned the Wheel of Law’. For the remaining forty-
four years of his life, as a wandering teacher, he preached the truth he had 
recognised, the basic tenets of which are the ‘Four Noble Truths’ and the ‘Noble 
Eightfold Path’. The ‘Four Noble Truths’ are as follows: existence is suffering; 
the cause of suffering is craving and attachment; suffering can be ended by 
eliminating desires; the way to end suffering is to follow the Noble Eightfold 
Path. The latter includes right view, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, 
right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right meditation. In everyday 
life, the Buddha considered moral conduct a must. He set out five precepts for lay 
followers: do not kill, do not steal, do not commit adultery, do not lie, and do not 
get drunk. In addition to this, monks were subject to a vow of celibacy and 
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poverty. The community of monks (sangha) and its lay followers grew rapidly, 
and it also had wealthy supporters. The Buddha rejected the absolute authority of 
the Vedas and the birth privileges of the Brahmins. Although most of his disciples 
belonged to the Brahmins and Kshatriyas, this did not rule out that persons of 
lower origin join the community. By creating an order of nuns, the Buddha also 
allowed women to be admitted into the order. Some of his disciples had already 
set out by this time and preached the doctrine throughout India. With his 
enlightenment, the Buddha cut off the chain of his rebirths and with his death in 
Kushinagar, he attained Nirvana (Sk. ‘extinction’, liberation from the constraints 
of worldly existence). His body was cremated, and mounds of earth (stupas) were 
raised above his body relics distributed among the chiefs of eight countries. 
 
Figure 31: Meditating Buddha. Relief panel at the eastern side of Stupa I (Great 
Stupa). Sanchi (Madhya Pradesh), Gupta period, c. mid-fifth century 
Source: Photograph by ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
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The Buddha did not write down his teachings, nor did he appoint a 
successor. The sangha, that is, saffron robe, regular meetings and the decisions 
made unanimously ensured the separation of the Buddha’s disciples from his lay 
followers. According to the Buddhist tradition, after the Buddha’s death, the 
members of the order gathered in Rajagriha to establish the main points of the 
doctrine (Pali Dhamma) and monastic discipline (Vinaya) as it lived in the 
memory of the disciples. The doctrine was preserved in oral tradition for a long 
time. The Councils that were convened from time to time sought to affirm the 
Buddha’s teachings considered authentic, but differences of opinion increased, 
and Buddhism split into sects. The Canon was first committed to writing in Pali 
in the first century CE in Sri Lanka, and in Sanskrit in Kashmir, which sealed the 
splitting between the two main branches known today, Theravada and Mahayana 
Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism, the doctrine of the Thera (Pali ‘elders’) or the 
direct disciples of the Buddha, spread south of India, in Sri Lanka and Southeast 
Asia: Burma, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, hence it is also called Southern 
Buddhism, while Mahayana (Sk. ‘great vehicle’, ‘wide path’) spread north of 
India: in Ladakh, Nepal, Tibet, Mongolia, China, Korea and Japan, and is 
therefore also known as Northern Buddhism. A relatively late development which 
grew out of Mahayana is Vajrayana (‘diamond vehicle’, ‘diamond path’) or 
Tantric Buddhism where spiritual emanations and a large number of Bodhisattvas 
including terrifying deities and their female counterparts form a complex esoteric 
system. In addition, mantras (magical formulas), mandalas (cosmograms) and 
other rites play an important role. The ideal of the Theravada is the arhat, the 
monk who has attained Nirvana, who, through individual self-perfection, is 
already freed from the bondage of desires on earth and is completely destroyed 
in death. However, this path is only open to a select few, which is why this trend 
has been called Hinayana (Sk. ‘lesser vehicle’, ‘narrow path’) with some mockery 
by the Mahayana devotees who, on the contrary, believed that they could attain 
enlightenment themselves. The ideal of the Mahayana is the compassionate and 
selfless Bodhisattva (Sk. ‘enlightenment being’) who has attained enlightenment 
but renounces Nirvana to help believers on the path to enlightenment. 
The scriptures of Southern Buddhism is the Tipitaka (Pali ‘Triple Basket’), 
i.e. a triple collection, which includes: 1. Vinaya Pitaka (‘Basket of Discipline’), 
a collection of rules of the monastic community; 2. Sutta Pitaka (‘Basket of 
Discourse’), which contains the speeches and sayings of the Buddha, and as such 
is the principal source of the Doctrine; 3. Abhidhamma Pitaka (‘Basket of Special 
Doctrine’), the scholastic interpretation of the Doctrine. The canon compiled by 
the Theravada school had been preserved for centuries in oral form, until, 
according to Sri Lankan tradition, after the Third Council it was brought by 
Mahinda, the son or brother of King Ashoka, to the island of Sri Lanka, where it 
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was written down in the first century CE. The teachings of the Mahayana are 
contained in texts called sutras, the most important which are the Mahavastu, the 
Lalitavistara, the Divyavadana and the Saddharma Pundarika. A significant 
portion of the original Sanskrit texts has survived in Chinese and Tibetan 
translations. Both the Theravada and Mahayana traditions see themselves as 
preserving the original teachings of the Buddha. 
 
Early Classical Age: the Maurya Empire 
 
Magadha, the easternmost of the sixteen Mahajanapadas, south of the 
Ganges (in what is now the state of Bihar), with its capital Pataliputra, became 
the starting point for the imperial aspirations of the subcontinent and expanded 
rapidly at the expense of the other Mahajanapadas. During this time, the areas of 
the north-western part of the subcontinent beyond the Indus River fell under the 
control of the Persian Achaemenid Empire for two centuries. Vedic and Iranian 
culture was equally present in Takshashila (Taxila), the capital of Gandhara. 
Persian rule here ended with the military campaign of Alexander the Great, who 
broke into India in 326 BCE. Crossing the Hydaspes River (today: Jhelum), he 
defeated the Indian armies marching against him, but due to the rebellion of his 
soldiers, he abandoned his plan for further Indian conquest. He advanced with his 
army along the Indus, then, leaving governors behind, he left India with some of 
his troops by land, the rest of his army returning to Persia by sea. However 
temporary, Alexander the Great’s stay in India had far-reaching consequences, 
opening up the channel of communication between the Hellenistic world and 
India through which Greek and Persian cultural influences were to arrive on the 
Indian subcontinent for centuries. 
The creation of the first great empire of the subcontinent is attributed to the 
Maurya dynasty. Chandragupta, the founder of the dynasty was originally from 
Magadha and ruled between 321 and 298 BCE. He united North India by expelling 
the successors of Alexander the Great. According to tradition, Chandragupta was 
assisted in establishing the empire by Kautilya (also known as Chanakya), author 
of the Arthashastra (‘Textbook of Advantage’), a treatise on statecraft and 
political science. This classical work is considered by many to be of later origin, 
but some parts of it certainly date back to the Maurya period. Kautilya, prime 
minister and advisor to Chandragupta, covers every detail of governance in his 
work from warfare to the organisation of the empire and taxation. Its basic 
premise is that the state can overcome its neighbours by virtue of its economic 
power because it allows for the maintenance of a strong army. Kautilya 
recognised the importance of obtaining information; in his work, the system of 
couriers, spies and messengers is given appropriate emphasis. Chandragupta’s 
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grandson, Ashoka (268‒232 BCE), extended his rule to the entire subcontinent 
except for the southernmost parts, and his empire stretched from Bengal to 
Afghanistan. However, during the war for Kalinga in East India, he felt remorse 
about the excessive bloodshed and converted to the Buddhist faith. Across the 
empire, he erected columns and placed rock edicts on which he had Buddhist 
religious teachings as well as principles of governance engraved. 
Ashoka’s royal support marked a turning point in the history of Buddhism. 
The converting activity of Buddhism outside India dates from the Third Council, 
which was convened on his initiative. Ashoka sent monks across the borders of 
India in all directions: Gandhara, Kashmir and other countries at the foot of the 
Himalayas in the north, Sri Lanka and modern-day Burma in the south. Although 
of these missions, so far only the Sri Lankan missionary activity has been proven 
as a historical fact, the Burmese Buddhist tradition also firmly preserves the 
memory of monks from India. The first and, for a long time, only Buddhist 
kingdom in Sri Lanka later became the source of the spread and many renewals 
of Buddhism in Southeast Asia. However, the Third Council did not involve the 
entire Buddhist community, so the separation of the northern and southern branch 
of Buddhism is likely to have taken place by that time.  
 
Literacy 
 
After the disputed Indus Valley antecedents of the literacy of Indian 
civilisation, the earliest coherent historical writings are the pillar and rock 
inscriptions of Ashoka (third century BCE), written everywhere in the local Prakrit 
languages. To encode them the so-called Brahmi script was used, from which all 
the writings of India and Southeast Asia are derived, including the Devanagari, 
which is used to record Sanskrit and Hindi. Short Brahmi inscriptions also 
survived on pottery fragments from the fourth century BCE. The Brahmi and its 
derivatives are syllabic scripts, in which syllable-forming vowels are indicated 
by diacritical marks linked to the consonants. At the same time, the north-western 
inscriptions of Ashoka were written in Kharosthi, another script which was used 
in Gandhara, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and later in Bactria and the Kushan Empire. 
Inscriptions, engraved in stone and later on copper plates, are among the 
most important written relics of Indian civilisation until the end of the Hindu 
dynasties. Inscriptions on coins have survived from earlier times. The lifespan of 
organic medium (palm leaves, birch bark, paper) under the tropical climate is in 
most cases not very long. The earliest surviving copy of palm leaf manuscripts, 
dried and smoked, pierced and bound with a string into a book, is a ninth-century 
Shaiva text preserved today in the Cambridge University Library. The average 
lifespan of manuscripts written on paper in India is usually only 200‒300 years, 
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therefore collections which contained this type of manuscript (e.g., the 
genealogical records of Brahmin communities) were constantly copied. The 
earliest manuscripts on paper have survived from the Middle Ages. The oldest 
manuscript of the Rigveda, also on paper, dates from 1362 and is held by the 
Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. 
 
The emergence of Buddhist art 
 
After a gap of about one and a half millennia following the prehistoric 
antecedents of the Indus Valley Civilisation, art reappeared in the Maurya period. 
The surviving fragments of the palace of Pataliputra (the capital) reflect Persian 
and Greek influence; this is not surprising since the north-western parts of the 
subcontinent, Bactria and the upper Indus region, that had been conquered earlier 
by the Achaemenid Empire and then by Alexander the Great came under the rule 
of Maurya Empire through the conquest of Chandragupta. North Indian territorial 
unification had a stimulating effect on trade and diplomatic relations. 
Megasthenes, a Greek historian and diplomat, spent four years at Chandragupta’s 
court in Pataliputra as the ambassador of Seleucus I Nicator. In the wake of these 
relationships, Persian artistic influence appeared in the power symbols of the 
imperial art of the Mauryas. Soon after the most famous of these, the Lion Capital 
 
Figure 32: Stupa I (Great Stupa) at Sanchi (Madhya Pradesh), third century BCE through 
first century CE 
Source: Photograph by ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
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 of Ashoka, gained a new symbolic content, simultaneously manifesting the glory 
of the emperor (Sk. chakravartin) and the Buddha. 
Emerging Buddhist art took on many foreign elements, but was also 
nourished by local sources: oversized, heavy and corpulent depiction of nature 
spirits and demigods of the folk cults (yakshas and their female counterparts, the 
yakshis) played an important role in the development of the Indian-style Buddha 
and Bodhisattva depictions. 
 
Figure 33: Bimbisara, the king of Rajagriha emerging from the royal palace to visit the 
Buddha. Relief at the eastern gateway of Stupa I (Great Stupa). Sanchi (Madhya 
Pradesh), c. second-third decades of the first century CE 
Source: Photograph by ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
 
The most characteristic edifice of the Buddhist cult is the stupa. The first 
stupas were used to house the bodily relics of the Buddha. Initially, they were 
simple mounds of earth, later they were covered with bricks or stone and sur-
rounded by a railing. The hemispherical body of the stupa symbolised the sky, 
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the column in its centre represented the world axis (axis mundi). The path of ritual 
circumambulation (Sk. pradakshina, ‘to the right’, that is, the object of reverence 
always has to be to the right of the worshiper) referred to the apparent orbit of the 
sun. The ornate gateways opened to the main directions in the railing separating 
the sacred area from the secular environment, and the plan of the stupa formed a 
swastika, a cross with broken arms, the ancient symbol of the sun. Of the early 
stupas, the stupa at Sanchi (Madhya Pradesh) can be seen today in its former glory 
(Figure 32). Its gateways are covered with carvings from the first century CE, 
depicting stories of the life and previous incarnations of the Buddha, embedded 
in bustling scenes of contemporary urban and rural life (Figure 33). 
 
Figure 34: Tree goddess at the eastern gateway of Stupa I (Great Stupa). Sanchi 
(Madhya Pradesh), c. second‒third decades of the first century CE 
Source: Photograph by ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
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The inscriptions on the reliefs record that the Sanchi monastic centre and 
Buddhist community were supported by many wealthy merchants, guild leaders, 
male and female city dwellers, thus contributing to the maintenance of a religious 
set-up that benefited them. The seductive female figures appearing in the sur-
roundings of the stupas, yakshis and tree-goddesses, whose voluptuous forms are 
scarcely covered by their veil-like garments, underline a conspicuous feature of 
Indian culture. Sacred art in India is not restricted to religious images and 
symbols, but encompasses, for instance, fertility symbols and erotic depictions 
that are regarded auspicious, sanctifying and fortune-bringing. As such, they are 
not alien to the religious context, be it a Buddhist monastic complex or later, a 
Hindu temple (Figure 34). The shrines and gathering places of early Buddhism 
were often set up in caves. In addition to their obvious climatic role in providing 
protection from the heat of the tropical sun and the monsoon rains, caves naturally 
carry the basic symbolism of Indian temple architecture which is based on the 
relationship between the mountain and the mountain cave, the temple tower and 
the main shrine below, standing for the heavenly abode of the gods and the place 
of their earthly incarnation respectively. 
In early Buddhist art, there is an absence of the portrayal of the Buddha 
himself; his presence is merely indicated by symbols: an empty throne, an 
umbrella, footprints, the tree of enlightenment, etc. The reason for this is not quite 
clear. It has been long assumed that the Buddha himself forbade his depiction, 
and this ban remained in force as long as his human nature was a living tradition. 
When, with the intensification of theistic religious tendencies, people began to 
worship him as God, his anthropomorphic form appeared in reliefs. This 
happened at about the same time in Gandhara in the north-west, and in Mathura, 
on the banks of the Yamuna River. By supporting Buddhism, the Central Asian 
Kushans, who united Hellenistic Bactria and North India to Mathura under their 
rule, gave an impetus to the consolidation and spread of the Buddhist religion 
toward China and Central Asia. This is also the period of the consolidation of 
Buddhist iconography, which has become a common ground for the symbolic 
depictions of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas not only in the Indian subcontinent 
but throughout the Buddhist world. The Buddha is always depicted as a monk, 
with a shaved head, in a monastic robe, while the Bodhisattvas appear in princely 
attire, richly adorned. Body postures and hand gestures are fixed and mostly 
reminiscent of important events in the Buddha’s life, e.g. the meditation posture 
refers to the weeks of the Buddha’s deep contemplation before enlightenment, 
the teaching gesture symbolises his first sermon, and the reclining posture his 
passing to Nirvana. Of the auspicious marks on his body, the elongated ears, the 
triple fold of skin on the neck, the cranial protuberance at the top of the head, and 
the tuft of hair between the eyebrows are almost always depicted, as are 
3.1. The Indian Civilisation 
167 

sometimes the wheels (chakras) on the palms and soles, the arms reaching to the 
knees or the huge body size. In the Kushan era, two traditions of Buddhist art 
developed: the Gandhara school, which, under the impact of Hellenistic style, 
gave birth to almost Apollo-like Buddhas, and the school of Mathura, which grew 
out of the local tradition of flesh-and-blood yaksha depictions. The masters of the 
Gandhara school created the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan on the 
north-western fringe of the subcontinent in the fourth-fifth centuries CE, which 
were demolished in 2001 by the Taliban, who belong to the radical branch of 
Islam. The Gandhara style, spreading north along the Silk Road, left a deep 
imprint on the art of northern Buddhist countries. In Southeast Asian Buddhist 
art, some new iconographic types of Buddha depictions have also emerged, and 
they often portray giant Buddhas as well as the Buddhas of past world eras. In the 
countries of northern Buddhism, the innumerable Bodhisattvas of the Mahayana 
and Vajrayana pantheon serve as an inexhaustible source of representations. The 
images of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion is particularly 
popular. 
 
The culture of the classical era 
 
The classical era of Indian civilisation begins with the closure of the 
Maurya period and last up to the end of the Gupta period. During this time, the 
significant events in the history of the subcontinent took place in four major 
regions. The eastern Ganges basin remained the starting point for unification and 
imperial ambitions within the subcontinent. It was the core area of the Shungas 
who succeeded the Mauryas and then of the Gupta dynasty. Both dynasties were 
Hindu. The northeast region continued to be the base of the subcontinent’s 
conquests, a scene of cultural interactions and blending. The Indo-Greek, Indo-
Scythian, Indo-Parthian and Indo-Sasanian kingdoms (second century BCE to first 
century CE) and then the Kushans (first to third century CE) gained prominence 
here, and their power sometimes penetrated further into the subcontinent. In the 
Deccan, an independent kingdom emerged under the rule of the Satavahana 
dynasty, whose sway spanned the peninsula from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of 
Bengal. In South India, Tamil-language literature flourished (Sangam era, c. 300 
BCE to 300 CE), reflecting the social structure of the South free of rigid caste 
constraints and the emergence of a classical culture that was still to a great extent 
independent of the North. By the end of the Sangam period, the three dominant 
kingdoms of South India: the Chola, the Chera and the Pandya, were formed. 
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Figure 35: Upper part of a pillar from Budhagupta’s reign depicting the mythical 
sunbird Garuda. Eran (Madhya Pradesh), Gupta period, 484 CE 
Source: Photograph by ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
 
The Gupta Dynasty, whose reign (c. 320–550 CE) is commonly referred to 
as the golden age of Indian civilisation, ruled over northern India and the Deccan, 
including the territories of the allied Vakataka dynasty. Owing to the military 
successes of the Gupta rulers, for the first time in centuries it was possible to 
subjugate foreign tribes and power centres and centralise the empire. The long 
development of the preceding periods and the stability of domestic politics 
brought with them outstanding civilisational achievements and an unprecedented, 
sophisticated urban culture, to the financial basis of which extensive long-
distance trade largely contributed. From this age, the first temples dedicated to 
Hindu gods survived, and due to royal support, the Brahmins once again came to 
prominence. The sciences (medicine, mathematics, and astronomy), philosophy, 
Sanskrit literature and the arts flourished. Kalidasa, the most distinguished 
ancient Indian playwright and poet who raised Sanskrit court poetry and prose 
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(kavya) to unprecedented heights, lived in the fifth century. His works started to 
be translated into English and German in the late eighteenth century. Gupta arts 
sought the ideal forms. The language of kavya is ornate, full of poetic images, 
puns, ambiguities. Not only the performing arts (music, dance, theatre) but also 
the literature were to a large extent influenced by the Natya Shastra, a handbook 
of dramatic art attributed to Bharata, believed to have been written between the 
first century BCE and third century CE. The Natya Shastra laid the foundations of 
Indian aesthetics by formulating the theory of rasa (‘taste’). According to this, 
the aesthetic taste or essence of any work, be it music, drama or visual 
representation, evokes the desired feelings and helps the viewer to reach a kind 
of catharsis aimed at experiencing transcendent reality. Rasa aesthetics was 
meant for an educated, receptive audience, thus indirectly referring to the high 
cultural standards of urban society in the Gupta era. 
A remarkable aspect of urban life in the fifth century is revealed by the 
Kama Sutra (‘Textbook of Love’), which, in addition to its erotic motive, displays 
a surprising level of sophistication and an interest in human relationships and 
women’s literacy. Sanskrit literature also abounded in popular stories and tales. 
The Panchatantra, a collection of tales that reached Europe as early as the 
eleventh century, originally belonged to a series of works on political ethics 
(nitishastra) and, as such, was intended as a code of conduct for kings. In its 
aphorisms, cunning and wits appear as essential virtues. In the south, the Pallava 
kingdom (fourth to ninth century) supported the adoption of Sanskrit culture, 
which was accompanied by donations to the Brahmins and a unifying effort to 
replace the tribal fragmentation of the previous era. At the same time, Tamil 
secular and religious literature reached its zenith. The development of poetry 
proclaiming devotion to Shiva and Vishnu, which spread the devotional bhakti 
cult and poetry throughout India, had a profound impact in the history of 
Hinduism. 
In the fine arts, purity and harmony prevailed. It is at this time that 
sculpture created in the representation of the human body a classical Indian 
tradition masterfully combining aspects of asceticism, spirituality, and sensual 
beauty. Similar to Buddhist depictions, Hindu iconography had also reached its 
full-fledged form by this time: Vishnu and his avatars (incarnations) and the 
various manifestations of Shiva are all depicted with their regular postures, 
gestures, attributes and mounts. Multi-armed and multi-headed images are 
frequent as symbols of omnipresence and omniscience. Vishnu wears a high 
headgear, a garland of forest flowers around his neck, and royal jewellery; in his 
hands, he holds a discus, a conch and a mace. His mount is the mythical Garuda 
bird (Figure 35). In a typical iconographic form, he is reclining on the coiled body 
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of the Serpent of Infinity, a lotus growing out of his navel with the god Brahma, 
the creator of the world (Figure 36). 
 
Figure 36: Vishnu lying on the Serpent of Infinity (detail). Dashavatara Temple, 
Deogarh (Uttar Pradesh), early sixth century 
Source: Photograph by ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
 
Vishnu’s female counterpart, Shri Lakshmi, the goddess of good fortune, 
abundance and happiness, whom he is often portrayed with, largely contributed 
to his popularity. His ten avatars ‒ Fish, Tortoise, Boar, Man-Lion, Dwarf, Para-
shurama (Rama with an axe), Rama, Krishna, Buddha (or Balarama) and Kalki ‒ 
are depicted on their own, in groups of ten, or around Vishnu. Shiva, known as 
the Lord of Yoga, often appears as an ascetic. He does not wear a headgear but 
has the crescent moon pinned to his matted locks of hair piled up on top of his 
head. The third eye in the middle of his forehead is the sensory organ of 
transcendent vision. A tiger’s hide is thrown over his breast, and a cobra curls 
around his neck. As the Lord of the Dance (Nataraja), he destroys the universe 
with his violent dance. His main attributes include the trident and the hourglass-
shaped drum; his mount is Nandi, the white bull. His spouse is Parvati, daughter 
of the Himalayas; his children are the elephant headed Ganesha, remover of 
obstacles, and the war god Skanda (Kartikeya). He is most often represented in 
the aniconic form of his phallic symbol, the linga (Figure 37). The creator god 
Brahma has four heads; he sits on a lotus throne or a white goose, in his hands 
holds a book (the Vedas), a sacrificial spoon, a rosary and a jar full of the nectar 
of immortality. The earliest surviving Hindu temples date back to the Gupta era. 
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Figure 37: Linga with the head of Shiva. Udayagiri (Madhya Pradesh), Cave 4. 
Gupta period, early fifth century 
Source: Photograph by ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
 
Hinduism 
 
The Hindu religion does not have a founder; therefore, it does not have a 
starting date either. Its origins are mixed and complex; during its formative period 
of about two thousand years, countless layers and impacts contributed to its 
evolution. Historically, it was formed by incorporating local traditions, cults and 
rites during the expansion of the Aryan civilisation on the subcontinent. The two 
main strands of these are the Sanskrit literature of the Vedic Aryans and their 
pantheon of many gods who often personify natural phenomena, and the religion 
of pre-Aryan peoples, centred on the cult of the mother goddess and fertility. 
Hinduism that is comparable to its today’s form developed in the first centuries 
of our era and reached maturity in the Gupta period. Vishnu and Shiva then 
emerged as principal deities, and the tradition of the Goddess (Devi) of various 
names appeared. 
The characteristics of Hinduism are difficult to define in general. Not only 
a founder but a holy book obligatory to all believers, teaching accepted by all, 
cannot be named; it has no common church, no elaborated dogmas. It well 
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accommodates ardent devotion to the godhead and atheism; exalted philosophies, 
folk cults, tree and snake worship; non-violence (ahimsa) and animal sacrifice. 
Given the circumstances and history of its formation, it is not surprising that 
Hinduism is not a religion, but a mixture of countless religions and cults that have 
never been forged into a homogeneous system. The name Hinduism itself is 
recent and not even Indian; it was coined by the nineteenth-century British 
scholarship to denote the typically Indian religious ideas and practices. The name 
Hindu is much older: the peoples living beyond the Indus River were so named 
by the Persians and Greeks. In the Middle Ages, the inhabitants of the 
subcontinent began to apply it to themselves, as opposed to the Muslim 
conquerors of North India, and from there it was only one step for the word to 
acquire a religious meaning. Ever since the concept of Hinduism was accepted in 
India, its followers have named their religion as Hindu Dharma, a version 
established in Indian languages. The term Sanatana Dharma (‘eternal religion’), 
which emphasises the eternal spiritual nature above the differences in the 
religious practices of Hinduism, is also widespread. 
The most striking feature of Hinduism is probably the multitude of gods, 
so it seems to be a polytheistic belief. However, since the Hindu believer only 
reveres as supreme god the one whose worship is established by tradition in his 
family, we can speak of religious pluralism rather than polytheism. On the other 
hand, Hindu believers do not deny the existence of the other gods either. They 
believe that the divine essence can manifest itself in an infinite variety of forms, 
so the path to it is also many. Religious practices can also be different. Going to 
the temple is not obligatory, nor is faith in God; one can be a Hindu as an atheist 
simply by being born into a Hindu caste. 
Despite the prominent role of spirituality, the social aspects of Hinduism 
are remarkable. The social hierarchy (varna and caste system) interwoven and 
reinforced with the rules of ritual purity and impurity inseparably intertwined 
with the precepts and practices of the Hindu religion. The support of the ruling 
dynasties, on whom not only the construction of temples symbolising the divine 
origin of the kingdom but also the royal donations for the maintenance of the 
priestly class depended, decisively influenced the history of Hinduism. Religion 
and society are profoundly interrelated through a system of basic concepts such 
as the four aims of human life, the doctrine of the duties of social classes and life 
stages (varnashrama dharma), or the observance of customs associated with rites 
of passage (sanskaras: birth, name-giving, first haircut, marriage, etc.). The four 
purposes of life are dharma, a set of religious and ritual prescriptions for one’s 
own life situation and social group; artha, meaning money, wealth, or simply 
livelihood; kama, meaning sensual, marital pleasures; and moksha, union with the 
transcendent. The doctrine of the four goals of life gave justification to living the 
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various aspects of life, whereas the concept of varnas and phases of life 
contributed to their balance by designating the emphases of the particular life 
periods. The task of youth was to learn, of an adult man to establish a family, 
support it and have children; of the ageing man to retire and, in the final phase of 
his life, to wander about as a homeless renouncer, preparing to exit worldly 
existence. The most emphatic Hindu concept is the dharma, which means the 
religion itself and, more broadly, the whole system of rules which includes the 
individual’s own life tasks and the duties arising from belonging to different 
social groups. The latter primarily include caste obligations, but others as well, 
such as the duties of women or kings. The most authoritative source of Hindu law 
(dharma) in Ancient India was the Code of Manu (Manusmriti, also known as the 
Manava Dharmashastra), created around the first century CE. Topics discussed 
in it include the ordinances prescribed for each period of life, the rites of passage, 
the duties of castes and the ruler, and the administration of justice. Thus, in 
addition to the criminal law exercised by the ruler, the dharma as religious law, 
religious practice, duty, virtue, a norm of conduct is given a focal role in the work. 
The Code of Manu is thus primarily a collection of prescriptions for lifestyle and 
behaviour. In subsequent codes (dharmashastras) the purely legal nature came to 
the fore. 
Another fundamental concept of the Hindu religion is karma, which means 
destiny as determined by the actions of a previous life. Hindu believers who 
follow the precepts of their religion strive to earn a better fortune in their next life 
and, through a series of rebirths, to get ever closer to salvation (moksha). Indian 
religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism) accept the concept of the 
transmigration of the soul, and for all of them, salvation means getting out of the 
cycle of life called samsara, breaking the chain of rebirths. In the context of 
Hindu religion, the only way to live a virtuous life is by following one’s dharma, 
that is, by strictly adhering to the regulations concerning one’s social status. If 
one is a king, should excel at performing royal duties; if one is a tanner, should 
excel at finishing leather. The caste system stiffened precisely because 
individuals could only complete their life goals at the very place of the social 
structure they were born, and only by obeying their destiny could they hope to 
have a better rebirth in their next life. 
For most Hindus, the Bhagavad Gita (‟The Song of the Lord”) is one of 
the most sacred texts. Presumably, it was created between the fourth century BCE 
and the second century CE and has survived as part of the Mahabharata. The 
decisive battle between the opposing Kauravas and the Pandavas is imminent but 
Arjuna, who is leading the army of the Pandavas, is in despair as he is about to 
shed the blood of his cousins and relatives. At this point, his charioteer, Krishna, 
reveals his supreme divine form to Arjuna and addresses him a speech. Man must 
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fulfil the task society imposed on him. It is warrior’s duty (dharma) to fight but 
driven by a sense of duty, not out of hatred, knowing that only the body can be 
destroyed, the soul (atman) is immortal; it wanders through a multitude of rebirths 
in the cycle of life in search of liberation (moksha). In his theophany, Krishna 
presents himself as the Ultimate Reality (Brahman), from whom all living entities 
and all phenomena of the world flow out at the beginning of creation, and 
eventually fall back there. The phenomenal world is nothing but magic, illusion 
(maya); Krishna offers devotion (bhakti) felt for him as one of the ways of 
liberation. 
The doctrines and cults of Hinduism were elaborated and affirmed in the 
Puranas that gathered together myths, legends, and oral traditions. One of the 
concepts put forward was the cyclical creation of the world and, related to it, the 
figure of the almighty deity who created, sustained, and destroyed the world. The 
main cults, Vaishnavism, Shaivism, and Shaktism developed around Vishnu, 
Shiva and the Goddess (Devi) respectively but over time the cult of Krishna also 
grew into an independent religion. Theologians sought to reconcile the divergent 
traditions of Vishnu and Shiva in the construction of the Hindu Trinity (Trimurti), 
in which the sustaining role of Vishnu and the destructive role of Shiva were 
complemented by Brahma as creator, and in which all three deities were seen as 
the manifestation of the supreme transcendent essence, the Brahman. However, 
this remained largely at the level of speculation, partly because the significance 
of the cult of Brahma was negligible compared to that of Vishnu and Shiva. The 
ancient female principle of the mother goddess (Magna Mater, ‘Great Mother’) 
was manifested in the many different names and forms of Devi, in her 
independent cult and her role as the female counterpart of the main gods. Mother 
goddesses (matrikas ‘mothers’) were also worshipped and depicted in groups. 
The Puranas devote ample space to the description of temples and images, as 
well as to the benefits to be gained from visiting holy sites, thus consolidating the 
Hindu tradition of temple cult, visual representations, and pilgrimages. 
The tendencies of Hinduism changed over historical periods. As the 
members of the Gupta Dynasty were devotees of Vishnu, during their reign, 
Vishnu cult strengthened with royal support. In the age of the Hindu dynasties 
that replaced the Guptas, the prevalence of Shaivism can be observed as a general 
phenomenon, which, however, did not mean at all the complete marginalisation 
of Vaishnavism. Often within the same dynasty, either Shaiva or Vaishnava rulers 
took the throne. The Islamic rule in India, most powerful between 1200 and 1750, 
is characterised by the increasing strength of the bhakti movement and the 
enhanced role of the community’s cohesive power. The age of colonisation had a 
decisive impact on the development of modern Hinduism. On the one hand, 
Hindu thinkers and reformers began to look at their own traditions through the 
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lens of European authors and critics, which sparked revival movements. First, 
Ram Mohan Roy’s movement (Brahmo Samaj, ‘Society of Brahma’, 1828), and 
then the Arya Samaj (‘Society of Aryans’, 1875) set the goal of reforming 
Hinduism. On the other hand, due to its intertwining with the independence 
movement, Hinduism took on a political hue at this time. The adoption of the 
concept of Hinduism came handy in forging a national unity that had a Hindu 
character from the outset. The emphasis on the sanctity of the Vedas (another 
concept emerging from the West) and the idea of a ‘mystical India’ also proved 
to be a useful tool for counterbalancing religious differences. The patriotism of 
the Hindu revival movement, which made India the holy land of Hinduism, 
intertwined with the cult of bhakti, and the mysticism of the Bengali Ramakrishna 
was vested with the role of a new nation-building force. Ramakrishna’s chief 
disciple, Vivekananda, who spread his ideas in the West, and the Theosophical 
Society founded in South India but relocated to New York in 1875, played an 
important role in spreading Indian religious and philosophical ideas to the West. 
Hindu religious practice and the Hindu way of life traditionally involves 
several other deeply-rooted phenomena and habits such as religious festivals that 
often last for several days, vegetarianism which is based on the principle of non-
injury (ahimsa), respect for cows, the living tradition of the caste system, and 
arranged marriages based on caste compliance and horoscope matching. 
However, in the practice of all this, significant social and regional differences can 
be observed, which are also influenced by the urban or rural environment, and 
the cultural background of the practitioner. 
 
Early Middle Ages: The age of Hindu dynasties 
 
The disintegration of the Gupta Empire was followed by centuries of 
political fragmentation in the subcontinent. Next time it was the Muslim Mughal 
Dynasty to establish a centralised state, bringing almost the entire subcontinent 
under its sway in the mid-sixteenth century. Regional Hindu kingdoms emerged 
and were continuously at war for supremacy over the numerous local vassal 
states. In the north-east the Palas (eighth to the twelfth century), in the north-west 
the Gurjara-Pratiharas (seventh to the tenth century), in the south-west the 
Rashtrakutas (eighth to the tenth century), in the Deccan the Chalukyas (seventh 
to the eighth century), in the south the Pallavas (seventh to the ninth century) and 
the Cholas (ninth to the thirteenth century) ruled over extensive territories. Unlike 
the Western-type state, the states of the subcontinent were defined by their centre, 
not by their territorial extent. The capital city was the seat of the divine ruler and 
the focus of cosmogonic concepts regarding world order. The power of the ruler, 
in its entirety, prevailed only in the immediate vicinity of the centre and with 
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distance, it gradually decreased. The dependence of the peripheral areas was loose 
or nominal. The kingdom may have been encircled by secondary and tertiary 
centres of vassal areas in multiple rings. This type of state structure, whose 
exercise of power was already described in Kautilya’s Arthashastra, has been 
called mandala state by researchers (the mandala being a diagram depicting the 
universe with a presiding deity in its centre surrounded by multiple rings of 
protection). In the sacred centre of the kingdom, the king had his temple built, 
and in its sanctuary, he had the image of the deity he worshipped erected, thus 
proclaiming the divine origin of his power. Rooted in India, the concept of 
devaraja (Sk. ‘god-king’, i.e. deified monarch) and its cultic and architectural 
dimensions took a mature form in the Southeast-Asian kingdoms; however, the 
need for a charismatic exercise of power also resulted in the emergence of a 
multitude of sacred centres in India. This gave a huge boost to the development 
of Hindu architecture and sculpture. Buddhism was pushed back to Northeast 
India in the eighth century, where it experienced its last Indian heyday during the 
Pala dynasty. In the early thirteenth century, conquering Islam destroyed its 
thriving monastic centres and famous universities (Nalanda, Vikramashila). Its 
monks fled abroad, and Buddhism practically ceased in India. South India was 
first united by the Chola kings. The dynasty of Tamil origin emerged as a land 
and sea power in the eleventh century through its conquests in Southeast Asia. 
Chola kings had a large fleet and army, and their imperial ambitions were backed 
by considerable economic power. In the cultural field, they left lasting 
impressions in both South India and Southeast Asia. As unconditional adherents 
of the Shaiva Hindu religiosity, the Cholas also spread this form of Hinduism in 
Southeast Asia. In South India, they erected grand-scale temples in honour of 
Shiva. The first temple cities (Thanjavur, Chidambaram) emerged as a result of 
their quest for monumentality. With their generous donations, they established 
the temples as independent economic actors in the life of the kingdom. 
The Hindu temple itself is actually a three-dimensional mandala: a symbol 
of the universe, with the divinity at its centre. Its primary symbolism refers to the 
mountain and the cave hidden inside it, translated into architectural forms by the 
tower and the sanctuary. The image of the deity (always the linga in the case of 
Shiva temples) is erected in the closed, dark, cell-like main sanctuary (Sk. 
garbhagriha, ‘womb chamber’). After the ritual circumambulation of the temple, 
the worshipper arrives here through the antechamber and the pillared hall 
(mandapa) to see the deity (darshana) and place the offerings (puja). The cosmic 
symbolism of the Hindu temple is enhanced by the images of deities and celestial 
beings covering the walls. Hindu temple architecture, in contrast to Indian secular 
architecture, was characterised by the use of durable materials (brick, stone) and 
conservative construction technologies. The ritual precepts of Hindu architecture 
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prohibited the use of arches and domes; they were replaced by beams, false arches 
and domes, and towers built of horizontal layers. As this construction technology 
is not suitable for covering large spaces, the interiors of Hindu temples are 
sometimes distinctly narrow, not allowing many believers to be accommodated. 
The temples of Khajuraho in Madhya Pradesh, built in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries, manifest the purest form of North Indian (nagara) architecture (Figure 
38). 
 
Figure 38: Temples of Khajuraho. Chandela dynasty, eleventh century 
Source: Photograph by ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
 
In South Indian (Dravidian) temple architecture, the sanctuary and its 
superstructure, symbolising the celestial vehicle of the deity, are dwarfed by the 
impressive gate towers rising above the entrances of the walls surrounding the 
temple district. The most important pilgrimage centres in the south from the 
sixteenth century onwards were transformed into large temple districts, whose 
maintenance and operation were ensured by generous royal donations, large areas 
of land and a big staff. An indispensable part of the temple is the sacred tank used 
for ritual baths and other temple rituals. In the courtyards enclosed by the walls 
of the temple, pillared halls (mandapas), shrines, pilgrims’ dormitories, kitchens, 
warehouses and other service buildings are located. The great temple cities of 
South India: Thanjavur (formerly Tanjore), Madurai, Rameshwaram, 
Tiruvannamalai took their present form in the last flourishing period of South 
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Indian temple architecture between the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries (Figure 
39). 
 
Figure 39: Arunachalesvara Temple, Tiruvannamalai (Tamil Nadu) 
Source: Adam Jones adamjones.freeservers.com. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ 
File: View_over_Arunchaleshvara_Temple_from_the_Red_Mountain _-
_Tiruvannamalai_-_India_01.JPG 
 
In the context of medieval Indian art, it is imperative to mention bronze 
sculpture, which culminated at this time thanks through the iconic works of Chola 
art. The temple cult of South India required many bronze statues, which were 
placed in shrines of the temple halls and carried around the city on holidays. The 
production of the large, solid Chola bronzes not only testifies to the high standard 
of artistic creativity, the perfect sculptural realisation of spiritual beauty but also 
to the economic strength of the kingdom, due to the huge amount of metals used. 
In addition, the casting technology applied (the so-called cire-perdue or lost wax 
process) assumed a high level of metal casting and metalworking knowledge. 
South Indian temple art is a prime example of the fact that the primary resource-
mobilising activity in Indian civilisation was, in technological, economic and 
aesthetic terms, sacred art, which used the noblest materials, the highest available 
technology and the best of human creativity. The images had to comply with the 
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rules of iconography and had to be perfect in a technical sense; only this way 
could they become suitable for cultic use. However, the creators of works of art 
aspiring to such perfection remained unknown in most cases. In the art of India, 
the names of creators have survived only as a rare exception. The recording of 
names was ruled out both by the perception of art whose only real aim was to 
approach transcendental reality and the low social rank of builders, stonemasons, 
sculptors, and bronze founders. 
In Southeast Asia, between the fifth and thirteenth centuries, Indian-type 
kingdoms and later vast empires emerged. Indian impacts arrived through direct 
relationships (e.g., the presence of Indian Brahmin priests in the royal courts), 
sacred texts and literary works, including the Mahabharata and the Ramayana. 
At the beginning of the Middle Ages, trade relations with the Mediterranean still 
existed but were soon replaced by relations with southern China. Increased 
maritime traffic boosted the inclusion of Southeast Asian areas along the sea route 
to China into India’s commercial and cultural sphere of interest. The Mon 
Kingdom, which existed in southern Thailand and Burma until the eighth century, 
was replaced by new centres of power. Their power structure was modelled on 
the mandala-type kingdoms of India. 
In present-day Cambodia, Chenla was replaced in the ninth century by the 
Khmer Empire with its capital at Angkor, the most powerful kingdom in 
Southeast Asia. Its power was counterbalanced by the Kingdom of Pagan in 
modern-day Burma. In the conflict zone between the two, the Thai kingdoms of 
Haripunchai, Sukhothai and Ayutthaya fought with varying outcomes against 
their neighbours. The eastern half of the mainland was dominated by Champa, 
which had long resisted Chinese pressure from the north. The Malay Peninsula, 
Sumatra, and West and Central Java were part of the Kingdom of Srivijaya. In 
the eleventh century, the Chola Empire conquered Sri Lanka and successfully 
intervened on the side of the Khmer Kingdom in the power rivalry between 
Srivijaya and Angkor, occupying parts of Srivijaya in the process. Hindu culture 
was dominant in this period in the Khmer and Cham areas, as well as in East Java 
(a unique local variant of Hinduism still exists on the nearby island of Bali). 
Hinduism in other kingdoms existed alongside Buddhism as the predominant 
religion. Within Hindu religiosity, Shaivism, Vaishnavism, Bhakti and Tantric 
cults focusing on creative energy were all present, albeit with varying weights. 
The great Indian epics in all kingdoms had a fertilising effect on local literature 
and the arts, especially narrative depictions, dance, and puppetry. Building 
complexes in Southeast Asian power centres (Angkor, Pagan, My Son, Pram-
banan, Borobudur, etc.) are among the most important sites for sacred art in Asia 
and the world. In addition to the dominant Indian character, local style influences 
and creative ideas prevailed in their art. In a sense, the temples of Angkor can be 
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considered the pinnacle of Hindu temple architecture. Through the concept of the 
temple mountain, the Indian perception of the structure of the world with the 
world mountain (Meru) in its centre and the surrounding lands and oceans was 
fully translated into architectural forms here. The construction of reservoirs and 
water systems required a high level of engineering knowledge, whose antecedents 
can also be found in India. The largest Buddhist stupa in the world was built in 
Borobudur, Java. With the decline of the great kingdoms, the influence of Hindu 
culture ceased in Southeast Asia. However, the heritage of Indian culture in the 
form of Theravada Buddhism fundamentally defines the image of the mainland 
part of the region to this day. An exception is Vietnam, where the ‘Pure land’ 
school belonging to Mahayana Buddhism gained popularity. 
 
Islam in India 
 
The Islamic conquest was a watershed in the medieval history of the 
subcontinent. Less than a hundred years after the hijra, Islam gained its foothold 
in the north-western part of the Indian subcontinent, in the areas west of the Indus, 
through the Arab conquerors and later the converted Persians, Afghans, and 
Central Asian Turks. From there, Muslim chiefs led increasingly frequent 
campaigns to northern Indian territories. In 1203, breaking the resistance of the 
Rajput principalities, the Muslim forces took Delhi and established the first 
Islamic state in North India. The crucial difference from earlier nomadic 
invasions in the history of the subcontinent was that while former settlers had 
been rapidly assimilated by the socio-political and cultural system of the 
subcontinent, Islam introduced its own legal and administrative system, religion, 
and ethical principles. The Delhi Sultanate expanded rapidly, and successive 
dynasties extended their power to northern India and much of the Deccan. The 
conquest took many casualties and caused significant destruction. Hindu temples 
on the routes of conquest were demolished and mosques erected in their place, 
and a head tax was imposed on the Hindu population. Although forced conversion 
also took place, due to the benefits of embracing Islam, the Muslim population of 
the subcontinent also grew though voluntary conversions, especially from the 
lower strata of Hindu society. The vast majority of Muslims in India came from 
the converted local population. In contrast to Hindu civilisation, Islamic culture 
concentrated in the cities, where large-scale construction works took place, soon 
transforming the Indian cityscape. Typical Islamic building types emerged: 
fortresses indicating the military character of power, mosques and minarets 
essential to the practice of religion, as well as tombs, gardens, madrasas. 
Although the Muslim land and public administration system left the rural 
foundations of Hindu society intact, the interruption of Hindu statehood led to the 
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gradual decay of former royal centres even in areas not directly affected by the 
military conquest. However, the emergence of Islamic statehood in India also 
gave rise to resistance. The West Indian fortresses of the Rajput dynasties, famous 
for their military virtues, were the main base for resistance and military operations 
of varying success (Figure 40). In the southern part of the peninsula, the power 
of the Delhi Sultanate was counterbalanced by the Hindu Vijayanagara Empire 
where Hindu culture flourished undisturbed until the mid-sixteenth century. 
 
Figure 40: Gwalior Fort, Madhya Pradesh. In its present form it was built in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
Source: Photograph by ZSUZSANNA RENNER 
 
The Delhi Sultanate was in fact only a prelude to the creation of the Mughal 
Empire (1526‒1858), which, at the zenith of its power, united the entire Indian 
subcontinent under its rule, except for the southern tip of the peninsula. 
According to researchers, the enormous empire, ahead of China in its day, was 
the world’s largest economic power, driven by growth in agricultural production, 
the accumulation of commercial capital, and a relatively high level of 
urbanisation. The official language of administration which operated from three 
capitals was Persian. Akbar (1556‒1605), the most prominent ruler of the Mughal 
Dynasty, married a Rajput princess and sought to bring Islamic and Hindu culture 
closer in other ways too. He studied Indian religions and merged some of the 
elements of Islam and the trends of Hinduism known at that time in a syncretic 
religion which he called Din-i Ilahi, the ‘Divine Faith’. His successors did not 
follow Akbar on the path of religious tolerance, but a kind of synthesis of Islamic 
and the Hindu culture was nevertheless achieved, especially in architecture. 
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Massive constructions took place under each of the Mughal emperors; however, 
the most outstanding builder among them was Shah Jahan (1628‒1658) at whose 
order the fortress of Delhi and Agra, and the world-famous tomb, the Taj Mahal 
was built. Muslim edifices of the time display elements of Hindu architecture that 
mark the creation of the distinctive Indo-Islamic style. The synthesis is even more 
evident in Rajput architecture, which not only embraced stylistic elements of 
Islamic art (e.g., lobed arches) but also building types (fortress, palace), 
technologies (vault, arch, dome) and structural features (multi-story, contiguous 
interiors). In terms of religion, Islamic mysticism and the presence of Sufi saints 
had an impact on Hindu religiosity; linguistically, the development of Urdu was 
due to the interplay of Persian and Indian languages. In music, Hindustani (North 
Indian) classical instrumental and vocal music bears the stamp of Persian and 
Arabic influences. In art, the sophisticated Mughal miniature painting, which did 
not prohibit human portrayal, had a lasting impact on local Indian miniature 
painting. Islam introduced many branches of applied arts and crafts, hitherto 
unknown in India: the making of glazed pottery, brocade and carpet weaving, 
metallic embroidery, gemstone carving, many varieties of metalwork, including 
the production of ornamental weapons, and the list could go on. These 
handicrafts, the finest creations of which were produced in the workshops 
(karkhana) of the Mughal court, are still practised in India today. 
Islam meant a counterpoint for the civilisation of India. Its cosmopolitan 
culture, the monotheism and congregational nature of its religion, the simple and 
pure architectural forms and vast spaces of its buildings, the complete absence of 
sculpture and the importance of writing in general and calligraphy in particular, 
the linear perception of time and the role of historiography – only to mention a 
few of the most striking differences – were in sharp contrast with the thousand-
year-old cultural patterns of India. The diverse cultural output of Islam in India, 
however, has infiltrated the fabric of the subcontinent’s civilisation over the 
centuries of coexistence. In the age of colonisation and modernisation, Indian 
civilisation underwent further changes in the context of the Hindu Renaissance 
and the Indian Independence Movement charged with Hindu religious hue. 
Today, when religious antagonisms, unfortunately, do not diminish but intensify 
and become a factor in arousing passions in political battles, we can only hope 
that India’s still living civilisation, drawing on its long tradition of tolerance and 
reconciling diverse cultural phenomena, will be able to accept its multifaceted 
past in the best sense of the word and use it as a resource for its benefit. 
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3.1.6. Chronological table 
  
Date Event 
c. 2600‒1900 BCE Indus Valley Civilisation 
c. from 1900 BCE Arrival of Aryans in India 
c. 1500‒600 BCE Vedic Age 
Around 1500 BCE Origin of the Rigveda 
sixth century BCE The rise of Magadha with its capital at Rajgir, later Pataliputra 
c. 599/570‒527/489 
or 468 BCE Vardhamana Mahavira, the Jina 
c. 563‒483 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha 
327‒325 BCE Alexander the Great’s campaign in India 
c. 323‒185 BCE Maurya Age 
c. 268‒231 BCE Ashoka Maurya 
180‒130 BCE Indo-Greek kingdoms in the north-west 
first c. BCE ‒first c. CE Saka and Parthian kingdoms in the north-west 
c. second c. BCE – 
second century CE Satavahana dynasty in the Deccan and Central India 
first‒third centuries Kushan era in the north-west and Central India 
c. 320‒550 Gupta Empire 
c. third‒sixth Vakataka dynasty in northern Deccan 
c. 600‒1200, in South 
India until 1761 Hindu dynasties 
c. mid-sixth century‒
mid-eighth century Early Western Chalukya dynasty in the Deccan 
seventh‒ninth 
centuries Pallava dynasty in Andhra and Tamil Nadu 
eighth‒tenth centuries Rashtrakuta dynasty in the Deccan 
eighth‒twelfth 
centuries Pala dynasty in Eastern India 
Mid-ninth‒thirteenth 
centuries Chola dynasty in Tamil Nadu 
1206‒1526 Delhi Sultanate 
1526‒1858 Mughal Empire 
1556‒1605 Akbar 
1627‒1658 Shah Jahan 
fourteenth to the 
nineteenth century 
Rajput principalities in Rajasthan, Central India, and at the foot of the 
Himalayas 
1336‒1565 Vijayanagar 
1858‒1947 British Indian Empire 
1947 Declaration of independence and partition of India 
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4.1. Judaism 
 
DÓRA ZSOM 
 
Judaism is the oldest monotheistic religion, which precedes both 
Christianity and Islam. Unlike these, the origins of Judaism are not linked to a 
particular historical event ‒ like the activity of Jesus Christ in Christianity, or that 
of Muhammad in Islam ‒, which would clearly mark the beginnings of Judaism. 
Moreover, contrary to Christianity and Islam, Jews do not promote their faith, 
and they do not aim to convert the different peoples of the world to Judaism. In 
fact, Jews consider themselves to be members of a large family, or distant 
relatives, and regard Judaism as the religion of this particular family, tribe, or 
people. Jewish descent (that is, belonging to the Jewish people according to 
Jewish law) is traced through the maternal line. In addition, converts were 
accepted since the beginning of Jewish history through a procedure similar to 
“adoption”, – nonetheless, this was rather uncommon. Jews have never actively 
promoted their religion and sought to increase the number of converts among 
non-Jewish people. 
The origins of Judaism date back to the nomadic tribes that wandered 
between ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt worshipping and offering sacrifices to 
their tribal gods. These tribes traced their lineage back to a mutual ancestor, 
named Israel. Hence, they called themselves “children of Israel” (Israel being an 
alternate name of the forefather Jacob). The alliance of these tribes settled in 
Canaan between the thirteenth and twelfth century BCE. Today, this territory 
comprises Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan. They founded their kingdom 
with its centre being the city of Jerusalem, however, the kingdom was soon 
divided into two, a northern (Israel) and southern (Judah) kingdom in the tenth 
century BCE. As a result of the conquests by the surrounding empires, both king-
doms lost their independence: Israel, as an independent kingdom, was eventually 
eliminated by the Assyrian Empire in the eighth century BCE, and Judah first came 
under the rule of the Assyrian, then the Babylonian, Persian, and finally the 
Roman Empire. The Romans demolished the Temple in Jerusalem (in 70 CE), the 
central place of worship of the ancient Israelites, which resulted in a complete 
transformation of the religion. As a consequence, we shall distinguish between 
the religion of the biblical age (Biblical Judaism) and the Judaism of later times 
(Rabbinical Judaism). 
 
  
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4.1.1. Judaism in Biblical Times 
 
The term “Judaism” does not appear either in the Hebrew Bible (i.e. the 
Bible used by the Jews) or in other ancient Jewish sacred texts. The Greek original 
of the word was used by Jews in the Hellenistic era to refer to their particular 
religious practices. (See 2 Maccabees 2:21, 8:1, 14:38. The Hebrew Bible is not 
comprised of the same books as the Catholic Bible, the Books of the Maccabees 
are not part of it.) The word “Judaism” is derived from the name of Judah, one of 
the great-grandsons of Patriarch Abraham, to whom the tribe of Judah traces back 
its lineage to. The English term “Jew” also originates in the name Judah through 
a variety of adoptions. The word “Hebrew” is the English equivalent of the 
biblical term “ivri”, which derives from the verbal root meaning “to traverse, to 
pass over, to wander”. The Bible denotes Abraham, one of the nomad ancestors 
of Israel as “ivri”. Abraham’s son was Isaac, father of Jacob, who was later given 
the name Israel. They are regarded as the Patriarchs of the Jewish people. Israel 
(Jacob) had twelve sons, and these sons were the ancestors of the twelve tribes of 
Israel, including the tribe of Judah. In modern English the term “Jewish” is used 
for the people and the religion, while “Israelite” refers either to a member of the 
ancient Hebrew nation or to a person having Jewish religion, and lastly, the word 
“Hebrew” is primarily used to denote the language. 
The principal source of knowledge about Biblical Judaism is the Bible 
itself. The Hebrew Bible roughly corresponds to the Old Testament of the 
Protestant Bible, i.e. it contains the same books but in a different arrangement. 
The Hebrew Bible is divided into three sections (Torah, Prophets, Writings). The 
Torah (meaning: “Law”, consisting of the five books of Moses) is primarily a 
legal text, but it also contains a description of the creation of the world and the 
first human couple, the Flood and Noah’s Ark, the Tower of Babel and the 
confusion of languages, the migrations of the Patriarchs, Israel’s Exodus from 
Egypt, the miracles of Moses, the Ten Commandments, and the description of the 
Jewish people’s wanderings in the wilderness. The continuation of the history of 
ancient Israel, that is, the conquest of the land of Israel and the history of the two 
kingdoms, is written in the books of the so-called Former Prophets (Joshua, 
Judges, Samuel, and Kings) and Latter Prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel). 
These books and the books of the Twelve Minor Prophets are included in the 
book of “Prophets”, the second main division of the Hebrew Bible. The third 
section, “Writings”, consists of both poetic and historical books: Psalms, the 
Book of Proverbs, the Book of Job, Song of Songs, the Book of Ruth, 
Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, the Book of Esther, the Book of Daniel, the Book of 
Ezra and Nehemiah, Chronicles. The three divisions do not reflect the chronology 
of the text, which itself is a very complex problem: biblical stories were initially 
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passed on orally and were only written down later on. The biblical text, in its 
present form, is the result of a combination of different sources and several stages 
of editing. The sources that were combined into a single story are of different 
ages, origins, and genres. In terms of genre and content, they fit into the literary 
tradition of the surrounding peoples, and many well-known biblical stories and 
motifs (the creation of the world, the flood, etc.) are present in other ancient 
Middle Eastern literary traditions, as well. 
 
4.1.2. The Biblical Story of Israel 
 
According to the biblical story, God commanded Abraham to leave his 
country, his people and his father’s household and go to the land he will show 
him (Gen. 12:1‒3). Abraham and his family wandered from the southern 
Mesopotamian Ur to Egypt through Canaan, and in the course of their journey 
God promised Abraham to give the land of Canaan to his family and descendants 
(Map 14). 
To confirm this, God made a covenant with Abraham, according to which 
each male must undergo circumcision (Gen. 17:1‒14). In the time of the 
Patriarchs, namely Abraham, his son Isaac, and Isaac’s son Jacob, God repeated 
this promise to the family; however, during that time the family (tribe) had not 
yet settled in Canaan, but led a nomadic lifestyle, wandering between Egypt and 
Mesopotamia, while crossing several times the land that later became Israel. The 
Bible explains the name Israel with a mysterious story: Patriarch Jacob struggled 
until dawn with an angel who, at the end of their struggle, gave him the name of 
Israel “for you have striven with God and with men, and have prevailed” (Gen. 
32:29)8. According to popular etymology, the Hebrew name Yisrael means “he 
who struggles with God”. Jacob’s twelve sons escaped from the famine that 
affected Canaan and fled to Egypt where they settled and multiplied. The twelve 
sons of Israel (Jacob) are the ancestors of the twelve tribes of the people of Israel, 
who united into a single people upon their Exodus from Egypt. 
  

8 The translations of Biblical passages are given, with slight modernisation, according to 
the so-called JPS Tanakh 1917, i.e. The Holy Scriptures According to the Masoretic Text: 
A New Translation. Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society, 1917.  
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Map 14: Migration routes of the Patriarchs according to the Bible 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA   
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The Second Book of Moses (Exodus) tells the story of the hardships the 
people of Israel had to face in Egypt when the Egyptians forced the nation into 
slavery. Moses became their advocate, and obeying God’s command, he 
demanded that Pharaoh release his people, and allow them to return to Canaan. 
Upon the Pharaoh’s refusal to grant this request, God struck Egypt with ten 
plagues, the most serious of which was the death of the firstborn. According to 
the story, God commanded the people of Israel to slaughter sacrificial lambs, to 
eat the meat with unleavened bread, to smear the blood of the lamb on the 
doorposts, and to remain in their houses at night, because: “For the Lord will pass 
through to smite the Egyptians; and when He sees the blood upon the lintel, and 
on the two side-posts, the Lord will pass over the door, and will not suffer the 
destroyer to come in unto your houses to smite you. (...) And it came to pass at 
midnight, that the Lord smote all the firstborn in the land of Egypt, from the first-
born of Pharaoh that sat on his throne unto the first-born of the captive that was 
in the dungeon; and all the first-born of cattle.” (Exodus 12:23, 29) Seeing this 
the Pharaoh gave his consent to the Israelites to leave Egypt, but soon after he 
had a change of heart, and pursued the nation of Israel with his chariots, and 
overtook them at the Red Sea. Holding out his staff, Moses separated the Red Sea 
and the Israelites walked on the passage of dry land with walls of water on both 
sides; however, their pursuers drowned as the waters rushed back. After their 
Exodus from Egypt, the people of Israel wandered in the wilderness for forty 
years, while God taught them how to serve him. The revelation at Mount Sinai 
took place at the beginning of these wanderings: Moses received the Ten 
Commandments engraved on tablets of stone; God disclosed his other 
commandments and laws as well, and finally, God made a covenant with the 
people (Ex. 20:1‒17, 24:3‒8, 12). The divine revelation was very frightening for 
the people, therefore they asked Moses to represent them before God. However, 
since Moses spent such a long time on the mountain, standing before God, the 
people thought that he had been consumed by the unbearable power of the divine 
presence. So, they made a golden idol, a calf of moulded gold for themselves. 
Upon descending from Mount Sinai after forty days, Moses found the 
people practicing idolatry, and in his exasperation, he broke the tablets of stone 
onto which God himself had inscribed His laws. However, after the people 
repented, at God’s command Moses remade the tablets of stone, but this time he 
inscribed the commandments on them instead of God. God himself led the people 
during the wondering in the wilderness; his place of worship was a portable 
tabernacle. The Ark of the Covenant (also known as the Ark of Testimony) with 
its winged cherubim was the tangible throne of the invisible God, the place of 
manifestation of the divine presence. 
  
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Map 15: Map of the twelve tribes of Israel 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA   
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Canaan was conquered only after a long period of wondering in the 
wilderness, after that had Moses died and Joshua assumed the role of leading the 
people. The territories they occupied were divided among the twelve tribes, who 
then sought to protect them from the invasions of neighbouring peoples (Map 15). 
The tribal alliance soon became a kingdom, headed first by Saul and then by 
David (first half of tenth century BCE), followed by his son, Solomon (second half 
of tenth century BCE). David occupied Jerusalem and made it the capital of his 
kingdom. The central place of worship, the Temple of Jerusalem, was built by 
Solomon. The cult was based on offering sacrifices in the Temple, and the rituals 
connected to the offerings were carried out by the priestly orders (Kohanim and 
Leviim). After Solomon’s death, the kingdom split into two. Ten tribes in the 
North established an independent kingdom called Israel, while two tribes in the 
South (the larger tribe of Judah and the smaller tribe of Benjamin) together 
formed a kingdom called Judah. During the next two centuries (ninth and eighth 
centuries BCE), the two kingdoms fought against one another as well as against 
the surrounding peoples, and the two dominant empires of the region (namely 
Egypt and Assyria), until Israel was eventually conquered by the Assyrian Empire 
(721 BCE) (Map 16). In line with the politics of the Assyrian Empire, while a large 
part of the population was deported to other parts of the Empire, ethnic groups 
from other parts of the Empire were moved to Israel. Soon Judah also came under 
Assyrian rule. After the fall of the Assyrian Empire, Judah became part of the 
Neo-Babylonian Empire. Nebuchadnezzar (Nabu-kudurri-usur), Babylonian 
ruler conquered Jerusalem in 597 BCE and deported a part of the population (so-
called “Babylonian captivity”). Approximately ten years later, the kingdom of 
Judah revolted against Babylonian rule. In response to that, the Babylonian army 
again sieged and conquered Jerusalem, and finally destroyed both the city and the 
Temple (587 BCE). King Cyrus of Persia defeated Babylon in 540 BCE and 
granted the deported Jews permission to return to Jerusalem, but the restoration 
of the Temple was only completed in 516 BCE (“the Second Temple”). The 
Hebrew Bible does not report the events of the centuries that followed: Judah 
became part of the spheres of interest of new empires; after it was conquered by 
Alexander the Great, the land remained under Greek military and cultural 
influence, against which the Jews rebelled (the Maccabean Revolt) in 167 BCE. 
Pompey the Great led a successful military campaign against Judah in 63 BCE, 
after which the supremacy of the Roman Empire prevailed over it. Judah was 
ruled by successive Judean kings and Roman governors (procurators), until it 
finally came under direct Roman administration, and became a province of the 
Roman Empire. In response to the Jewish revolt against the Roman rule in 70 CE, 
the Roman army destroyed Jerusalem and the Second Temple, which was never 
rebuilt. 
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Map 16: The Assyrian Empire following the annexation of Israel 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The only original wall still standing in the area of the Temple Mount is the 
Wailing Wall (also known as the Western Wall), which is not, however, a wall of 
the Temple’s building but a section of the wall surrounding the Temple area, built 
by Herod the Great (ruled between 37‒4 BCE). Its significance is due to the fact 
that in practice a religious Jew cannot get closer to the site of the former Temple, 
which also became a holy place for the Muslims following the Islamic conquest. 
Nowadays, the Dome of the Rock stands on the site of the former Temple. 
 
4.1.3. Religious rituals and cult in the Biblical Period 
 
The tribal cult of ancient Israel was slowly transformed into a centralised 
religious practice, which was based on the notion of covenant: first between God 
and a specific person (Abraham), then between God and a tribe (descendants of 
Abraham), finally between God and a people (Israel). A covenant is a contract 
between two parties with well-defined terms and conditions in which the parties 
to the contract assume certain obligations. According to the biblical history, God 
promised to consider the people of Israel as his chosen people, whom he leads 
into Canaan, which he gives to his people. In turn, it is Israel’s duty to observe 
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God’s laws: “And Moses went up unto God, and the Lord called unto him out of 
the mountain, saying: ‘Thus shall you say to the house of Jacob, and tell the 
children of Israel: You have seen what I did unto the Egyptians, and how I bore 
you on eagles’ wings, and brought you unto Myself. Now therefore, if you will 
hearken unto My voice indeed, and keep My covenant, then you shall be Mine 
own treasure from among all peoples; for all the earth is Mine’; [...] And all the 
people answered together, and said: ‘All that the Lord has spoken we will do’.” 
(Exodus 19:3‒5, 8) 
The religious practice consisted primarily of offering sacrifices and 
observing certain religious festivities, three of which required the whole people 
to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem where they had to offer sacrifices in the 
Temple. The Temple was divided into different parts according to the degree of 
sanctity: the outer court of the Temple was open to everyone, even to non-Jews. 
To the inner court Jewish women could enter but non-Jews could not; and only 
Jewish men could go any further, while only priests had access to the innermost 
halls and chambers. The holiest area was the so-called “Holy of Holies”, where 
no one was allowed to enter except the High Priest, but even he could enter only 
once a year, on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur). In the Holy of the Holies 
the invisible God himself dwelled above the Ark of the Covenant. The Day of 
Atonement was the only occasion on which the High Priest uttered the name of 
God. According to Jewish tradition, it is forbidden to pronounce the four-letter 
name of God (the Tetragrammaton), which therefore has to be substituted by 
names such as “Lord” or “Eternal”. God’s four-letter name was a taboo due to 
the tremendous power attributed to it, which was life-threatening even for the 
High Priest himself, who pronounced it once a year in obedience to the divine 
ordinance. 
After the destruction of the Temple, the religious practice was radically 
transformed, as its central element, the offering of sacrifices, was no longer 
possible to perform. Its role was assumed by studying, reciting, commenting and 
discussing the sacred texts. 
 
4.1.4. The Major Branches of Judaism 
 
After the destruction of the Second Temple (70 CE), most of the Jews were 
forced into diaspora; that is, dispersed throughout the world. Jewish history is, 
therefore, extremely diverse, as it forms an integral part of the history of each 
country in which Jews settled. Each community followed their own traditions, 
always living as part of the minority within the majority population, assimilating 
to a greater or lesser extent to the majority (for example with regard to language, 
local customs, clothing, and legal system). The congregations did not form a 
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single hierarchical organisation and enjoyed a high degree of independence. On 
the basis of origin, customs and rituals, we can distinguish between three large 
groups: the Ashkenazi, the Sephardi and the Mizrahi Jews. 
The name Ashkenazi9  refers to the Jews who come from Germany or 
Northern-France and follow the religious rites and customs that evolved in those 
regions, regardless of where they currently live for example in the United States, 
in the State of Israel, or in Budapest. In the Middle Ages Germany and France 
were intellectual centres of Judaism, and therefore, the Ashkenazi form of 
Judaism became prevalent in Europe. Ashkenazi Jews spoke, and to some extent, 
still speak Yiddish, which belongs to the Germanic language group. Ashkenaz is 
the term referring to Germany in medieval Hebrew texts. 
Jews who originally come from the Iberian Peninsula are called Sephardi10 
Jews. Up until the end of the Middle Ages, Jewish culture flourished in that 
region, but in 1492, when Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon, known as 
the “Catholic Kings” (Reyes Católicos), expelled the last Muslim conquerors 
from their kingdoms, the rulers decided to establish a united, monoreligious 
nation. Therefore, the Jews under their rule were compelled to choose between 
converting to Christianity and leaving the country. The communities that decided 
to emigrate were given a three months’ grace period to fold up their livelihood, 
sell their properties, and leave Christian territory. Of course, property prices 
immediately plummeted, since it was commonly known that Jews would be 
forced to sell their properties regardless of the low prices once the grace period 
ended, since after that deadline, Jews remaining in the countries of the Catholic 
kings faced death penalty. Furthermore, the export of wealth was severely 
hindered, since Jews emigrating from Spain were forbidden to take precious 
metals with them. Some emigrating Jews settled in North Africa and the Ottoman 
Empire, while others moved to nearby Portugal, where they soon had to face new 
hardships. Portugal, similar to Spain, also issued an expulsion order in 1497, with 
the exception that the grace period was only one month. However, the Jews were 
eventually not expulsed from Portugal: when they gathered in the ports 
designated for boarding on the day of the departure (after having liquidated their 
shops and sold their houses), they were simply surrounded by Christian priests 
and soldiers, who forcefully baptised them. After their forced baptism as fresh 
Christian subjects, they were forbidden to leave the country. This was because, 
in the meantime, the Portuguese ruler had realised, that expelling the Jewish 
craftsmen, traders and bankers from the country would have grave economic 
consequences. Although Jews converted to Christianity were prohibited to leave 

9 Also known as Ashkenazic Jews, or Ashkenazim, by using the Hebrew plural. 
10 Also known as Sephardic Jews, or Sephardim, by using the Hebrew plural. 
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Spain, and their religious observance was supervised by the Inquisition both in 
Spain and Portugal, Christians of Jewish descent kept secretly emigrating from 
the Iberian Peninsula in the next centuries. Jews who descended from those who 
left the Iberian Peninsula, whether at the time of the expulsion or later are called 
Sephardi Jews (Sepharad is the name for Spain in medieval Hebrew literature). 
Most of them spoke Ladino until recently, which means that they continued to 
use the Spanish language for about five hundred years after they had been 
expelled from the country. 
The Hebrew term Mizrahi, meaning “Oriental”, refers to the Jews who 
settled in Muslim countries before the expulsion of the Jews from the Iberian 
Peninsula. Mizrahi Jews lived among other places in the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, 
the Caucasus, India and Pakistan. However, since the vast majority of Sephardi 
Jews also lived in Muslim countries, Mizrahi, or Oriental Jews are often 
confounded with Sephardi Jews. 
 
4.1.5. Jewish Languages 
 
It has been common for Jews to speak, in addition to, or instead of the 
Hebrew language, the dominant language of the area where they live. When 
Aramaic became the lingua franca across Syria and Palestine, it was also adopted 
by the Jews, to the extent that the use of Hebrew was mainly reduced to the sphere 
of religious life and scholarly production, while Aramaic became the commonly 
spoken language. When the Jews were dispersed across the world, the native 
language of each Jewish community became the language of the country where 
they settled. In fact, they would even carry on using the assimilated foreign 
language when moving to another language region. For example, in the Middle 
Ages, Jews who settled in the Iberian Peninsula spoke Spanish (the form of 
Spanish used at the time), and they carried it on after they had been expelled from 
Spain in 1492 and had scattered throughout North Africa, the East coast of the 
Mediterranean Sea and in Asia Minor. Only the three major languages are 
mentioned below. 
 
Aramaic 
 
During the Neo-Assyrian Empire, Aramaic became a kind of lingua franca 
in Mesopotamia and the Middle East, including the region of Syria and Palestine. 
Parts of the Bible were written in Aramaic (Book of Daniel, Book of Ezra), and 
around the beginning of the Common Era, Jews (including Jesus) spoke Aramaic. 
A large portion of post-biblical Jewish literature is written in Aramaic: a 
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considerable part of the Talmud, various exegetical collections (midrashim), and 
of course the Aramaic translations of the Bible (targumim). 
 
Yiddish 
 
Yiddish is a dialect of German, which is written in Hebrew letters, and 
contains a lot of foreign words of Hebrew and other origins. It evolved in the 
Middle Ages and was used by European Jews. It mostly became widespread when 
the Bible and its commentaries were translated into Yiddish for the masses who 
no longer spoke Hebrew. Today, modern Hebrew has gradually overshadowed 
Yiddish, nevertheless, it is still spoken by many Orthodox communities, most of 
which have long been living outside of Europe. 
 
Ladino 
 
Ladino is the language of the descendants of the Jews who were expelled 
from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492. It used to be a widely spoken language, 
primarily among Jews living in Turkey, up until a couple of generations ago. 
(Following their expulsion from Spain, Jewish people migrated to the Ottoman 
Empire in large numbers). Upon the foundation of the State of Israel, almost the 
entire population of Jews from Muslim territories immigrated to Israel and, in just 
a few generations, they have lost the Ladino language, used for centuries. In many 
respects, Ladino has preserved the Spanish language of the fifteenth century, 
while it has also been enriched with Hebrew and other foreign words. It is written 
in Hebrew letters. 
 
4.1.6. Rabbinic Judaism 
 
The word rabbi (master), which plays a central role in the Jewish religion, 
is not mentioned at all in the Hebrew Bible. However, it appears in the New 
Testament as well as in Jewish religious texts, such as the Mishnah, dating back 
to the beginning of the Common Era. The rabbi did not only teach Jewish 
religious law, he also decided controversial cases and litigations, both in 
religious, civil and criminal matters. After the Jews spread throughout the world 
(diaspora), the role of the rabbi changed, because in each country, besides the 
Jewish religious law, the laws of that country had to be observed as well. In many 
cases this did not allow the application of a different system of criminal law. 
Initially, the rabbis also had a secular occupation in order to provide for their 
families as they were not allowed to accept payment for their rabbinic functions. 
Rabbis still head each Jewish community today. Their roles are to manage the 
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affairs of their community in collaboration with other community officials. Each 
Jewish community is autonomous, which means that another community cannot 
intervene in its affairs or override its decisions. This means, there is no such 
hierarchy in Judaism as in the Catholic Church, where the Pope who leads the 
entire organisation exercises supreme power. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that all religious communities are of equal weight; for political, economic or 
cultural (intellectual) reasons, a given congregation may prevail over others. 
When this happens, other congregations begin to align themselves with the 
leading religious community and follow its practice, at least as long as the 
congregation in the leading position maintains its status. Due to the characteristics 
of the Jewish diaspora, there are usually several leading congregations existing 
parallelly, but these do not constitute a hierarchic system in which the 
communities are subjected to a supreme authority. 
 
4.1.7. The Most Important Jewish Religious Texts  
 
The most important texts of Judaism besides the Bible are the Mishnah and 
the Talmud, and their commentaries. Within the Bible, the Torah (meaning 
teaching, doctrine, law), which consists of the five books of Moses (Figure 41) 
is of special significance. According to Jewish tradition, the Torah was “given” 
by God to Moses on Mount Sinai, and God revealed to Moses at the same time 
its oral interpretations and commentaries. According to this tradition, a distinction 
is made between “written law” (Written Torah) and “oral law” (Oral Torah). The 
latter is mainly included in post-biblical collections of religious law, namely the 
Mishnah and the Talmud. 
 
Figure 41: Torah scroll from the Munk-Munkácsi collection, MILEV (XIX-69) 
http://collections.milev.hu/items/show/31795 ‒ accessed 20 April 2020 
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Each week (on Monday, Thursday, and Saturday) a longer passage is read 
from the Torah in the synagogue, called the weekly Torah portion. The Torah is 
divided into 54 weekly portions; in this weekly division, the entire text is read 
publicly each year. (Because of the specific features of the Jewish calendar and 
holidays, there are more weekly portions than the number of weeks in a year, 
therefore, on certain weeks two weekly portions are read.) 
The text is read with characteristic intonation and chanting, while 
following the text with a silver Torah pointer, featuring a small hand at the end 
of the stick (Figure 42). It is not mandatory to use a silver Torah pointer, but it is 
not allowed to touch the sacred text with bare hands. 
 
Figure 42: Torah pointer, Marrakesh, Jewish Museum 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
 
The Torah is handwritten on a single parchment scroll, with rollers at-
tached to the two ends of the scroll used to roll the parchment up. The parchment 
is made from the skin of an animal that is ritually pure, and therefore, it is quite 
expensive. 
 
Figure 43: Lazama Synagogue in Marrakesh 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI  
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The text is organised into columns, the size of each column is well defined 
(usually 42 rows per column, with minor variations in some communities). The 
copyist is a trained scribe who works under strict rules and copying the text usu-
ally takes more than a year. The completion of the Torah scroll is a cause for 
great celebration, during which it is carried to the synagogue while dancing 
(Figure 43). The scroll is kept in a case; the type of the case (shape and material) 
depends on the customs of the specific community. Torah scrolls are stored in the 
synagogue in the ornamental Torah ark, normally located in the middle of the 
wall facing Jerusalem (members of the congregation turn towards the Torah ark 
when reciting prayers, in the direction of Jerusalem). At the end of the Torah 
reading, the open scroll is lifted so that the community may see the script. 
The Mishnah is a legal collection of the so-called “oral law”, which was 
passed down orally in Hebrew until the end of the second century CE and was 
then written down. The Mishnah is a fundamental source of Jewish religious law, 
however, besides legal texts it also contains other types of narratives, commen-
taries, exegetical texts and masterpieces of the wisdom literature. The Hebrew 
word Mishnah means “repetition”, “learning”. The name Mishnah does not only 
refer to the entire collection, but also to the individual sections, traditions (i.e., a 
given mishnah is a law or a certain passage of the collection called Mishnah). 
The Talmud (meaning “learning”) is also a collection of the oral law, but 
it is more recent than the Mishnah, and also comprises it (Figure 44). The Talmud 
is basically a commentary and explanation of the Mishnah, which is reflected in 
its structure as well: each mishnah passage is followed by a long discussion on it, 
mostly in Aramaic (the Talmud is thus a bilingual text). The genre of the inter-
pretation of Jewish law is basically the debate that the Talmud captures almost as 
a dialogue, however, often without identifying the participants. Since both 
Hebrew and Aramaic scripts only record consonants, and the text lacks interpunc-
tuation, Talmudic debates are difficult to follow, since the reader may not always 
be sure where a particular sentence begins and ends. Since the Talmud was ini-
tially passed down orally, its text was deliberately concise. Therefore, the Talmud 
is usually not studied alone, but in pairs or groups, where the students may recon-
struct and continue the discussion of the Talmudic sages. By studying the Talmud, 
one can master dialectics, the art of debate. Talmud study is a religious duty of 
every adult male to this day. The genre of the Talmud (i.e. debate) and its 
continuous study over the centuries probably influenced the image and character 
of Judaism. The Talmud has often been the target of anti-Semitic outbursts and it 
was publicly burnt several times in history along with other books. 
  
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Figure 44: Babylonian Talmud. Prague: Landau, 1832. 
Source: The Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
4.1.8. Stages of Jewish Life, Certain Religious Rules 
 
The Jewish religion is based on the observance of the 613 commandments 
(mitzvah) from the Torah. The commandments are not listed in an itemised way 
in the Bible but were deduced and recorded by rabbinical authorities. The com-
mandments are divided according to the following aspects: There are 248 active 
(positive) commandments corresponding to the number of members of a human 
body and 365 negative commandments corresponding to the number of days in a 
year. (The number of bodily members is 248 according to Jewish tradition.) Di-
vision is also made between commandments referring to the relation between 
man and God, and to others referring to the relation between man and the fellow 
people. Jewish law also distinguishes between commandments related to a spe-
cific time and the ones that are not. A commandment related to a specific time is, 
for example, the Torah reading on Saturday, which is done on Saturday morning 
in the synagogue. Commandments related to specific times do not apply to 
women because, according to the traditional perception and explanation, they pri-
marily have to look after the family and children, and it is often impossible to 
reconcile childcare with specific times. 
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Circumcision 
 
On the eighth day following the birth of a boy, it is mandatory to circum-
cise him. According to the Bible, circumcision is a sign of the covenant between 
God and Israel: “This is My covenant, which you shall keep, between Me and 
you and your seed after you: every male among you shall be circumcised. [...] 
and it shall be a token of a covenant between Me and you. [...] My covenant shall 
be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant.” (Gen. 17:10‒11, 13) Circumcision 
is performed by a trained specialist (mohel) within the framework of a religious 
service. The child is given a name during this ritual. (Girls are named in the com-
munity following the Torah reading: the father is called to the Torah and this is 
when he announces his daughter’s name to the community.) The ceremony is 
concluded with a festive meal. 
 
Bar Mitzvah 
 
Boys are required to observe Jewish religious laws from the age of thirteen 
(girls are required to observe the laws from the age of twelve, but they are subject 
to fewer rules than boys). Bar mitzvah (which literally translates to “son of com-
mandment”) on the one hand refers to a boy who has turned thirteen years old, 
and also to the festive occasion, when the boy observes a commandment in front 
of the community for the first time in his life. This usually means the boy will 
read a passage from the Torah in the synagogue, but depending on his skills, he 
may also be entrusted with additional honorary duties. 
 
Marriage 
 
A couple wishing to contract marriage sign a document in which the man 
undertakes to provide for his wife. The ceremony commonly includes the follow-
ing: The groom is led to the bride and covers her face with a veil, then he steps 
under the wedding canopy (huppah). The bride is led to him, and she walks 
around the groom seven times, while those present hold candles in their hands. In 
the Ashkenazi tradition the canopy is set up in the open air, because the sky re-
minds those present to the promise that God made to Abraham: “Look now to-
ward heaven, and count the stars, if you be able to count them’; and He said unto 
him: ‘So shall your seed be’” (Genesis 15:5). The groom lifts the bride’s veil and 
they both drink a sip of wine. The groom gives the bride a ring and recites the 
declaration: “Behold, you are consecrated to me with this ring according to the 
Law of Moses and Israel”. They listen to the seven marriage blessings then they 
take another sip of wine, and the groom breaks the glass with his foot. 
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At this point, the guests cheer, and the dance begins. The traditional expla-
nation for breaking the glass is that no joy can be complete until the Temple in 
Jerusalem is not rebuilt: “If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget 
her cunning. Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I remember you 
not; if I set not Jerusalem above my chiefest joy.” (Psalm 137:5‒6) Breaking the 
glass is a symbol of bitterness affecting the joy of the festive occasion. Afterward 
the newlyweds retreat to a private place: in traditional societies and in older ages, 
this was the first time the couple was left alone. Sex within marriage is also reg-
ulated by religious rules. 
It is worth noting that Jewish religious law permits divorce: the divorce is 
to be conducted before a body of three rabbis (rabbinical court), as civil divorce 
is not recognised according to Jewish law. 
 
Prayer Shawl, Phylacteries, Mezuzah, Covering the Head 
 
One of the positive commandments of the Torah is that fringes must be 
attached to any garments with four edges: “‘Speak unto the children of Israel, and 
bid them that they make them throughout their generations fringes in the corners 
of their garments, and that they put with the fringe of each corner a thread of blue. 
And it shall be unto you for a fringe, that you may look upon it, and remember 
all the commandments of the Lord and do them; and that you go not about after 
your own heart and your own eyes, after which you use to go astray” (Numbers 
15:38‒39). Accordingly, Jewish men wear a so-called tallit katan over their un-
dergarments, which is rectangular and fitted with four fringes on its corners to 
comply with the rules. This is worn all day. During the morning prayer, a larger, 
ornate piece of cloth is also worn called tallit, a prayer shawl (Figure 45) with 
four fringes as well. 
During weekday morning prayers, Jewish men wear phylacteries (tefillin). 
The tefillin is a set of two small black leather boxes containing scrolls of parch-
ment inscribed with passages from the Torah. These boxes are fitted with leather 
straps to the head and to the left arm. 
  
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Figure 45: Prayer shawl (tallit) with silver embroidery, MILEV 
http://collections.milev.hu/items/show/32623 ‒ 20 accessed April 2020 
Figure 46: Sephardi mezuzah from Macedonia 
Source: PretoriaTravel, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=23829644 
 
The passages from the Torah cite the principles of the Jewish faith, and 
they are tied to the body to symbolise total acceptance and subordination. The 
text inside the tefillin also mentions God’s commandment to wear the passages 
on the body: “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one. And you shall 
love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all 
your might. And these words, which I command you this day, shall be upon your 
heart; and you shall teach them diligently unto your children, and shall talk of 
them when you sit in your house, and when you walk by the way, and when you 
lie down, and when you rise up. And you shall bind them for a sign upon your 
hand, and they shall be for frontlets between your eyes. And you shall write them 
upon the doorposts of your house, and upon your gates.” (Deuteronomy 6:4‒9) 
This passage is the most concise statement of Jewish monotheism; it is one of the 
most important prayers of Judaism, which has to be repeated five times in the 
daily prayer. In order to observe the last sentence of this passage of the Torah, a 
mezuzah is placed on the (right) doorframe in Jewish homes (Figure 46). It 
consists of a small case and a parchment scroll inside it inscribed with specific 
verses from the Torah. It is usually a decorative case, made of metal, wood, or 
plastic, and on the outside, it bears the name of God: Shaddai (Almighty). It is 
customary to touch (or kiss) the mezuzah when passing by.  
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Covering the head is such an essential part of the appearance of religious 
Jews that it is perhaps the best known sign of Judaism for outside observers. 
However, wearing a hat, cap, or other headgear is not a commandment of the 
Torah, it is rather a custom, a way of showing respect for God. According to the 
traditional explanation, in the Roman Empire, covering the head was a symbol of 
slavery; free people walked with their heads uncovered. Jewish people cover their 
heads to remember that they are servants of God. In addition to hats and other 
headgear, the so-called kippah is a common headwear, consisting of a small round 
cap, often made of black silk, velvet or coloured crocheted yarn. Its size, material, 
and colour vary by religious congregation, consequently the kippah (along with 
other pieces of clothing) indicates the congregation its owner belongs to. 
 
4.1.9. Major Holidays 

Given the fact that Jews have lived in diaspora throughout history, and, to 
some extent, they are still living in diaspora today, and the fact that religious 
communities are not hierarchically organised, holiday customs are diverse and 
the interpretation of holiday rules varies from one congregation to another. There-
fore, the following overview is limited to the most basic features that a particular 
congregation may significantly deviate from. 
The dates of holidays are determined by the Jewish calendar, which is lu-
nisolar, meaning that it takes into account both the Sun and the Moon as it 
revolves around the Earth. Jewish months are lunar months (from New Moon to 
New Moon), nevertheless the length of the full year corresponds to the length of 
the solar calendar year. Because the lunar year is 11 days shorter than the solar 
year, an extra lunar month is added to the year at specific intervals (every second 
or third year) to compensate for this difference. Each day lasts from sunset to 
sunset, meaning that the day begins in the evening. 
 
Sabbath 
 
The Ten Commandments includes the Sabbath as a holy day: “Six days 
shall you labour, and do all your work; but the seventh day is a Sabbath unto the 
Lord your God, in it you shall not do any manner of work, you, nor your son, nor 
your daughter, nor your man-servant, nor your maid-servant, nor your cattle, nor 
your stranger that is within your gates; for in six days the Lord made heaven and 
earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested on the seventh day; wherefore 
the Lord blessed the Sabbath day, and hallowed it.” (Exodus 20:9‒11) However, 
this passage does not explain exactly how it is to be made holy. Only one of the 
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Sabbath prohibitions, the prohibition of fire, is mentioned explicitly in the Torah 
(Ex. 35:3). 
Since according to the Jewish calendar, each day begins at sunset, Sabbath 
also begins on Friday evening. Work is not allowed after the beginning of Sab-
bath, therefore all preparations for the holiday must be done by Friday afternoon: 
cleaning the apartment, cooking the festive food, setting the festive table, taking 
a shower, putting on festive clothes, etc. The Sabbath officially begins when the 
housewife lights the two Sabbath candles about twenty minutes before sunset and 
blesses the lit candles while covering her eyes. Two loaves of Challah bread are 
placed on the table covered with a tablecloth, along with glass of wine, called 
kiddush cup because a blessing is recited over the wine to sanctify the Sabbath 
(this is called the Kiddush – “sanctification” – ceremony). 
The beginning of the Sabbath, which is called “the welcoming of Sabbath” 
is celebrated in the synagogue, where men and at least the older children are usu-
ally present, but women (especially wives having children) are not required to 
attend the synagogue service since they are supposed to take care of the smaller 
children and the celebration at home. 
Women are usually happy to rest a little after the Sabbath preparations and 
before the Sabbath dinner, or to be with their smaller children before the family 
and Sabbath guests arrive. However, many women also attend the Sabbath ser-
vice in the synagogue; this depends on each woman’s individual circumstances 
and decision. 
After the synagogue service the family gathers at home around the festive 
table, often inviting guests, too. They sing religious songs together, the father 
blesses his children before dinner, and then he recites the kiddush with the cup of 
wine in his hand, after which everyone drinks from the wine (the children drink 
grape juice, which is considered ritually to equal wine). After that, they wash their 
hands while reciting the corresponding blessing, the father recites the blessing 
over the bread (Challah), cuts it into slices and distributes it among those present. 
This is followed by the festive meal, during which it is customary to talk also 
about religious topics. The meal ends with long blessings that are recited or sung 
together. 
The Sabbath morning service in the synagogue is much longer than the 
weekday services, it lasts almost for the whole morning. Women are not required 
to attend this service either. The second festive meal is at noon and it follows a 
similar ritual as the Sabbath dinner. The afternoon is mostly spent relaxing, walk-
ing, chatting, playing games, or perhaps studying. Studying in this context means 
studying the Torah in its broader sense: individual reading or in-group discussion 
of the Bible, its commentaries, or Jewish legal texts (like the Mishnah or the Tal-
mud). Studying the Torah is compulsory for men on the Sabbath, but this obliga-
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tion is fulfilled by everyone when attending the synagogue service, where a por-
tion of the Torah is read out loud as part of the service. Spending some time with 
studying during the Sabbath is a widespread practice, but not mandatory. The 
Sabbath ends after the third meal with the “separation” (havdalah) ceremony at 
sunset, after full darkness. This ceremony involves reciting a blessing over wine 
again, smelling some spices held in an ornate spice container, and finally, lighting 
a candle with several wicks and blessing its flame. This is followed by the reci-
tation of the havdalah blessing: “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the 
universe, Who distinguishes between the sacred and the secular, between light 
and dark, between Israel and the nations, between the seventh day and the six 
days of labour. Blessed are You, Lord, Who distinguishes between the sacred and 
the secular.” 
The main feature of the Sabbath is the tranquillity provided by the intricate 
system of prohibitions to work. The religious concept of work is not the same as 
the everyday meaning of the word: work is not equal to occupation (job, profes-
sion) or physical effort. The Torah does not interpret the nature of work that is 
forbidden on the Sabbath, nor does it list the activities prohibited. These are ex-
plained in later rabbinical literature. The prohibition of certain activities was 
established by applying a specific Jewish exegetical principle, which attributes 
an additional meaning to the succession of passages in the Torah. Even if two 
passages seem to be unrelated to each other, the mere fact that the second follows 
the first establishes a connection between them that may have consequences from 
the point of view of religious law. The rules for preparing the wilderness taber-
nacle in the Torah are immediately followed by a call to observe the Sabbath (Ex. 
31:1‒13). Already in ancient times, this was interpreted as an intimation to which 
activity is actually forbidden on the Sabbath: all the activities, direct or indirect, 
that are necessary to build the tabernacle (since works for building the tabernacle 
were suspended during Sabbath). The Mishnah (Sabbath 7:2) lists thirty-nine 
such activities. However, hundreds of additional labours can be derived from 
these activities (these are the so-called “primary labours”), which makes the sys-
tem of Sabbath prohibitions very complicated. For example, there were sacrificial 
breads in the tabernacle, and as a result all activities necessary for making bread, 
such as ploughing, sowing, reaping, binding sheaves, threshing, grinding, knead-
ing, baking, are forbidden on Sabbath. Since in the tabernacle there were can-
vases, garments and priestly vestments as well, sheep-shearing, carding, launder-
ing, dyeing, and sewing are also among the forbidden activities. However, these 
categories should not be understood in their ordinary sense but interpreted in an 
abstract way. For example, sheep-shearing in the broader, abstract sense of the 
word means to separate from the body itself something that grows from the body. 
This is where, among other things, the prohibition to comb the hair on Sabbath 
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comes from: because a few strands of hair may also fall out while combing, one 
may, even if unintentionally, separate from the body things (strands of hair) that 
grow from it. 
The prohibition to switch on the light originates in the prohibition to light 
fire. Naturally, this does not mean that Jews would spend the festive day holed 
up in the dark, they simply make sure to turn the lights on already by Friday 
afternoon, and set a timer to switch them off at a certain time. Before the invention 
of electricity, this was done by preparing a sufficient amount of lamp oil, etc. in 
advance. Sabbath prohibitions, therefore, do not depend on whether an activity 
can be regarded as work in the ordinary sense of the word, but solely on whether 
it is included among the primary labours listed in the Mishnah, or among the 
activities derived from them. To the outside observer, it may seem as though there 
were many difficulties in observing the Sabbath; nonetheless, this is not so: 
throughout all eras and circumstances in history there have been well-established 
and well-known methods of observing the Sabbath, which were followed by the 
different congregations. 
It should be noted that according to Jewish religious law, the sustenance 
and protection of life is more important than any of the commandments, and in 
case of such necessity, all commandments must be violated (with the exception 
of three special commandments). That is, if a person’s life can only be saved by 
not observing a Sabbath prohibition then every Jew is obligated to violate the 
Sabbath. For the same reason a variety of emergency services, such as hospitals, 
ambulances, firefighters may operate on Saturday, and this is the reason why 
members of various armed bodies are exempt from the laws of Sabbath. (The 
three commandments that are not to be violated despite any life-threatening cir-
cumstances are those prohibiting idolatry, murder and illicit sexual relations.) 
 
The Days of Awe: Rosh ha-Shanah and Yom Kippur 
 
The first ten days of the Jewish year are called “The Days of Awe”. The 
period begins with the Jewish New Year (Rosh ha-Shanah) and ends with the 
Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur). 
Rosh ha-Shanah marks the anniversary of the creation of the world; it is 
the beginning of the Ten days of Repentance. This is the time when the shofar, ‒ 
the ram’s horn used to summon the people, call for war, and intimidate the enemy 
in biblical times, ‒ is blown in the synagogues. (Figure 47). There are three mod-
ulations of sounds produced on the shofar: a long, unbroken blast, a three-part 
blast, and a seven-part blast. The sound of the shofar is not pleasant, on the con-
trary, it is rather alarming and shocking. 
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Figure 47: Man blowing a ram’s horn (shofar). Festive prayer book (mahzor), South 
Germany, end of the thirteenth century 
Source: The Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Ms Kaufmann A. 388/II. fol. 12v 
 
On the eve of the holiday, symbolic foods are consumed to ensure a good 
new year: challah bread or apple dipped in honey (symbolising a sweet new year), 
a meal served with fish or lamb head (to make the diners the “head”, meaning to 
make them leaders rather than subordinates), pomegranate (just as the fruit is full 
of seed, one may be full of merits in the new year), etc. 
Yom Kippur is the Day of Atonement for all the sins, when members of the 
congregation engage in rigorous fasting: they do not consume any food or drink 
for approximately 26 hours, do not pursue any pleasant activities (for example, 
they only wash themselves to the extent which is absolutely necessary, do not 
wear leather shoes, etc.). Fasting begins in the afternoon, before sunset, and ends 
in the next evening, after dark. The Yom Kippur service grants redemption for 
one’s sins committed against another person, but only if the person against whom 
the sin was committed also forgives the sinner; therefore, before the ceremony, 
members must apologise to anyone who may have been hurt by them. In other 
words, the Day of Atonement is also the day of repairing relationships. Sins com-
mitted against God are forgiven by God when one repents sincerely. Worship 
begins with a prayer that has a heart touching melody, called Kol Nidre (“all 
vows”), which is actually a legal formula that annuls in advance any vows made 
to God in the next year, which cannot be upheld by the believer for whatever 
reason. Since the persecution of the Jews in medieval times, this ceremony gained 
particular significance, and has been charged with emotional undertones. As a 
result of the medieval persecution of Jews and the forced conversion to Chris-
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tianity, masses of Jews were forced to abandon their religion (the extent of forced 
conversion was so great that in some countries the majority of Jews or even the 
entire Jewish population was forcibly baptised). Christian religious practices of 
the converted Jews were overseen by the Inquisition, a special institution of the 
Catholic Church, which sentenced tens of thousands of baptised Jews to death for 
trying to observe certain rules of the Jewish religion in secret. However, fasting 
and repentance on the Day of Atonement was considered such a strong religious 
obligation that even people who were regarded to have broken the Jewish law by 
being baptised wanted to observe it to its possible extent, and hence many of them 
joined the celebrating Jews on this occasion. According to some interpretations, 
this is the historical reason why, before singing Kol Nidre, the cantor recites out 
loud: “By the authority of the Court on High and by authority of the court down 
here, by the permission of One Who Is Everywhere and by the permission of this 
congregation, we hold it lawful to pray with sinners (that, is Jews converted to 
Christianity forcefully).” 
The entire Day of Atonement is spent with prayers for forgiveness in an 
increasingly intense state. According to the widespread tradition, the Day of 
Atonement is the only day of the year when the Satan cannot accuse man in front 
of God. According to the traditional interpretation, this is indicated by the 
numeric value of the Hebrew letters in the word Satan (meaning the Devil), which 
is 364, one less than the number of days in the year. Therefore, the Day of Atone-
ment is an exceptional opportunity to ask for forgiveness. The congregation con-
cludes the service by reciting a final prayer, called the Ne’ila (“locking”) before 
sunset. This prayer was originally recited while the gates of the Temple in Jeru-
salem were locked, but today the name refers to locking the gates of Heaven. 
While the gates of Heaven are open, God is listening to the prayers of repentance, 
and as the time for locking the gates approaches, the congregation makes final 
efforts to seek forgiveness. According to folk tradition, this is the moment when 
God closes the “Book of Life and Death”, in which he inscribes each person’s 
fate: whether they will still live the next Day of Atonement, or whether they will 
depart from this life by then. 
 
Sukkot11 
 
Sukkot means “tabernacles, or tents”, in which the Jews dwelled after the 
Exodus from Egypt for forty years in the wilderness (Figure 48). The Feast of 
Tabernacles commemorates this event and is symbolically relived as believers 

11 Also spelled Sukkoth. 
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“dwell” in tents or tabernacles for a week; that is, they spend as much time there 
as possible. 
 
Figure 48: F. Kaskeline, Celebrating Sukkot in the synagogue, MILEV 
Source: http://collections.milev.hu/items/show/31846 ‒ accessed 20 April 2020 
 
Nowadays the tabernacles are actually booths that are installed in the gar-
den or on the balcony, and meals are always served here. The booth must be a 
temporary structure, and its roof constructed of organic materials grown from the 
earth, such as tree branches, straw of cereals, reed, but the branches or stalks can-
not be bound together. The Holiday of Sukkot is celebrated in early autumn, when 
the temperature in Israel is mostly pleasant, so it is not uncomfortable to stay in 
the booth. However, in many European countries it is already very cold and rainy 
around this time; therefore, only the first two evening meals of the holiday period 
must be served in the booth under any circumstances. During the ceremony of 
Sukkot prayers are recited while waving a special bouquet called lulav, which is 
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composed of a type of citrus (etrog), myrtle leaves, branches of willow tree and 
palm tree. 
 
Figure 49: Depiction of the menorah in a manuscript of Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah, 
North-East France, 1296 
Source: The Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Ms Kaufmann A. 77/III. fol. 3v 
 
Hanukkah 
 
Hanukkah (meaning: “dedication”, i.e. of the temple in Jerusalem) is a win-
ter holiday commemorating the rededication of the Temple in Jerusalem at the 
time of the Maccabean revolt against the Seleucid Empire. The Maccabeans de-
feated the Seleucid army in 165 BCE. Since the Temple was desecrated by the 
Seleucids, it had to be purified and rededicated (this is where the name of the 
festival originates from). 
According to the ancient tradition the seven branches of the candle holder, 
the menorah had to be lit with oil in the Temple, however, there was only enough 
sealed (consequently, not desecrated) oil left to fuel the flame of the menorah for 
one day (Figure 49). Miraculously, the oil burned for eight days, the time it took 
to press the new oil. To commemorate this, each day an additional candle is lit in 
the eight-plus-one-branched hanukkiah during the eight-day holiday. It is not pro-
hibited to work during this holiday. There are a variety of customs accompanying 
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the holiday, such as eating deep fried doughnuts, giving gifts to children, as well 
as games associated with it, for example playing with the spinning top, called 
dreidel (Figure 50). 
 
Figure 50: Spinning top (dreidel) played during Hanukkah, MILEV 
Source: http://collections.milev.hu/items/show/29761 ‒ accessed 20 April 2020 
 
Purim 
 
Purim (meaning: “fate”) commemorates the story told in the Book of 
Esther included in the Bible. In the Persian Empire, during the reign of King 
Ahasuerus, Haman, one of the leaders of the ruling political elite, persuaded the 
king to order the extermination of Jews in the empire on the grounds that the Jews 
did not adhere to the central religion of the empire. Haman cast lots to choose the 
date on which the Jews would be exterminated, hence the name “purim”. 
Although Queen Esther of Jewish descent persuaded the king to change his heart, 
the decree against the Jewish people could no longer be annulled. However, the 
king allowed the Jews to defend themselves on the day designated for their 
extermination, and the Jews eventually won against their enemies. Purim, 
similarly to Hanukkah is a particularly happy holiday, when one must send food 
and drink to at least two people, donate to the poor, serve a festive meal and read 
the Scroll of Esther (this book of the Bible is also traditionally written on 
parchment scroll). It is not prohibited to work during the holiday, and it is 
characterised by a carnival atmosphere (the festival is celebrated at the end of the 
winter). People are dressed in costumes, and publicly burn a puppet symbolising 
“the evil Haman”, and each time Haman’s name is read out loud (54 times in 
total) during the reading of the Scroll of Esther, the congregation engages in 
noise-making with Purim graggers to blot out his name (in order to erase his 
memory), which is especially fun for children. The tradition of wearing costumes, 
according to some explanations, is a hint to the fact that God does not control 
history in an explicit, obvious manner, but in a hidden, disguised way. 
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Pesah12 
 
The “Jewish Passover”, Pesah is celebrated in spring. It is the festival of 
the Exodus from Egypt, and of the unleavened bread. It commemorates the 
Exodus of the people of Israel from Egypt following their slavery in Egypt for 
centuries and despite the Pharaoh’s prohibition and resistance. The Exodus was 
led by Moses and accompanied by miraculous events. Its significance is due to 
the fact that, according to tradition, the Exodus from Egypt shaped the nomad 
tribes subordinated to states and empires into one autonomous people, for this 
reason Pesah is actually a celebration of freedom. 
 
Figure 51: Table set for the Seder meal 
Source: Leó Singer: Haggadah shel Pesah. Budapest: Schlesinger, 1917 
 
The first Pesah, held in Egypt, fell on a Thursday. On that evening God 
commanded every Jewish family to slaughter and serve a sacrificial lamb and 
smear the front door of their house with the blood of the lamb. The lamb’s blood 

12 Also spelled Pesach. 
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protected the Jews from the Angel of Death sweeping through Egypt that night 
and taking the lives of every first born. However, God “bypassed” or “passed 
over” (pasah), the doors marked with blood. This is where the name of the 
holiday pesah (Passover) originates from. Then the Jews had to leave the country 
in such a hurry that they had no time to let the bread rise. To commemorate this, 
it is forbidden to eat or own anything leaven during the festival (for seven days 
in Israel, for eight days in the diaspora). The story of the Exodus from Egypt is 
told in Exodus 1‒15. 
The main event of the holiday is the Seder eve, a ritual feast conducted on 
the first night of the Pesah involving retelling the story of the Exodus with 
symbolic acts and dishes (Figure 51). The order of ritual of the Seder dinner is 
set forth in the richly illustrated text, called Haggadah (meaning “telling”), which 
is read (and in part sung) together by the family before the dinner. The text of the 
Haggadah is not rigidly followed, it only serves as the framework for the main 
points of the narrative; that is, in the spirit of the text of the Haggadah, 
participants themselves make commentaries about the biblical story and its 
subsequent rabbinical interpretations. In part, this discussion takes the format of 
questions and answers, because telling the story of the Exodus is actually a 
learning process, meaning that it assumes that participants enter into a dialogue 
or even a debate (juxtaposition of viewpoints). The reading of the Haggadah, 
including the verbal commentaries takes several hours. Meanwhile, symbolic 
foods are consumed: bitter herbs (for example horseradish) symbolising the 
bitterness of slavery; hard-boiled eggs (as a reference to the mourning for the 
destruction of the Temple); parsley or celery (as a symbol of renewal, spring, 
fertility); salty water (as a symbol of suffering and tears); grated apples mixed 
with nuts, cinnamon and wine representing the mortar (another reference to 
slavery). In addition, a lamb shank bone or a roast chicken wing is also placed on 
the Seder plate but it is not eaten. It symbolises the sacrificial lamb, which, 
however, cannot be properly offered since the demolition of the Temple. The 
meaning of unleavened bread is explained by the Haggadah (in Aramaic) as the 
following: “This is the bread of poverty which our ancestors ate in the land of 
Egypt. Anyone who is famished should come and eat, anyone in need should 
come and partake of the Pesah sacrifice. Now we are here, next year we will be 
in the land of Israel; this year we are slaves, next year we will be free people.” 
The Haggadah is mostly written in Hebrew, but some parts are in Aramaic 
because in the first centuries AD Aramaic was the spoken language of the Jewish 
people. According to Jewish tradition, everyone must consider himself to be led 
by God out of Egypt; that is, one must personally experience the move from 
slavery to liberation. 
  
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Shavuot 
 
The Revelation on Mount Sinai took place seven weeks after the Exodus 
from Egypt, when God gave Moses and the people the Tablets of Stone of the 
Ten Commandments and revealed the written and the oral Torah. This was the 
moment when God entered into a covenant with Israel: “that He may establish 
you this day unto Himself for a people, and that He may be unto you a God, as 
He spoke unto you, and as He swore unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and 
to Jacob.” (Deut. 29:12) According to Jewish tradition, all the Jews, whether born 
later or even converted, that is, every single Jew until the end of time were present 
when establishing this covenant. As it reads in the following portion of the Torah: 
“Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath; but with him that 
stands here with us this day before the Lord our God, and also with him that is 
not here with us this day.” (Deut. 29:13‒14). It is customary to stay up all night 
on Shavuot to study. 
 
4.1.10. Dietary Laws 
 
The notion of “kosher” (kashrut in Modern Hebrew), meaning conforming 
to religious requirements, is the basic concept of Jewish dietary laws. Religious 
Jews can only eat food that is kosher. The Bible distinguishes between clean and 
unclean animals: for example, beef, goat, and chicken are clean, but rabbits and 
pigs are unclean (Leviticus 11, Deuteronomy 14:2‒21). It is forbidden to eat 
unclean animals. Even a clean animal should only be consumed if it has been 
slaughtered in accordance with the rules of ritual slaughter and examined for any 
disease that renders the animal unfit for consumption, in which case the clean 
animal is not considered kosher. The blood must be completely drawn out of the 
meat because the consumption of blood is forbidden. Likewise, vegetables 
intended for consumption must be carefully examined for maggots and worms, 
because if they are present, the consumption of the vegetable is prohibited. 
Foods are divided into three categories: meat products, dairy products, and 
neutral (neither meat nor dairy). Meat and dairy products also include everything 
that is made of meat or milk, as well as the fats derived from them. It is prohibited 
to mix meat and dairy foods. This seemingly simple rule has many consequences: 
meat and dairy products cannot be mixed during cooking or consumption, nor 
during digestion inside the stomach. Therefore, one must wait a certain amount 
of time between eating meat and dairy foods (less time is required if meat is 
consumed after dairy foods, since it is easier to digest milk, but dairy food can 
only be consumed several hours after eating meat). Different dishes and cutlery 
must be used for dishes containing dairy or meet, for example, it is forbidden to 
use a butter knife to cut meat or to cook meat dishes in a pan that was previously 
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used to cook dishes with dairy products. Neutral foods (such as vegetables) can 
be mixed with either dairy or meat dishes, but one must make sure that the cutlery 
does not transmit any meat or dairy onto the neutral (called parve in Hebrew) 
food. For example, mustard is a parve food: it is neither meat nor dairy, and it 
can be mixed with both categories. However, if a knife used to eat cooked 
frankfurters is dipped into the mustard jar, the cutlery will transfer the meat 
character over to the mustard, which will in turn become “meaty”, and hence it 
can no longer be consumed with dairy products (e.g. cheese). Therefore, it is 
customary for Jewish kitchens to also have separate cutlery and dishes for parve 
products, the third category of foods. Different types of cutlery are usually colour 
coded (for example, knives with red handles are for meats, while for dairy foods 
knives with blue handles are used) or otherwise distinguished. Dietary laws are 
extremely complex, therefore a more detailed description of these is not in the 
scope of this chapter. 
 
4.1.11. Schools of Thoughts in Judaism 
 
Kabbalah 
 
Kabbalah is the main (but not the only) manifestation of Jewish mysticism, 
which seeks to explain God’s unknowable essence. The Kabbalah is an extremely 
diverse and multifaceted mystical doctrine, with many different schools; for this 
reason, this short summary must be confined to the most general principles. 
According to the Kabbalistic teaching, no positive statement can be made about 
God, because in essence God is absolutely unknowable. For the same reason, the 
Kabbalist does not approach God by means of his intellectual faculty but intends 
to gain an intuitive knowledge of God by attaining to God’s intimate closeness. 
Communication with God is made possible through the system of sephirot, which 
are emanations through which God’s unknown essence reveals itself. The use of 
Kabbalistic language is highly anthropomorphic, and it does not refrain from 
sexual connotations. The feminine principle of the Divine plays a critical role in 
the Kabbalistic tradition, and in this respect, the Kabbalah is unique among other 
Jewish schools of thought. The most important Kabbalistic work is the Zohar 
(Book of Splendour) written in Aramaic in the thirteenth century in Spain. 
According to the teachings of the most influential Kabbalistic master, Isaac 
Luria (1531‒1572), during the creation God contracted, i.e. withdrew to a certain 
extent his divinity in order “to make space” for the world to be created. The divine 
light poured into the material forms of the world, but they were too weak to bear 
it, and so they all burst, shattered, and sparks of the divine light became enclosed 
in the shells of the shattering forms. By obeying the commandments of the Jewish 
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religion, sparks of the divine light can be released, whereby the faithful Jew 
completes the act of creation. God remains passive in this process; the fate of 
creation and the evolution of the world depends on human activity. 
 
Hasidism 
 
The Hasidic movement started in Poland and Ukraine in the eighteenth 
century. Hasidic Jews assimilated and further developed elements of the 
Kabbalistic concept of intimate proximity to God. According to the Hasidic view, 
personal connection with God entails a feeling of enthusiasm and pleasure that 
manifest itself in the zest for life. Hassidic Jews seek to get into God’s closeness 
through intuition rather than trying to comprehend divinity using their rational 
faculty. Their teachings are primarily transmitted through stories, tales, and 
parables. Hasidism soon became a mass movement. For ordinary people, the 
“holy” rabbi, the rebbe or tzadik (“righteous man”), transmits the will of God, 
becoming a kind of mediator between God and men, who stands above the order 
of creation and can even perform miracles. The Hasidic movement continues to 
this day, primarily in Israel and the United States. 
 
Zionism 
 
In Europe, the emancipation of Jews began during the French Revolution. 
Christianity was not considered a prerequisite of citizenship anymore and Jews 
were gradually recognised as entitled to equality and citizenship rights. 
Emancipation entailed assimilation: Jews began to assimilate into the majority 
society by adopting its customs and culture. Efforts were made to modernise the 
Orthodox Jewish religion, and many turned away from the religion, and led 
secular lives. Secularisation culminated in Zionism, which aimed to make the 
Jewish people equal to all other nations living in independent states and disposing 
of the right to self-determination. The chief ideologist of Zionism was Theodor 
(Tivadar) Herzl (1860‒1904), born in Hungary, the founder of the international 
World Zionist Organisation. Zionists began to purchase lands on a large-scale in 
Palestine, and followers of the movement settled in those territories with the 
purpose of creating a new Jewish culture independent of Rabbinic Judaism, and 
with the ultimate aim of founding an independent Jewish state. Initially, Orthodox 
Jews opposed Zionist aspirations because they regarded the movement as turning 
away from God. However, the Holocaust greatly changed the attitude of Jews 
regarding the concept of a secular Jewish state. Owing to the trauma of the 
Holocaust, masses of Jews believed that only their own state could guarantee their 
safety, and hence, after the end of World War II an increasing number of Jewish 
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people immigrated to Palestine. Following the UN’s resolution, the State of Israel 
was established on May 14, 1948. 
 
4.1.12. Chronological table 

Date Event 
BCE thirteenth‒
twelfth centuries Israel settles in Canaan
BCE 721 Israel becomes part of the Assyrian Empire, the end of the Northern 
Kingdom 
BCE 587 Siege of Jerusalem by the Babylonian army; destruction of the city and the First Temple
BCE 167 Beginning of the Maccabean Revolt
BCE 63 Siege of Jerusalem by Pompey the Great, end of the independent Jewish kingdom (the Hasmonean Kingdom)
70 The Roman army destroys Jerusalem and the Second Temple
1492 The expulsion of Jews from Spain
1948 Foundation of the State of Israel

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4.2. The Islamic Civilisation 
 
KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
 
4.2.1. Introduction 
 
The religion of Islam was the last of the three major Middle Eastern 
monotheistic religions to be established, in the seventh century. Islam, however, 
has been more than a religion to this day; it regulates and influences all areas of 
life. Up to the first decade of the twentieth century, Islam almost exclusively 
determined both intangible and tangible culture. This is why in the world of Islam 
the period between the seventh and twentieth century is referred to as the era of 
Islamic civilisation. The past 100‒150 years have already witnessed a growing, 
partly positive, partly negative and alienating impact of Western culture and 
civilisation, in view of which we shall limit the examination of Islamic 
civilisation to the above 1300 years.  
At the moment there are some 1.7 billion Muslims, i.e. followers of Islam 
in the world. Most of them live in countries where Islam is either the only religion 
or that of the decisive majority of the population. It is the totality of these 
countries that is referred to as the world of Islam, but even outside the world of 
Islam a significant number of Muslims live in minority (Map 17). Countries of 
the Islamic world are situated from Southeast Asia to North and West Africa. 
These are: 
In Southeast and South Asia: 
• Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Bangladesh, the Maldives  
In Central Asia: 
• Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan 
In the Middle East: 
• non-Arab countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey 
• Arab countries: Saudi-Arabia, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan 
In North Africa: 
• Republic of Sudan (North-Sudan), Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Morocco, Mauritania 
From the other African countries, at the time of writing, there is a Muslim 
majority in Mali, Niger, Djibouti, Somalia, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, Burkina Faso and the Comoro Islands, while about half of the population 
is Muslim in Chad and Nigeria. In Europe, Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo are 
considered to have a Muslim majority. 
Civilisations from East to West 
222 

 
Map 17: The world’s Muslim population in 2018 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
In numerous other countries Muslims live in minority. Some of them have 
always lived in the same area but converted to Islam at some stage, contrary to 
the majority of the population. This includes among others, in Asia, Muslims in 
the Philippines and India, Uyghurs in China, and Muslims in certain areas of 
Russia like Chechens and Tatars. In many countries in Africa, Muslims comprise 
a certain percentage of the population (for details cf. the chapter on African 
civilisation). Another large group of Muslims living as minorities are those who 
immigrated to Europe and North and South America in the past century, in 
various ways and for a number of reasons. They used to refer to themselves as 
living “in emigration”; today they call themselves “Muslim minority”. Their 
number is currently estimated to be 25 million in Western Europe and some three 
to four million in North and South America together. Afro-American Muslims 
who converted to Islam after 1950 should be distinguished from the former. The 
Muslim use of “the world of Islam” is different and is used to refer to any area or 
country with some Muslim population.  
In view of the above, what is referred to as the world of Islam, whether in 
the broader or narrower sense of the term, comprises a colourful diversity of 
ethnicities (ethnic groups) and languages, even though originally the “mother 
tongue” of Islam used to be – and has remained to be – Arabic (Map 18). Arabs 
4.2. The Islamic Civilisation 
223 

still comprise the largest group of Muslims with over 400 million people. The 
second largest ethnic group are Indians living in Pakistan and India, followed by 
Indonesians, Malays, various Turkic peoples and Persians. Others include a 
multitude of African ethnic groups as well as Afro-Americans. As regards 
language, Arabic is once again the major and most important language in the 
Islamic world, followed by Urdu (in Pakistan and India), Indonesian and Malay, 
Turkic languages and Farsi. Arabic and Farsi have been the two most important 
languages in the history of Islamic civilisation, having a great impact on the other 
languages, primarily Ottoman Turkish and Urdu.  
 
Map 18: The major ethnic and cultural groups in Islam in 2018  
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The impact of Arabic has been great not only on the vocabulary of the 
languages of Islam, but also on the spread of Arabic script. For example, some 
35‒40 percent of the vocabulary of the East-African Swahili language, while 30‒
35 percent of modern Farsi words are of Arabic origin. From among the 
languages Farsi, Urdu, Azeri, Pashtu as well as Iraqi and Iranian Kurdish have 
continued using Arabic script until today, Swahili and Turkish switched to Latin 
script in 1870 and 1926 respectively, while Central Asian Turkic peoples adopted 
the Cyrillic script during the years of Soviet reign, after 1921. For a long time, 
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the two related languages, Malay and Indonesian only differed in that Jawi, a 
variety of the former, retained Arabic script until the end of the twentieth century, 
while the latter adopted the Latin script during the Dutch colonisation in the 
nineteenth century. Arabic script is one of the major writing systems besides Latin 
and Chinese. 
As a geographical characteristic, the first five hundred years of the 
foundation and spread of Islam took place in a clearly identifiable area: a zone 
spreading north to the Tropic of Cancer in the Northern hemisphere (Map 19). A 
major characteristic of this area (with the exception of Pakistan and North India) 
is little precipitation producing vast deserts, in many regions (e.g. Arabia) 
interrupted only by bare mountains and highlands. The area also features the 
Eurasian mountain system referring to various mountain ranges in Afghanistan, 
East Iran, Turkey (Anatolia) as well as the North-African Atlas mountain range.  
 
Map 19: Geographical characteristics of the Islamic world 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
Up to the last third of the twentieth century, the characteristic way of life 
in the desert had been nomadism for thousands of years, based on sporadic water 
sources and complemented by systems of oases where garden-type agriculture 
and small domestic animal  husbandry (sheep, goats) could be established near 
permanent wells (Figure 52). Desert nomads were referred to as camel breeding 
nomads as camels are able to withstand the shortage of water and walk great 
distances without drinking. 
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Figure 52: In the barren countryside, date palm oases continue to be a major source of 
living to this day 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
 
Geopolitically, most of the Islamic world ‒ irrespective of geographical 
location (with the exception of Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Muslim 
countries in West-Africa) ‒ has been referred to as the ‘Near East’ in the past, 
while ‘Middle East’ essentially supplanted Near East in the early twentieth 
century, although the two are now used interchangeably among English speakers. 
Both of these terms are Eurocentric, meaning that the historians named the region 
on the basis of its position relative to Europe. The significance of the Middle 
Eastern region grew to a large extent after 1930, when vast oil reserves were 
discovered in several countries in the region (Iraq, Iran, Saudi-Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, as well as Libya and Algeria in North Africa), 
continuously increasing exploitation as well as the wealth of especially those 
among the above countries that have a smaller population size. The region has 
recently attracted international attention once again due to the political changes 
ongoing there (“Arab Spring”, “Islamic State”) as well as the migration 
originating from there, which, considering the proximity, poses special tasks for 
border protection in the European Union (Map 20). 
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Map 20: The Arab League, established in Cairo in 1945 and comprising 22 countries 
today, incorporates the Arab states situated in the central areas of the Islamic world  
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
4.2.2. History 

Muhammad and Islam 

The origin of the religion of Islam  
The religion of Islam emerged in the first third of the seventh century; its 
founder was Prophet Muhammad (d. in 632). Muhammad, son of Abdallah, was 
born in Mecca, Arabia, in around 570. He was orphaned at an early age, whereby 
he developed social sensitivity, and this is also expressed in the holy book of 
Islam, the Quran. While traditional tribal society tried to take care of orphans and 
widows, this was given less focus in Meccan society based on trading activity 
and a higher degree of individualism. Muhammad was, however, more fortunate 
than fellow orphans. After his first guardian, his grandfather Abd al-Muttalib also 
died, according to tribal traditions he came under the guardianship of his eldest 
uncle Abu Talib. Until his death, Abu Talib defended the Prophet from the attacks 
that were to grow increasingly stronger against him, even though Abu Talib 
himself did not convert to the new religion.  
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As another fortunate circumstance, Muhammad had the chance to marry 
the wealthy tradeswoman Khadijah, which secured him employment and 
subsistence by her side, and she, too, tried to protect him herself, being much 
older. In that society based on polygamy, Muhammad did not take another wife 
as long as Khadijah was alive. During his trading trips Muhammad probably met 
with the teachings of Judaism and Christianity, as well as with Biblical stories. 
The best-known story from Muhammad’s travels in his young age is what 
is referred to as the Bahira legend. According to Arab historians, his uncle took 
the 12-year-old Muhammad on a trading trip to Syria, where they met a Syrian 
Christian monk, Bahira. Bahira invited the traders into his cell to cool down, but 
they left the boy outside in the heat of the sun to look after the camels. However, 
a cloud unusual at that time of the day provided shade for Muhammad. The monk 
declared this event a miracle and foretold that Muhammad would become a 
prophet. 
It is assumed that at that time many places in Arabia and thus Mecca, too, 
were regularly visited by preaching Christian monks. What was known as the 
Fertile Crescent surrounding Arabia, as well as the southern part of the peninsula, 
were populated by Christian Arabs. There were Jews, on the other hand, living in 
several oasis towns such as Yathrib and Khaybar. It is clearly apparent from the 
text of the Quran and some of its linguistic turns that Meccans were familiar with 
Biblical stories, prophets and with monotheism itself. 
Muhammad is assumed to have been around 30 years of age when he 
started wondering about the questions of life, about justice, the meaning of life 
and spiritual purity. While he continued to respect Meccan traditions and rituals, 
year by year he visited a cave in the nearby Hira Mountain where others, too, had 
withdrawn to meditate. In the course of these visits in 610‒611, at the age of forty 
approximately, Muhammad underwent dramatic experiences. During one of his 
withdrawals he heard a voice and had a vision, which summoned him to worship 
God who had created the world, the only God whose name was Allah, whom 
Arabs respected but who did not have a special cult among them. Encouraged by 
his wife Khadijah, Muhammad realised that the voice had really come from God 
himself and was brought down by archangel Jibril (Gabriel) to him, God’s chosen 
prophet. From then on, he continued receiving new messages in his visions, 
summarised under the name Quran, which originally means “recitation”. For 
some time, Mohammed shared the divine messages only with his wife and some 
close friends, but three years later he felt that he had a prophetic mission for his 
people and started openly spreading the new cult in Mecca. The Meccan tribe 
Quraysh was mostly mistrustful and rejecting towards the new teachings, which 
they saw partly as Muhammad’s individual pursuit of power and partly, due to 
the similarity to the known Christian teachings, as an intrigue by the Byzantine 
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Empire attempting to exercise control over Meccan trade as they had done before. 
At the same time, they feared to lose the pagan cults and idols which, together 
with the annual Meccan pilgrimage and fairs as well as the right to designate the 
holy months when fighting was forbidden, ensured Mecca’s superiority over the 
tribes of Arabia. Muhammad was therefore often insulted and ridiculed during 
his public preaching, which, however, could not dissuade him. The number of his 
followers slowly grew to a few dozen, primarily among disadvantaged orphans 
and slaves, and soon a group of literates formed who followed him and recorded 
his teachings. These notes on palm leaves, bones, pieces of papyrus and leather 
as well as soft sand stones were to form the basis of collecting what was to 
become the Quran.  
Numerous events recorded in his biography show that neither the 
occurrence of the revelations nor their contents were under Muhammad’s 
conscious control. After the early revelations he received no divine guidance for 
a long time, which made him severely depressed, and was helped through only 
by the unceasing encouragement and faith of his wife Khadijah. Later on he 
received the longed for revelations as required but even so it happened sometimes 
that he did not receive the divine decision in some important issue and interpreted 
this as his humiliation by God for his mistakes. Such remarks occur in the Quran 
itself, which often quotes God’s words to Muhammad. 
Arabs were not unfamiliar with accounts of people who claimed to have 
been taken over by a being beyond their control, putting words into their mouth, 
and the rhymed prose of the early parts of the Quran could be familiar, too, as 
such was also the register of soothsayers (kahin) in their ecstatic statements. At 
the same time, poets (shair) also claimed that their words of military motivation 
and glorification for their tribes were inspired by spirits (jinn). Therefore, both 
Muhammad and later Muslims made great efforts to distinguish the revelations 
of the Quran from soothsayers’ and poets’ statements. 
Meccans watched Muhammad’s missionary activity with growing hostility 
and after they failed to persuade his clan, the Banu Hashim, to deny Muhammad 
the protection obligatory according to tribal morale, they took measures against 
the whole clan in 616 boycotting them for three years. It was prohibited to keep 
contact or trade with the Banu Hashim clan. In 619, however, there were two 
events which negatively affected Muhammad: his wife Khadijah and his 
protective uncle Abu Talib died. 
 
Accounts of the Night Journey and Heavenly Ascension of the Prophet 
Muhammad 
It is assumed that the tragic events with a great impact on his life, the death 
of his wife and his uncle, left Muhammad in despair and a loss of certainty about 
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the success of his mission. Then, in around 619 he received a vision, which is 
referred to only by half a sentence in the Quran but is described in detail in dozens 
of the traditions. The quotation from the Quran is as follows (17:1): “Glory to 
Him who journeyed His servant by night, from the Sacred Mosque, to the Farthest 
Mosque”. On the basis of the word used here, the first part of the story is referred 
to as the “night journey” (Isra) and every Muslim religious scholar accepts it as 
authentic. The details are outlined in the Hadith with reference to Muhammad’s 
account. One night, Muhammad was taken by archangel Jibril from the roof of 
his house in Mecca to the farthest mosque, which, based on the identical name, 
scholars identify with the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, built much later. 
According to the accounts Muhammad was awake and followed the angel 
travelling on the back of the mule Buraq. In the mosque he prayed together with 
the earlier great prophets Moses and Jesus, who asked Mohammed to lead the 
prayer as an imam. The vision may have thus reinforced Muhammad’s sense of 
mission. For the second part of the story there is no evidence in the Quran and 
has thus not been accepted by all religious scholars, although its assumed date is 
celebrated throughout the Islamic world. This is the heavenly journey (Mi’raj). 
The story says that Jibril led the Prophet “from the farthest mosque” to the seven 
levels of Heaven, where in every level he was awaited and greeted by prophets 
known from the Bible and finally he proceeded to God’s throne. 
 
The hijra (emigration) 
As the head of the clan Abu Talib was succeeded by another uncle of 
Muhammad who is referred to in the Quran as Abu Lahab (“Father of Flame”), 
which metaphorically means “destined for Hell”. He did not wish to protect 
Muhammad, who thus had to find support outside Mecca. He did find the support 
from the side of the population of Yathrib, 320 km north of Mecca, later called 
Medina. The inhabitants of Yathrib engaged in agriculture and primarily date cul-
tivation. The three Jewish tribes who lived there were later joined by two pagan 
Arab tribes, the Aws and the Khazraj, who were in constant fight with each other. 
According to ancient Arabian tradition they were to welcome a neutral arbitrator 
in town who had the necessary moral dignity and wise understanding, and this 
they found in Muhammad. Negotiations went on in the years 621‒622, after 
which they signed the two so-called Agreements of al-Aqaba, in which they ac-
cepted the new religion and Muhammad as the leader, and at the same time they 
promised him, Meccan Muslims and their families the protection granted to the 
members of their own tribes, their wives and children. Thereafter, in September 
622, a group of some 70 Muslims left Mecca, and Muhammad followed them. 
This emigration is called hijra in Arabic, and this was to mark the beginning of 
Muslim calendar. The emigration had to be fast and secret, because between 
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Mecca and Yathrib (Medina) Muslims could not enjoy either the old or the new 
protection, anyone could have killed them without a consequence.  
 
Islam in Medina 
In the new town Muslims, who had no understanding of agriculture, first 
of all had to face economic and financial difficulties. Initially, the solution was 
that the new Medinese Muslims, the Ansar (“supporters”), accepted the emigrants 
(muhajirun) as their brethren. In early 624 Muhammad adopted a method that 
helped to solve financial difficulties and, by weakening Meccan pagans, ad-
vanced the cause of religion at the same time. In a holy month (when fighting was 
not allowed) they attacked the Meccan caravan carrying goods on their way to 
Syria. Although many even among the Muslims disapproved of violating the holy 
month, a Quranic revelation (2:217) said this was allowed in the fight against the 
greater evil, paganism. The greatest success Muhammad had was in the Battle of 
Badr (March 624), where Muslim forces who were of a smaller size succeeded 
in robbing a well-guarded, bigger caravan. The success was significant not only 
financially, but it also reinforced Muhammad’s authority, which was also indi-
cated by the fact that he succeeded in expelling one of the Jewish tribes who had 
been intriguing against him – the Banu Qaynuqa – from Medina. These battles 
were also of ideological significance, since there were clan members fighting 
against clan members and even Muslim family members against pagan family 
members. Muhammad declared that the old tribal system was over; Muslims 
formed a single super-tribe called umma. Members of the umma were not allowed 
to keep contact with former fellow tribesmen, were not allowed to inherit from 
them and vice versa. The following year, the too hot-headed young people per-
suaded Muhammad into a battle that was to end in a severe defeat at Uhud, but 
Meccans were unable to exploit their victory and destroy Medina. At the same 
time, Muhammad succeeded in expelling the other Jewish tribe supporting the 
Meccans, the Banu Nadir as well. They were not allowed to take their property 
with them, which were thus passed down to Muslims. Hostility with Meccans 
also continued who, in order to protect their trade, decided for a decisive step in 
627. They recruited a force of thousands of Bedouins from among their allies, 
joined also by many Meccans, and went to Medina to attack and seize it. Muham-
mad was, however, informed of their plan in time and had deep trenches dug in 
order to protect the city, while the removed earth served as a protective wall. The 
Battle of the Trench (khandaq) lasted as long as a month and Meccans had to 
retreat without results. This led to the reinforcement of Muhammad’s position in 
Medina. After the battle, the last Jewish tribe in Medina collaborating with 
Meccans, the Banu Qurayz, were massacred under the pretext of a conflict with 
Muslims. Thereby both external and internal resistance was dissolved, and 
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Muhammad’s attention could now turn to organising the Muslim community, 
now including all inhabitants of Medina acknowledging Muhammad’s leader-
ship, on a religious basis. 
In the initial years of Islam in Medina, Muhammad did not make efforts to 
pass universal regulations guiding the new community. It seems that in the at-
mosphere of waiting for the end of the world, he considered Muslim life in this 
world would be ephemeral. As his authority and power grew, however, there was 
growing need for passing laws, and this became increasingly clear in the 
Medinese chapters of the Quran as time passed. Certain laws referred to perform-
ing various forms of worship: creed (the profession of faith), prayer, compulsory 
almsgiving, fasting and pilgrimage. Since these are, however, not always compre-
hensive instructions, these were later complemented with the traditions of actual 
religious practice as performed by Muhammad. Another category of laws dealt 
with relationships between people: marriage, divorce, inheritance, trade 
agreements. These, too, were described only to the extent they diverted from the 
existing habits and norms. A third category focused on moral requirements like 
declaring sexual relationships outside the new marital relationship approved by 
Islam as sinful. The Medinese revelations stipulated ways of punishment for 
certain major sins (hudud): murder, theft, adultery, and defamation. At the same 
time, they specified the most important prohibitions in diet and marriage. 
Not everyone welcomed the Prophet’s growing prestige in Medina; for 
example, his enemies misused the rumours in connection with one of his wives, 
Aisha. The Quran therefore contains numerous instructions that refer only to 
Muhammad and his household. Finally, it was important to legalise the fight 
against members of the old Meccan tribe and clan who remained pagan and order 
the struggle (jihad) against those prohibiting exercising Islam. The Quran 
mentions at the same time that this fight – literally “struggle” – must take root in 
the soul of Muslims in order to reinforce their faith. In the world of Islam marked 
by the Quran, individuals may, however, reach happiness in this and the other 
world only as members of the Muslim community, the umma, in view of which 
it encourages Muslims to try to keep to the “straight path” by supporting and 
guiding one another to the right path. 
In 628 Muhammad decided for a bold step: with his followers including 
Bedouins from the neighbourhood he went to Mecca unarmed to perform the 
pilgrimage. Meccans offered peace, as a result of which Muslims were allowed 
to perform the pilgrimage the next year, in 629. In 630, however, an incident 
provided an excuse for Muhammad to denounce peace and seize Mecca. The con-
quest was bloodless, Meccans surrendered to Islam and six weeks later they 
already fought together and won in the Battle of Hunayn against hostile Bedouin 
tribes. The year 631 witnessed the final breakthrough when all tribes in Arabia 
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sent delegations indicating their intention to join Islam, while at the same time 
smaller raids and campaigns were launched to border areas of the neighbouring 
Sassanid Persian Empire and the Byzantine Empire. In 632 Muhammad, who 
decided to stay in Medina, performed the pilgrimage to Mecca once again – 
referred to as the “farewell pilgrimage” – and soon, unexpectedly even for his 
close companions, he died. 
 
The question of succession 
Muhammad failed to appoint a successor (caliph), whose election was 
therefore preceded by heavy disputes. Medinese Muslims felt they had enabled 
the success of Islam and therefore they should provide the successor, while the 
Meccans argued for the principle that the successor should come from Muham-
mad’s tribe, the Quraysh. Tribal traditions made two kinds of succession possible. 
Either an experienced and wise leader was appointed by election or the most 
prominent member of the family or household (Ahl al-Bayt) of the deceased chief 
became the new chief of the tribe. Finally, at the initiative of Umar, who had 
played a significant role in governing the life of the community in Muhammad’s 
life already, the oldest and one of the first Muslims, Abu Bakr, was elected the 
first caliph. This was, however, unwelcome by some of the Muslims who wanted 
Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and at the same time the husband of his daughter, 
Fatimah, to be the caliph. These Muslims called themselves “party of Ali” (Shiat 
Ali) and were to form a branch of Islam still existing today, Shii Islam. 
 
The Caliphate in Medina: the reign of the four rightly guided caliphs 
 
The caliphate of Abu Bakr (632‒634) 
Abu Bakr’s most important task was to defeat the separatist efforts of 
Bedouin tribes from Islam (ridda, “apostasy”). These tribes considered joining 
Islam as a traditional contract of tribal alliance, which was related to Muhammad 
as a person and for them his death made it invalid. Abu Bakr’s armies were 
victorious at several points of Arabia, so he was able to reunify the peninsula. His 
efforts to maintain power and unity were facilitated by the circumstance that, 
continuing the external conquests started by Muhammad, he sent troops against 
the Byzantine Empire and the Sassanid Persian Empire. The allocation of the 
booty obtained in the victorious battles enhanced the loyalty and fighting spirit 
of Bedouin tribes. Abu Bakr rose to power at an old age and died two years later, 
but before that he designated Umar ibn al-Khattab as his successor in order to 
avoid disputes similar to those preceding his appointment. 
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The caliphate of Umar (634‒644) 
The second caliph Umar had achievements important from the point of 
view of Islamic history in three areas. First, he reinforced the organisation and 
internal order of the new and growing empire. Umar used to be the guardian of 
order when Muhammad was still alive; he applied much stricter measures against 
phenomena he considered immoral or anti-Islamic than Muhammad himself. 
Tradition says that he was the one who urged a total ban on wine drinking, too, 
towards the end of the Medinese era as drunken behaviour led to disorder. During 
his reign he was quick to ban the so-called pleasure marriage, which was a 
temporary relationship allowed also by the Quran. The explanation he gave for 
the ban was that pleasure marriage had only been allowed temporarily during the 
lengthy siege of the oasis of Khaybar when fighting Muslims were unable to keep 
contact with their wives for a long time. The other area where Umar had the 
greatest success was his fast and huge military victories.  In 635 Muslim forces 
occupied Damascus and by 636 the whole Syrian and Palestinian province of the 
Byzantine Empire became part of the Muslim Caliphate. Finally, between 638 
and 641 they seized Egypt, too, from Byzantium. Fast military success also 
continued towards the East. At the Iraqi al-Qadisiyya in 637, they had a decisive 
victory against the Persian Empire whose capital and central areas were in the 
Western border zone of the empire, in Iraq. Arab conquests continued after the 
victory and within a few years the whole vast Sassanid Empire was in Muslim 
hands. Umar appointed his own loyal men to the top positions of all the armies 
and newly occupied provinces and in this way, he was able to maintain control of 
the caliphate that had grown at an unexpected pace. The third area where Umar’s 
activity has had significance to this day was collecting and organising the various 
parts of the Quran. Umar assigned the Prophet’s scribe Zayd ibn Thabit to 
perform this task and it was through the activity of this scribe that the current 
structure of the Quran, the order of the verses (aya) and chapters (sura) was 
established. As a consequence of an assumed personal injury, Umar was 
murdered while praying in 644. 
 
The caliphate of Uthman (644‒656) 
Umar was succeeded by Uthman ibn Affan, a member of the most prestig-
ious Meccan clan – the Banu Umayya – and husband of one of Muhammad’s 
daughters. Uthman also understood the significance of the Quran and assigned a 
committee led by Zayd to collect all the existing copies of the Quran and make 
the script uniform by eliminating the various linguistic versions. Uthman then 
had the various versions burnt and the uniformised version copied in enough 
copies to be sent to all the provinces.  
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During Uthman’s reign conquests continued both in the direction of the 
eastern provinces of the Persian Empire and in that of Libya in North-Africa. At 
the same time, there was growing dissatisfaction over the fact that the caliph 
appointed the members of his family and clan to all important positions. This is 
how Muawiyah, son of the pagan Meccan leader opposing Muhammad and the 
later caliph became the commander of the important Syrian province. At the same 
time, the supporters of Ali (the Shia) had a growing community as well. Finally, 
Caliph Uthman was killed in his own house by rebels in 656. Muslims were un-
able to reach an agreement on the question of succession. 
 
The caliphate of Ali (656‒661) and the first civil war (fitna) 
In Medina, Ali was elected caliph, but he was not recognised by the 
Syrians, who had elected Muawiyah. The armies of Ali and Muawiyah met at the 
bank of the Euphrates (at Siffin, today’s Raqqa) in 657, where following ancient 
Arab tradition they decided for arbitration, on the basis of which the western 
territories remained under Muawiyah’s and the eastern territories under Ali’s 
rule. Some of Ali’s supporters did not accept this and broke away from the camp 
claiming that Ali became caliph because God ordered it to be so, and people were 
not allowed to change this. They established an independent state in the central 
parts of Arabia. They were referred to as Kharijis (“those who leave”) by later 
generations. In the meantime, Ali and his followers moved to a new military town 
in South Iraq, Kufa, where Ali was assassinated by a Khariji when coming out of 
a mosque. Thereby Muawiyah became the only ruler. 
Kharijis formed the first sect of Islam. According to their strict views, 
anyone who committed a major sin was to be punished by death, while the most 
suitable Muslim was to be appointed caliph, irrespective of his origin. Those who 
did not follow their teachings were not Muslims and could be freely killed. These 
tenets were revived in extremist political Islam in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries once again. After the eighth century, Kharijis were forced out of the 
central areas of Arabia and established countries on the edge or more hidden parts 
of the Islamic world. The most significant of these was the Rustamid Imamate in 
the territory of today’s Algeria in the ninth century. A more moderate branch of 
Kharijis are the Ibadis, who founded an independent state in Oman still existing 
today. There are smaller Ibadi communities in today’s Algeria, in the Mzab 
Valley, as well as Libya, Tunisia and Zanzibar (Map 24).  
 
The Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus (661‒750) 
 
Muawiyah’s reign marked the beginning of the Umayyad dynasty, who 
governed the vast empire from Damascus. The first era (661‒683) is referred to 
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as the Sufyanid Umayyad dynasty since the caliphs came from among descend-
ants of Sufyan within the Umayyad clan. The first of them was Muawiyah (661‒
680), who reigned with the support of Syrian Arab tribes. After the first so-called 
civil war (fitna) of the Islamic Empire ended with the death of Ali, the majority 
of Muslims, striving for unity, supported the Umayyads. The remaining internal 
resistance, Ali’s supporters and the Kharijites were successfully defeated by 
military force, and at the same time external conquests continued primarily with 
the help of a strong and successful fleet established against Byzantium, which 
occupied the island of Cyprus. At that time, the influence of the new provinces 
on the Islamic Caliphate became clear since desert Bedouin tribes had no under-
standing of shipping, for which Syrian, Palestinian and Egyptian Muslims were 
used. In all areas of state administration, the Umayyad Caliphate strongly relied 
on Christians in the conquered Syria who continued Byzantine traditions and 
performed public administration in the Greek language. The currency at the same 
time was adopted from the Sassanid Persian Empire: the Arabic version of the 
silver drachma was dirhem. It was also a Byzantine effect that hereditary reign 
was adopted as a custom after Muawiyah’s death, so was followed by his son 
Yazid I. Ali’s supporters – the Shia – who were in majority in South Iraq tried to 
use the disputes regarding succession and led by Husayn – Ali’s son and Muham-
mad’s grandson – they went to attack the Umayyad governor. The battle of 
Karbala fought against a much larger enemy ended in the defeat of Husayn and 
his martyrdom together with that of most members of his family. The comme-
moration of his death has become a Shii mourning holiday called Ashura and is 
celebrated on the tenth day of the first month (muharram)of the lunar calendar 
year. 
 
The second civil war (fitna) (683‒692) 
After the death of Yazid, Marwan I from the other branch of the Umayyad 
clan rose to power (683‒685). As succession had never been regulated in principle 
and chieftains always took their loyalty oath to the caliph in person rather than 
the dynasty, there were once again several claimants to the caliphate when Yazid 
died. 
Zubayr gained power in a Medina of diminished prestige and tried to reign 
from there, while Mukhtar became the Shii candidate in Kufa. The fights finally 
ended only after the military success of Marwan’s son Abd al-Malik (685‒705), 
who became the actual and acknowledged ruler of the whole empire only after 
692. There were three significant characteristic features of his reign that affected 
the later development of Islam. 
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x On the one hand, influenced by great empires in the region and following 
their example, he put an end to the caliph’s dependence on tribal and 
military leaders and became a ruler with absolute power.  
x On the other hand, relying on strong military governors, he solidified his 
power in the new provinces, primarily in the territories of Iraq and Iran. 
The governor here was Hajjaj for decades, who not only continued 
expanding the empire further east but also succeeded in introducing an 
effective taxation system. Islam never obliged the population of the 
conquered territories to convert, but for reasons of taxation Hajjaj wished 
to explicitly block Islamisation. While Muslims only paid land tax 
(kharaj), the followers of acknowledged religions referred to as dhimmis 
(Jews, Christians and in Iran Zoroastrians) were also obliged to pay poll 
tax (jizya). He was therefore considered anti-Islamic by later generations 
as he tried to prevent conversion and keep peasants from leaving their 
villages and move to the new town. He had one more reason for doing so: 
the disgruntled population of the new military garrison towns like Kufa 
and Basra in South Iraq were Shii and forever in opposition. 
x The third feature of the reign of Abd al-Malik was the Arabisation of the 
state. Arabic replaced Greek as an official language, new coins – gold dinar 
– were minted to replace Greek ones, with a quotation from the Quran 
instead of the sovereign’s image, while public administration was 
gradually transferred from Christians to educated Arab Muslims.  
 
During the reign of Abd al-Malik’s successors the empire expanded 
towards the West and reached a decisive stage in 711 (Map 21). Led by Tariq ibn 
Ziyad the Muslim troops reinforced by the conquered North African Berber tribes 
who had converted to Islam, crossed over to Europe at a place called the Gibraltar 
pass today. The name of Gibraltar (Jabal Tariq, Tariq’s Mountain) has retained 
the name of this commander until our days. From then on, they rapidly advanced 
and with the exception of the northern mountain range took control of the whole 
Hispanic Peninsula (today’s Spain and Portugal). They called the area al-Andalus 
(Andalusia), which was larger than the province of Andalusia in today’s Spain. 
The Umayyads’ reign was basically based on the support of the Arab tribal 
system, which guaranteed certain stability to the caliphate, but was at the same 
time prone to the negative effects of inter-tribal discord primarily between the 
Northern and Southern Arab tribes: the relatively recent immigrant Qays, and the 
Qalb whose members had arrived earlier in Syria. With the troops, this rivalry 
was transferred to Andalusia as well, where fights were recorded for centuries. It 
was because of its nature of being based on the Arab tribal system that later Arab 
historians referred to the Damascus Caliphate as the “Arab Kingdom”. This, 
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however, generated dissatisfaction among non-Arab Muslims. If they wanted to 
be acknowledged in urban life, they needed the protection of some Arab tribe, 
clan or family and to become their protégée (mawla, “client”). It was this 
dissatisfaction that led to the strengthening movement and later open rebellion 
that is referred to as the Abbasid Revolution which led to the fall of the Syrian 
Umayyad Caliphate in 750 and the establishment of the Iraqi Abbasid Caliphate. 
 
Map 21: The expansion of Islam 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
Religious movements in the first half of the eighth century 
The growing dissatisfaction in the second half of the Umayyad era also 
manifested itself in various religious movements. Although apart from the Shiis 
and Kharijis who clearly rejected the dynasty, the followers of numerous other 
religious movements and views accepted the existing rule, they did formulate 
critical views. The Murjiah (“those who postpone”) were dissatisfied with the 
religiousness of the system, they postponed their judgement and left it up to God 
to judge sovereigns on Judgement Day. The Qadariyah asserted God was just, 
and humans followed the good or the evil exercising their free will. In the Quran 
they studied the concept of divine decree (qadar) and came to the conclusion that 
God did not arrange everything in advance. Their followers were mainly 
members of the South Arabian tribe Kalb who were disillusioned with the 
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Umayyads. The Jabriyah (jabr meaning coercion) on the contrary believed in 
divine predestination and taught that human intention had no role in determining 
our deeds. Another teaching that became of decisive importance in the ninth 
century was also established under the name Mu’tazila. The Mu’tazilites did not 
make a stance in political issues and accepted the concepts of free will and divine 
justice. They, however, were not active in Syria but in Basra in South Iraq. 
The son of Caliph Muawiyah, Yazid I (r. 680‒683) who died at a young 
age in a horse-riding accident had special respect among some of the Northern 
Iraqi Kurds. Their followers, the Yazidis separated from Sunni Islam. The closed 
endogamous community of Yazidis have lived in Northern Iraq until today. 
 
The Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad (750‒1258) 
 
Although the members of the dynasty used the title “caliph” between 750 
and 1258, their actual power lasted much shorter, until 945. From then on, power 
shifted away to various military dynasties, while the caliphs symbolised the 
lawfulness and legality of these dynasties’ reign in the eyes of their subjects as 
the military governors (emir) of the time always pledged allegiance to the caliph. 
The members of the Abbasid dynasty were descendants of Abbas, one of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s uncles. They regarded themselves as God’s delegates on 
Earth (“God’s shadow on Earth”) and, accordingly, after rising to power, they 
adopted regnal names alluding to God’s will. The first who helped the family to 
power had himself called al-Saffah (“the blood-shedder”) indicating that God had 
chosen him to eradicate the Umayyads as well as their followers, all held for 
disbelievers, which he, worthy of his name, in fact did. There was only one 
member of the Umayyad family who was able to escape, who went to Andalusia 
and there, relying on friendly Arab tribes and breaking away from the Abbasids, 
established an independent Umayyad Emirate under the name Abd al-Rahman I. 
The reason why al-Saffah was, despite the brevity of his reign (750‒754), able to 
efficiently eradicate his enemies and later even some of his supporters who 
became dangerous, was that he did not rely on tribal Arabs among whom even a 
caliph had to think twice before killing a dangerous rival as according to tribal 
tradition he had to fear obligatory blood feud. The Abbasids, however, primarily 
relied on East-Iranian, mainly Khurasani mountain-dwellers and the Iranian-Iraqi 
peasantry in their movement. Understandably, they were to choose their capital 
also in this region, close to the capital of the former Sassanid Empire. 
Al-Saffah’s successor was Caliph al-Mansur (“the one supported by God”) 
(754‒775), who first moved to his South Iraqi castle of al-Hashimiyya near the 
river Euphrates, but soon planned to establish a new capital further North near a 
small Persian village on the river Tigris, Baghdad. This place was extremely 
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suitable from the military, the public administration as well as the trade aspects. 
Here the two large rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates are close to each other; 
they were connected by a huge canal system which surrounded Baghdad as well, 
and since ancient times this was the place where the East-Western (Silk Road) 
and the North-Southern trade routes crossed each other. The old Sassanid capital 
Ctesiphon was nearby, and south to it lay the huge agricultural area providing 
also for the Persian Empire, the Sawad (“black soil”). The original idea was that 
the imperial seat surrounded by a double castle wall system and called, because 
of its form, round city, would only be inhabited by the caliph and his court: the 
clerks running public administration, the treasury and first of all the caliph’s large 
community of bodyguards. Caliph al-Mansur moved into the city in 762 and 
although officially it was called Madinat al-Salam, in everyday life it was called 
Baghdad from the very beginning. The caliph’s original idea was that tradesmen 
and manufacturers would only deliver the required goods to the round city, but it 
would be prohibited for them to settle there in the fear of potential clashes 
between the population and the military or the negative effects of potential riots.  
Soon, however, various small towns were established around the capital lying on 
the right bank of the Tigris, which, gradually growing into one, were to form the 
vastest city in the Middle Ages. Thereby the weight of the caliphate irrevocably 
shifted towards the east, which was one reason why they were unable to keep the 
Western provinces with the exception of Egypt. Besides the Umayyad Emirate in 
Iberia, independent emirates were formed also in the areas of today’s Tunisia, 
Algeria and Morocco (Figure 53).  
 
Figure 53: The fortress of Monastir (Tunisia) originally built by the Abbasid governor 
in the late eighth century, later used and enlarged by the local dynasties 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
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The main difference of the Abbasid Caliphate (or Caliphate of Baghdad) 
from its predecessor in Damascus was that putting Syria into the background, Iraq 
became the centre in every respect. It was here that agriculture was developed; it 
was here that new crafts like paper manufacturing came into being, and in the 
administration, Syrians were replaced by descendants of officers of Iraqi or 
Iranian origin. The caliphs of Baghdad adopted the system of the earlier offices 
(diwan) but complemented it with a new office, that of the chief minister (wazir), 
whose duty was to carry out the caliph’s instructions but in numerous issues he 
was able to decide individually and he had his own staff of clerks. The caliph was 
no longer the highest-ranking Arab sheikh, but the protector of Muslims entrusted 
by God. 
The Abbasid rise to power inevitably involved a change in the composition 
of the army. The military victory over the Umayyads was mainly thanks to the 
mercenaries hired from the province of Khurasan, and for half a century they 
became the major support of the caliphate. When, after 820, the province became 
semi-independent under a military commander called Tahir and his dynasty and 
they did not give more soldiers, the caliphs relied on an army of mercenaries from 
various Turkic tribes rather than on Arab tribal armies like the Umayyads. The 
only exception were border areas where troops of voluntary warriors were formed 
from locals who bore the title Ghazi (“warrior against disbelievers”) and were 
given some of the booty of possible raids. 
 
Figure 54: Gold dinar with an Arabic inscription, Museum of Mahdia (Tunisia) 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
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The first Abbasid era between 750 and 830 witnessed great economic 
booms. The uniform and vast empire provided a huge market for the agricultural 
and handicraft products, and the caliphs reigning according to the Meccan 
traditions tried to facilitate trade, which marketed the goods as far as the Atlantic 
Ocean in the West and India in the East. All these made it necessary to establish 
a well-developed financial as well as a commercial letter of credit distribution 
system. Money changers had to be up to date about the exchange rate of the silver 
dirham used in the Iranian part of the empire and the gold dinar meeting the 
Byzantine traditions (Figure 54). In order to avoid that the tradesmen carry a huge 
amount of silver or gold, the credit system based on cheques was established, and 
these were accepted from tradesmen from Baghdad everywhere from Morocco to 
the Province of Sindh at the bank of the Indus River. The word cheque itself is 
also of Arabic origin (sakk). As Islam prohibits that money should beget money 
considering it as usury, most monetary institutions were operated by Jews and 
Christians. 
 
The age of Harun al-Rashid (786‒809), the golden age of the Caliphate of 
Baghdad 
After crushing internal riots, the caliph’s attention turned to the 
organisation of the empire. The caliph who was also the “commander of the 
faithful” at the same time, personally commanded a troop every year. On one 
occasion he supervised the Meccan caravan, the following year the usual raid 
against Byzantium. He considered guaranteeing public security to be the highest 
priority task of the central authority; he made efforts not to interfere with the 
private sphere and usually left legal and religious issues up to scholars of law and 
religion. The caliph and his court, however, effectively supported culture and 
science all the time. Even for a long time after his death, the name of Harun al-
Rashid still well known among the population of Baghdad; he became one of the 
main characters in the oldest versions of Arabian Nights as the just sovereign who 
in disguise mingles with the people so as to listen to and resolve their complaints. 
One of the real manifestations of this was the special court held every week under 
the supervision of the caliph to remedy unlawfulness (mazalim courts), where 
anyone could bring their complaints to the caliph. This tradition, which originally 
was adopted form the court of the Persian king, survived for centuries but from 
the tenth century it was headed by the chief minister rather than the sovereign. As 
an advantage, the sovereign or the chief minister were not bound by the 
complicated provisions of Islamic law and could make instant judgements as they 
liked. After the seventeenth century, a separate office under the name Diwan al-
mazalim was established in the Ottoman Empire where judges examined the 
complaints lodged against decisions. 
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The court of the Caliph of Baghdad was famous for its splendour and 
opulence. The only reason why we cannot experience the beauty of the buildings 
and gardens is that in the thirteenth century the Mongols destroyed everything; 
only the establishments in Andalusia modelled on the Iraqi examples can give us 
a picture as those were not destroyed by the Christian armies during the 
reconquest (reconquista; twelth‒fifteenth centuries). 
 
Caliph al-Ma’mun (813‒833) 
Al-Ma’mun, who occupied Baghdad in a fraternal war, tried to limit the 
authority of religious scholars who relied on traditions and with reference to the 
eternal Quran tried to lay down the rules of religion, law and social life. He 
therefore made the Mu’tazilite teachings the official dogma, whose 
representatives taught about the created – i.e. not eternal – Quran and free will. 
The “created” nature of the Quran means that God could have created it 
differently from the way we know it today, which gives room for the sovereign’s 
or the government’s intention in the interpretation of divine laws as the Quran no 
longer has an absolute nature. Under al-Ma’mun and his successors this dogma 
became obligatory for state officials and religious leaders in mosques, and those 
who did not share the teaching of the created Quran were imprisoned. This was 
called inquisition (mihna). 
 
The beginning of the fragmentation of the empire 
In the second half of the ninth century Abbasid power weakened; the huge 
empire was impossible to govern by directly appointed governors. Provincial 
governors’ growth of power is primarily indicated by the fact that local dynasties 
were formed which, although they acknowledged the caliphs of Baghdad, 
governed independently and most of the time kept the collected taxes as well. 
First it was the eastern territories that became independent from Baghdad. The 
Saffarids governed Iran and the Province of Sindh (today’s Pakistan, 
Afghanistan), later the Samanids who defeated them moved their centre to 
Central Asia making Bukhara their capital. They considered themselves the 
descendants of the pre-Islamic Persian dynasty and regarded the dissemination of 
new Persian literary language and Persian culture against Arabicate culture as 
their main task. They were deprived of their power by their own Turkish 
mercenaries, who established the Ghaznavid Empire with Ghazna as capital after 
1000. They, too, were supporters of Persian culture. It is to the credit of their first 
sovereign Mahmud (997‒1030) that he sponsored one of the greatest works of 
Persian culture: Firdawsi’s historical epic, the “Book of Kings” (Shahnameh) was 
dedicated to him by the author. 
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Figure 55: The Bab al-Futuh (Gate of Conquests) built by the Fatimids in the eleventh 
century, in Cairo. In the background, a minaret of the Hakim Mosque named after the 
sixth Fatimid Caliph 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
 
In the central territories of the Caliphate of Baghdad, in Iraq and Western 
Iran, the Iranian Shii Buyids (also called Buwayhids) took control of actual power 
in 945 for about half a century and used the Caliph of Baghdad for authorising 
their power. 
In Egypt as well as in the areas of today’s Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, 
dynasties of military governors reigned in the ninth century. These dynasties, 
however, all acknowledged the Caliph of Baghdad as the head and the religious 
leader of the Islamic Empire and did not launch a fight against him as they had 
no religious-ideological differences of opinion. The Umayyad Emirate in Spain 
also acknowledged the Caliph of Baghdad as religious leader despite political 
differences. In the tenth century, however, a new power emerged in North Africa: 
the Shii Fatimids (Figure 55). 
 
The disintegration of the Abbasid Caliphate 
In 1095 Pope Urban declared the First Crusade to liberate the Holy Land, 
i.e. Jerusalem, and the crusader troops – whom Arabs called Franks irrespective 
of their origin  – soon established several smaller or larger principalities near the 
Mediterranean Sea in the region of Syria and Palestine, of which the Kingdom of 
Jerusalem was the most significant one.  
The crusaders fought heavy battles with the Seljuk Emirate that initially 
took control of Syria and later of Egypt as well. The most famous of these was 
the battle fought at Hattin in 1187, where Emir Saladin defeated the crusader 
troops and regained control over Jerusalem as well for some time. Smaller 
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crusader states, however, resisted for another one hundred years until as long as 
1291 when the last Palestinian town Akko, too, was lost. Despite their final lack 
of success, the Crusades nevertheless had a great impact on the history of the 
Middle East. They opened the eastern region of the Mediterranean Sea to 
European, primarily Venetian traders, while Islamic civilisation made a 
significant material and intellectual impact on the Europe of the Middle Ages. 
 
Islam in Spain 
 
Islamic troops, which by then included the indigenous inhabitants of North 
African regions – the Berbers – as well, invaded the Hispanic Peninsula in 711 
and formed various Islamic states there until the fall of Granada in 1492. The 
Umayyad Emir who fled from Damascus and his descendants reigned in much of 
the peninsula with Córdoba as the capital from 756 to 1031. In 929 Abd al-
Rahman III proclaimed himself caliph and thus broke with Baghdad from a 
religious point of view as well, but he did not launch hostile actions, either 
ideologically or militarily, against the Eastern caliphate. The Caliphate of 
Córdoba did not only leave marvellous material heritage – building, gardens and 
various smaller objects – behind, which stand as witnesses of the highly 
developed civilisation of the age, but constituted the first channel via which the 
products and achievements of the culture and civilisation of the Islamic East 
reached Europe. This is proven among others by the hundreds of cultural terms 
that were adopted from the Arabic via the Spanish to European languages. 
Examples for these words include adobe, algebra, alchemy, estrade, magazine, 
tariff, and giraffe. During the Muslim reign large numbers of Christians and Jews 
were allowed to freely practice their religion, while at the same time they mixed 
with the Arab-Berber population both linguistically and culturally.  
The Caliphate of Córdoba survived until 1031 when after the death of the 
last Umayyad sovereign it fell apart into small regional city-states. This is referred 
to as the age of “petty kingdoms” or “reyes taifas” with a Spanish-Arabic term. 
This age passed with small kingdoms fighting against one another, in which the 
Northern Christian principalities supported various Muslim sovereigns 
alternately in the military sense as well. At the same time commercial and cultural 
relations were continuous among both Muslim principalities and the territories 
under Christian rule. 
 
The reconquista 
At the end of the eleventh century there was a turn in the political relations 
in the peninsula. Using the fragmentation of the Western Islamic world, Christian 
kingdoms started to launch attacks; marking the beginning of the fights called 
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reconquista (“reconquest”), which were to last until 1492, the centre of the 
Northern Muslim territories Toledo fell under Christian rule in 1085. After the 
Castilian conquest Toledo remained to be an important cultural centre. Its Arabic 
language library suffered no harm; at the school founded there Muslim and 
Jewish scholars translated the Arabic and Hebrew philosophical, logical and 
mathematical works to the Castilian language, to be later translated by Spanish 
scholars into Latin, the language of European science at the time. Thereby the 
ancient Greek sciences that had been lost for Europe for a long time could spread 
in the Christian Europe. 
As another consequence of the fall of Toledo, the Muslim small kingdoms 
invited in the troops of the Berber dynasty reigning in the territory of Morocco, 
the Almoravids, to prevent Christian conquest. This proved a doubled-edged 
sword however, because the Almoravids, after halting the Christian conquest, 
stayed in the Muslim-ruled areas of the peninsula and joined these territories to 
their own empire. Originally the Almoravids formed a religious alliance of 
nomadic Berbers living in North-West Africa. Even their name itself means 
“those who live at a monastery-fortress (ribat) and spread Islam in a militant 
way”. Men veiled their faces the way like their late successors, the North-African 
Tuaregs do. Starting from Senegal they occupied Morocco, where in 1062 they 
established the city of Marrakesh, which remained to be their capital. Between 
1086 and 1147 they gradually occupied Muslim Spain. 
Their leaders called themselves “commanders of the faithful” (amir) and 
in religious issues they accepted the authority of the caliphs of Baghdad. They 
left behind significant heritage especially in the field of architecture. Their capital 
in Iberia was Sevilla instead of Córdoba. 
At the beginning of the twelfth century a new Berber religious movement 
was launched from North-Western Africa, which by 1147 conquered the 
Almoravid Emirate. They were the Almohads, which name is the Spanish version 
of the Arabic al-Muwahhidun, the strict interpreters of divine unity. By 1146 they 
occupied the Spanish territories of Almoravids and in 1147 their capital, 
Marrakesh, as well. Their religious doctrines were formulated by their first leader, 
Ibn Tumart who led an ascetic life, disapproved of music, dance and wine 
drinking, the last of which was widespread despite being prohibited by Islam. He 
regarded himself as mahdi, God’s messenger. His successors adopted the title of 
caliph and separated from Eastern Islam in the religious sense as well, although 
they claimed to be Sunnis. They extended their power to the whole of North-
Africa, up to the Egyptian border. They made Seville the capital of their whole 
empire not only of the Spanish territories. Although the Almohad’s primary goal 
was to block the advance of the holy war and of Christian troops in Spain, from 
the end of the twelfth century they gradually suffered military failures and finally 
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in the battle at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 their whole huge army was 
annihilated by the united troops of Christian kingdoms, whereby the united 
Islamic Empire ceased to exist in the Iberian peninsula. Only a single Muslim 
state was able to survive for another 250 years, the Emirate of Granada. 
 
The Middle East after the collapse of the Caliphate of Baghdad 
 
The Mamluk Sultanate 
A southern line of the Mongol invasion gradually conquered and 
devastated the areas of the Caliphate of Baghdad, then in 1258 the armies of the 
Mongol leader Hulagu destroyed Baghdad and killed most of its inhabitants 
including the last caliph. Various Mongol successor states were established in the 
Middle East afterwards, the most significant being the Iranian empire of Timur 
(or Tamerlane) in the fourteenth century. At the same time, after 1250 the 
Mamluk Sultanate was established replacing the Ayyubid Emirate and survived 
until 1517 in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and the holy places of Hijaz, Mecca and 
Medina (Map 22). 
 
Map 22: The Mamluk Sultanate at its greatest extension 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
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The word Mamluk means a “slave soldier” who was bought at a very young 
age and trained to become a soldier primarily in the barracks of Central Asia and 
the citadel of Cairo. As they did not have social contacts of any kind, their loyalty 
to the sovereign could be counted on. The various emirs, commanders and even 
the sultan himself were Mamluks originally. Their sons could not become 
mamluks as only imported young slaves could become soldiers. The leading 
Mamluks not only dominated the army but the economy as well, as they owned 
most of the arable land. 
 
Figure 56: The mosque built in the territory of the citadel of Cairo by the Bahri Mamluk 
Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad ibn Qalawun in the early fourteenth century 
Source: Photograph by MÁTÉ L. IVÁNYI 
 
In the first period between 1250‒1382 Mamluk sultans governed the 
empire from the Roda Island on the Nile, to which they owe their name Bahri 
(river) Mamluks (Figure 56). They were mainly of Turkish nationality. Later on, 
between 1382 and 1517, the sultans moved over to the citadel built by the 
Ayyubids, after which they were named Burji (castle-dweller) Mamluks. They 
were mainly of Circassian origin. Mamluks were primarily proud of their cavalry. 
Their favourite pastime was polo. This was also the reason why they were ulti-
mately defeated and lost their empire in 1517 when against the Ottoman Turkish 
army that used canons, they were only able to fight with a cavalry armed with 
spears and arrows. 
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The lasting heritage passed down by the Mamluk age, especially in Egypt, 
was created in the field of architecture. As regards science, development was 
greatest in medicine and especially in ophthalmology and veterinary medicine. 
 
The Muslim conquest of India  
During the first four caliphs, up to 660, Muslim armies got as far as the 
area of today’s Afghanistan in the East, and in the second half of the seventh 
century they proceeded further on in Sindh province to the area of modern Paki-
stan, up to the river Indus. Peace was, however, not restored after the initial con-
quests, either, as the various local sovereigns kept on fighting against the Muslim 
governors of the eastern provinces (Sistan, Khurasan and Sindh) on the heavy and 
high mountain terrain for decades. Thus, the Arab strategy in the border regions 
was to collect taxes rather than consolidate their power. The conquest of the 
Province of Sindh was finally completed only during the caliphate of Damascus 
in 720.  
In the Province of Hind in the area of today’s India, only temporary success 
was achieved at that time. From the direction of Central Asia, Turko-Afghan 
Mamluk warriors succeeded in invading the territory of India and founding the 
Delhi Sultanate only at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The famous 
Moroccan traveller Ibn Battuta visited there in the first half of the fourteenth 
century and gave us a detailed description of Indian Muslims, also available in an 
English translation. The greatest merit of the sultanate probably was that it 
prevented the invasion of Mongol herds – which had caused much devastation in 
the areas of Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq – to the territory of India. 
 
The Indian Mughal Empire  
Some parts of the Central-Asian Empire established by Timur survived as 
long as until 1507 under his successors. In 1398 Timur conquered and ravaged 
the Delhi Sultanate under the pretext that the Muslim sultan had been too lenient 
with his Hindu subjects. Under his successors the empire fell apart, until at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century Babur (“Tiger”), who claimed to be a 
descendant of Genghis khan and Timur, having lost his predecessors’ estates in 
Uzbekistan and their capital Samarkand, turned south and occupied North-India. 
There he founded the Mughal Empire, which lasted for more than 300 years, 
between 1526 and 1857, even though in the last 100 years it existed only in name. 
Their capital was the city of Agra, East to Delhi. In the sixteenth century the 
empire only extended to North India, but later today’s Afghanistan, Pakistan 
(Sindh) and Central India were also under their control up to 1739 when the 
Persian Nadir Shah occupied Delhi together with much of the Mughal Empire. 
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The Mughal culture left lasting traces primarily in North India. Outstand-
ing of its architectural heritage is Taj Mahal, which is considered to be one of the 
most beautiful buildings in the world. The Mughal era was an outstanding stage 
of Indian culture in the areas of both fine arts and literature.  
 
Map 23: The so-called Gunpowder Empires 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
Iran after the sixteenth century 
After the collapse of the Timurid Empire which included Iran as well, the 
Safavids who had an army organised from various nationalities in the area of 
Azerbaijan established an empire in the region in 1502, which included besides 
today’s Iran the areas of Azerbaijan, Georgia, North-Caucasus and Afghanistan 
and, for a hundred years, also those of Iraq, Bahrain and some parts of Syria and 
Anatolia as well. Originally the Safavids were members of a Sufi order who felt 
that they would be able to complete their religious mission only by gaining 
political power. Their first sovereign Shah Ismail I converted to the Twelver Shii 
branch of Islam, which he made the state religion. This has had a lasting impact 
until today as the great majority of the populations of Iran, Iraq and Azerbaijan 
are Shii. The Safavids tried to extend towards the West in Anatolia, where they 
had clashes with the Ottoman Empire. 
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The Ottoman Empire 
By defeating Seljuk Turks in Northwest Anatolia in the last years of the 
thirteenth century, the chief of the Oghuz Turk tribe Osman established an 
empire, which after 1354 extended to the Balkans as well, embracing the 
Byzantine Empire. Finally, in 1453 Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror (r. 1451‒
1481) occupied Constantinople and put an end to the one-thousand-year-old East 
Roman Empire (Map 23). When the Persian Empire started recruiting soldiers 
from among Anatolian Turkmen, the Turks started a war against the dangerous 
neighbour and using cannons they made a great victory against the Safavids in 
1512, thereby halting their advance and forcing them out of Asia Minor. 
Similarly relying on their cannons, they defeated the Egyptian-Syrian 
Mamluk army in 1517, thereby putting an end to the 250-year-old Mamluk 
Sultanate. After that they not only occupied Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Hijaz, i.e. 
the Mamluk Empire, but North-African Arab territories as well, i.e. today’s 
Libya, Tunisia and Algeria with the exception of today’s Morocco. The greatest 
sovereign Suleiman the Magnificent died in Hungary in 1566 during a siege. 
The more than 100 year-long war against Iran ended in the occupation of 
Iraq in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Turks led this war not merely 
with the purpose of gaining territories but as the leaders of the Islamic world as 
well, since the sultans had adopted the title of caliph and regarded themselves as 
protectors of Sunni Islam against the “heretic” Shiis. 
After the Peace Treaty of Karlóca in 1699 the Ottoman Empire was pushed 
out of Hungary but kept its territories in the Balkans and Greece until the first 
third of the nineteenth century. From Arab countries Algeria and Tunisia got 
under French colonial reign in 1830 and 1891 respectively. Egypt, Syria, 
Palestine and the Hijaz broke away from Turkey at the end of World War I. The 
Sultanate was abolished in 1922 and Turkey became a republic. 
Turkish civilisation basically developed under a Persian-Arabic influence; 
the Ottoman Turkish language, too, was written in Arabic script. Literature was 
influenced by the Persian literature, religious life and religious literature by the 
Arabic language. As regards clothing, habits and various fields of everyday and 
social life in general, upper classes were fundamentally under a strong Persian 
influence.  
  
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4.2.3. Religion 
 
The fundamentals of the religion of Islam  
 
The pillars of Islam 
The belief system of Islam, its fundamental teachings and system of law 
regulating private and social life crystallised throughout centuries. The rituals 
affecting the whole community were consolidated quite soon, however. These are 
called the five pillars (arkan) of Islam to this day. These are the following: 
1. The profession of faith (shahada), i.e. repeating that “There is no deity 
except God and Muhammad is the messenger of God.” (Figure 57). Ac-
cording to the teaching of Islam prophets with whom God sent revelations 
laid down in books are regarded as messengers (rasul). These are Moses 
with the Torah, Jesus with the Gospel and Muhammad, the seal of 
prophets, with the Quran. The first part of the profession of faith 
distinguishes Islam from idolatrous pagans, while the second half from the 
other monotheistic religions: Judaism and Christianity. 
2. Prayer (salat) five times a day: before sunrise (morning prayer), immedi-
ately after noon (noon prayer), in mid-afternoon (afternoon prayer), before 
sunset (sunset prayer) and in mid evening (evening prayer). 
 
Figure 57: The profession of faith in calligraphic form on the wall of a Cairo mosque 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
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The exact times, of course, change seasonally and geographically. As we 
can see, three prayers are closely related to the movement of the Sun, but 
it is not allowed to pray exactly at sunrise, noon or sunset so as to avoid 
resemblance to the pagan cult of Sun worshipping. Prior to the prayer, the 
call to prayer (adhan) warns Muslims of their religious obligation. Tradi-
tionally the adhan was chanted by the mu’azzin who went up to the top of 
the minaret, the tall tower forming a part of the mosque, every time so as 
to be better heard by the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Nowadays usu-
ally a pre-recorded adhan is transmitted via loudspeakers. The prayer can 
be performed anywhere, not only at a mosque, but only after ritual ablution 
(wudu), which means washing the face, the hands and the feet according to 
a precise instruction. At a mosque, this can be done at the well (mida’) in 
the courtyard of the mosque (sahn). Another important requirement of the 
prayer is that the person praying should face the qibla, i.e. the direction of 
the sacred shrine in Mecca called the Kaaba. The text of the prayer com-
prises specifically chosen quotations from the Quran, which are to be re-
cited in the Arabic language even by non-Arabs. The prayer always 
includes the profession of faith, which forms the basis of Islam as well as 
a so-called Takbir formula, i.e. the profession that God is the greatest 
(Allahu akbar). Each prayer is made up of two or more rakaa, which are a 
series of bowing and prostration movements. It is recommended to perform 
the prayer at a mosque where believers stand in rows and led by an imam 
(leader of the prayer), who recites the prayer with the same wording as the 
others a little ahead of them, they pray together. In the inner space of the 
mosque the direction of prayer is indicated by a semi-circular niche in the 
wall, the mihrab (Figure 58). Of special importance is the prayer at Friday 
noon, which, where possible, should be performed by all adult male 
inhabitants of a community (town) at a Friday congregational mosque 
(jami’) where the prayer is followed by a sermon (khutbah). This in the 
Middle Ages was in the Arabic language all the time and its political 
significance is indicated by the fact that it had an established form in which 
the name of the acknowledged Muslim ruler, usually the caliph, was 
mentioned. 
Very often the subjects learned about the political changes only by the 
change of the ruler mentioned in the sermon. Its political significance has 
been kept to this day, e.g. the Friday sermons also played a major role in 
preparing the Islamic Revolution in Iran before 1979. The sermon is 
delivered by the preacher (khatib) from a pulpit (minbar) located next to 
the mihrab, to be reached via a few steps. 
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Figure 58: Mihrab and minbar in a Cairo mosque 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
 
3. Fasting (sawm) in the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, the month of 
Ramadan, partly to commemorate the fact that the revelation of the Quran 
began in that month. In each country, the beginning of the fasting month is 
announced by the highest religious dignitary after he has caught sight of 
the crescent moon at a high point in the sky. Fasting lasts from dawn to 
dusk every day, which means that fasting is longest in the summer months 
when it is the most difficult to make it through without drinking in these 
countries of hot climate. During fasting you are not allowed to either eat or 
drink, to smoke or to engage in sexual intercourse; according to the stricter 
interpretation you are not allowed to swallow even your own saliva. Only 
healthy men and women above the age of 12 are required to fast. Fasting 
may be broken for various reasons (like travelling, menstruation, etc.) In 
such cases the days without fasting must be made up for later on. 
Traditionally, in many places up to a few decades ago, believers were 
informed of the beginning and the end of fasting by firing a cannon. When 
fasting is broken in the evening it is followed by a social meal (iftar), which 
has a strong community building effect. According to the Prophet’s 
tradition, the first food to be eaten after fasting should be dates and if dates 
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are not available, fasting should be broken by water. This is usually 
followed by entertainment and street celebrations until late at night, on 
which occasion it is a custom to decorate the streets with lampions. Many 
people spend some of the night at a mosque reciting special Ramadan night 
prayers (tarawih). Most people get up early for a meal before fasting. The 
end of the fasting month is celebrated by a three-day post-fasting festival 
(Eid al-fitr or “smaller feast”), which is opened by a special communal 
morning prayer. 
4. The alms or religious tax (zakat), whichnowadays is generally the moral 
obligation of only those who can afford to donate for the poor. Originally 
and throughout the Middle Ages it was an obligatory tax to be paid by 
everyone every year, based on the value of all of one's possessions. 
Traditionally Muslims had to donate one fortieth part (2,5%) of all their 
wealth and savings beyond the minimum required for subsistence. The 
collected tax (which did not necessarily mean money) was distributed 
among poor Muslims, religious officials and mosques. Today religious tax 
is collected on a voluntary basis in most countries, usually by mosques. In 
some Muslim countries it is an obligatory tax collected by the state, e.g. in 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Malaysia. Unlike in Sunni Islam, for the Shiis 
paying the zakat has always been voluntary and collected by mosques. 
5. The pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) in the twelfth month of the lunar year (dhu 
l-hijja), between the seventh and ninth days of that month, when all those 
who are able to afford it considering their health and financial status should 
once in their lives make a pilgrimage to God’s House, the Kaaba (Figure 
59). Today, when the number of pilgrims is almost three million a year, the 
quota system per country may be an obstacle for people to perform the 
pilgrimage at least once in their lives.  
Pilgrims enjoy great respect all their lives and have the prestige to be called 
a hajj (if a man) or a hajja (if a woman). Pilgrims may enter the holy district 
of Mecca only wearing special attire (ihram), which for men are two white 
robes without stitches, while women are not allowed to wear gloves or veils 
covering their face. It is characteristic for the pilgrimage that, while in 
mosques women are always separated from men, here they perform the 
rituals together. The pilgrimage starts and finishes with the tawaf, i.e. fast 
circumambulation around the Kaaba seven times. After that the pilgrims 
make the distance between two hills near the Kaaba – nowadays this is an 
outside corridor of the great mosque – seven times (sa’i) by running (or 
walking very fast) to commemorate that Hagar, the wife of the Prophet 
Abraham had tried to find water in the desert here for herself and her son 
Ismail. According to the Quran the Kaaba was built by Abraham, while 
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Ismail is held to be the ancestor of Arabs. The next day the pilgrims 
proceed together to the plain of Muzdalifa near Mecca, where they pray 
and spend the night in tents. On the ninth day of the month they proceed 
from here to Mount Arafat where they throw small stones and pebbles at 
pillars symbolising the devil. The next day the feast of sacrifice (Eid al-
adha) or the “greater feast” begins, which once again starts with a special 
communal morning prayer and continues with a ritual animal sacrifice 
whereby pilgrims slaughter sheep in Mecca and other Muslims do the same 
at home.  
 
Figure 59: Mecca and Medina in a Muslim prayer book copied in the eighteenth century 
Source: The Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Ms Arab O. 54, fols. 11v‒12r 
 
According to many, the sixth pillar of Islam is jihad, which has a double 
meaning based on the interpretation of the Quran. The great jihad means the strife 
in the believer’s soul for true faith, while small jihad means the fight for the 
protection of Muslims and for practising the religion of Islam.  
 
Mosques and madrasas 
While the primary function of mosques was to serve as the place where the 
five prayers per day could be performed, in between praying times they also 
served as sites for socialisation. It was here that you could meet, have a talk, sign 
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contracts, engage in reconciliation, and arrange marriages. It was not only the 
sacred nature of the place but the presence of men of religion – primarily the 
imam of the mosque – that played a role in this. Before and after praying the 
Quran reader recited extracts from the holy book. It was here, too, that you could 
ask scholars of religion for legal advice. The cool and airy prayer room covered 
with carpets was also suitable for an afternoon siesta. In every bigger town there 
was a larger, central mosque where Friday noon prayers and sermons after that 
were held in the presence of the local ruler or leader. This mosque was called a 
jami (“congregational mosque”) alluding to the Arabic name of Friday meaning 
(“the day of gathering”). 
From the very beginning, mosques were also placing of teaching. The 
teaching activity was carried out for a small circle of disciples (halka); the teacher 
(sheikh) sat down with his back against a pillar and was surrounded by his 
disciples. The teaching method was uniform until the twentieth century: disciples 
memorised concise texts which were sometimes arranged in rhymes, to which 
explanations were provided by the teachers. The basic education of children – 
writing, reading, Quran recitation and memorising – also took place at the mosque 
or a school attached to the mosque called maktab or kuttab. 
 
Figure 60: The madrasa of Sarghatmish in Cairo built in 1356. It houses a mosque and 
a mausoleum as well 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI   
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Demand was highest for teaching experts of law, considering which a 
unique institution, the madrasa (“school” or “college”) was established and 
disseminated in the world of Islam; here Islamic law was taught primarily, the 
second most important subject being linguistics as the basic tool for interpreting 
texts (Figure 60). The first college of that type (the Nizamiyya) was founded by 
the chief minister of the Seljuk Empire Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092) in Baghdad, and 
later in other cities of the empire. 
 
The development of the legal system of Islam  
 
In the new empire, the moral and legal system regulating all areas of life 
started to become consolidated in the span of over two centuries, by the ninth and 
tenth centuries only. While the rituals of religion were regulated rather soon on 
the basis of the texts of Islam, the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet (Hadith), 
it took much longer for the instructions guiding everyday life, human relations 
and family law to crystallise and often the earlier habits of a given territory 
contributed to shaping them.. The interpretation of specific Quranic places started 
to develop only by the ninth century. The collection of the Hadith began in the 
mid eighth century, while the arrangement and critical analysis of the hundreds 
of thousands of traditions took another century.  
These traditions were expected to reveal how the Prophet Muhammad, 
guided by divine inspiration, lived, how he behaved, acted and how he made 
judgements in the thousands of issues of life. The sunna (literally “custom”) was 
a totality of the customs followed by Muhammad, which could serve as models 
for later generations. 
What is Sharia? What we refer to as Islamic law is in fact the totality of 
instructions guiding the whole life of Muslims and all their actions. This sharia 
(literally “way” or “path”) designated by God to follow is actually the divine law. 
The divine intention is, however, not clear to everyone; it must be understood. 
Interpretation should be carried out by those who devote all their lives to studying 
the divine resources in depth, with true faith and good moral conduct, i.e. make 
individual efforts (ijtihad). The way they understand, describe and teach Sharia 
to people is called fiqh (literally “understanding”): this is what Islamic law in the 
narrower sense is, and the expert, the scholar of law is called faqih. Thus, while 
Sharia is the one and only divine law, fiqh is the product of the colourful human 
activities which are sometimes completely different from one another and which 
are carried out by the faqih. 
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The establishment of schools of law  
In initial times, the scholars of law of the various fields often worked 
completely independently, providing interpretations and legal regulations for 
judges in a region as well as for the Muslims living there. By time, the number of 
the various legal tendencies was reduced to four. They are called madhhab, which 
is usually translated as school of ritual and law. The earliest of these schools were 
established in the second half of the eighth century at two important places, 
Medina and Iraq. The Iraqi school was later named after its first master, Abu 
Hanifa, Hanafi madhhab, while the one in Medina was named Maliki madhhab 
after the great Medinese teacher Malik. At the beginning of the ninth century 
Shafi’i madhhab became the third of these schools. This was named after al-
Shafi’i who, having made long study tours, settled in Egypt. The fourth one, the 
Hanbali madhhab, was named after Ibn Hanbal who lived in the first half of the 
ninth century. When the Hanafi School was established, it could rely on the 
Hadith only to a limited extent, so Hanafi faqihs considered the individual 
opinions (ra’y) of scholars of law also as a means of legislation beyond Iraqi 
customary law. Malik relied on Medinese traditions primarily, but he also took 
into consideration the Hadith already available to a significant extent. His 
handbook with the title al-Muwatta (“Well-trodden path”), although it does 
contain traditions, is not a collection of Hadith but a collection of teachings 
including hadiths serving as explanation for legal issues, put down later by his 
disciples. It should be noted that Abu Hanifa did not put down his legal 
interpretations, either, it was left to his disciples to do it. One reason for this could 
be that in the Islamic Empire paper manufacturing became widespread only after 
770, i.e. after the death of Abu Hanifa and in Malik’s last stage of life, and it 
became possible only later to write books of a large size. Al-Shafi’i developed a 
theory according to which legal decisions could be exclusively based on the 
Quran. Hence it fundamentally differs from the two earlier schools of law, the 
one complementing the words of the Quran with those of the Hadith only and the 
school complementing the missing implications from the Quran on the basis of 
individual opinion. This theory stipulates that it is the Quran itself that encourages 
using the Prophet’s tradition when saying “obey the Prophet” and by extension it 
is obligatory to obey Muhammad’s sunna as a source of law as the exclusive 
supplement to the Quran. At the same time, instead of using unregulated 
individual opinion (ra’y), he worked out rules for using analogy (qiyas), with the 
help of which a solution could be found on the basis of a case inferred from a 
written text to a case not included in Islamic texts (nass). He claimed the method 
was justified on the basis that the Quran also used analogies. 
  
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Map 24: The major branches and schools of law of Islam 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
Analogy 
The most important tool of interpreting religious texts has become analogy 
(qiyas), which solves the problem described by a religious scholar in the Middle 
Ages the following way: the number of texts is finite, but the number of cases in 
life is endless, and the only way to bridge this gap is to use the rules of analogy. 
The result depends on what the school of religious law (Map 24) considers as the 
basis of the analogy. The way to determine it is by attempting to establish what 
the intention of the lawmaker (God or Prophet Muhammad inspired by God) 
could have been when formulating the original text, i.e. follow the spirit of the 
law. Let us take an example of extending the scope of a hadith based on analogy. 
When conquering the Arabian oasis Khaybar, the Prophet left the original 
landowners on the lands as sharecroppers in return for their taking care of the date 
palms. It was this that the so-called “shared irrigation farming” (musaqat) 
contracts in Islamic law were based on, but the respective schools of law 
interpreted this tradition in different ways. Abu Hanifa opposed using it under the 
excuse that it was unpredictable how much yield there would be and how much 
profit the two parties would have. Malik in contrast extended the scope of the 
contract to all horticultural products: fruit tree cultivation, grape growing and 
vegetable growing. Al-Shafi’i permitted sharecropping contracts only for grape 
growing and date palm cultivation because they were traditionally cultivated in 
the same garden. Those, however, who were willing to interpret the texts only 
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literally (the Zahiris) did not use an analogy and said that, based on the Hadith, 
such contracts could only be signed for date palms. 
 
Islamic law and state law in the nineteenth century 
Islamic law (Sharia) has never been an exclusive legal source in the history 
of the world of Islam. There has always been need for ordinances and instructions 
by the rulers in issues that were not regulated by Islamic law or the discussion of 
which would have been complicated at the Sharia courts, e.g. where a case 
required support by two or four witnesses. In the Ottoman Empire these 
regulations by the sovereign were called qanun; these dealt with the issues of 
taxation, public administration, finances or criminal law. Often these only 
complemented, in other cases replaced the provisions of Islamic law. At the same 
time, the qanun system helped cope with the problems caused by the fact that 
Muslim religious law relied on the interpretations of religious scholars to a great 
extent, which made uniformly regulated court practice impossible. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century the legal system of the Ottoman 
Empire underwent a significant reform, which was referred to as reorganisation 
(tanzimat). This was influenced by the Napoleonic Code, while the pressure of 
European powers could be felt on the laws that targeted granting equal rights to 
persons of various religions and trade rights to Europeans. It was a further 
significant change that these state laws were enforced by newly established state 
courts independent from the Islamic religious council. 
In the Arab world it was first in Egypt, more or less under Ottoman reign 
and yet controlled by the English, that the system of courts was modernised in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century based on the Ottoman example. With 
the exception of family law (Personal Status Law) the role of qadi courts was 
taken over by state courts, and legal regulations were laid down in state laws. The 
pyramidal structure of courts – lower courts, higher courts and courts of appeal – 
was established in Egypt as well. Islamic law does not have a concept of higher 
court where you can appeal against a judgment, and neither the charge, nor the 
defence have representatives: the judge makes his decision single-handedly. 
Simultaneously the office of the state-appointed national mufti was 
established, and the approval of death penalties was transferred to his scope of 
authority. The Chief Mufti in Egypt has exercised this scope of authority to this 
day. Let us illustrate this with an example taken from 1987. A man admitted at 
the police to have kidnapped, detained and raped a woman. As there were no 
witnesses, the man was sentenced to death on the basis of that confession, even 
though he withdrew his statement at court. Based on Egyptian law, testimonies 
made at the police are also conclusive. The judgement was brought before the 
Chief Mufti, who rejected it on the grounds that he had found a case among the 
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Prophet’s hadiths that, using analogy, could be used for this case. A man who had 
admitted having kidnapped and raped somebody’s wife was brought before the 
Prophet. There were no witnesses. The Prophet ordered that the man be brought 
away and stoned to death. Half a day passed when those commissioned with 
executing the stoning returned, and when the Prophet asked them what had taken 
so long, they said the convict had run away and it took long to catch him and 
stone him to death. The Prophet said in response that they had acted wrong: by 
running away the man had withdrawn his testimony and he should not have been 
stoned. 
 
The science of Hadith 
 
In 750 the Abbasid dynasty rose to power with the ideological background 
that they would restore genuine Islam and rule on the basis of its laws. One of the 
signs of this was that they supported collecting the Prophet’s traditions, the 
Hadith. The word hadith means “report, communication” and contains the 
Prophet’s words and the words of his companions who were present when the 
Prophet guided Muslims through his actions. The significance of the Hadith is 
based on the principle that everything the Prophet said was inspired by God. 
According to the scholars of religion, the Prophet’s whole life, his deeds and 
words, if compiled in the form of hadiths provide an explanation for the Quran at 
the same time. Thus, a hadith is a saying that those of the Prophet’s companions 
who heard it shared with others later on and they, after Muhammad’s death, 
passed down to later generations. Later on, it became a real fashion to learn these 
and try to find the companions who knew such verbal sayings. As in the course 
of the conquests the companions disseminated to various provinces of the empire, 
many such hadith collectors made lengthy travels in order to acquire still 
unknown traditions. After some time not only the saying itself was remembered 
or written down but also the person they heard it from and the person that this 
person heard it from, back to the person who had stood next to the Prophet when 
he said it. The chain of these narrators or transmitters makes up the first part of 
the hadith called “support” (isnad), while the saying itself makes up the other 
part, which is called the “text” (matn). While imitating the Prophet became a 
requirement in all areas of life, the significance of collecting hadiths grew. As a 
consequence, however, many invented hadiths partly in order to narrate as many 
traditions as possible, since this had become a profitable job, and partly in order 
to underpin their views and political stances. 
In Iraq, two military garrison towns were established after the Prophet’s 
death, Kufa and Basra. In the centuries to come, these developed into important 
political, religious, scientific and cultural centres and started rivalising with each 
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other. In order to reinforce their own significance and excellence, the inhabitants 
of both cities falsified hadiths in which the Prophet praised their city, even though 
these had not even existed in the Prophet’s life. The narrators and collectors of 
traditions also committed numerous benevolent falsifications. Among others, 
they attributed many well-known wisdoms and proverbial sayings to the Prophet. 
There are also many hadiths that contradict one another, which does not 
necessarily imply falsification but indicates only that the Prophet reacted 
differently to certain issues depending on the occasion and the necessity. On one 
occasion, for example, he forbade visiting and honouring graves, while he 
recommended it at another time. In many cases it easily turned out that a hadith 
was falsified because the alleged narrators had not lived at the same place or at 
the same time so they could not have passed on the tradition to one another, or 
the first narrator had not lived in the Prophet’s age. The falsifications were also 
detected by the representatives of the science of Hadith that developed in the ninth 
century, therefore, as the first step, they collected the narrators’ names and tried 
to find out about their biographies, examining what intellectual and moral 
characteristics had been recorded about them. Based on these they made critical 
remarks concerning the hadiths these narrators had passed on. The traditions 
were, however, qualified primarily on the basis of their isnad, the chain of 
narrators, and not on the basis of their contents. As the next step in the second 
half of the ninth century, the major Hadith collections that have been respected 
as holy books until today were compiled. Initially hadiths were arranged based 
on the narrators, an example for which is Ibn Hanbal’s book containing 28 
thousand hadiths, while later they were organised based on their content. Six such 
books were compiled, the most famous of which are the books by al-Bukhari and 
Muslim with the title Sahih (“healthy, sound”), which include some seven 
thousand hadiths considered to be authentic. Al-Bukhari said he had selected 
from some 600 thousand traditions the sound ones, i.e. those accepted by 
everyone. The basis of selection was the chain of narrators. It was a basic 
requirement that the tradition should be based on a connected chain of perfect 
men with an excellent character, trustworthiness and a good memory. It was 
another aspect of the selection that a narration should rely on several chains of 
narration. If there was information that many had listened to the Prophet but only 
one narrator passed on the story, the hadith was discarded. Certainly, there were 
some principles set also for the acceptability of the content (matn): a hadith must 
not contradict the teaching of the Quran and the fundamental principles of Islam, 
must not contradict the laws of nature or the common experience of Muslims and 
it must not glorify a person, place or tribe – which many hadiths did. A hadith 
must not make reference to future events by specifying the place or the time, and 
a hadith must not claim that the Prophet says or does things or acts in a way that 
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contradicts the holiness of the Prophet or the teachings of Islam about prophets. 
As the respect for the Hadith grew, the teaching developed – which has retained 
its importance until today – that the first three generations of Muslims constituted 
the group of “pious predecessors” (salaf) who were to be followed because they 
were the depositaries of the traditions of the Prophet.  
The following hadith can be found in al-Bukhari’s collection, which is 
divided into books and chapters, and is No. 1. in the first chapter of the book with 
the title “Revelation”: “al-Humaydi Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr related to us saying: 
Sufyan related to us saying: Yahya ibn Sa’id al-Ansari related to us, saying: 
Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Taymi told me that he heard ‘Alqamah ibn Waqqas 
al-Laythi say: Narrated by Umar ibn al-Khattab say on the pulpit: I heard the 
Prophet saying (here ends the isnad, the chain of narrators going back as far as 
the Prophet): “The reward of deeds depends upon the intentions and every person 
will get the reward according to what he has intended. So, whoever emigrated for 
worldly benefits or for a woman to marry, his emigration was for what he 
emigrated for.” (This part is the matn, the actual text of the tradition). 
Hadiths usually have several versions. There is one more sentence in 
another version: “He who emigrates to God and his Messenger, reaches God and 
his Messenger.” This tradition has been passed down via another chain, too, 
which proves its correctness. A hadith that has been passed down via only a single 
chain is usually viewed as suspicious.  
 
Islamic mysticism: Sufism 
 
Towards the end of the Umayyad and in the first century of the Abbasid 
era, in certain provinces of the Islamic Empire – primarily in Iran and Iraq – 
ascetic trends advocating withdrawal from the world and movements embracing 
the mystical concept of the world grew increasingly stronger. Ascetics did not 
live in communities; they withdrew from secular life individually to live as 
hermits or wayfarers, longing for the afterlife, having been sickened with the 
perversity and purposelessness of the world. Mystics, too, shared the belief about 
the purposelessness of worldly efforts, relations and goals, but unlike ascetics 
they wished to attain happiness already in this life by getting closer to God in 
their heart. They strove for getting to know God and feeling love for God, 
thinking this would guide them on their path leading to God’s proximity. As a 
fundamental characteristic of any mystic concept and not only Islamic mysticism, 
it is believed that it is impossible to get to know God’s world (“the absent world”) 
by rationally interpreting texts. Thus, every sentence and every word in the Quran 
as well as all the facts in the world have another, concealed meaning, which can 
only be accessed in a state of mystical immersion, speculation and trance.  
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In the second half of the eighth century those who were later respected as 
the early mystics still considered that turning away from the world was the most 
important step. One of them was a noble prince who under the influence of a 
vision seen at night dressed up as a beggar; another was the leader of a gang of 
ruffians who upon hearing a Quranic recital he quit his trade and became a 
wayfarer. Yet others heard voices while in the solitude of a graveyard. This is the 
first stage of the mystical journey called repentance and its essence is to sever 
worldly ties. It was in the middle of the ninth century that mystics were first called 
Sufis after the long, coarse, woollen (suf) robe that they wore. After repentance, 
the Sufi withdrew from worldly life for some time, either by locking himself up 
in his home or by staying at a faraway barren place to meditate. After that, 
however, he immediately looked for companions and a master so as to find the 
right path leading to God. This is what distinguishes a Sufi from a hermit. On the 
one hand, the master demonstrated among disciples (murid, “one who seeks”) 
ready to embark on a mystical journey the rituals through which a Sufi could get 
into the desired ecstatic condition (hal), and on the other hand within the 
framework of a personal conversation with the individual disciple selected the 
spiritual practices suitable for that particular disciple. This is how “those who 
sought” could advance via the stages of their journey, which include turning away 
from the world – and this here is not the ultimate goal but a transitional stage and 
a means to advance – and poverty, which simultaneously means renouncing 
worldly goods and “being in need” in the sense of having a need for God. This 
was such a typical characteristic of the majority of the Sufis that the Arabic word 
faqir (poor) and the Farsi word dervish (beggar) referred to devoted mystics in 
general. Sufis, who respected the law, did not reject the provisions of Islamic law, 
the Sharia and respected religious sciences as well, but were of the opinion that 
this external knowledge was only the beginning and disciples who proceeded by 
following the tariqa, i.e. the mystical path would ultimately reach the level of 
masters (haqiqa), God’s truth. 
At the same time, humbleness and humility are very important 
characteristics of a true Sufi. Bistami, one of the most famous Central Asian 
mystics in the ninth century, had a disciple, a rich and elegantly dressed merchant, 
complaining to the master that he had been attending mystical gatherings and 
rituals for twenty years, but he had never once had either Muhammad or God 
appear even in his dream, and he had never had the feeling to have discovered 
God in the bottom of his heart. Bistami looked at him top to bottom and advised 
him to dress up in rags, hang a beggar’s bowl around his neck and put nuts in it 
so that they would make noise by each step, and dressed up like that stand outside 
his shop at the market where everyone knew him. Then God would help him 
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towards his proximity. The merchant certainly refused to humiliate himself in this 
way. 
Not having a master caused suffering to these pious Muslims who longed 
for God’s love, so if they were unable to find a master – Arabic: sheikh, Farsi: pir 
– in their own city, they embarked on a long wandering. Sometimes they even 
left to find another master to learn from if they already had one, and their master 
himself encouraged them to do so. There has been a saying among them that “the 
master of those who do not have a master is the Satan”. The various masters mark 
the respective stages of the Sufi path in different ways but believe that every path 
leading to God was equally good. After poverty and the severing of earthly ties 
the Sufi usually reaches the stage of intoxication (saqr), which causes satisfaction 
and joy, but this is soon followed by sobriety (sahw), a kind of disillusionment 
and sadness when the Sufi realised that God is at an unattainable distance above 
him. First, this causes fear (khawf), followed by the hope (raja) that it is 
nevertheless possible to make it to the end of the journey, to get to know God and 
reach the state of divine love. The Sufi who consolidated these stages indicating 
spiritual conditions, reached an important stage in his mystical existence: the 
stage of spiritual expansion and joy (bast), to be followed by compression and 
anxiety (qabd). The first was the phase of long-lasting happiness and joy, the 
second the phase of prolonged despair.  
It was narrated of Bistami that he spent twenty years in the state of anxiety, 
in the course of which he avoided city life wandering in forsaken places. It was 
acceptable of a Sufi to say in the condition of trance things that would have 
qualified as unlawful and forbidden in the case of everyday people. Bistami 
asserted among others: “Glory be to me! How great is my glory!” In Islam this 
quality was allowed to be assigned only to God. Those who interpreted Bistami’s 
words maintain, however, that what he said should not be understood as self-
deification but in a way that he had had room in his heart only for God and his 
heart became one with God’s glory. 
To this day, Bistami has remained the example for an intoxicated Sufi, 
while Junayd, who lived in Baghdad at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries, 
was a sober Sufi. The later mystical organisations – the so-called dervish orders 
– considered both their “heavenly” masters. A Sufi, however, reaches his ultimate 
goal only when he reaches God’s proximity and forms spiritual intimacy (uns) 
with God. This is called “attainment” which, however, can only be achieved with 
God’s will and help. Those who reach that stage feel obliged, after their “return”, 
to become masters and guide others. Such masters with this attitude, regarded as 
Sufi sages, have been given the designation, based on a quotation from the Quran, 
“God’s friends” (awliya Allah), the singular of which is wali and is usually 
translated into European languages as “saint”.  
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Once the fame of a wali spread, Sufi disciples came from faraway places 
in order to learn from him. In exceptional cases the wali tried to flee from 
popularity seeking solitude. There were whole groups of them, primarily in 
Nishapur in East-Iran, who concealed their deep mystical religious devotion or 
even took the blame (malama) by outsiders that they were not religious enough 
and were therefore referred to as malamati. They despised those who called 
themselves Sufi and walked the streets in groups, praising God and begging for 
subsistence as they had quit their original job. The Malamatis in contrast were 
craftsmen and tradesmen probably brought together by their profession and the 
guild as they did not openly look for followers or disciples. 
The further development of Sufism was greatly affected by a dramatic 
event in the first third of the tenth century. With his statements uttered in trance, 
the influential Baghdadi mystic Hallaj, disciple of the moderate Sufi Junayd 
disturbed the peace of mind of the inhabitants of the streets and markets of 
Baghdad, while considering the high number of his followers he probably became 
suspicious politically as well. After a long period of confinement, he was 
executed under brutal circumstances in 922: he was butchered, and his body was 
set alight. Hallaj was primarily charged with heresy because of two of his 
statements. One was his teaching of “incarnation” (hulul), i.e. that God had 
moved into his soul and therefore he said among others: “I am the Truth” (Haqq), 
which is God’s most important name among Sufis. The other was his saying that 
the pilgrimage could be performed anywhere, even around his body as if it was 
the Kaaba in Mecca or could be performed in one’s heart. The martyrdom of 
Hallaj had a sobering effect on Sufis for centuries and their handbooks usually 
began with a lengthy argumentation confirming that Sufis adhered to Islamic 
provisions and Sharia law in every aspect. Their rituals and religiosity were not 
meant to replace the provisions of Sharia but to complement them. The Sufi desire 
to unite with God, to adopt godly characteristics instead of earthly human ones, 
also raised criticism. As a reaction to this criticism, the Sufis emphasised that they 
wished to follow the example of Muhammad and imitate his life; he is the 
example of the “perfect man” and it was via him that they wished to get closer to 
God. One of the signs of this was that several Sufis made their own “celestial 
journeys” to the Seven Heavens, to the pedestal of God’s throne, but while 
Muhammad had done so while being awake and in his body during his celestial 
journey (miraj) (which is not accepted by all religious scholars), the Sufis, e.g. 
Bistami only claimed they had advanced in their dreams and in their hearts via 
the Seven Heavens to God.  
One of the earliest pieces of written evidence for the outstanding role of 
the Prophet Muhammad in Sufism that has survived is found in the mystical 
biography of the ninth century Persian mystic Hakim Tirmidhi (“Sage of 
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Tirmidh”), and is the description of dozens of dreams. In one of his first dreams 
Muhammad takes Tirmidhi by hand and leads him into the city mosque where 
people are waiting for the Friday prayer, leading him up to the pulpit. At the 
highest step of the pulpit stands Muhammad, pointing with his right hand up to 
God, and holding with his left hand Tirmidhi’s right hand, while with his left 
hand Tirmidhi points at the people in the mosque. This on the one hand 
symbolises the chain that helped the sage advance to the proximity of God and 
on the other hand it symbolises the mission that Tirmidhi should lead Muslims 
on the Sufi path. 
 
The role of the Quran in mysticism 
While various external influences, including the eighth century 
Christianity in Syria, certainly had a major role in the development of the Islamic 
mysticism, Sufis tried to derive every idea and teaching from the Quran and trace 
them back to a Quranic verse. Good examples for this – certainly special – 
interpretation are the above concepts of qabd and bast. In the Quran, these two 
words are in the following verse: “God straightens and enlarges” (2:245). It 
means that God may give “opening His palm” (basata) – the way one gives 
money to a beggar with an open palm – while “straightening” is expressed with 
the verb qabada, i.e. “close His palm”. Sufis have interpreted this saying that God 
opens their hearts to be receptive to God’s grace and inspirations, and later closes 
them, whereby a condition of doubts and anxiety follows. 
 
The golden age of Sufi or dervish orders between the thirteenth and nineteenth 
centuries 
The identity and character of the mystical Sufi movements that developed 
in various parts of the Islamic world in the ninth‒twelfth centuries changed 
rapidly and somewhat unexpectedly after the thirteenth century. The often-
concealed religious practice of individuals and small groups grew into 
organisations of brotherhoods – called dervish orders in Europe – that mobilised 
and in one way or another attracted to their membership whole city quarters and 
even whole cities.  
An important step towards the establishment of orders was that the 
relations between the leaders (masters, sheikhs) and the seekers (disciples, murid) 
became regular, in the course of which the latter, guided by their masters, strove 
to reach various stages of the mystical path (maqamat). Early masters tended to 
guide rather than teach; practice was more important than theosophy and it was 
of secondary importance to summarise the teachings. 
The Sufi orders used the word tariqa (way) for specifying themselves. 
Tariqa is a practical method for guiding the seeker by proceeding along a certain 
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(tested) system which ensures, in addition to reaching the mystical stages, 
experiencing the spiritual-intellectual (trance) conditions as well. Initially, two 
ninth-century Sufi schools were distinguished as guiding lines: Junayd’s sober 
contemplation and Bistami’s intoxicated ecstasy, and the various orders usually 
respected both and regarded both as their masters. Deceased masters, too, 
constituted parts of the “order” as parts of the chain, i.e. the series of living and 
deceased masters that leads back to the Prophet Muhammad, whose intercession 
before God they hoped for. 
The orders started to develop around outstanding masters in the twelfth‒ 
thirteenth centuries. Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166) was the founding wali of the 
Qadiriyya order, while  Abu l-Hasan ash-Shadhili (d. 1258) was the founding 
wali of the Shadhiliyya order – both of these disseminated primarily in North 
Africa and Egypt – while Mu’in al-Din Chishti (d. 1236) is regarded as the 
founder of the Indian Chishtiya order. The initial groups were loose and flexible 
associations. Their members could travel, they looked for masters or stayed at 
one and the same place; they worked as craftsmen or lived on alms. The usually 
lived at a khanqa or ribat built for them from donations, which housed, besides 
some alcoves and a mosque, storerooms, a kitchen, a bathroom and a well, and 
was provided with a full catering staff. As long as the dervishes lived at such an 
accommodation, they had to comply with strict requirements, e.g. they were not 
allowed to have a worldly job; they were allowed to perform only religious tasks 
like copying the Quran and other religious books. They had to attend three or four 
remembrance ceremonies (dhikr) per week and five prayers per day. They 
constituted the inner circles of orders which grew larger and larger and it was 
them who were called dervishes. Being a member of an order did not mean at the 
same time that a dervish was not allowed to find accommodation with another 
order in another city. The members of the outer circle, whose number could be a 
hundred times bigger than the number of the dervishes, did not attend the masters’ 
individual or group activities, but several times a week they could attend the Sufi 
rituals held at the mosques or houses of the order, could learn the order’s prayer 
book and recite it or chant it together. They also helped the dervishes with 
donations and felt a bond towards them.  
An increasing number of dervish orders were established later on all over 
the Islamic world, and they were often assigned serious political roles. The 
Bektashi Order founded in the fourteenth century was the official Sufi institution 
for the Janissaries in the Ottoman Empire, the Mevlevi order was the official 
order of the Ottoman sultan and his court, while the Halvati order had commoners 
as members. The members of the Mevlevi order follow the teaching and mystical 
practice of the Persian Sufi writer and poet Jalal al-Din Rumi, who lived and 
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worked in thirteenth century Anatolia, by performing a special dance at the 
rituals, after which they are called Whirling Dervishes. 
 
Shii Islam 
 
With respect to most religious and legal regulations there are just 
insignificant differences between Sunni and Shii Muslims. The significant 
difference concerns the person of the Imam, who is required to be a descendant 
of Ali. At the same time, the Imam acquires his infallible knowledge not by 
learning but by inherited divine inspiration. Since the last Imam disappeared in 
the ninth century, during what is referred to as his “occultation”, this knowledge 
is inherited by the highest Shii religious scholar. 
 
Figure 61: Ali’s wise saying in a calligraphic arrangement on six tiles: “There is no 
higher nobility than Islam”. 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
 
Imami or Twelver Shiis 
Shii Islam developed from Ali’s party in the course of centuries. Their 
fundamental teaching is that Ali (Figure 61) should have followed Muhammad 
as a caliph and his descendants, i.e. the Prophet’s closest relatives – his 
“household” – were to follow after him. In view of this, Shiis soon developed a 
habit of cursing “usurper” caliphs, primarily Uthman. In the course of centuries, 
the dogma developed that Ali had received secret teaching from Muhammad or 
that God had given Ali special knowledge which his descendants the Shii Imams 
also inherited. Sunni religious scholars held that Islamic law, Sharia, was an 
autonomous body of norms accepted as authentic and independent of any earthly 
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power, maintained and preserved by the community as a whole even, where 
necessary, against the ruler’s will. Contrary to this, according to Shii teachings, 
the continuity of divine law should be guaranteed by the authentic representative 
of the divine will, i.e. the true Imam, similarly to the age of Muhammad. The 
loyalty to Ali and his family guarantees this chosen person. In their view, Ali was 
not simply the fourth caliph, but the person who had been around Muhammad all 
his life and had thus acquired special knowledge, and so a person who abandons 
Ali’s camp in fact abandons divine justice. Loyalty to Ali, on the other hand, 
guarantees a kind of esoteric knowledge that others are unable to attain. This 
secret, hidden knowledge is possessed by the Imams and only Shiis have been 
able to evaluate and get to know it. This coupled with awaiting the “pre-appointed 
leader”, the Mahdi, who would guide society to the straight path before 
judgement day. For the Shiis, the secret explanation of the Quran is also about 
Imams and their fate. These Imams were Ali’s descendants through his two sons, 
Hasan and Husayn. In their lives they usually did not have either a political or a 
religious role with the only exception of Jaafar al-Sadiq (“the truthful”) whose 
religious teachings are respected even by the Sunnis. He was the sixth Imam. The 
majority of the Shiis acknowledged his son, Musa al-Kadhim as Imam after him. 
His descendants are the Twelver or Imami Shia who make up the majority of the 
Shiis in Iran and Iraq still today. The ninth and tenth Imams died in their 
childhood and their imamate was accepted.  In their case it is evident that it had 
to be assumed not only that their words were the truth as a result of divine 
designation and that an imam was infallible, but also that an imam possessed 
divine inspiration and passed it on to his descendant without the need to acquire 
earthly knowledge. What the imam passed down to his descendant was the special 
divine light that God placed in him, as a consequence of which he was aware of 
the truth following from his nature. The eleventh Imam Hasan al-Askari was 
assassinated at the caliph’s court in 873. He did not have a son that was known 
of but a certain Muhammad who disappeared in a cave as a child is allegedly his 
descendant. He is the Imam in occultation whose return the Shiis have been 
awaiting to this day. He was represented by four deputies until 940, who ensured 
that the divine knowledge would be maintained. This is what is referred to as the 
“minor occultation”. As the last deputy did not name another deputy, the major 
occultation (ghayba) when the Shii community does not have a leader guided by 
God, began. When the Twelver Shiis rose to power in Iran later on in the sixteenth 
century, the dogma was established that in the absence of the Imam the leading 
religious scholar, the Ayatollah inherited the divine inspiration and became the 
infallible leader of the community. According to Shii historical descriptions 
Imams, who were endowed with cosmic values, were always persecuted, 
imprisoned or poisoned by Umayyad and Abbasid rulers. Shii holidays, 
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anniversaries and pilgrimages therefore are held in order to mourn them and most 
importantly Husayn who suffered immensely from thirst in the desert, was 
betrayed even by his own supporters and was finally killed by his enemies in the 
Battle of Karbala. However, on legal and social issues the Shiis do not differ 
considerably from the Sunnis. They usually stick to the wording of the Quran 
more strongly and reject the practice that a Quranic verse might abrogate another 
or that a tradition might abrogate a Quranic verse. As regards their traditions 
traced back Muhammad the main difference from Sunni traditions is that the Shiis 
prefer traditions going back to Muhammad’s family and especially those that 
support Ali’s right of heritage and his excellence. 
 
Ismaili or Sevener Shiis 
There were, however, Shiis who held that the descendants of Jaafar’s other 
son Ismail, who died still during Jaafar’s life, were the true Imams. Their 
followers are the Ismaili or Sevener Shiis, who established the Fatimid Caliphate 
and ruled in North Africa and the Middle East from the tenth to the twelfth 
century. As their major characteristic they launched a dynamic social and 
intellectual movement which supported numberless riots. The first member of the 
Fatimid dynasty that claimed descent from Muhammad’s daughter Fatima, 
Ubaydallah Mahdi, occupied the capital of the governor who supported the 
Abbasids in today’s Tunisia in 909 and proclaimed himself caliph. This was the 
first case that Muslims had two caliphs, i.e. representatives of God on Earth at 
the same time. One weapon that Ismaili Fatimids used was sending out 
missionaries, who converted even the population of far-away territories to their 
teachings. In 969 they conquered Egypt, a great part of Syria as well as the holy 
cities of Hijaz, Mecca and Medina. They transferred their centre to Egypt and 
built a new capital, Cairo, and were in constant conflict with the Caliphate of 
Baghdad. 
In their teachings they relied on the hidden meaning of the Quran 
understandable only to initiates, while Twelver Shiis only party did so. Another 
difference between them is that according to the Ismaili teachings the seventh 
Imam Ismail has always had hereditary Imams. At the moment (since 1957) the 
forty-ninth Imam Aga Khan IV has been the leader of the Ismaili communities 
scattered around the world. 
At the end of the eleventh century Nizar, a candidate of the Fatimid 
Caliphate was killed during the debate for succession and his supporters, 
members of the Nizari Ismaili community fled from Egypt to the Middle East. 
One of their groups established the Druze sect, who today live in Lebanon, Syria 
and Israel in the area of the Mountain of the Druze. Others, occupying several 
high mountain castles, established a system of fortresses from Syria to East Iran, 
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from where for 150 years they kept the states of the surrounding plains in dread. 
After their assumed practice of smoking hashish, they were called “Assassins” 
(Arabic hashshashin). Since they committed suicide murders against renowned 
statesmen, their name means “murderer” and “to murder” in several European 
languages (e.g. assassinate in English). 
Owing to its internal strives the Fatimid Dynasty was unable to resist the 
new military systems that arose in the role of the protectors of Sunni faith and 
restorers of the Abbasid Caliphate. The Syrian province of Fatimids was first 
occupied by Seljuk Turks; later the Kurdish Ayyubid Army occupied Cairo and 
the whole of Egypt in 1171. The leader of the new Ayyubid Empire became 
Saladin (Salah al-Din, reign: 1171‒1193), who took Syria from the Seljuks but, 
just like Seljuks, took the oath of loyalty to the Caliphs of Baghdad.  
 
Further Shii branches 
From the fifth Imam the moderate Zaydi Shia branched off, who 
considered Zayd ibn Ali rather than Muhammad al-Baqir the fifth Imam. Today 
the largest Zaydi community is in Yemen where the Northern part of the country 
was governed by Zaydi Imams as long as until the end of the twentieth century. 
Mention must be made also of the Alawi branch, who are an extremist sect 
that broke off from the Twelver Shiis. As they keep their religious documents 
secret, only their previous name “Ali ilahi” tells us about their central teaching, 
i.e. that Ali is divine. At the moment they form a significant minority in Syria but 
have communities in Turkey and Lebanon as well.  
 
Branches of Islam in the modern age  
 
The Wahhabi branch of Islam 
In the eighteenth century a new, puritan Hanbali-based movement emerged 
which interpreted the teachings of Islam in an extremist way and which soon 
gained popularity in Arabia. After its founder, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
(1703‒1791), who lived and taught in Najd in central Arabia it is called the 
Wahhabi branch. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab felt that the darkness of ignorance reigned, 
because of which he taught that the true arms were books and knowledge. He 
fought against various popular practices and superstitions like asking the 
intercession and the help of the Prophet at his tomb, , adoring holy trees, stones 
and tombs. His purpose was, as he explained, to restore Islam the way it had been 
during the time of the Prophet and the first caliphs by eliminating elements 
adopted from other religions. Thereby he can be regarded as the founder of 
modern fundamentalist Salafi Islam (following ancestors). In the first part of his 
life his enemies were plentiful; he considered everyone who contradicted him a 
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heretic, and this became a characteristic of the extreme religious branches of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. He was convinced that both public and 
private life had to be controlled by religion. At the same time, he also had positive 
teachings that are not followed by his late successors: he spoke up for social 
justice, the equality of Muslims, the protection of women, the poor and property, 
and spoke up against corruption. He advocated that fighting was allowed only in 
justified cases; the instruments of persuasion were teaching and preaching. He 
called his teaching the doctrine of the unity of God (tawhid); his followers have 
called themselves muwahhidun (“those who profess the unity of God”) until 
today. 
It was a decisive change in the history of the Wahhabi branch when, in 
1744, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab signed an agreement with the militant chieftain of 
Najd, Muhammad Ibn Saud. Accordingly, the latter became the secular 
commander and emir, while Ibn Abd al-Wahhab the Imam, i.e. the Islamic 
religious leader. Thereby he legalised the tribally-based kingdom – the Saudi state 
of Najd – from the religious aspect, whereby the tribal raids multiplied. Although 
the jihad – religious war – became a duty of the new state, according to the 
Wahhabi teaching the conquered must first be demanded to convert to “true” 
Islam and may only be killed if they refuse to do so. As the troops did not follow 
this but murdered, looted and destroyed everything instead, Muhammad Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab became disappointed and retired from direct engagement in governing 
after 1770. His doctrine survived and was influential in many regions, e.g. Egypt 
and India, already in the nineteenth century; of, while it became the official 
religion of Saudi Arabia established in the first third of the twentieth century.  
 
The nineteenth-century reform age of Islam (nahda) in Egypt 
During the European – English and French – colonisation in the second 
half of the nineteenth century religious scholars and intellectuals in several Arab 
countries got in contact with Western civilisation. The influence of the West was 
double: on the one hand it awakened the desire to catch up with the West and 
restore the old glory, and on the other hand the anti-Islamic, secular external 
power also aroused rejection. It was as an effect of this double reaction that the 
Islamic reform movement (islah) developed first of all in Egypt, and alongside 
with that an effort – called Renaissance (nahda) – appeared to renew the secular 
culture. The father of religious reforms was primarily Muhammad Abduh (1849‒
1905) Egyptian jurist, religious scholar and liberal reformer, who is considered 
to be the most important figure of the modernisation of Islam. He broke away 
from rigid dogmatism, advocated the new doctrine that the gates of religious 
renewal and new interpretations did not close in the Middle Ages. As a young 
man he was strongly inspired by and learned a great deal from Jamal al-Din al-
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Afghani (1838‒1897) who stayed in Egypt in the 1870’s and who was a reformer, 
an agitator, liberal and an extremist at the same time. It was in the course of their 
activity that the intellectual strife for restoring the power of Islam and blocking 
the European advance first took a more or less coherent shape. This reform 
movement was characterised by the influence of Western rationalism, efforts for 
the unity of Islam, the criticism of Western imperialism and the adoption of 
modern civilisation. Al-Afghani emphasised Pan-Islamic efforts and envisaged 
the Ottoman Sultanate as the caliphate uniting the world of Islam. Abduh 
restricted his activity to Egypt, where he was regarded as a reformer and reviver 
who, in addition to adopting the achievements of Western civilisation, wanted to 
deepen religious practice. This effort was facilitated by the fact that towards the 
end of his life he was officially appointed the Grand Mufti of Egypt. In that 
function he advocated women’s equal rights and launched a fight against the 
activities of Sufi orders which he considered an obstacle to development. 
 
Major tendencies of Islam in the twentieth century 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the followers of an influential 
Sunni preacher Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835‒1908) formed a separate group in 
Punjab in India. They regarded their leader as a second Prophet after Muhammad 
and referred to themselves as Ahmadi Muslims. As a result of persecution, they 
live scattered around the world today and engage in zealous missionary work. 
In the twentieth century, in the years following World War I, various 
tendencies of political Islam developed in several parts of the Islamic world. The 
most important of these is the Movement of Muslim Brethren established in the 
Middle East, primarily in Egypt and Syria. The movement was launched by the 
Egyptian Hasan al-Banna murdered in 1949, the goal of the movement was to 
attain power and its main characteristic was that it did not rely on men of religion 
but on lay intellectuals. 
The most influential figure of political Islam in the Indian subcontinent and 
after 1947 in Pakistan was Abul Aala Mawdudi (1903‒1979). His goal was to 
propagate the teachings and legislation of Islam among the Muslim masses. In 
his view, organisations based on Islam should only take over power provided that 
the above concepts were shared by the people. 
The ideas of Hasan al-Banna and Mawdudi were further developed and 
published in a simple, reader-friendly manner by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, 
executed in 1966, whose fundamental idea, which later became popular, was that 
modern-age Muslim countries actually lived in the pagan age (jahiliyya). It was 
not enough if somebody claimed to be a Muslim; everything must be done, if 
necessary, by force, so that the world would be governed, according to God’s 
will, by the teachings of Islam. The same principle in Shii Islam was implemented 
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by Ayatollah Khomeini (1902‒1989) via the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. 
In the thus established Iranian Islamic Republic, political leadership was 
transferred to religious scholars (velayat-e faqih). 
In the world of Islam, the view that the legal order based on the divine law 
of Islam (Sharia) must be restored is widely shared even by non-extremist Muslim 
religious movements. Sharia as the state law in Sunni Islam was clearly 
implemented in Saudi Arabia where both political and religious power is held by 
the king. This means that the questions in which religious scholars have the 
authority to make judgements on the basis of sacred scriptures are not laid down 
in state laws. In spite of this, state laws must be passed for two thirds of the legal 
issues as those are outside the scope of Sharia. In the second half of the twentieth 
century extremist Muslims called themselves Salafis claiming they followed the 
lifestyle and morals of the age of the Prophet and the three generations after him 
(salaf meaning “pious predecessors”). They consider everyone who does not 
share their views – which is the majority of Muslim societies – as a nonbeliever. 
This charge of unbelief is called takfir. This has relevance because according to 
the Quran a Muslim must not fight against another Muslim except if the latter has 
been declared a nonbeliever. 
Another widely used concept of contemporary Islam is jihad, which has 
become the slogan of extremist Muslim political activists in the meaning of “holy 
war” mainly in the past forty years. This fight, they believe, must be fought both 
within and outside the world of Islam.  
 
4.2.4. The secular civilisation 
 
The secular sciences in the East 
 
In the first decades of the ninth century, Harun al-Rashid’s son, Caliph al-
Mamun became famous for further extending the House of Wisdom established 
by his father in order to support translations from the Greek and Syriac languages, 
and for giving significant financial subsidy for its operation. By this, he partly 
attempted to counterbalance the advance of religious sciences. In addition to 
housing translators, the institute provided premises for a huge library. Several 
hundred works by some 80 authors were translated there, primarily in philosophy 
and natural sciences, which had a great impact on both intellectual and religious 
life.  
The works of the most prominent representatives of Greek science were 
translated into Arabic language during what is referred to as the second 
translation era in the second half of the ninth century, by the Syrian Christian 
scientists living in North Syria who had earlier translated these from Greek to 
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Syriac language. The most significant of them was Hunayn ibn Ishaq who 
translated Aristotle, Plato as well as works in medicine. Qusta ibn Luqa translated 
Aristotle, Plutarch’s historical works and Euclid’s Elements, a fundamental book 
of mathematics into the Arabic language. As all these works were later translated 
into Latin, Mediaeval Europe has become acquainted with Greek science due to 
the Arabs. Arab philosophers and natural scientists not only interpreted Greek 
works but, in many cases, developed them further. The philosopher and logician 
al-Farabi (d. ca. 950) and the philosopher and physician Avicenna (Ibn Sina), (d. 
1037) were the greatest scientists. Avicenna provided a complete system of 
sciences in his multi-volume work The Book of Healing, while he summarised 
medicine in his work The Canon of Medicine (al-Qanun fi t-tibb). The activity of 
scientists writing in the Arabic language also had a great impact in the field of 
mathematics. The word algebra is of Arabic origin: al-jabr meaning “the reunion 
of broken parts”, i.e. ways to find the wanted unknown. It was the Arabs that 
added the zero to the sequence of numbers: the Arabic sifr is chiffre in French, 
and this is also where the English “cipher” come from. The first great 
mathematician and astronomer was al-Khwarizmi (d. 850); the word “algorithm” 
in the European languages originates from his name.  
From the great number of valuable works in Arabic historiography, a world 
history by al-Tabari (d. 922), entitled Annals (Tarih) is outstanding. The greatest 
figure in scientific historiography, who had a great impact on modern European 
historiography as well, is Ibn Khaldun whose Introduction (Muqaddima), written 
to his world history provides both theoretical and practical fundamentals for 
historiography.  
 
Achievements of Islamic civilisation in Spain 
 
After the end of the reconquest in 1492, in the field of material culture it 
was primarily architecture and landscape architecture that influenced, via the 
Kingdom of Spain, the European civilisation in the centuries to come. The former 
Muslims who had seemingly converted to Christianity were allowed to stay in the 
peninsula for more than a century but were constantly suspected by the Spanish 
of practising their old faith.  They were called Moriscos (Spanish for Moorish). 
They constituted the craftsmen stratum of society in the new Spanish Kingdom 
and transmitted the products of science and culture from the Middle East towards 
Europe. The most influential Muslim scholar was the philosopher Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes) living under the Almohads in the twelfth century, whose works were 
translated to Latin and were used by Christian theologians as well, e.g. the 
greatest figure of Christian theology in the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas. It 
was also in Spain where Arabic medical literature was translated into Latin, of 
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which the above-mentioned work by Ibn Sina was still taught at European 
universities at the beginning of the nineteenth century. When in 1609, at the 
demand of the inquisition Philip III, King of Spain ordered that the Moors and 
the Jews be expelled from Spain, they fled primarily to North Africa, causing a 
great shortage of experts in the kingdom. According to Spanish historical 
resources more than half a million Moors were expelled at that time. The number 
of Arabic books they left behind, which were burnt as heretic documents, is 
estimated to have been around 600 thousand. Mosques were transformed into 
churches, while the thousands of baths that were viewed as the symbols of 
“pagan” Muslim culture were destroyed. Between the fall of Granada and the first 
decade of the seventeenth century some three million Moors were expelled or 
executed for the sin of falling back to Islam.  
 
Literature in the central parts of the Islamic world 
 
Arabic literature in the Middle Ages 
The most important genre in Arabic literature in the Middle Ages was 
poetry. On the one hand genres were kept which preserved traditions from pre-
Islamic poetry – panegyrics, elegies, satires – and on the other hand new genres 
were born like wine poems, love poems and religious poems. Since there are very 
strict formal conditions for classical Arab poems as well as due to an abundance 
of paronomasia, they cannot really be translated. 
The first fiction in the Arabic language is Kalila and Dimna, a collection 
of fables from the eighth century, written as a mirror for princes. The majority of 
the tales are of Indian origin. A more widely known collection of tales and also 
of a larger size is the collection without an author and with the title Arabian 
Nights, which took five hundred years to compile from Indian, Persian and Arabic 
sources. A special Arabic genre is the maqama, which came into being in the 
tenth century, and in which the permanent narrator tells in first person singular 
about his adventures with a permanent trickster, which happened to him in 
various cities of the Arab world. The most renowned maqama writer was al-Hariri 
in the twelfth century. An outstanding figure of Arabic literature in Andalusia, 
also from the twelfth century, is Ibn Tufayl, whose novel Hayy ibn Yaqzan, a 
philosophical tale has been published in English, too. One of the most interesting 
sources about the times of the crusades is the work of Usama ibn Munqidh which 
is also available in English: An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period 
of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usama Ibn-Munqidh (Kitab al i'tibar). The most 
prominent piece of travel literature is a travelogue about the journeys of Ibn 
Battuta in the fourteenth century, also translated into English. The author 
travelled some 20 thousand kilometres around the world. 
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Persian poetry in the Middle Ages 
At the time of the early Muslim empires the use of Arabic in the written 
language pushed Farsi into the background. The first literary accomplishment in 
the New Persian language written in Arabic script, which has been one of the 
most influential ones until today is Firdausi’s (ca. 940‒ca. 1021) historical epic 
Shahnameh (“Book of Kings”). Poetry was the most famous genre in the 
Mediaeval Persian literature. Besides the four-line (rubaiyat) wine verses and 
love verses by Umar Khayyam (1048‒1131), the poems of Hafiz from the 
fourteenth century stand out. These have become also very popular in Europe 
from the eighteenth century on. An outstanding poet in the twelfth century was 
Nizami, whose major work “Five treasures” (Panj ganj) comprising five long 
epic poems had been a favourite for illustrators for long centuries. Similarly, 
important works are the rhyming couplets (masnavi) of the great mystical poet of 
the thirteenth century Jalal al-Din Rumi as well as Sadi’s Rose Garden in which 
he made a systematic compilation of wisdom based on his experiences, 
adventures and the knowledge and experience gained by travelling. The works of 
Jami who was born in the territory of today’s Afghanistan and lived in the 
fifteenth century spread primarily via the mystical Naqshbandi order to the whole 
Persianate region, including Central and South Asia. His best-known work 
containing seven works bears the title Haft awrang (“Seven Thrones”), one story 
in which (Yusuf va-Zulaykha) tells the story of Joseph and the wife of Potiphar 
based on the twelfth chapter of the Quran. 
 
Ottoman-Turkish literature 
The literature of the Ottoman period, written in the Ottoman Turkish 
language includes both folklore material based on oral tradition and written texts 
not related to the former. Ottoman literature, which was written in Arabic script, 
was to a great extent influenced by Arabic and Persian literature. Just like in these 
two, the main genre was the so-called diwan poetry, while prose was less 
significant. Both oral and written poetry were permeated by mystical notions. The 
first poet of significance was Yunus Emre (1238‒1320), an outstanding figure of 
Sufi mysticism, who had a great impact on Ottoman literature in all of its ages. 
He belonged to the poets of his time who did not write in a literary register – 
which was under Arabic and Persian influence – but used a vocabulary much 
closer to spoken language. Fuzuli (1483‒1556), who was of Azeri origin, wrote, 
following the traditions of his age, significant works both in Ottoman Turkish and 
Persian. A representative poet of the age of Suleiman the Magnificent was Bâkî 
(1526‒1600), who is considered a great master of style. Nedim (1681‒1730), the 
poet of the “Tulip Age” who brought revolutionary innovations, intertwined the 
literary language of the elite with linguistic turns from folk poetry. An 
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outstanding genre in prose was that of travel books (Seyahatnâme), whose most 
excellent representative was Evliya Çelebi (1611‒1684).  
 
Islamic art 
 
The diversity of art in the region gives a true picture of the diversity of 
Islam in place and time. The framework of this chapter does not allow the 
presentation of all branches of art, therefore only a brief mention is made of the 
two most significant ones: mosque architecture and calligraphy. 
 
Styles of mosque architecture 
Hypostyle mosques 
This is the simplest type, which reminds Muslims of the first mosque, the 
house of Prophet Muhammad in Medina. This layout was built most frequently 
all over the Islamic world (Figures 62‒63) before the four iwan mosque became 
widespread in the twelfth century. The best-known mosque built in this style is 
in Qayrawan, Tunisia. 
 
Figure 62: The Great Mosque of Qayrawan founded by Uqba ibn Nafi in 670, which 
gained its final form during the reign of the Aghlabid dynasty in the ninth century 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
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Figure 63: The Mosque of Ibn Tulun in Cairo built in 879 and its minaret 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI 
 
Four-iwan mosques: 
An iwan is a large, vaulted hall that opens to a courtyard (Figure 64). Just 
like in the case of a hypostyle mosque, the walls enclose a vast courtyard. The 
biggest iwan is the one facing praying direction (qibla). Although it developed in 
Iran under ancient Persian influence, it later spread everywhere from India to 
Cairo both in sacred and secular architecture.  
 
Figure 64: The iwans of three madrasas built between the fifteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in the Registan, the main square of Samarkand in the Timurid period 
Source: Photograph by MIKLÓS SÁRKÖZY 
 
Centrally planned mosques: 
Ottoman Turkish architecture was to a great extent influenced by the 
church Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, which was the largest of all Byzantine churches, 
and whose main characteristic feature is the monumental central dome above the 
huge nave. Turkish mosques mostly copied this example.  
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Calligraphy (khatt) 
Before modern age, the most important and in many places the only field 
of fine arts in the Islamic world was Arabic calligraphy. Striving for beauty had 
such importance in writing – probably with the exception of much of the book 
copying – that the Arabic word for writing, khatt, means calligraphy at the same 
time. Engaging in calligraphy constituted a part of high-level knowledge and the 
most famous calligraphers (khattat) came from among high-position clerks like 
Ibn Muqla (d. 940), the chief minister of several Abbasid caliphs. 
 
Figure 65: Quran excerpts (1:7; 12:53) in Kufic script  from the eighth century, with a 
decorative sura dividing panel. Museum of Islamic Art, Istanbul 
Source: Photograph by MÁTÉ L. IVÁNYI 
 
Arabic script developed in two geometrically different versions in the sixth 
and seventh centuries. The square Kufic script was named after the city of Kufa 
in South Iraq (Figure 65). This was used for inscriptions on buildings as well as 
for copying the Quran until the tenth century; for decoration it was frequently 
used later as well. 
The Maghrebi script developed from the Kufic and was also used by book 
copiers before book printing was invented, and the Quran was written in 
Maghrebi script even in its printed form. The other type of writing was the round 
naskhi script, which was the “script of copyists” and was used for writing 
manuscripts until the middle of the nineteenth century. This script was developed 
into several decorative scripts, too, e.g. thuluth, diwani, muhaqqaq, and this 
became the script of the Quran, too, after the year 1000. Naskhi script was the 
basis for various Persian scripts like taliq and nastaliq, which latter developed 
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from the former (Figure 66). In offices shikaste, characterised by tiny and thin 
letters, was used, which was also adopted by the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Figure 66: The tiles on the facade of the Abdullah Khan Madrasa covered with 
inscriptions, Bukhara, sixteenth century 
Source: Photograph by MIKLÓS SÁRKÖZY 
 
Calligraphy has retained its artistic function in modern art as well (Figure 67). 
 
Figure 67: Modern street art in Cairo making use of calligraphy 
Source: Photograph by KINGA DÉVÉNYI  
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4.2.5. Chronological table 

Date Era Event 
c. 570 
Muhammad 
and the 
formative 
period of 
Islam 
The birth of the Prophet Muhammad 
c. 611 The start of the revelation of the Quran 
622 The hijra, Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina, 
marking the beginning of the Islamic calendar. 
624 The Battle of Badr, Muhammad’s first great victory against 
Meccan pagans 
630 The conquest of Mecca 
632 The death of the Prophet Muhammad 
632‒661 The reign of the first four, “rightly guided caliphs” in Medina 
632‒634 Abu Bakr, the first caliph 
634‒644 The reign of Caliph Umar  
644‒656 The reign of Caliph Uthman  
656‒661 The reign of Caliph Ali, with Kufa as the centre 
657 The Battle of Siffin between Ali and Muawiya, arbitration, the 
secession of Kharijis from Ali’s camp 
633‒651 
Conquests 
The conquest of Mesopotamia and Persia 
634‒641 The conquest of Syria 
639‒642 The conquest of Egypt 
647‒722 The conquest of North-Africa (Maghreb) 
711‒722 The conquest of the southern and central parts of Hispania 
(Andalusia) 
661‒750 Arab 
dynasties 
Umayyad Caliphate in Damascus 
750‒1258 Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad 
756 
Further 
dynasties  
in Arab 
territories 
Umayyad Emirate in Córdoba 
929‒1031 Umayyad Caliphate in Córdoba 
909‒1171 Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa and the Middle East 
1174‒1260 Ayyubid Sultanate in Egypt and Syria 
1040‒1147 Almoravid reign in North Africa then Andalusia 
1147‒1269 Almohad Caliphate in North Africa and Andalusia 
1251‒1517 Mamluk Sultanate with Cairo as capital 
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Date Era Event 
819‒999 
Other 
Muslim 
dynasties 
Emirate of Samanids of Persian origin in the areas of East Iran, 
Afghanistan, Central Asia and West India, with Samarkand and 
later Bukhara (Central Asia) as capital 
945‒988 Emirate of Iranian Shii Buyids in West Iran and Iraq 
acknowledged by the Caliphs of Baghdad 
977‒1186 Ghaznavid Emirate with Ghazna (Afghanistan) as capital in the area of the earlier Samanid Emirate – the reign of slave soldiers 
1050‒1153 Great Seljuk Empire with Isfahan (Iran) as the centre. Their 
reign extended to the whole Middle East 
1299 Bey, then Sultan Osman establishes the Ottoman Empire 
bearing his name in Asia Minor 
1453 Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror conquers Constantinople, which 
under the name Istanbul becomes the capital of the Empire 
1502 Foundation of the Shii Safavid Empire in Persia 
1520‒1566 The reign of Suleiman the Magnificent in the Ottoman Empire 
1526 The Foundation of the Mughal Empire under Sultan Babur in 
India 
1794‒1925 Reign of the Qajar dynasty in Iran 
1925‒1979 Pahlavi dynasty in Iran 
1922‒23 Abolition of the Sultanate and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, led 
by Kemal Ataturk 
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran led by Ayatollah Khomeini 
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5.1. The Civilisations of Africa13 
 
ZOLTÁN SZOMBATHY 
 
The plural form in the title of the chapter – “civilisations” rather than 
“civilisation” – is not an accidental typo but is a form justified and used 
intentionally. The reason is that, as opposed to the other civilisations discussed in 
the book, the civilisations of Africa (and within that, Sub-Saharan Africa) are 
interrelated by very few characteristics to the extent which would justify 
considering the continent as a single, more or less uniform civilisation. Africa 
shows so great diversity in terms of culture, religion and society that it is in fact 
almost impossible to treat it as a single civilisation; however, in the absence of a 
better solution, we will nevertheless do so in this book. For this very reason, this 
is exactly the aspect that should be highlighted and emphasized right at the outset: 
to what extent and in what sense can we talk about an “African civilisation”; or 
in other words, to what extent and how does the African continent or at least the 
part thereof south of the Sahara constitute a civilisational entity and an 
independent cultural area, if it does so at all. The most important general principle 
to be established right away is related to the definition of African civilisation(s): 
Africa constitutes a single civilisation exclusively in the geographical (and racial) 
sense; it would be difficult to refer to a cultural unity in the case of Africa. The 
African continent cannot be considered as a culturally defined civilisation, not 
least because a significant overlap with other civilisations – discussed in this book 
as well – can be detected. Therefore, for instance, it would be completely absurd 
to discuss the Islamic civilisation as if the statements made there did not concern 
the Sub-Saharan African Muslim population (nearly one fifth of the Muslims of 
the world, which is an ever-increasing ratio for that matter). These are not minor 
details that can be disregarded conveniently: currently, at least one third of the 
population of Sub-Saharan Africa is Muslim (therefore the chapter on Islamic 
civilisation discusses them as well), and nearly half of the population of Sub-
Saharan Africa is Christian (therefore the chapters about Western and Eastern 
Christianity as a civilisation apply to a significant extent to them as well). 
  

13 Most of the African languages now use the Latin script; spelling conventions, of course, 
differ from those of English. However, for the sake of uniform spelling, we use all words 
and names in African languages in roughly English spelling. 
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5.1.1. Terminological matters and the boundaries of African 
civilisations 
 
In discussing the African civilisations, it will be advisable to clarify some 
terminological aspects first. The first among these is the name of the region itself, 
which is not merely a linguistic matter but also an issue of principle, which affects 
the boundaries of the civilisations to be discussed as well. In the scholarly 
literature written in English, French, Spanish and other Western languages, 
compound words formed with the adjective “Sub-Saharan” (French: subsaharien; 
Spanish: subsahariano; etc.) are used often (“Sub-Saharan Africa”, “Sub-
Saharan region”); the advantage of this term is that it is a neutral, descriptive 
geographical term free from ideological overtones. Unfortunately, it has a major 
disadvantage as well: the expression implies that the Sahara is some kind of 
cultural-civilisational boundary between two completely different regions – as 
you will see, this is not even remotely true. In Hungarian, the name “Black 
Africa” is more common, and we have no reason to change this, since no 
systematic pejorative meaning is attached to the adjective “black” in the 
Hungarian language. However, it shall be noted that the equivalents of the 
expression “Black Africa” used to be and partially are still used in several 
European languages (e.g. English Black Africa; French Afrique noire; etc.); the 
decline in the use of these expressions may be traced back to explicitly political 
– ideological reasons, for these are fundamentally descriptive terms: they reflect 
the fact that the regions situated south of the Sahara are inhabited mostly by a 
population of markedly dark complexion. In any case, in what follows we will 
use the now usual English term “Sub-Saharan Africa”, or - for the sake of brevity 
and unless noted otherwise – the word “Africa” will mean “Sub-Saharan Africa” 
throughout this chapter. 
As we have already mentioned briefly, both the name “Sub-Saharan 
Africa” and the name “Black Africa” raise a serious – and ultimately unsolvable 
– theoretical problem, to wit: where can the anthropological and cultural 
boundaries of Sub-Saharan Africa be drawn in the north. The problem is 
unsolvable because these boundaries cannot be drawn anywhere in reality: 
although the region of the North African Arabic-speaking countries is a rather 
different world compared to Sub-Saharan Africa (more in terms of anthropology 
and much less in terms of culture), no clear boundary can be established 
anywhere. In other words, the Sahara is not a boundary but rather a transitional 
area. In most of the desert the majority of the population are of Sub-Saharan 
African character. Culturally however, the Sub-Saharan African links dominate 
in certain regions (e.g. the Saharan areas of Chad), while North African links 
dominate in other regions (e.g. Mauritania or certain regions of Algeria). The 
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entire Saharan population is Muslim; however, this is also the case in the Sub-
Saharan African region situated more to the south (the so-called Sahel belt) as 
well. Countless trade routes have run across the Sahara since ancient times, which 
ensured permanent relations between the two lands bordering the desert; and in 
the same way that populations of (partially) Arabic origin and of (mostly) Arabic 
culture live in Sub-Saharan Africa (the Sudan, Chad), population elements of 
fundamentally Sub-Saharan African origin can be found also in North Africa (this 
is the so-called Haratin population in Morocco and Algeria). 
Another terminological matter should be briefly discussed as well. In the 
English language (and in other modern European languages as well) it has been 
a common phenomenon that the word “tribe” would be used in reference to 
African ethnic groups, even in cases where it is not justified at all. This reflects a 
prejudiced thinking: it is totally unjustified to use the word “tribe” in Africa to 
refer to social groups for which the word “nation”, “ethnic group” or “ethnicity” 
would be used in Europe. A social group which in any case includes several 
hundred thousand or several million people, speaks its own common language, 
and which may also constitute a political unit and considers itself as an 
independent nation is a “nation” or “ethnic group” in Africa as well, and not a 
tribe. There are, to be sure, tribes also in Africa – the same as in Asia and as they 
used to exist in Europe as well – but it is a different (lower) level of social 
organisation. Thus, for example the Somalis are a nation or an ethnic group, but 
there are tribes within the nation (e.g. Darod, Isaaq, Dir, Hawiye, Rahanweyn, 
etc.). 
 
5.1.2. Cultural diversity 
 
As already emphasised in the introduction, Africa is exceptionally diverse 
in terms of culture, a degree of diversity the like of which can be observed only 
on the Asian continent. Despite this Asia is usually not treated as a single civilisa-
tion (it is not in this volume either). The issue of diversity will have to be stressed 
again and again as part of the presentation of different cultural characteristics 
(language, religion, social organisation, political structures, states, external 
cultural influences). For this reason, when discussing such specific questions, we 
will revisit this aspect as well; here it is noted only in general that there is hardly 
any area or phenomenon of culture regarding which Africa shows uniformity.  
Let us start with the issue of religion. Even aside from the foreign 
influences – although, as we will see, these cannot be disregarded – the traditional 
religions of Africa show few shared characteristics present everywhere. Even 
more important is the fact that the religious and cultural life of numerous regions 
of Sub-Saharan Africa have been profoundly informed by Islam since the Middle 
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Ages, while some other African regions have just as deep-rooted Christian 
traditions. These two religious communities show few common characteristics, 
and their cultural orientations could not be more different (in some cases even in 
spite of close geographical proximity: the Cristian Ethiopian Highlands and the 
Muslim East Ethiopia are geographically close, but are strikingly dissimilar in 
terms of religion and culture). 
The linguistic map of Africa shows even more diversity. Languages 
belonging to several, totally unrelated language families are often spoken within 
the same small region; moreover, many Sub-Saharan African languages have 
their closest relatives on other continents. For example, most of the languages 
spoken in Madagascar are related to the languages of Indonesia and the Pacific 
Ocean region (the most closely-related languages being spoken on the island of 
Kalimantan in Indonesia); the languages of the central and northern belts of 
Nigeria are related more closely to, for example, Hebrew or Arabic than to the 
neighbouring languages spoken in the Nigerian regions situated directly to the 
south. In the southern part of Kordofan province in the Sudan, languages 
belonging to at least four different language families are spoken, often in 
mountain ranges situated in each other’s immediate vicinity, thereby creating a 
linguistic mosaic which is perhaps most reminiscent of situation in certain regions 
of the Northern Caucasus. 
Lifestyles, material and intellectual cultures also show incredible variety, 
so that it would be a futile effort to try summarising this aspect in any concise 
manner. A particularly interesting phenomenon is that the most primitive cultures 
are frequently found in the immediate vicinity of quite sophisticated states and 
cultures, which often had and continue to have permanent and profound cultural 
interactions with remote regions within the continent as well as regions outside 
Africa while having minimal contacts with neighbouring communities having a 
more primitive culture. A pertinent example is the sophisticated culture of the 
Christian Ethiopian highlands, and, not far from these, the remarkably primitive 
pastoral cultures such as those of the Muslim Afar people or the small animist 
peoples of the lower Omo River valley. Likewise, quite next to the Muslim high 
cultures and states of the Hausa and Fulani of Northern Nigeria, one finds the 
rather primitive cultures of the small animistic (now partly Christianised and to a 
lesser extent Islamised) ethnic groups of the so-called Middle Belt , the two types 
of civilisations having had a fairly limited interaction with each other. In the 
vicinity of the feudal states of the Congo Basin (including the Congo Kingdom , 
which has been Catholic since the sixteenth century and had maintained friendly 
contacts with the Portuguese), the hunter-gatherer jungle communities of the 
Pygmy peoples have survived to this day. 
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5.1.3. Images of Africa: distortions, exoticism and ideology 
 
The fact that societies on very different levels of material development 
existed side-by-side on the African continent led to interesting and revealing 
distortions of the image of Africa, in popular literature as well as in part of the 
scholarly literature. Distortions and misconceptions on Africa can be traced to 
three main reasons. Firstly there was a marked tendency to emphasise the exotic 
aspects over characteristics that appeared familiar to Western observers, 
secondly, political and ideological points of view had their impact, and thirdly 
racism, an example of such ideologies, has unfortunately dominated discourse on 
Africa. The first of these factors, i.e. the overemphasising of exotic elements, is 
a universal human error, and while there is no reason to suspect a political agenda 
behind it, it can be very harmful. The so-called colonial gaze meant that the eyes 
of colonialists were especially keen to note what appeared alien and bizarre, albeit 
many features of African civilisations were by no means incomprehensible to 
Western observers. 
Reports on the more primitive cultures of Africa are often overrepresented 
in descriptions of the continent’s cultural life, while external cultural influences 
are often downplayed or neglected: the primitive and the outlandish are “more 
interesting” than the more sophisticated and the familiar. A ludicrous example of 
this tendency is the Sudanese material of the renowned photographer and 
filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl (1902‒2003) who “portrayed” the lives and culture 
of the Nuba – a collection of ethnic groups having a very primitive culture – 
conveniently forgetting to note (and, to be sure, to show in her photographs) that 
the majority of these people had converted or were converting to Islam and did 
not insist on preserving their traditional and very primitive lifestyle intact. 
Obviously, Sudanese Muslim culture did not seem exotic enough to be worth 
recording, and even of noting. 
In other cases, distortions of Africa’s image result from explicit ideological 
concerns. This observation applies especially to the issue of extent to which many 
African cultures, or aspects of culture, can be considered as “authentically” 
African. The whole issue of African “authenticity” is hopelessly beyond the reach 
of scholarly argumentation. Of course, civilisations have always influenced one 
another, and the sea not being an impassable obstacle to trade and 
communication, cultural influence does not stop at the shores of any continent. 
As we have already noted with regard to religions and languages, foreign cultural 
influences have been present throughout the history of Africa no less than in other 
parts of the world, and therefore discussions in terms of just how “authentic” or 
“genuine” any African civilisation or cultural feature is nonsense, making as 
much sense as it would be in discussions of European culture. To give a more 
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specific example: the degree of the “authenticity” of, say, the culture of the 
Muslim Swahili trading towns of East Africa or the culture of the Orthodox 
Christian Ethiopian Empire is precisely as meaningful as an academic 
controversy as a similar exploration of the “authenticity” of Western Christianity 
of Japanese Zen Buddhism would be. Of course, the roots of European 
Christianity can be traced back to the Middle East and Zen Buddhism ultimately 
derives from China (and indeed from India), but “authenticity” in these cases is a 
patently inadequate analytical concept. Likewise, why would a mosque built in 
colonial Baroque style in Lagos by Yoruba slaves resettled from Brazil for their 
own community, be regarded as anything but an integral part of African 
civilisation? Yet such absurd controversies are common (to some extent even in 
academic works), demonstrating an implicit tendency to measure African 
civilisations by standards not applied to other civilisations of the world. This is 
entirely unjustified and betrays the impact of heavily ideologised views. 
Ideologised thinking is often present among the political and cultural élite 
of modern Africa as well. An obvious example is the so-called autenticité 
ideology of the former Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko, which required the 
country’s élite to take “authentic” African personal names despite the fact that 
many Africans have used personal names of Arabic or European origin for 
centuries (in what was to become Zaire, for example, Christian personal names 
have been used since as early as the sixteenth century). The absurd question of 
“authenticity” has been raised by outsiders as well as Africans regarding almost 
every advanced culture in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially those African societies 
that established and maintained regular commercial and cultural contacts with 
peoples living outside the continent. 
As a sample, one might mention a few African ethnic groups and societies 
that became the unfortunate subjects of fatuous debates regarding their “African 
authenticity” debates that sadly are still going on in some cases. Examples include 
the Christian peoples of the Ethiopian Highlands (Amharic and Tigrinya 
speakers), the Arabic-speaking populations of Sudan and Chad, the Swahili of 
the East African coast, the Portuguese-speaking Christian élite of Angola and 
Congo, the population of Madagascar, the black population of West Africa who 
have returned from America (Yoruba people who returned from Brazil in Nigeria, 
and Creoles in Liberia and Sierra Leone). The list goes on, but one specific 
example will suffice to illustrate the tendency. The population of the Egypt-Sudan 
border region, known as Nubian, are black and speak an African (Nilo-Saharan) 
language, but they have obviously been exposed to a variety of foreign cultural 
influences since Antiquity: from the powerful influence of ancient Egypt to the 
Monophysite Christianity of the Middle Ages to the ever-present influence of 
Islam from the late Middle Ages to the present day. The foreign influences that 
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affected the Nubians even include a handful of immigrants originating from the 
Balkan Peninsula and Hungary – or perhaps legends of such immigration (the so-
called Kushshaf and Majarab communities were established this way). Today 
Nubians still speak their own language, preserve their own characteristic culture, 
and it would be ridiculous to refer to them as in some way not “authentically 
African”. 
Doing justice to the varied foreign influences that have had an impact on 
African civilisations – or even making an overview of the major influences is 
beyond the scope of this book. However, a few examples will be instructive, such 
as the introduction of numerous plant species (including maize, cocoa and 
tobacco from the Americas, and a lot of plant varieties from Southeast Asia), a 
large number of musical instruments and musical techniques, scripts and writing 
systems (see below), numerous elements of folklore (e.g. characteristic legends 
of origin and folktale types), and of course the two world religions (Islam and 
Christianity) complete with all their cultural traditions. In addition to the main 
colonising powers (England, France and Portugal), the Arabs also had a very 
powerful influence on the civilisations of Africa (emanating partly from North 
Africa and partly from the Arabian Peninsula), as did more recently (and to a 
much smaller extent) the Indians. Of strictly local importance yet interesting is 
the influence of Jewish culture on the highland areas of Ethiopia (through the 
Falasha population who adopted the Israelite religion and consider themselves 
Jews), as well as the (limited) Chinese influence on the East African coast (visited 
by a Chinese fleet under the leadership of Zheng He in the first half of the fifteenth 
century, making the use of certain Chinese luxury items such as porcelain dishes 
fashionable among the Swahili élite). European (and American) influences 
mostly date from colonial times onwards, yet similarly to other parts of the world 
this influence is pervasive in Africa too, being most evident in music, films, 
material culture and – in the Christian parts of Africa – religion. 
 
5.1.4. The influence of racism and the African diaspora 
 
Racism is a very special – and in Africa an unfortunately quite significant 
– kind of ideological attitude. Its importance in discussions of Africa is enhanced 
by the fact that, due to the extreme cultural variety of African civilisations, race 
is in fact the only basis of the supposed unity of the Sub-Saharan regions. Racism 
left its imprint on the attitudes of the European colonisers to Africa, who tended 
to perceive the cultures of Africa as inferior and derived from outside sources. 
Examples of such views include the insistence – totally baseless yet not less 
tenacious for that - on attributing the huge stone constructions of the Zimbabwe 
state and its other cultural achievements to immigrants from outside Africa, and 
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on misidentifying the Swahili city-states as “Arab trading cities”. The ideas of 
German ethnologist and Africanist Leo Frobenius (1873‒1938) about the 
“Eritrean” and “Atlantic” archetypes of African civilisation are further examples 
of the race-based approach (although in his case, the underlying sentiments were 
fundamentally benevolent towards Africans). 
However, racism has affected not only the research done by Europeans and 
Americans; the impact of racist ideas is evident on the work of African and 
African-American scholars as well. The so-called négritude movement of the 
French-speaking regions and the so-called Afrocentrism, which is widespread in 
the work of certain university departments in the USA can be mentioned in this 
regard. Both trends are characterised by the celebration of African traditions, the 
myth of African cultural unity, as well as a good dose of racism, which are often 
accompanied by absurd and completely baseless statements regarding African 
culture and history. (These are the scholarly circles in which, for example, ancient 
Egypt is treated as an integral part of Sub-Saharan Africa, which then makes its 
achievements Sub-Saharan African accomplishments.) These ideas result from 
an inescapable, sad historical fact: no matter how understandable the nostalgia 
for the motherland, i.e. Africa, in the American Black diaspora, the fact remains 
that due to the nature of the slave trade, there is not a single African-American 
person today who will be able to identify with certainty the place within Africa 
where his or her ancestors originated. For this reason, a kind of pan-African 
nostalgia blurs more precise historical details, hence the totally erroneous idea of 
pan-African cultural unity. 
Accordingly, the influence of African civilisations on the American Black 
diaspora is utterly eclectic. As iconic features of ‘African culture’ one finds, for 
instance, the kente fabrics and clothes of the Ashanti people of Ghana, the wood-
carvings and masks of the Congo Basin and other areas, an assortment of 
elements from various of African languages, the celebrations in Harlem and 
elsewhere of the Senegalese Muslim sect, mass conversion to Islam among 
American Blacks (e.g. the Nation of Islam), the lobbying for a variety of African 
political causes, as well as the invention and celebration of totally imaginary 
‘African’ festivities (e.g. the entirely fictitious Kwanzaa, which is meant to 
replace Christmas). The diaspora preserved few original cultural traditions, which 
is a consequence of the slave trade: the slaves coming from different ethnicities 
and areas were deliberately intermingled, resulting in the inevitable loss of their 
languages and cultural traditions. Some religious traditions were preserved in the 
diaspora (e.g. the possession cults: in the Arab world Zar and Gnawa, in Brazil 
Macumba and Candomblé, and in the Caribbean Voodoo and Santería). certain 
African words were also preserved in some dialects, such as in the Gullah dialect 
spoken on the islands of South Carolina; Brazilian Portuguese preserved certain 
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Yoruba words, and Haitian Creole a few Ewe words, etc. However, the most 
important locus of African cultural influences are obviously cuisine (e.g. 
Caribbean Black gastronomy, soul food and Creole cuisine, in the Southern US, 
etc.) and music, in which the African influence is indisputable in such musical 
genres as jazz, reggae and several Latin American musical styles, as well as in 
Moroccan Gnawa music. 
Just as Africa influenced the Black diaspora of the American continent and 
the Arab world, the Black diaspora also influenced Africa. In this regard music 
may be mentioned again, with numerous musical styles – which often draw on 
African cultural roots – returning to Africa and achieving great popularity there; 
such as reggae or Congolese rumba (although rumba is played in other African 
lands as well), popular throughout Africa. An interesting if very limited influence 
is the presence of the Jamaican Rastafarian cult in certain African countries. The 
teachings of the cult emphasise the attraction of Africa (mainly Ethiopia) as the 
motherland, and the desire of returning there, a goal realised by certain members 
of the cult. Although for historical reasons the ancestors of Jamaican Blacks 
simply cannot have come from Ethiopia, in the town of Shashemene in South 
Ethiopia a small Rastafari community has been formed of Jamaicans who settled 
there. As noted above, for emotional and ideological reasons Africa tends to be 
perceived by the Black diaspora as a distinct, unified civilisation, regardless of 
all the evidence that contradicts this perception. 
 
5.1.5. Ethnic groups and languages 
 
Similar to all other continents, the population of Africa can be classified 
according to various criteria. Genetic, somatic, cultural and linguistic criteria may 
equally be used, and each of these will obviously result in different divisions. For 
example, in certain cases populations of completely identical origins and great 
genetic proximity may speak very different languages; peoples of similar culture 
often use completely different languages and have starkly different origins, and 
so on. In what follows, the aspect which perhaps allows for the most objective 
classification is adopted: linguistic divisions will serve as the fundamental 
criterion for identifying the main subdivisions of the ethnicities of Africa. It bears 
emphasis, however, that this is not the only possible classificatory scheme. It is 
also worth stressing that shared language by no means implies shared ancestry: 
thus for example, the Arabic-speaking populations of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(primarily in the Sudan and Chad) – with insignificant exceptions – are 
overwhelmingly not of Arab origin but descendants of Sub-Saharan African 
Blacks who adopted the Arabic language during the last few centuries (and to a 
small extent intermarried with a few Arab immigrants). The “Arab” population 
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of the East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania) is also of largely African origin; 
moreover, these communities typically do not even use the Arabic language but 
do trace their pedigrees back to, fictitious Arab ancestors. The Ethiopian 
Christian Amhara people speak a Semitic language, however, in terms of their 
origin the Amhara people are not a purely Semitic population but evolved from 
the mingling of a numerous local African population and less sizeable 
communities of immigrants arriving from Arabia. 
The issue of assimilation and mixing is extremely important for the history 
and ethnography of Africa, and therefore before discussing the linguistic 
classification, this question has to be addressed briefly. As in Europe, in Africa 
too the majority of the largest ethnic groups emerged through the assimilation of 
a multitude of smaller ethnic communities. In many cases the process of 
assimilation was that the dominant ethnic group of a vast, expansionary feudal 
empire assimilated masses of the peoples under its domination. However, the 
process often took place with no centralised state exerting its influence, indeed in 
some cases without any kind of state structure. For example, the Fulani (or Fulbe) 
people, widespread throughout West Africa, established a number of large 
Islamic theocratic states (among others in the territory of today’s Nigeria and 
Mali), and in these states the members of other ethnic groups adopted the Fulani 
language and culture on a massive scale and became Fulani themselves in this 
way. (The process shows obvious parallels with the emergence of several 
European nations, suffice here to mention only the role of the French state in the 
evolution of the French nation and in the assimilation of populations speaking 
other languages.). The Swahili population of the East African coast, or the Hausa 
population of North Nigeria assimilated other peoples in a similar manner within 
the domain of smaller local states. On the other hand, the Oromo (or Galla) ethnic 
group of South Ethiopia assimilated a large number of smaller ethnicities without 
establishing a large-scale state, thus here the assimilation process was not linked 
to an organised political entity. It is worth mentioning that the peoples which 
emerged this way include some of the largest ethnic groups of Africa in terms of 
demographic figures (the Hausa is now the largest ethnic group of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, while the Oromo is the second-largest, and the Fulani is also among the 
most numerous African ethnicities). It is thus difficult to overstate the 
significance of linguistic assimilation; moreover, such processes continue to 
shape the ethnic map of Africa today. 
That said, brief linguistic categorisations of the population of Sub-Saharan 
Africa will be given (Map 25). Practical considerations will be given priority in 
structuring the following categorisation, i.e. language families with fewer 
speakers can be disposed of more briefly and will therefore be discussed first, 
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while the more complex groupings that encompass numerous languages and are 
present in most of the African continent will be discussed last. 
 
Map 25: Language families of Africa 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The Khoisan language family may be considered a curiosity rather than a 
crucial subject vis-à-vis the larger ethnolinguistic and civilisational landscape of 
Africa. The languages which belong to this language family are spoken by a few 
scattered hunter-gatherer communities living in the southern part of the continent 
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(primarily in the territory of the Kalahari Desert of South Africa and Namibia), 
and for the history of the continent, these groups have had minimal significance. 
The two main branches of the language family are the Khoin and San languages. 
The Khoin-speaking nations used to be referred to as Hottentots – a name of 
uncertain origin – while the word Bushmen was previously used for the San 
peoples. The use of these names is no longer customary in the scholarly literature. 
The most prominent characteristic of the Khoisan languages is the use of various 
click-like sounds; the number of speakers of these languages is decreasing due to 
linguistic assimilation. 
The languages of the Austronesian (former name: Malayo-Polynesian) 
language family, while absent from the African continent, are present on the 
island of Madagascar off the east coast of the continent. Most of the languages of 
this family are spoken in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific, and such languages 
were brought to Madagascar by immigrants arriving from that region. Later, the 
immigrants intermarried with other ethnicities arriving from the African 
continent, and therefore Austronesian languages are also used by populations of 
Black African origin there. The official language of Madagascar is Malagasy (or 
Malgache according to French spelling), which is a typical Austronesian 
language. The importance of this language family is infinitesimal with respect to 
other areas of Africa. 
The Indo-European language family has to be mentioned too, although it 
is only from the twentieth century that these languages (primarily English, French 
and Portuguese) have been used in Africa to any appreciable extent. What accords 
these languages significance is in the fact that, although very few Africans use 
them as their native languages, most contemporary African states have preserved 
the official use of the language of the former colonial power. The reason usually 
cited to account for this is the linguistic heterogeneity of the African counties, 
since the latter makes it necessary to rely on a vehicular language. However, this 
rationalisation is unconvincing for two reasons. On the one hand, in most of the 
multi-ethnic, linguistically diverse African counties there is an African lingua 
franca as well which is understood by the majority of the people (e.g. Wolof in 
Senegal, Lingala in Congo, Dyula in Ivory Coast, Swahili in the East African 
countries, etc.). On the other hand, one must note that the language of the former 
colonial power has usually been preserved for official purposes even in those 
African countries that are practically monolingual: a good example is French as 
the official language of Rwanda, where everybody speaks the local Kinyarwanda 
language. Therefore, the multilingual situation seems rather like a mere pretext, 
while the real reason may be that the African political élites that emerged during 
the colonial period try to preserve their exclusive power and cultural monopoly, 
seeking to restrict social mobility through linguistic policy among other things. 
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European languages have very few native speakers in Africa, although in some 
places unique local versions did appear (e.g. South Nigerian Pidgin English and 
Sierra Leonean Krio), and of course there is the Afrikaans language spoken by 
the white population of South Africa, virtually a variant of Dutch. 
The name of the Afroasiatic (former name: Hamito-Semitic) language 
family speaks for itself: these languages are spoken partly in the African continent 
and partly in Asia; it is noteworthy that the vast majority of the speakers of 
Afroasiatic languages are Africans. The languages of this family may be 
classified into several branches; the branches that merit a mention here are the 
Semitic, Berber, Ancient Egyptian, Cushitic, Chadic and the so-called Omotic 
languages. We will not discuss the now extinct Ancient Egyptian language 
(which was not used in Sub-Saharan Africa anyway) and the Omotic languages, 
which are spoken by tiny ethnic groups in the southwestern part of Ethiopia, 
however, we will discuss each of the other four groups. 
Many of the Semitic languages (for example, Hebrew, Aramaic, partially 
Arabic) are spoken by populations of non-African origin in the territory of 
Southwest Asia and in the Middle East. However, the majority of the Semitic-
speaking populations of the world are African. Arabic is by far the most important 
Semitic language, being the official language of the northern zone of the African 
continent, and it is the mother language of countless people within Sub-Saharan 
Africa as well. Several million people who speak Arabic as their mother language 
live in the Sudan and Chad, the majority of this population originates from 
Africans who adopted the Arabic language. Another large bloc of the Semitic 
languages is also located within Sub-Saharan Africa, to be precise in the 
Ethiopian highlands, where the (mostly Christian) Amharic- and Tigrinya-
speaking population play a dominant role in politics. The official language of 
Ethiopia is Amharic. These modern Semitic languages are the descendants of the 
medieval Ge’ez language, which has survived as a written language used in the 
Ethiopian Christian church to this day. 
Although the Berber dialects are spoken mostly in North Africa and in the 
western part of the Sahara, groups which speak Berber as their native language 
(mainly the Tuareg people, the dialect of whom is known as Tamasheq) are also 
present in certain areas of West Africa (e.g. in Mali and Niger). As a result of 
slavery and frequent intermarriage, a significant part of the Berber-speaking 
populations of African are black. It should be noted that the Tuareg people 
developed their own writing system (the so-called Tifinagh script), although in 
circumstances of a nomadic lifestyle the use of this writing has always been 
limited. Today, the modern version of this script is taught in elementary schools 
in Morocco, to record the standardised Berber language. 
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The Cushitic languages constitute one of the most important, most widely 
spoken language groups of Africa. The vast majority of the speakers of Cushitic 
languages are Muslim and live mostly to the south, east and northeast of the 
Ethiopian highlands. The largest Cushitic language is Oromo; however, Somali 
is spoken by almost as many people; there are far fewer speakers of Afar (or 
Danakil) and of the Sudanese Beja languages. 
The Chadic languages – as suggested by the name – are spoken around 
Lake Chad, mainly in the territory of Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. Although a 
multitude of Chadic languages exist, only one of these, namely Hausa, has special 
significance, being as it is second only to Swahili among the languages of Africa 
in terms of the number of speakers. Hausa is spoken as a native language mostly 
in the territory of Nigeria and Niger; however, it is used as a vehicular language 
in other areas of West Africa as well. The Hausa-speaking population is almost 
entirely Muslim.  
The name of the Nilo-Saharan language family is also based on 
geographical criteria, and as suggested by the name these languages are spoken 
partly in the Sahara (more specifically in the southern and south-eastern 
extremities of the Sahara) and partly along the Nile. The speakers of the Nilotic 
languages live south of Egypt, primary in the Upper White Nile area, from where 
certain Nilotic-speaking (nomadic and pastoral) ethnicities migrated southwards 
to East Africa (to the territory of today’s Kenya and Tanzania) in the last few 
centuries. The latter groups include the Kenyan Luo people and the Kenyan and 
Tanzanian Maasai people, while the South Sudanese Dinka and Nuer peoples are 
some of the more important Nilotic-speaking groups that have stayed along the 
Upper Nile. The most important language of the Saharan branch of this language 
family is Songhai, which is spoken in Mali and Niger, along the middle section 
of the Niger river. The languages of the Tibbu and the Zaghawa, spoken in Chad 
and in northern Sudan, are also among the more important languages of this 
group. 
In geographic terms as well as, in all probability, in terms of the number of 
languages it encompasses, the Niger-Congo language family is the most 
widespread group of languages in Africa. The Niger is the largest river in West 
Africa, while the Congo is the largest river in the southern half of Africa, and 
these two geographical names roughly define the geographic expansion of the 
language family: the Niger-Congo languages are spoken in most of West Africa 
and in the southern half of the continent. A language family present over such a 
vast area is of course very diverse, which makes it necessary to identify 
subdivisions. Two main branches, and within those branches, subdivisions can be 
identified: the languages of West Africa form one of the two main branches, and 
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the so-called Bantu languages, spoken in the southern part of Africa, form the 
other. 
The languages of West Africa may be classified into a number of distinct 
groupings. The following are some of the most important divisions: the West 
Atlantic languages of the region extending along the ocean’s coast from Senegal 
to Liberia (among these languages Wolof, the quasi-official language of Senegal, 
and Fulfulde, the language of the Fulani people widespread throughout West 
Africa have the greatest importance); the Mande languages in the territory of 
Mali, the Ivory Coast, the Gambia and Guinea (e.g. Banmana, Dyula and 
Mandinka); the Voltaic languages (mainly in the territory of Mali, Burkina Faso 
and Ghana); and the so-called Kwa languages along the coast of the Gulf of 
Guinea (e.g. Akan in southern Ghana and Yoruba and Igbo in southern Nigeria). 
The entire southern half of Africa is the home of the Bantu languages, a 
group of languages with subdivisions of its own. The word Bantu means 
“people”, and most of these languages tend to express this concept with some 
form of this word (e.g. in Swahili “people”: watu). Among the Bantu languages 
Swahili, which was originally used by the population of the east coast of Africa 
as their native language, is by far the most important. The very name Swahili 
(more precisely Kiswahili) points to its geographical origins, since the word is 
derived from the Arabic term sawāḥil (“coastal areas”). A strong Arabian cultural 
influence is attested by not only the Islamic religious identity of the Swahili but 
also by the not insignificant part of the Swahili vocabulary that is made up of 
loanwords of Arabic origin (it bears emphasis, however, that the greater part of 
the vocabulary and the entire grammar are purely Bantu). In addition to native 
speakers, Swahili is commonly used as a language of interethnic communication 
in all countries of East Africa, which has now turned it into the African language 
with the greatest numbers of speakers. Other important Bantu languages (also 
used for interethnic communication on a regional level) include Lingala and 
Kikongo in the Congo Basin, Zulu and Xhosa in South Africa, Kikuyu in Kenya 
and Luganda in Uganda. 
 
5.1.6. Literacy and oral tradition 
 
It is a frequently heard claim that literacy did not exist, or at least played a 
negligible role, in precolonial African civilisations. Although the claim is 
definitely wrong, it could hardly be disputed that writing was indeed unknown in 
many precolonial African cultures, and where it did exist it played a much more 
restricted role than in, say, Europe, the Middle East or the Far East. It is also 
important to note that the knowledge and practice of writing – wherever there was 
a written tradition at all – was typically the privilege of a small, specialised group 
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of experts, and writing was never used for trite, everyday purposes. Thus, some 
African societies in fact did not use writing, while some other societies did use 
writing but only with certain limitations. The specialist literature uses the term 
“restricted literacy” for the latter situation. Restricted literacy characterised many 
African civilisations before the colonial era. 
 
Figure 68: Mistrels (griot) from King Sambala’s court (Medina, Mali) 
Source: Henri-Nicolas Frey, Côte occidentale d’Afrique: vues, scènes, croquis, C. 
Marpon & E. Flammarion, Paris, 1890, p. 128. 
 
As a result, oral traditions played a crucial role in the preservation of 
historical memory in most of Africa. So much so that in several African societies 
it was the task of a separate specialised social stratum – in many cases virtually 
an endogamous, closed caste – to memorise oral traditions, pass them on and 
perform them on designated occasions. An example of such groups is the so-
called griot caste that existed in much of the savannah zone of West Africa, 
members of which were responsible for maintaining historical memory in the 
service of rulers or nobles as a full-time occupation: they memorised, preserved 
and transmitted historic traditions, legends of origin, dynastic and aristocratic 
genealogies. Such traditions were often performed to musical accompaniment, 
therefore members of the griot caste had to excel as musicians or singer-
storytellers as well. Some of the historical traditions were rather long and 
detailed, so much so that they can be considered as veritable epics (Figure 68). 
The most well-known and most influential epic of this kind is probably that 
immortalising the founder of the Mali Empire, the first member of the ruling 
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dynasty, Sundyata Keita, a historical figure. This text is preserved to this day in 
numerous versions and is still performed regularly, among others on radios and 
televisions of the region. 
 
Figure 69: First page of a nineteenth-century family chronicle from Northern Ghana 
Source: Photograph courtesy of MUHAMMAD HAFIZ 
 
Past works of African literacy which are extant are primarily historical 
works (the chronicles of states, dynasties, ethnic groups or families), administra-
tive documents (tax documentation, documents recording estate boundaries, etc.), 
and works on religious topics (Bible translations, Quran copies and Quran com-
mentaries, the hagiographies of Christian or Muslim saints, Islamic juridical 
works). A smaller number of literary works also survived in written form (for 
example, the poems of the eighteenth-century Swahili poet Muyaka bin Mwinyi 
Haji al-Ghassani). Written chronicles are valuable sources of African history, and 
wherever such chronicles exist and have survived they allow us to know much 
more about the historical past than in contexts in which such sources are not avail-
able (Figure 69). Exceptionally rich sources of historical information are, for in-
stance, two local chronicles in Arabic of the medieval West African empires (see 
below), Mahmud Kati’s work titled Tarikh al-fattash (late sixteenth century) and 
Abd al-Rahman al-Sa’di’s work titled Tarikh al-Sudan (seventeenth century). A 
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relatively great number of extant written sources are available on the history of 
Ethiopia, and there are numerous historical works in verse and in prose (utenzi 
and habari) on the East African coast as well, among others the chronicles of the 
medieval Kilwa (Tanzania) and Pate (Kenya) sultanates. 
 
Figure 70: Book written in the script of the Bamum people of Cameroon, c. 1910 
Source: Patrick Landmann/Science Photo Library 
 
African writing can be classified into three different types, namely: 1. the 
use of foreign writing systems by Africans for recording foreign languages; 2. the 
adaptation of foreign scripts for recording African languages; 3. the use of 
locally-developed scripts for recording African languages. This order of listing 
also shows the prevalence of the three types of writing: the most widespread prac-
tice was for Africans to utilise foreign languages (especially Arabic or certain 
European languages) for their own purposes, using the script of that foreign lan-
guage. The least common practice was for Africans to develop their own writing 
systems in order to record their own languages. The third type (i.e. various Afri-
can languages being recorded in foreign – Arabic or Latin – a characters) was not 
rare in certain regions, but it was far from general. In Muslim societies this type 
of literacy (African languages written in Arabic script) was usually called Ajami 
(a term of Arabic origin; meaning “non-Arabic”), and starting from the late 
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Middle Ages, quite a lot of works were composed in this system in languages of 
Muslim African ethnic groups: in Hausa, Fulfulde, Wolof, Yoruba, Swahili, 
Oromo, etc. The use of Latin script for recording African languages became typ-
ical in a much later period, and initially it was linked to missionary activities and 
Bible translations, however, over time literacy in the Latin-script lost its religious 
connotations and now – for practical reasons – even most of the Muslim African 
peoples (including the ones mentioned above) write their languages using Latin 
characters. The majority of the writing systems developed locally for African lan-
guages have always been used by a select few and rarely. However, there were 
and are quite a number of such writing systems: e.g. the Yasini writing which was 
developed in the Middle Ages in what is today Mali and Mauritania, the writing 
system called N’ko of the Banmana people living in Mali, and the scripts of the 
Cameroonian Bamum people (Figure 70) and the Vai people of Liberia. 
 
Figure 71: Ethiopian manuscript including gospel extracts and prayers in Ge’ez 
language. Archangels Michael and Gabriel on the right 
Source: The Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Ms Etióp 4. 
 
There is only one African writing system which has been used since 
Antiquity to this day and in which a substantial quantity of texts have been com-
posed (including nowadays newspapers, books, Internet sites, etc.): the script of 
the Ge’ez language, which was and is used to record much of the Ethiopian Chris-
tian religious and literary tradition (also in the Amhara and the Tigrinya 
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languages) (Figure 71). Some African languages have used more than one script 
over time. Thus, for example, the Cameroonian Bamum people (who are mostly 
Muslim) have on different occasions recorded their language in Arabic script 
(Ajami), Latin script, and at the beginning of the twentieth century their sultan 
named Njoya even developed their own special writing system. 
 
5.1.7. Social structure 
 
It is difficult to discuss the political structures of African societies in gen-
eralised terms, and even more difficult to make statements valid for the whole 
continent. Social structures are an aspect in which the continent shows remark-
able variety that allows for only very limited generalisation. One fundamental 
distinction is nevertheless possible to make and it is all-important: while the ma-
jority of the African population have for centuries lived in feudal kingdoms, the 
social organisation of other ethnic groups remained on the level of tribal organi-
sation (e.g. the nomadic pastoralist peoples of East and Northeast Africa, such as 
the Cushitic-speaking Somali and Afar, and the Nilotic-speaking Maasai, Dinka 
and Nuer). Some African societies were more or less egalitarian, with but little 
socioeconomic differentiation, while other societies (e.g. the empires of West 
Africa) were characterised by marked class differences, and even had certain 
caste-like social strata. In the latter type of society, four fundamental strata tend 
to have been present: a nobility or military aristocracy centred on the rulers’ 
courts, the commoners who were mostly subsistence farmers, craftsmen and other 
specialised castes (including where applicable the group of the literate élite and 
griots), and lastly the slaves. It was also typical in most of the continent that the 
first inhabitants of a state, a region or a settlement – the early settlers or founders 
of a community – enjoyed special rights, and the populations who settled there 
later would be symbolically considered as their “guests”, while the first settlers 
would be regarded as the “hosts” of all later newcomers. This conception proved 
especially useful for long-distance trade, since a group of foreign traders who 
arrived in a region would thereby gain an advantageous symbolic status as 
“guests” of the original local population, and therefore could more easily estab-
lish amicable relationships , which facilitated successful trading activity. 
Most Sub-Saharan African societies attributed special social significance 
to biological age. This would often result in political leadership being explicitly 
based on age, with supreme power over the community being the preserve of its 
oldest members. This social organisation is called gerontocracy (“rule of the 
elders”), and this term does describe the nature of political power in many tradi-
tional African societies. Moreover, some ethnic groups in fact organised all mem-
bers of their society into age sets, i.e. institutionalised generational cohorts, and 
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the social obligations and rights of every person were based on membership in a 
particular age set. This organisation has been especially characteristic of the pas-
toralist peoples of East and Northeast Africa speaking Cushitic and Nilotic lan-
guages. For instances, among the Oromo people a new age set came into being 
every eight to nine years. Members of the same age set showed special solidarity 
towards each other, played the same the social roles required of their age cohort, 
and would eventually live to fill collectively the leadership roles monopolised by 
the elders’ set (unless, to be sure, they died before reaching that age ). The social 
significance of age also manifests itself in that most African peoples practised 
some form of the community ritual of initiation, by which the initiates would 
ritually – and often only after prolonged teaching and preparation – leave the 
status of children and acquire a new social status as adults. Initiation rituals were 
customary for both sexes, being strictly separate and different for each sex. 
Although in the most advanced civilisations of Africa – and especially in 
the larger empires – the majority of the population was engaged in agriculture, a 
significant portion was composed of groups which pursued some kind of special-
ised activity. As mentioned above, caste-like groups of artisans and other profes-
sionals included people charged with the task of preserving and transmitting his-
torical traditions. In like manner a distinct social group, or in some cases even a 
distinct ethnic group, would monopolise the positions requiring literacy (such as 
the Muslim literate élite of some parts of the West African savannah region, the 
so-called Jakhanke people). The castes or ethnic groups that often virtually mo-
nopolised long-distance trade had particular importance. Such specialised mer-
cantile communities operated trading networks which often spread over vast ter-
ritories; perhaps the best-known example being the trading network of the West 
African Wangara or Dyula ethnicity that operated from the coast of the Gulf of 
Guinea up to the south edge of the Sahara. This network carried Saharan salt and 
North African luxury items to the south, and kola nuts, fabrics, ivory and mainly 
gold in the opposite direction. 
Gold was one of the main export items of precolonial Africa, and it was a 
sought-after item of trade within Sub-Saharan Africa as well. Goldmines operated 
in many places, but above all in the territory of today’s Guinea and Ghana, Zim-
babwe and Mozambique. The medieval and early modern West African empires 
(e.g. the Mali and Songhai Empires, and later on the Ashanti Kingdom) owed 
their prosperity above all to the export of gold, and the same is true of such states 
of East Africa as Monomotapa, which flourished in what is today Zimbabwe. 
Gold of African origin was exported to Europe in such quantities that according 
to certain etymological speculations the English word “guinea” is derived from 
the toponym “Guinea”. In the course of his celebrated pilgrimage to Mecca the 
Mali emperor Mansa Musa Keita (1312‒1337) passed through Cairo with his 
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entourage, and he brought along such large quantities of the precious metal that 
the value of gold was inflated for several years’ time. 
In addition to gold, Africa had another export item from which traders 
could gain enormous profits: slaves. The slave trade and slavery have always been 
present in the societies of Africa – at least in stratified societies – but such 
activities were of relatively minor dimensions and certainly did not have a 
fundamental, defining impact upon the affected societies. This situation changed 
in the early modern age due to two factors: on the one hand, the Arab states of 
the Middle East were no longer able to import large quantities of slaves from 
Europe and Central Asia and therefore turned their attention to Sub-Saharan 
Africa; and an even more significant and tragic development was the increasing 
need of the plantation agriculture of the New World for labour, which would 
create a demand for tens of millions of African slaves. The latter factor – the 
Atlantic slave trade – in particular had consequences nothing short of 
catastrophic: it would destroy traditional social structures, create conditions of 
widespread insecurity and fuel continuous wars. The middlemen of this wretched 
trade made fortunes from raiding for and selling slaves, which established 
parasitic economies and caused immeasurable suffering to neighbouring 
societies. Such parasitic middlemen communities emerged on both the West 
African and the East African coasts; the former were mostly Christian, while the 
latter were Muslim Africans. (A typical example of the wealthy slave trader was 
the late nineteenth-century trader of Congolese origin, Hamad bin Muhammad 
bin Juma bin Rajab el Murjebi – better known under the nickname Tippu Tip – 
the autobiography of whom is incidentally one of the classics old Swahili 
literature.) It is difficult even to estimate the exact number of Africans carried 
over the Atlantic Ocean, but they were many millions or even tens of millions, 
and further millions lost their lives during the voyage or due to warfare in their 
homelands. There is simply no more tragic episode in the history of Africa than 
the era of the slave trade. 
 
5.1.8. Religion 
 
Traditional African religious practice is so varied that very few universally 
applicable observations can be made. The majority of African local religions were 
explicitly specific to one single ethnicity, and thus can be described as ethnic 
religion. For example, the supreme god of the shepherding Maasai people, Ngai 
– similarly to the God of the Old Testament – was concerned about the welfare 
of this particular ethnic group only (thus He deemed it a heinous sin against the 
universal order of things that peoples other than the Maasai should possess cattle). 
Even the question of whether traditional African religions can be considered as 
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monotheisms or rather as polytheisms cannot be answered unequivocally. Most 
African religions had one creator god responsible for the creation of the entire 
world, including all other deities or spirits. Such religious systems could indeed 
be termed monotheisms, provided that other deities are thought to be beings of 
lesser status vis-à-vis the creator god. Some African religions – for example, the 
cult of Waaq, the sky god of Cushitic-speaking peoples – display this tendency, 
and therefore there is good reason to consider them monotheisms. However, other 
African ethnic religions regarded creation as the only important act of the 
supreme deity, who would thereupon cease to interfere with the affairs of this 
world (in religious studies, creator gods playing such a limited role are referred 
to by the Latin term deus otiosus); therefore the focus of religious worship are the 
other, lesser deities whom he created and who manage the matters of the world, 
and who therefore must be placated. In this sense traditional African religions 
show the characteristics of polytheism. However, it should be noted that such 
definitions also depend on whether these beings are regarded as “deities” or as 
“spirits” by followers of the cult, since the latter interpretation is consistent with 
the monotheistic teachings (and therefore with Islam and Christianity as well). 
This allows for example the Yoruba Muslims and Christians to preserve the cult 
of the so-called orishas, now considering these beings as spirits rather than 
deities. 
 
Figure 72: Local commanders of the Tijaniyyah Sufi Order in Kiota, southwest Niger 
Source: Photograph by ZOLTÁN SZOMBATHY 
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The belief in various incorporeal, invisible beings which however interact 
with the people was – and still is – generally characteristic of Africa. This 
conception, according to which animals, plants and even inanimate objects have 
souls and therefore a volition of their own, is called animism. Many types of 
spirits (or deities) appear in African religions, and every type is the object of 
unique rituals. Thus certain spirits are linked to places (local spirits), others 
protect certain persons or communities (protective spirits), while others may 
invade the bodies of people (possessive spirits), Belief in the spirits of the 
deceased ancestors and their worship is probably more important and widespread 
than the cults of any other type of spirit. 
The cult of ancestors may take numerous forms – one common type of 
ritual is the offering of food, drink or sacrificial animals at shrines designated 
specifically for this purpose – and an especially important type of such rituals is 
the phenomenon of masking cults. The use of masks in religious rituals is 
common in a considerable part of Africa, while it is unknown in the cultures of 
numerous African peoples (for example, the peoples speaking Cushitic and 
Nilotic languages have never used masks). Wonderful as works of art and 
therefore treasured possessions of many Western museums, it is important to 
emphasise that masks are definitely not art for art’s sake in the African perception 
but objects which play an important cultic role. The main function of masks is to 
personify a spirit (or deity) and hide the person wearing the mask, and therefore 
the costume (made of fabric or vegetable fibres) attached to the mask and 
covering the entire body is always an integral part of an African mask. A famous 
and to this day common example of masked rituals is the cult of the Egungun 
spirits of the Yoruba people in Nigeria and Benin. The Egungun masks embody 
the spirits of the ancestors, which appear regularly so as to exhort their 
descendants to observe proper behaviour and respect the traditions. They address 
people during the rituals in a strange, high-pitched voice similar to a frog’s 
croaking. The masked rituals live on in Christian and Muslim environments as 
well (the majority of the Yoruba people are either Protestant Christians or 
Muslims); thus the do masks of the Dyula people of the Ivory Coast and Mali, 
who have been Muslim for centuries, are primarily used on occasion of the two 
main Muslim holidays. However, over the last 100 to 200 years African religious 
life has undergone enormous changes: the vast majority (today more than 90 
percent) of Sub-Saharan Africans have become the followers of the two great 
world religions, Christianity and Islam. This has not resulted in the complete 
disappearance of traditional religions: many elements of the older cults – for 
example the cults of spirits, masked rituals, etc. – have been integrated into the 
religious lives of Muslim and Christian believers, giving rise to heavy religious 
syncretism (the mixing of religious elements from different traditions). Both 
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African Islam and African Christianity are characterised by a great deal of 
syncretistic features, although this phenomenon is the object of vehement 
criticism in both religious traditions. 
 
Map 26: Religions of Africa 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The mystical tradition of Islam – Sufism - is extremely prevalent among African 
Muslims, and some Sufi orders show markedly syncretic characteristics (such as 
the Senegalese Mouride Sufi order, and even more its sub-group called Baye Fall) 
(Figure 72). There are also countless small churches within African Christianity, 
with indigenous churches often unashamedly mixing elements of African 
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religious practices with Christian teachings. Well-known examples of this include 
the southern Nigerian Aladura (“praying”) churches and the sect of the Congolese 
religious leader Simon Kimbangu. 
Both Christianity and Islam appeared in Sub-Saharan Africa in a quite 
early period: Christianity was dominant in the Ethiopian highlands (and for some 
time in Nubia as well) during the Early Middle Ages (since the fourth century), 
and as is proudly stressed by African Muslims, the first Muslim community 
outside Mecca was formed in Ethiopia, in a settlement named Negash (this is the 
so-called “first emigration”, or al-hijra al-ula in Arabic). In the Middle Ages 
Islam spread over the greater part of West Africa, in Northeast Africa and on the 
East African coast, however, with the exception of the latter region Islam 
continued to be the religion of a (substantial) minority until colonial period. The 
colonial period, and especially the first half of the twentieth century, was a turning 
point in the process of conversion, with a significant part of Sub-Saharan Africa 
becoming almost entirely Muslim in this period, while other parts became largely 
Christian. Today, half of Sub-Saharan Africans (mostly in the southern half of 
the continent) are Christians, and more than a third of Sub-Saharan Africans are 
Muslims (Map 26). 
An unsettling development of recent decades throughout Africa is the 
increasing influence of modern religious fundamentalism (and the accompanying 
religious intolerance) both in Christianity and in Islam. In the Christian regions 
of Africa the main agents of this trend are the US-inspired Pentecostal and 
Evangelical churches, while in Muslim lands the they are mainly the Salafi and 
Wahhabi movements that often reflect the influence of Saudi Arabia as well as 
the extremists of such groups who propagate jihad (holy war). 
 
5.1.9. History, African states 
 
As noted above, stateless ethnic groups did exist on the African continent, 
but the majority of Africans lived as subjects of various kingdoms from the 
Middle Ages onwards. These kingdoms show considerable variety; yet the 
absolute power of the ruler and the existence of a feudal elite supporting it are 
almost universally characteristic of them. Absolute power was usually expressed 
symbolically through the use of magnificent regalia (thrones, parasols, 
palanquines, horns, ceremonial garments) and often by the custom of the king 
having to address his subjects only through an “interpreter.” In some societies 
royal absolutism evolved into the institution of divine kingship. The economic 
basis of the feudal states was provided by the peasantry, who constituted the 
majority of the population, as well as by taxes and duties from the quite profitable 
long-distance trade. The military basis was provided by cavalry troops in the 
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states of the savannah region, and by archers and (later) infantry in the kingdoms 
of the jungle zone, in which African trypanosomiasis precluded the use of horses. 
After the appearance of Europeans in the sixteenth century, firearms spread 
rapidly throughout Africa, and over the next centuries the armies of a significant 
number of feudal kingdoms (e.g. the Ashanti Empire in Ghana from the 
eighteenth century) relied on firearms.  
 
Map 27: Major pre-colonial states in Africa 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
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In precolonial Africa, the majority of the most advanced kingdoms were 
concentrated in three regions (Map 27): 1. Northeast Africa (the highlands of 
Ethiopia and the regions along the Nile in the Sudan); 2. West Africa; 3. the 
Bantu-speaking regions (including multiple concentrations of states such as the 
Congo Basin; the area of today’s Zimbabwe and the coast of East Africa). 
 
Figure 73: Dutch image of the city of Benin (today in Nigeria), 1668. 
Source: Olfert Dapper, Naukeurige Beschrijving der Afrikaensche gewesten. 
Amsterdam: Jacob van Meurs, 1678 (original edition 1668), 678‒679. 
 
The earliest Sub-Saharan African states emerged in Northeast Africa as 
early as in Antiquity. By far the most ancient Sub-Saharan African statehood 
emerged in Nubia, which was under heavy Egyptian influence. The black 
pharaohs of the Twenty-fifth 'ynasty conquered Egypt from Nubia in the mid-
eighth century BCE, and the Nubian states of Meroe and Napata reflect this 
tradition. Later too Nubia was heavily influenced by Egypt, an impact reflected 
in the adoption of Monophysite Christianity in the Early Middle Ages and in the 
emergence of Muslim states in Nubia from the Late Middle Ages. The Ethiopian 
highlands also saw the development of sophisticated states from Antiquity, , 
reflecting the powerful influence of Christian Egypt –up to the twentieth century 
the head of the Monophysite church was the Patriarch of Alexandria – as well as 
of Christian (and to a smaller extent Israelite) immigrants arriving from Yemen 
in the south of the Arabian Peninsula. The Ethiopian state has been Christian 
since Antiquity, and it was able to expand its dominion over the Muslim and 
animistic populations of the peripheral regions only in the last centuries. In West 
Africa, the first states and then empires emerged much later than in than in the 
northeast, but when they did there came a succession of large empires in the 
savannah zone. The first of the three greatest West African empires, Ghana 
(neither a predecessor of today’s state of the same name nor even situated in the 
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same area), was founded by non-Muslims but it converted to Islam before its 
demise. However, the other empires of the savannah region were ruled by Muslim 
dynasties. 
Ghana was followed by the Mali Empire, which reached the apogee of its 
power in the fourteenth century. Then came the turn of the Songhai Empire in 
what is today Mali and Niger in the fifteenth to sixteenth century. East of these 
empires other (smaller) Muslim states flourished, for instance Bornu around Lake 
Chad, and the states of the Hausa people in today’s North Nigeria. From the early 
eighteenth century until the appearance of the colonisers the history of the West 
African states was determined by the Muslim jihad movements which intended 
to “purify” Islam, and by the resulting theocratic states ruled by the Fulani people. 
In the southernmost belt of West Africa, on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, a 
series of feudal states emerged, in which the role of Islam was far less significant, 
indeed quite insignificant in some cases. Such states included the kingdoms of the 
Yoruba people (especially Benin in what is now Nigeria – not in the modern state 
of the same name) and the Ashanti Empire in Ghana (Figure 73). In the southern 
part of Africa, numerous important kingdoms emerged in the Bantu-speaking 
areas: in the Congo Basin (for example, the kingdom of the Kuba people, and the 
Kingdom of Congo, which was under heavy Portuguese influence from the 
sixteenth century), in the territory of today’s Zimbabwe and the neighbouring 
countries (for example, the late medieval Monomotapa Empire along the 
Zambezi River, which became rich from the export of gold), as well as the 
Muslim Swahili city-states along the entire East African coastline. 
 
5.1.10. Arts 
 
A lot of African societies produced large quantities of exquisite and 
beautiful fabrics. The types of African textiles are too varied even for a brief 
overview, thus a few well-known examples will suffice: the patterned adinkra 
and kente fabrics of the Ashanti people in Ghana, the wonderful embroidered 
cloth woven from the fibres of the raffia palm in the Congo Basin – which is often 
referred to as Congolese velvet – and the cotton fabrics produced in the city of 
Kano in North Nigeria and dyed with indigo. 
Sculpture may well be the best-known and most iconic African art form. 
The very best of African sculpture is characterised by the to the tendency of 
abstract depictions, a feature surprisingly dominant in the sculpture all over the 
continent. Not that African artists were unable to create quite realistic images: for 
example, some of the bronze sculptures of Benin City and the Congolese wooden 
sculptures are astonishingly lifelike portraits. The abstraction of physical forms 
into geometric shapes, the almost caricature-like highlighting of certain 
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accentuated formal characteristics are a conscious, deliberate method, which 
touched a chord with a lot of European graphic artists at the beginning of the 
twentieth century so much that Cubism was explicitly inspired by the approach 
of African art. 
The most important genre of African graphic arts may be the exquisite 
woodcarving of the continent. In addition to various sculptures often serving 
cultic purposes, many African ethnic groups produced masks, whose religious 
role has already been commented upon. Some peoples of the Congo Basin and 
the East African Makonde people are particularly famous for their woodcarving. 
For example, in the kingdom of the Congolese Kuba people, an “official” portrait 
sculpture (ndop), carved from wood, was made of every ruler. Although the ndop 
sculptures are highly stylised portraits, they always include a symbolic object 
(iboi) which helps identify the king by alluding to an object associated with him: 
for example, Shamba Bolongongo, 93rd king of Kuba in the late sixteenth 
century, was fond of a characteristic African board game, and therefore his 
portrait statue (now in the British Museum) incorporates such a board. 
 
Figure 74: Three warriors, c. sixteenth-century Yoruba bronze plaque from Benin 
Source: Photograph by Saiko, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benin_Bronzes#/ 
media/File:Benin,_placca_con_tre_guerrieri,_XVI-XVII_sec.JPG 
5.1. The Civilisations of Africa 
319 

Apart from wood, some African peoples also used metal as the raw 
material of sculpture. For centuries the most important Yoruba states – above all 
Ife and Benin – produced a great variety of beautiful bronze sculptures using the 
so-called cire-perdue (lost-wax) technique; these sculptures show an astonish-
ingly high level of artistry (Figure 74). 
The subject-matter of these sculptures is quite varied. However, most of 
them are lifelike portraits (for example, one famous piece depicts a sixteenth-
century Portuguese musketeer) and animal figures (Figure 75). The majority of 
the works of this art genre have been carried away by the colonisers, and to this 
day Nigeria strives to no avail to recover its artistic heritage. This type of art was 
adapted by the neighbouring Yoruba states as well, and it is still practiced in 
Benin City. 
 
Figure 75: Yoruba bronze portrait from the city of Ife, today in the British Museum 
Source: Photograph by Saiko, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronze_Head_from_Ife#/ 
media/File:Arte_yoruba,_nigeria,_testa_da_ife,_12-15mo_secolo.JPG 
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The typical genre of the fantastic copper and bronze sculpture of the 
Ashanti people in Ghana – carefully elaborated figurines, which were designated 
to measure gold-dust (mrammu) – may be counted among the best of African 
metal sculpture. (Figure 76). 
 
 
Figure 76: Ashanti copper figurines from Ghana, for weighing gold, in the British 
Beaney House of Art and Knowledge (Canterbury) collection 
Source: Photograph by Geni, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akan_goldweights#/media/ 
File:Ashanti_goldweights.JPG 
 
Whereas a significant number of African peoples did not use permanent 
materials for construction – in many places such materials were simply 
unavailable –some societies did develop architecture to a high level. The earliest 
examples of durable architectural works are the pyramids located in the Nubian 
region of the Sudan (mainly around the town of Meroe), which despite all 
observable differences reflect the Egyptian influence. 
A little-known fact, today one finds more pyramids in the Sudan than in 
Egypt itself. No less fascinating are the stone-built architectural monuments of 
the Christian Ethiopian highlands, including the giant ancient stelae in the town 
of Axum, the medieval rock churches of the town of Lalibela, the rock-hewn 
monasteries of Tigray province, as well as the buildings (including the fortress) 
of the late-medieval Ethiopian capital city, Gondar (Figure 77). 
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Although the Muslim regions of Ethiopia do not abound in similar 
architectural wonders, there is one important exception: the vast medieval old 
town (encircled by several kilometres of city walls) of Harar. A large number of 
stone-built monuments survived in the more southerly, Bantu-speaking regions 
of Africa, as in the Swahili city-states of the East African coast, in which the main 
building material was coral.  
 
Figure 77: Bete Giyorgis (Church of St. George) in Lalibela (Ethiopia) 
Source: Photograph by Bernard Gagnon, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_ of_ 
Saint_George,_Lalibela#/media/File:Bete_Giyorgis_03.jpg 
 
An exhaustive list of the hundreds of these settlements is impossible here, 
but particularly worthy of mention are the old towns of Zanzibar (Tanzania), 
Lamu and Mombasa (Kenya), as well as Mogadishu (Somalia), the ruins of Gedi 
on the Kenyan coast, and above all the seat of the sultans of medieval Kilwa in 
the south of Tanzania, the most important remnant of which is the huge fortress 
of the sultans (Husuni Kubwa). 
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Further inland, lasting architectural monuments are found primarily in the 
Zimbabwe region, where one can admire the ruins of numerous enormous stone 
complexes surrounded by walls. The most significant ruins include the so-called 
Great Zimbabwe – which lends its name to today’s state of Zimbabwe – and 
Mapungubwe. According to researchers, the inspiration behind these huge round 
stone complexes was the simple cattle corral fenced off with thorny branches. 
Such structures were first built in smaller sizes, but already using stone walls (this 
intermediary state is illustrated by the ruins of the Kenyan Thimlich Ohinga 
among other places) and then later versions magnified to huge size were built 
(Figure 78). 
 
Figure 78: Part of the Great-Zimbabwe Buildings 
Source: Photograph by Vinz and Korrigan, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Great_Zimbab 
we#/media/File:Great_zimbabwe_2.jpg 
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In most of West Africa stone is not available in sufficient quantities to 
allow people to use it for construction. However, in the states of the savannah belt 
a breath-taking architectural style, the so-called “Sudanic Gothic” style, was 
developed, using mud as the main building material. (The adjective ‘Sudanic’ 
refers not to today’s Sudan Republic but to the entire savannah region situated 
south of the Sahara). Mud architecture had been developed to an advanced level 
by the stateless peoples living there, examples of which include the large mud 
houses of the Musgum people in Chad and the mud fortresses (tata) of the 
Tamberma people of northern Togo and Benin. Later on, developing this 
technology further, enormous and wonderfully beautiful public buildings were 
built in the great West African Muslim empires, which would be re-plastered 
every year after the end of the rainy season with the help of a wooden scaffolding 
built into the walls. Famous examples for this style are the Great Mosque of 
Djenne in Mali (and countless similar mosques in Mali and the neighbouring 
countries), the old town of Timbuktu, the emperor’s mausoleum of the Songhai 
Empire in the town of Gao, and the minaret of the town of Agadez in Niger (the 
tallest mud structure in the world) (Figure 79). 
 
Figure 79: Great Mosque of Djenne, one of the greatest architectural gems of the 
Sudanese-Gothic style 
Source: Photograph by Andy Gilham, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Mosque_of_ 
Djenn%C3%A9#/media/File:Great_Mosque_of_Djenn%C3%A9_1.jpg 
 
 
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5.1.11. Chronological table 
 
Date Event 
from 2000 BCE Nubian states developing under ancient Egyptian influence 
c. 500 BCE – 500 CE Meroe 
c. 300‒800 Axum 
c. 600‒1100 Ghana 
c. 1200‒1500 Mali Empire 
c. 1200‒1591 Songhai Empire 
c. 125‒1500 Great Zimbabwe 
c.1450‒1700 Monomotapa 
c. 1500 
The Portuguese arrive at the Gulf of Guinea and then reach East 
Africa 
eighteenth‒ 
nineteenth centuries 
In the savannah belt south of the Sahara, Muslim theocratic states are 
established. 
seventeenth‒ 
nineteenth centuries 
The era of transatlantic slave trade 
1700‒1900 k. Ashanti Empire 
1884‒1891 Division of Africa among the colonising powers 
1956‒80 The countries of Africa progressively gain their independence 
1963 Establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
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6.1. Orthodox Christian Europe: 
The Russian Version 
 
ZOLTÁN SZ. BÍRÓ 

6.1.1. Identification of the area 
 
The boundary in Europe between Western and Eastern Christianity runs 
more or less along the border between Russia and its neighbours Finland, Estonia 
and Latvia, between Belarus and the neighbouring Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, 
Ukraine and Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, along Romania’s western border, the 
borderline separating Serbia from Hungary and Croatia, as well as between 
Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These borders are, however, of a 
highly relative nature since large segments of the populations living in the 
western parts of Belarus, Ukraine and Romania do not belong to the local 
Orthodox Church but some denomination of Western Christianity or the secular 
communities of their respective countries. Nonetheless, the above borderline 
clearly separates areas whose development has been dominated by the Orthodox 
Church rather than Latin Christianity or Islam. Of the countries to be found on 
the map of Europe today this category includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Georgia, Romania, Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria, 
Albania, greets and Cyprus. Most – but not all – of the countries listed above have 
autocephalous, that is, autonomous, or, with some simplification, national, ortho-
dox churches (Map 28). The exceptions include Moldova, Belarus, Montenegro 
and Macedonia; they have no such autocephalous churches, because orthodox 
believers living in the territory of Moldova are associated with the Roman 
Orthodox Church or – like those living in Belarus – to the Moscow Patriarchate,  
while Eastern Christians in Montenegro and Macedonia are associated with the 
Serbian church. Ukraine is special in that not only many of the local clerics but 
the secular power also made considerable efforts after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union to ensure that Ukraine has its own unified and autonomous Eastern 
Christian church, recognised by the other autocephalous churches. At the same 
time, in addition to those listed above, the churches of Constantinople, 
Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Poland as well as the jointly Czech and 
Slovakian are still regarded as mutually recognised autocephalous churches. 
There is one more Orthodox Christian church in addition to the above-mentioned 
ones: the one in America, but its autonomy has still not been recognised by all 
Eastern Churches. This is why they say that there are altogether fourteen or 
fourteen plus one autocephalous churches today. This then reveals that there are 
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canonical, that is, mutually recognised churches even beyond the borderline 
separating Western and Eastern Christianity such as the Polish or the joint Czech 
and Slovak, just like other churches established by the apostles, whose followers 
have long been a minority relative to other denominations living in their 
respective territories. Such autocephalous Eastern Churches are those of 
Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem.  
The word “orthodox” in the names of the eastern or orthodox churches 
means “righteous/correct opinion”, being of the true faith. “Orthodoxy” means 
the correct faith – not conservatism or backwardness – as opposed to heterodoxy 
(different or other belief) and cacodoxy (erroneous belief). Pravoslav is none 
other but the Russian translation of the adjective orthodox, a word of Greek 
origin, which also means righteous. 
 
Map 28: Orthodox churches in Europe and the Middle East14 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 

The tradition of calling the church of the Western or Latin Christianity 
Catholic and the Eastern Christianity Orthodox developed gradually after the 
great schism in 1054. It was a long story the way Christian community which 

14 The first seven orthodox churches – listed in italics – were established by apostles 
during the first century. 
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used to be unified initially, split and began to drift away from each other. This 
process has been driven and influenced by historical and political factors as well 
as language, dogma and liturgy, along with differences regarding church politics 
and church organisation. One of the most well-known of the many debates 
regarding matters of dogma was the “Filioque” debate relating to the issue of the 
origin of the Holy Spirit. This is because the eastern churches – holding on to the 
universal teaching adopted by the synod in the fourth century – held that the Holy 
Spirit originated from the Father alone while the western church, protecting the 
Son’s divine authority, argued that the Holy Spirit originated from both the Father 
and the Son too (ex Patre Filioque procedit). The differences between their 
respective organisational systems however, played an even more profound role 
in the growing distance between the two churches than did their opposing 
dogmatic considerations. Namely, while in the eastern parts of the Roman Empire 
a number of local churches came into being pursuant to the apostles’ propagation 
of faith, linked together by the shared faith, while keeping their internal 
administration separate and independent of each other, in the western territories 
this process evolved in an altogether different direction; a new political situation 
evolved in the wake of the West Roman Empire in which concentration of 
spiritual power in a single centre appeared to be more advantageous for the 
survival of the church. In the east however, as the secular power managed to keep 
up its strength and the emperor managed to maintain order and the rule of law, 
the church was not forced to assume roles that are alien to the spiritual power. In 
the west on the other hand, the situation was different. The new Germanic 
kingdoms were engaged in constant rivalry with each other, creating an 
environment in which only the Pope represented a certain degree of unity and 
continuity. This provided the Pope with a role the like of which the eastern 
patriarchs never had. The differences between the centralised governance of the 
western church and the synodal, sort of collegial, governance by eastern 
patriarchates were growing more and more salient over time. The Byzantines 
never condemned the centralisation of the western church organisation as long as 
the Pope refrained from interfering with the lives of the eastern churches. This 
however, changed after a while and from the ninth century those in the west were 
growing increasingly convinced that the Popes’ canonical jurisdiction extended 
over the eastern territories as well. Christians living there however – while they 
were ready to recognise Rome’s honorary primacy and look upon the Pope as the 
first bishop of the pentarchy, that is, the rule of five comprising Rome, 
Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, they did not accept that the 
Pope should have the last word concerning all matters of importance. They held 
that no single individual, but only the synod of all bishops of the church, could 
decide matters of faith.
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From the middle of the ninth century the Byzantine Church crossed the 
boundaries of its home ground and embarked on an intensive evangelisation 
campaign in Central and Eastern Europe. A particularly important role was 
played in this missionary activity by two monks Cyril (826‒869) and Methodius 
(81‒885). Their first mission was to the Caucasus, then on to the Moravian 
Principality. For the local ruler asked the Byzantine Church for missionaries who 
can propagate the Christian faith in a Slavic language and are able to translate the 
Holy Bible into Slavic. This however, required the development of a suitable 
written form of the Slavic language as well. It did not take long for Cyril and 
Methodius to fulfil both requests, laying down the foundations for Slavic 
Christian church culture. By translating the Bible and church service books Slavs 
joining Orthodoxy acquired linguistic and cultural advantages not available for 
western Christianity for quite some time: Slavs could read the Book and listen to 
church service in their own language right from the beginning.
The people of Moravia were followed by other converted communities, 
from Bulgarians through Serbs to Romanians. The Christianisation of the eastern 
Slavs started in the late tenth century. Taking up Christianity played a major role 
later on in enabling Eastern Slavs to maintain their identity during the centuries 
of the Mongol invasion (1237–1480). And when Constantinople and other eastern 
patriarchates – those of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem – as well as the 
Balkan churches, came under rule while Russia then called Moscovia was no 
longer under Mongol control, the conditions were just right for the Russian 
church to play a dominant role in the orthodox world. This process took place in 
two phases. First the actual autonomy of the church was created by Russian 
bishops electing their religious leader, the new metropolitan of Moscow directly, 
bypassing Constantinople. This marked the beginning of the actual (though not 
yet recognised by others) autochefality of the Russian church. This de facto 
autonomy came to be recognised by the Constantinople Patriarchate only about a 
century and a half later, in 1589, which is when the metropolitan of Moscow was 
raised to the rank of a patriarch.
Another important element in the relationship between Moscow and 
Byzantium was that Ivan III (1462–1505), Grand Duke of Moscow, married the 
niece of the last Byzantine emperor in 1742. It was from that point in time that 
the ruler of Moscow used the title autocrator, and the Byzantine double-headed 
eagle in the national coat of arms. And it was also then that the ideological 
construct of Moscow as the third Rome appeared. According to this construct the 
first Rome was taken control over by the barbarians and fell into heresy; the 
second Rome, that is, Constantinople, got infected by the Florence Union and 
then fell under Ottoman rule; in other words, each of the former Romes had fallen 
but “the third Rome stands upright and there will be no fourth one”. This concept 
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was suggestive of a kind of a Russian messianism, giving rise to the perception 
that the Russians can justly consider themselves to be God’s chosen people.
Although the Russian Orthodox Church was not exposed to Reformation 
with the religious wars that broke out in its wake, yet it did not mean that it was 
not shaken from time to time by major religious polemics. The most profound of 
these was related to the innovations introduced by Patriarch Nikon. The 
Ecclesiarch of the mid-seventeenth century revised Russian liturgy books by 
comparing them to original Greek scripts. At the same time, he also insisted on 
Russians also cross themselves with three fingers in the Greek way, not with two, 
the way Russians did. But Nikon went even further than this. He attempted to 
raise the church over the state power. This however, would have meant breaking 
with the diarchal system, based on the rule of two powers, adopted by Russia 
following the Byzantine example, i.e. the model in which both the religious and 
the secular power play equally major roles, since it is their symphony, or close 
and harmonious cooperation, that forms the basis of effective and efficient 
governance of the community. Nikon failed to gain the upper hand in this conflict, 
however, he managed to “achieve” two things though his innovations. One was a 
schism in the Russian church, forming a large group of those refusing to accept 
his reforms. They were the orthodox separatists. On the other hand, through this 
schism he managed to weaken the church to such an extent that a few decades 
later Peter I (1682–1725) could not only easily subject it to, but even integrate it 
in the secular power. 

6.1.2. Russia’s territorial expansion 
 
The first state of the eastern Slavs was the Kievan Rus, an extensive, but 
short-lived, state formation. One reason for this was the absence of the right of 
the first-born in the ruling family; thus, it did not take long for the former single 
coherent state to fall into principalities vying even with each other. One of the 
consequences was a considerably reduced capability to resist the Mongolian-
Tartar forces moving towards Europe, as a result of which much of the areas 
populated by Slavs had come under tartar control by the middle of the thirteenth 
century. While the southern and central parts of the country were occupied by the 
Golden Horde, the western regions were conquered by the rising Lithuanian 
Grand Duchy. After a while the Grand Duchy of Moscow, covering the north 
eastern segment of the area populated by Slavs came to unite the Russian lands 
again. The duchy, lying at a considerable distance from Kiev, had grown from a 
mere 20 thousand square kilometres in the early fourteenth century had expanded 
to 430 thousand square kilometres by 1462 when Ivan III took the throne. In other 
words, it did not take more than a century and a half for the duchy to grow to 
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twenty times its former size (Map 29). This dynamic process of gaining territories 
continued: At the time Vasily III (1505–1533) died the territory of the Moscow 
state was more than six times its size seventy years before.
The rise, and then the rapid growth of the territory, of the Russian state 
with Moscow as its centre was essentially enabled by the fall of the Golden Horde 
and Byzantium, the collapse of the two empires that had exercised – political or 
religious – power over the Russian state up to the mid-fifteenth century. Relieved 
of their influence, Moscovia began to expand, at an increasing rate. This process 
accelerated particularly after Ivan IV (1533‒1584) defeated in the middle of the 
sixteenth century the Golden Horde’s two successor clanships: the clanship of 
Kazan (1552) and the clanship of Astrakhan (1556).
 
Map 29: Growth of the areas under Moscow’s influence up to the sixteenth century 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
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The country’s territory nearly doubled under his rule, growing from 2.8 
million to 5.4 million square kilometres. This was the era of the Moscovian state’s 
great and durable triumphalism which did not come to an end even upon the death 
of Ivan IV. So much so, that the area of the Grand Duchy of Moscow continued 
to grow by an average of 35 thousand square kilometres, the size of today’s 
Netherlands, each year during the next 150 years. Consequently, in 1600 the size 
of the Russian state equalled the size of the rest of Europe. The area of Siberia 
which it managed to conquer in the first half of the seventeenth century equalled 
twice the size of Europe without Russia (Map 30) However, this rapid expansion 
covered, for the most part, very sparsely populated areas. No significant 
populations lived even in the regions of the most densely populated towns of 
Novgorod and Pskov, let alone the territories beyond the Ural Mountains. The 
population density was not higher than two-three persons per square kilometre 
even in the European parts of the Russian state in the mid-sixteenth century, while 
in Western Europe it was typically about ten times as many. Although low 
population density enabled quick conquering of large areas against little 
resistance but then it made it very difficult to benefit from the opportunities 
offered by the territories so taken, as well as the governance of the country whose 
territory had increased to immense proportions. 
Map 30: Territorial expansion of Russia between the seventeenth century and 
World War One 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
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All these developments, however, took place before Peter I declared his 
state an empire in 1721. The new situation entailed not only practical conse-
quences, but it also profoundly affected the ideological foundations of the 
Russian statehood. Peter did not refrain from laying down sacral foundations for 
the mission pursued by the Russian state, but he did not find it alone to be 
sufficient either. Therefore, he tried to combine its elements in some way with 
rational western traditions. This was in relation to his endeavour to create not 
simply a universal Orthodox empire based on the Byzantine model but rather a 
global empire combining the traditions of the Byzantine and the Western Roman 
empire. It was in this spirit that he established the country’s new capital city and 
named it Saint Petersburg. Even the very naming of the city was a symbolic act. 
It was meant to remind all of Rome, the city of the apostle Peter. Indeed, even the 
keys in the town’s coat of arms were modelled after the apostolic keys in the coat 
of arms of the Vatican. With the foundation of a new capital city the Russian 
Empire had two sacral centres: Moscow as the Third Rome, and Saint Petersburg 
appearing as an analogue of the ancient Rome, the city of the apostle Peter. 
There is one more piece of evidence of how important it was for Peter I – 
in addition to following sacral traditions – to lay down secular foundations for his 
power. This evidence lies in the way the ruler adopted the title of imperator, as 
his procedure differed profoundly from the way Ivan IV took the title of tsar in 
1547. The latter had himself crowned when assuming the title of tsar, while Peter 
I did not consider this necessary when he adopted his new title. What can be 
rightly concluded from this is that while the adoption of the title of tsar was 
primarily a religious act, that of the imperator was a cultural one. The latter was 
not accompanied by any religious ceremony whatsoever; indeed, it may not really 
be regarded as an act aimed at expanding the ruler’s power. The decision taken 
by Peter I was to change the country’s cultural orientation. The renaming of the 
ruler’s title was aimed at underpinning the general orientation – towards Europe 
– of the reforms adopted by Peter. 
The territorial expansion of the empire continued in the eighteenth century, 
during the reign of both Peter I and Catherine II (1762–1796), all the more so, 
because the Russia had to live with its particular geographical conditions, the 
immensity of the territory acquired earlier, an area that had – and have – no 
natural borders apart from the Arctic Ocean in the north and the Pacific Ocean in 
the east. For this reason, the Russian state felt – just like earlier on, in the 
eighteenth century too – vulnerable and exposed. To suppress its fear, it started 
to threaten others and spared no effort to expand its boundaries as far as possible. 
Consequently, at the beginning of the century part of the Baltic and in the second 
half of the century Lithuania, along with more and more Polish areas, came under 
Russian control. Alaska was also gradually conquered during the reign of 
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Catherine II, just like the northern shores of the Black Sea. It was then that 
Russian forces reached the northern edge of the Caucasus and founded in 1784 
the now famous fortress town of Vladikavkaz (meaning “ruler of the Caucasus”). 
Nonetheless, at that time they did not yet succeed in pacifying the whole of the 
northern part of that mountainous area. Small local peoples continued to resist 
the Russian colonisation for decades to come. By contrast, Georgians, Armenians 
and Azeris living on the southern slopes of the Caucasus – then still referred to 
as Mountain Tartars – were incorporated in the empire as early as in the first third 
of the nineteenth century. This created a strange situation which the tsarist power 
wished to put an end to as quickly as possible, but it took until the mid-sixties to 
break the resistance of the small North Caucasian peoples and take full control 
over the Caucasus. And this has brought us to the moment in history when the 
size of the Russian Empire reached its maximum. This period was between 1864 
and 1866, when the empire included the areas of the Grand Duchy of Finland, 
Bessarabia and the former Polish Kingdom, taken during the Napoleonic wars. 
At that point the entire Caucasus already belonged to Russia, but the Saint 
Petersburg court had not sold Alaska to the United State. The total area of the 
empire was already nearly 24 million square kilometres during those years but 
thereafter the area of the country began to shrink: partly as a result of the sale of 
Alaska in 1867, and partly through losing areas in north-east China as a result of 
defeats suffered in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese war, as well as through ceding 
half of the Sakhalin Island to the Japanese. 
The administration of the vast empire was quite a challenge even during 
the years when there were no serious problems in its most remote areas, as no one 
mutinied or fought for separation. Suffice it to refer to the 9500 km distance 
between the capital city and Petropavlovsk, a fortress town in Kamchatka. 
Russian fortresses in Alaska, at even greater distances from the capital city, were 
much quicker to reach – and not only because Alaska is on another continent – 
even during the first half of the nineteenth century by sailing across oceans, than 
on land through Siberia. The reason for this was that transportation on land many 
times more expensive than by sea. Moreover, sailing was also much safer. 
Therefore, the central power preferred sailing from Saint Petersburg or Odessa, 
nearly circumnavigating the entire globe, rather than carrying supplies – 
including grains – to its garrisons in Alaska. 
And this applied to the other way round as well. It took nearly two years 
for Russian traders to transport the fur of game killed in Alaska to China via 
Siberia even as late as in the second half of the nineteenth century. For American 
ships it took five months to cover the same distance. This then meant that – no 
matter how it was a land power – it was more complicated for Russia to reach its 
peripheries than other for other powers their overseas colonies: “India was closer 
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to London in both technically and psychologically than many governorates of the 
Russian Empire to Saint Petersburg.” 
For, paradoxically, the oceans did not separate distant areas but rather 
brought them closer to one another. Alexander Etkind summed up the advantages 
offered by keeping in contact by sea in his work on Russia’s internal colonisation 
along these lines: although enemies and pirates could be encountered on the sea 
but not subjects who were alien, poor, discontented or disobedient, for which they 
would have had to be placated, studied at length or perhaps relocated, 
enlightened, taxed, recruited from, and for whom responsibility would have had 
to be assumed towards the world, well, no such peoples were to be encountered 
on the seas (ETKIND, A. 2011, p. 15). In other words, keeping such a vast land 
empire together and managing its administration efficiently and effectively, were 
not easy tasks even “in normal mode” owing to the immense distances and in the 
absence of roads and railway lines. 
Clearly, this circumstance must have contributed to the central power’s 
putting off the necessary reforms for so long and when it did embark on 
introducing reforms at long last in the mid-nineteenth century it still insisted on 
keeping the empire’s political system intact. Alexander II (1855‒1881), who did 
not wish to let his power be restrained in the first place, was convinced that any 
constitutional limitation of the supreme power, by sharing it with some 
representative institution, would jeopardise the governability of the empire. In his 
view autocracy was the only suitable means for the effective and efficient 
administration of his vast country. His grandson Nicholas II (1894–1917), how-
ever, in the early twentieth century, had no choice but accept the curbing of his 
autocratic power. Not even that, however, was sufficient for keeping the empire 
together. 
The governmental and then the general political crisis brought about by 
World War One resulted in a temporary disruption of the third largest empire of 
all times. Peripheries of the immense country separated, one after another, some 
of them temporarily, others for longer periods of time. And some even managed 
to quit the empire for good, like Finland and Poland. The Bolsheviks, however 
managed to nearly fully restore the empire, thanks to many of the peripheral 
countries joining it in the hope of formally keeping their autonomy. Four soviet 
socialist republics – the Russian, the Ukrainian, the Belorussian and the 
Transcaucasian – formed an alliance and created the Soviet Union at the end of 
December 1922. At that time however, the territory of the new federal state was 
smaller than that of the Russian Empire in 1914. And it remained so even after 
the Khorezm and the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republics joined the federal state 
in 1923–1923. The total area of the Soviet Union was even then only 20.9 million 
square kilometres, smaller than the Russian Empire before World War One. It 
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was not until Moscow’s annexation of Eastern Poland, and the three hitherto 
independent Baltic states as well as Bessarabia (which used to belong to Romania 
between the two world wars), based on a secret bargain with the Germans in the 
early phase of World War Two, that the new federal state grew even larger. The 
territory of the Soviet Union thus exceeded 22 million square kilometres, larger 
than the Russian Empire at the time of its disintegration but still smaller than 
when it was at its peak, in 1864–1866. 
Keeping the Soviet Union together entailed no difficulties as long as the 
constituent republic were headed by members of the same political party, the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This set-up itself guaranteed that the soviet 
state structure would remain intact. However, towards the end of the Gorbachev 
era the communist party lost its monopoly on political power, the future of the 
Soviet Union also became questionable. The first signs of secession appeared in 
the Baltics and Georgia, i.e. where there were traditions of sovereign statehood, 
even if not quite from the recent past. And the coup attempt against Gorbachev, 
aimed at preserving the Soviet state framework, brought about the opposite result: 
in it accelerated the disintegration process in August 1991. The first phase of this 
process saw the fully legitimate and peaceful “release” of the three Baltic states 
from the Soviet Union, soon after the failed coup attempt. At that time no one 
knew what would become of the huge country, although it was already on the 
verge of crumbling into pieces. The final verdict was announced on 7 December 
1991 when in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha in Belarus the heads of the three Slavic 
member republics – of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus – signed the document 
announcing the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Article 5 of the document 
declared that the “The High Contracting Parties acknowledge and respect each 
other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the 
Commonwealth.” This principle was upheld and observed by the contracting 
parties and former soviet republics that had become independent and that joined 
the agreement a few weeks later, apart from Armenia and Azerbaijan that came 
to be entangled in an armed conflict back during the late soviet era. This 
convention was broken by Moscow when it annexed the Crimean Peninsula, part 
of Ukraine, in March 2014. 
 
6.1.3. Special features of Russia’s historical development 
 
Even at the end of the seventeenth century Russia was still considered as a 
peripheral part of Europe. No European state had ever considered seriously the 
possibility of forming an alliance with the Grand Duchy of Moscow, before the 
reign of Peter I. Although the country of the tsars was here in Europe, but it was 
hardly taken note of, apart from its very neighbours. Or when it was taken note 
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of, it was regarded as a negative example. Even Jean Bodin, who in his late 
sixteenth century volume on sovereignty, referred to the Moscow monarch as the 
only ruler in Europe – together with the Turkish sultan – who has exclusive power 
over not only the people living in his country but even their property and “whose 
subjects are called holop, that is, slave”. In other words, the power of the duke of 
Moscow was even in Bodin’s eyes, of a different nature than what was customary 
in other parts of Europe, in “royal or legitimate monarchies”, as in the latter the 
“subjects obey the monarch’s laws and the monarch obeys the laws of nature, 
leaving the subjects their natural freedom and ownership rights” (BODIN, J. 1987, 
pp. 135–136). 
The situation was truly different in the Grand Duchy of Moscow, where 
the concept of ownership (dominium) was, for quite some time, not separated 
from that of power (imperium). The ruler not only looked upon his subjects as 
people over whom he exercised power but also as people in his ownership. For 
two substantive elements of western feudalism – conditional land ownership and 
the institution of vassalship – were missing in the eastern edge of Europe, or some 
of their elements came about at such time and under such circumstances when 
the western parts of the continent was already being dominated by altogether 
different processes. Allodial title (votchina) was replaced in Russia by the land 
ownership based on service (pomeste) at a time when the opposite was taking 
place in Europe: benefices (Latin: beneficium) were gradually turning into estates 
free of feudal service obligations. The primary reason for this was that the “exact 
replica of the Western feudal synthesis never came about” in the East. In the 
Moscow state the “constituents of feudalism appeared in rather confused, aslant 
and asynchronous combinations, none of which had the state of completion or 
unity of the original synthesis in full” (ANDERSON, P. 1989, p. 294). This is why 
certain fundamental political skills were never acquired, and some important 
institutions never came into being in Russia. Where feudalism evolved, however, 
its internal structure and reciprocity made a considerable contribution to the 
development of a political practice which ultimately lead to a culture of seeking 
for consensus. For the private contract between senior and vassal stipulated 
mutual commitments and obligations regardless of the respective situations and 
possibilities of the parties, and of the asymmetry between their respective 
positions. In other words – no matter how profoundly different possibilities each 
had – neither of them was exposed to the other: this was all the more so because 
the oath of fealty sworn to each other could be unsworn by both the overlord and 
the vassal. This was referred to as the diffidatio based on assuming and allowing 
that the vassal treaty can be broken unlawfully by the feudal overlord as well. And 
if the privilege of lawful conduct at all times does not follow from the more 
favourable position in the feudal hierarchy, there is a need for also an institution 
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that can deliver justice in the case of a conflict between the parties – breach of 
trust (felony) by either party – in an impartial manner. This need, and the presence 
of a church separated from and rivalling the secular power, brought about in 
Western Europe the institution of courts, independent of the prevailing power, at 
a relatively early stage. Indeed, it may be argued without any exaggeration, that 
the right to break the fealty was that particular element of the agreement between 
the controllers and the controlled, those on top and those below, which – laying 
down the foundations for the right to resist – made a profound turn in the political, 
social and legal development of Europe. 
However, no feudal hierarchy developed in Russia, and no system of 
private contracts relating to it evolved either. No agreement with mutual 
obligations was put in place between the duke and his boyars. The difference 
between their actual positions – hierarchy – was not adjusted by any contract 
whatsoever. The inequality between the parties rendered their relationship a one-
way relation, with no place for diffidatio. Consequently, even the institutions of 
the administration of justice came into being in Russia under a different influence 
and in a different way, than in the western and central regions of Europe. The 
feudal contract however, fixed not only the law-governed relationship between 
the parties but at the same time also served the expression of mutual good will. 
This does not mean, however, that Western Europe during the middle ages was a 
world of prolonged social peace. Violence, however, was equally present in the 
process of development in both the east and the west, however, as a very result 
of the spreading practice of mutual good will, other forms of conflict resolution, 
not necessarily involving or threatening violence, appeared already in a relatively 
early stage of development. And this was immensely important, for the 
expression of mutual good will was a forerunner of the gradual recognition of 
political opponents also as representatives of the public good. This world of 
human interaction was the antecedent to the development of a political culture 
with mutual tolerance – as well as legal compliance – being a key element, 
together with an attitude of regarding political rivals not as enemies to be 
destroyed but only as adversaries or opponents. In Russia however, the absence 
of feudal hierarchy permitted the evolution of one-way relations even within the 
privileged social group. The latter group – the group of so-called “serving people” 
– comprised those performing military, court or administrative services around 
the duke, as boyars or members of the duke’s entourage. Although they were in 
a privileged positions, even they – not to speak of the so-called “burden bearing 
people” “below” them in the social hierarchy – could not expect to be protected 
by law and unbiassed courts, in the case of a conflict. 
By contrast, constitutions generalising feudal contracts and independent 
courts authorised to resolve feudal legal disputes appeared in the West at a 
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relatively early stage, together with the claim that not only the “spirit” but the 
“body” should not be exposed to the will of those in power. Initially, the Habeas 
Corpus, or the freedom of the body, applied to a select few, even in the West. But 
just like the feudal agreement, as the archetype of contractual political conduct, 
exceeded the limits of its original purpose and validity and started to function as 
a generally followed example, so did the scope of the Habeas Corpus expand and 
apply wider and wider circles of the subjects. In the medieval societies of Western 
Europe, the “freedom of the body” was enforced by means of horizontal solidar-
ity. This, however, would hardly have been possible without distinguishing in the 
West – based on Roman legal traditions – the concepts of political power and 
ownership. Because it was this very distinction from which it followed that the 
subjects’ obedience did not mean at the same time the relinquishing of natural 
freedom and ownership. It was only in the systems referred to by Bodin as 
“despotic monarchies” that the sovereign had the right to dispose over the 
subjects’ property and person. This is said because in the medieval and early new 
age Russian state there was nothing to protect the institution of private property: 
no customs, no laws, not even the living and accepted tradition of the Roman law. 
The same applied to the “freedom of the body”. So much so, that up to the end of 
the eighteenth century even noblemen could be corporally punished. This is not 
surprising in a country where owing to the absence of the feudal system even the 
oath of fealty imposed obligations only on the swearer in the subordinated 
position, showing that structure of unilateral dependence in which the concept of 
“human dignity retained even in a subordinated position” (Szűcs J. 1983, p. 30) 
remained unknown. 
Before Peter I the orthodox church formed a close-knit symbiosis with the 
secular power, being neither its subordinate, nor its rival. Because the Russia’s 
historical development took place without the medieval Western European form 
of distribution of power, i.e. the separation of temporal power from spiritual 
power. In the West, in the medium of Latin Christianity, the power of the state 
was curbed by the church while in the East – in the world of Orthodoxy – this 
role remained unfulfilled. In the western part of Europe people in the Middle 
Ages lived in two worlds, the world of the “body” and the world of the “spirit”. 
While the worldly power had competence concerning the former, its supremacy 
was not recognised in the latter. This resulted in the evolution of a dual power 
and a dual subordination. This was also expressed in the evolution of dual law. 
While church jurisdiction followed the universal canonical law, secular 
jurisdiction was based on a special “national law”. 
What made this possible was – inter alia – that transcendence, recognised 
as a higher and independent principle was a legitimate tradition of the European 
culture: the principle of allowing and accepting that a perfect existence could be 
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“placed” behind the fallible worldly existence. It was primarily this tradition that 
in Western Europe the church could develop into an alternative formation that 
could be opposed to the secular structures, restricting their power ambitions. 
Nonetheless, not even the ever so important spiritual tradition of the legitimate 
existence of transcendence – something not even known elsewhere – could have 
been sufficient to ensure this. This is said because although it is true that no such 
specific and sacred sphere of interests evolved anywhere else beyond the 
boundaries of the Christian world, which would have been inaccessible, indeed, 
forbidden for the state – because everywhere else the state itself was sacred, so 
religious requirements coincided with those of the state – yet this alone could 
hardly have turned the church into a factor imposing such strong secular 
restrictions on the worldly power. There was one additional necessary 
component, namely, the collapse of the West Roman Empire leaving a temporary 
political vacuum in its wake. Since however, it did come about, this situation 
explained at the same time why the case of Russia – which belonged to the 
Christian Ecumene – was so much different from that of the central and western 
parts of Europe. 
In other words: this circumstance also explains why the joint Christian 
cultural tradition’s legitimate capability of criticising could not develop into a 
true political counterforce in Russia. Well, one reason is that in the eastern edge 
of Europe Christianity appeared under the protection of the worldly power, in 
most cases with its active assistance. This could not have happened in any other 
way, as no Christian communities had been present for instance in the Kievan 
Rus, before its Christianisation. If only for this reason, the church definitely 
depended on the state’s patronage and support. Moreover, the Byzantine 
christening of the country entailed the introduction of a political pattern as well, 
whose foundation was formed by a combination of the temporal and spiritual 
power, that is, the state doctrine of its symphony. While conflicts between the 
church and the secular community, between secular law and religious norms, 
were part and parcel of day-to-day life in the societies of Western Europe, only 
one hierarchy of values evolved in the Kievan and later the Moscovian states. The 
eastern orthodoxy formed a foundation for both culture and the “political 
community”. For this very reason the medieval Russian state and its “citizens” 
are inconceivable outside the confines of the church framework and regulations. 
The symbiosis between profane and sacral in the Russia that existed before Peter 
I was so strong that even a political concept that is as “mundane” as despotism 
appeared “in the mind of the Russian people not as a legal regulation but a fact 
presented by God himself” (FLORENSKY, P. 1916, p. 26). 
Peter the Great, however, brought about a profound change in the nature 
of the relationship between church and the worldly power. The close 
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interdependence vanished when as a consequence of Peter’s policies the church 
not only came under the close supervision of the worldly power but actually 
became a subordinated part of it. The monarch did away with the institution of 
the patriarchate in 1721, when the position of the Moscow patriarch had been 
vacant for as long as 21 years. It was replaced by a collective decision-making 
body called, during the reign of Peter Ecclesiastical College, and, after his death 
Sacred Synode, headed by a chief procurator representing the will of the worldly 
power, with an extensive scope of powers. Peter I radically transformed the legal 
framework in which the church was operating and also started to strip them of 
their allodial estates, on which their relative autonomy relied. This was going on 
for decade after decade, but it did not actually achieve its ultimate goal until the 
second half of the century, under the reign of Catherine II. She, on the other hand, 
started to disburse a remuneration to a growing part of the clergy – by way of 
compensation for the expropriation of the still existing ecclesiastical estates – on 
a regular basis, thereby turning the clergy into a serving estate, the like of nobility. 
Financing the clergy from the central budget however, had not become a complete 
and comprehensive system even by the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Only those working in institutions performing tasks of the administrative 
governance of the church and in church schools as well as those serving at small 
parishes on the peripheries were paid regular salaries even at that point. This 
treasury “alimony” however, was seldom ever sufficient, therefore clergymen 
supplemented their income in other ways, mostly by growing crops and relying 
on donations of the faithful as well as other local funding sources. 
Peter I however changed not only the position of the church; he had much 
more ambitious plans. His aim was no less than leading Russia out of the closed 
and archaic world in which it existed before he had come to the throne. Having 
recognised the disadvantages stemming from his country’s failure to have moved 
with the times his ambition was to develop a regulating state which would be 
capable of not only governing the country in an effective and efficient way but 
also to enforce compliance with the law and protect the population from despotic 
bureaucracy. 
The reforms of Peter I were highly complex, aimed at making profound, 
fundamental changes to the Russia of the day. First of all, the tsar wished to 
rationalise the system of governance itself. To achieve that however, he had to 
transform the institutions of state power. To this end, the monarch brought down 
two of the main pillars of the existing system: the “boyar council” and the system 
of key administrative bodies – a kind of a stewardship – of central power, created 
in parallel with the expansion of the territory of the country, carrying out the 
complex tasks of the administration and management of the newly acquired lands. 
He replaced the first with the Senate while the latter was replaced with a system 
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of colleges organised on the basis of a sectoral principle, with nationwide 
competence. Those then evolved into the forerunners of the ministries which were 
set up later, in the early nineteenth century. 
In transforming the political system, the tsar focused primarily on renewing 
the state apparatus and the central administrative institutions, besides organising 
Russia’s first regular army and providing it with adequate funding. The reforms 
were aimed not only at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
administration of his country but also at enabling the monarch in the new 
circumstances to exercise reliable and firm supervision and control over both the 
state machinery and the army. This was the aim of a famous regulation introduced 
by Peter I in 1722, the so-called Table of Ranks Law requiring civil or military 
service to the state as a prerequisite for land ownership. Another important result 
of the regulation was that it rationalised the practice of performing service to the 
state – bringing it under a harmonised and systematic set of rules – and 
transformed the conditions and criteria for advancement in the hierarchy. The 
latter meant that the aptitude and professionalism of the candidates grew 
increasingly important in the course of appointments and promotions, even giving 
the system some measure of “democratism” since advancement in the service no 
longer depended exclusively on one’s distinguished ancestry but more and more 
one’s performance in the service concerned. 
The rationalisation of governance entailed not only institutional changes 
but also standardisation and modernisation of the administrative processes. It was 
at this time that recording instructions on paper rolls was replaced by the use of 
booklets and books, a more up-to-date form of documentation. An even more 
profound change was the shift from the use of Cyrillic to Arabic numerals, at last. 
From 1700 on the years no longer started in September, reflecting the previous 
Russian approach, but in January, like in the rest of Europe. In all, reforms were 
introduced in as many areas as possible to bring Russia closer to Europe. Peter I 
was making very conscious and persistent steps towards adopting western values, 
way of life, legislation, technologies and terminologies. To accelerate the process, 
he even went as far as to invite large numbers of experts, professionals and 
advisors from the west to take important senior positions in the army, the state 
machinery and industry. 
Nonetheless, Peter’s the impatient and forced Europeanisation of his 
country resulted, paradoxically, in conserving social structures that not only 
failed to eliminate but even amplified certain Asian traits of Russia’s 
development. “Peter the Great – as was pointed out by Ferenc Tallár – made no 
attempt at shifting the immense agrarian society of the village communities by 
relying on the potential of the towns that were developing like inclusions among 
the »pores« of the medieval Russian society, towards a capitalist type 
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development based on market, money and commodity relations. Indeed, with his 
brutal tax policy, drawing extremely heavily on the resources of the taxpayer 
population, applied in some cases with blood violence, and with his decrees 
impeding the development of a free workforce base that could have formed the 
foundations for capitalist production, even repressing any initial forms of its 
evolution, structuring the entire population of the empire into estates with specific 
rights and obligations, assigning every single subject to a given community, Peter 
essentially prevented any continuation of even the very modest development that 
had begun in this direction” (TALLÁR, F. 1984, p. 22). Nonetheless, the reforms 
which Herzen called “inhuman Petrovian exercising”, still achieved certain 
results. Russia grew stronger as a military power, capable of effectively respond-
ing to the external challenges of the day. This, however, was a costly achieve-
ment: the empire fell into an increasingly deep evolutionary trap. But none of that 
was perceptible at that time. What was clear however, is that by the time of the 
death of Peter I in 1725 Russia had become one of the five great powers of the 
continent. The empire he left behind was a power formation geared towards 
continuous development and upkeep of the country’s military capabilities, as its 
key function and purpose, even though not of the Prussian model of “an army 
with a state” where the needs of the military were prioritised over any and all 
other needs and institutions. The reason why this was necessary was because – as 
Perry Andeson put it – “the unequal development of feudalism in Europe (...) was 
most typically and most directly expressed in terms of not the trade balance 
between the relevant regions of the continent but in a balance of arms” 
(ANDERSON, P. 1989, p. 256). Peter had no time to take any other approach. If he 
wanted to avoid defeat in the international competition of the day, he had to create 
a centralised state machinery matching those of the Western absolutisms – and 
fast. 
While strengthening his empire in terms of its military might, for which he 
built up an adequate military industry background as well, Peter I also made sure 
that the members of the emerging privileged estate, one that was becoming 
increasingly uniform and unified on the basis of new foundations, are obliged to 
serve the state as soldiers or officers; otherwise they could own no lands. This 
rigorous system was functioning up to 1762 – when the nobility was relieved 
from the obligation of serving the state. From that point on it was up to them to 
decide whether they would be willing to continue to perform civilian or military 
services for the state. Peter III (5 January–9 July 1762) issued a letter of liberty 
in which he guaranteed that nobility could retain their lands and other privileges 
even without serving the state. Having been granted such liberty many of the 
nobility abandoned their positions in which they had been providing the 
obligatory services and returned to their estates, where some of them, having 
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recognised the circumstances in which their serfs were living, found new 
vocations for themselves. From that point – instead of serving the state and the 
society – they found their role in devotion and self-sacrifice to “the people”, 
whereby they could pay tribute in practice to the idea of European enlightenment. 
The enlightened part of nobility started to regard themselves in this new situation 
more and more as moral leaders and cultural mentors of “the people”. They could 
do so because during the eighteenth century they gradually adopted and adapted 
many elements of the Western secular culture, while they themselves became 
organised as an estate and found their new awareness. This process was not 
unwelcomed by Catherine II, the most important Russian ruler of the age (besides 
Peter I). For she (just like the key figures of Russian enlightenment, such as 
Novikov, Fonvizin, Krilov, Radistsev and Karamzin) wished see the largest 
possible numbers of “active individuals, loyal subjects and patriots who are aware 
of their moral obligations not only towards the state and the empire but all 
members of society, including the peasants” as Marc Raeff would put it (RAEFF, 
M. 1990, p. 134). Meanwhile however, Catherine II spared no effort to make sure 
that the emerging estates are not allowed to establish foundations or charity 
institutions trying to help the hungry and the sick or attempt to extend education 
for the people independently from the state. For though the government looked 
with benevolence upon enlightened individuals recognising of their moral 
obligation, committed to social welfare and actively participating in promoting 
the country’s material and intellectual development, it would not have the 
attainment of their moral, cultural and social objectives leading to any kind of 
independent and institutionalised activity and the evolution of a dynamic network 
of social solidarity. This would have entailed the risk of the administration losing 
control over them. Honestly devoted to enlightenment, exchanging letters with 
French philosophers of the age, she wished to avoid such carelessness by any 
means. 
Catherine II tried to organise the Russian society in a system of estates 
known from Western and Central European feudalism. These estates in Russia 
however, evolved not through social progress but were created a had been 
intended by the monarch, therefore their members could never be confident that 
their privileges would last. This is one of the reasons for the still ongoing debate 
as to whether “real” estates existed in Russia and if they did, when did they come 
about. For on the eastern edge of Europe – in contrast to Western and Eastern 
Europe – the rights of the estates were not protected by law against the ruler’s 
will. These rights were granted as a favour by the ruler, i.e. they were guaranteed 
neither by law that would have been impervious to arbitrary changes by the 
monarch or by the social weight and political power of the nobility or other 
estates’ corporations. Meanwhile in the West the estates were not only part of the 
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social structure but also that of the political system. Key elements of the latter 
included the parliament, sejm or Landtag, each established and operating on the 
basis of the estates’ representation. However, no representative institution based 
on estates was present in Russia’s development after Peter I. Any freedom or 
privilege enjoyed by anyone in Russia “was theirs only because they were 
allowed to have such in exchange for the services performed for the state” (BLUM, 
J. 1971, p. 150). The nobility owed their civic rights to the ruler’s efforts aimed 
at “providing [its servants] with adequate moral authority and financial security 
to enable them to carry out their duties” (Becker, S. 1985, p. 28). 
At the same time, such rights – stemming from the needs of the state and 
integrated in the asymmetric structure of the sharing of power between the 
nobility and the monarch – were rather uncertain, guaranteed by nothing other 
than the ruler’s good will. This is clearly indicated what happened to the charter 
of the nobility issued by Catherine II, granting privileges to the nobility, as it was 
in force for hardly more than a decade after its issuance, until it was withdrawn 
by the ruler’s son Paul I (1796–1801), meeting no resistance whatsoever, 
restoring the nobility’s obligation to perform service to the state as well as the 
possibility of applying corporal punishment to the nobility, which had been 
banned beforehand. Although a few years later the new monarch Alexander I 
(1801–1825) withdrew his predecessor’s decree and restored the privileges 
concerned, the nobility remained just as exposed to the monarch’s will as they 
had been before, because Alexander’s decision did nothing to change the fact that 
the ruler in power had the right – depending on the momentary needs of the state 
and at his/her discretion – to regulate, expand or restrict, the nobility’s privileges, 
just like the rights and privileges of the other estates. Nicholas I (1825–1855) for 
instance, severely tightened the conditions applying to the nobility’s travelling 
and staying abroad and reintroduced the obligation for the less wealthy Polish 
nobility, living in the western governorates of the empire, to provide services for 
the state on a mandatory basis. No matter how anyone would have objected to 
such decisions, they could not have prevented them from entering into force. The 
primary reason for this was that the Russian estate of nobility was lacking in 
corporative discipline and solidarity. And what they were most sorely lacking in 
was a mutual vertical loyalty. This was a result primarily of the Russian course 
of development without the forms of institution of the vassal system, i.e. of the 
fact that there had never been any firm legal foundation for any of the privileges 
the various estates had in Russia. 
The Russian nobility could never defend their rights at court against the 
supreme power – in contrast to the nobility in western countries – because those 
rights “had always been based on political foundations” (ROMANOVICH–SLAVA-
TINSKY, A. 1870, p. 214). The privileges of the various estates – and whether they 
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were taken away from or added to – were always dominated by current political 
practicality. The political nature of their rights made it possible for the supreme 
power to grant privileges to some and strip them from others, depending on the 
needs of the state” (ROMANOVICH–SLAVATINSKY, A. 1870, p. 214). There was 
nothing to control the supreme power in this, apart from the needs of state 
administration and the ruler’s common sense. Clearly, although with some delay, 
but certainly by the second half of the eighteenth century, social groups that 
differed from each other in their legal statuses, i.e. the estates, had emerged 
(because they were created by the state) in Russia as well, just like they had earlier 
in Western and Eastern Europe, however, in Russia there was no institutional 
guarantee whatsoever for the rights and privileges of the estates. It was solely up 
to the ruler in power to decide whether to expand or restrict them; the ruler could 
withdraw and grant privileges at his or her sole discretion. 
In the system that had evolved in the Russian circumstances the social 
position and status of every subject of the empire was determined essentially by 
the estate (soslovye) The law on estates – in force up to 1917 – provided that “four 
basic types of people (rod) are distinguished within the urban and rural population 
on the basis of the differences between their respective legal statuses: the nobility, 
the clergy and the urban and the rural population. The “types of people” and 
“belonging to estates” however, coincided only in the case of the first two estates. 
By contrast, the urban and the rural population formed not specific, clear-
cut estates but were distributed among various estates that differed from each 
other in terms of their legal statuses. In terms of estates, urban residents could be 
honorary citizens – this estate had a hereditary and a personal version – or 
merchants, artisans or petty bourgeois. The largest estate of the rural population 
was made up of peasants of different legal statuses, but the Cossacks also counted 
as rural subjects, forming a separate estate. Unlike peasants, however, they 
enjoyed a variety of privileges. There was one more estate in the Russian course 
of development, that is, the so-called aliens. They were the ones to whom the 
scope of the empire’s laws could not be extended for a variety of – ethnic, 
religious, way of life related – reasons, therefore such people continued to live 
under their own rules even after being brought under Russian control. 
Privileged, that is, non-tax paying, estates among these, included the no-
bility, the clergy as well as the group formed of honorary citizens. They did not 
have to pay a poll tax. But this was not the only privilege they had. Another im-
portant privilege they enjoyed was that they could not be obliged to perform 
services for the state, recruited as soldiers or subjected to corporal punishment. 
By contrast, the estate of merchants was only a partially privileged group. Mer-
chants forming the most affluent segment of the estate were free from the obliga-
tion to do military service, until the introduction in 1874 of general compulsory 
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military service. The poorest traders however, never had such privileges. Their 
subordinated position is clearly indicated by the fact that they could be corporally 
punished just like the petty bourgeois, artisans and peasants. 
Ultimately, the poll tax payment obligation main dividing line splitting the 
society into two fundamentally different groups: the privileged and the rest, that 
is, the taxpayers. The state’s policy relating to society was aimed primarily not at 
forming estates but at determining which social groups should and which ones 
should not be included in the taxpayer category. And the importance of being 
added to the taxpayer group did not lie primarily in the tax payment obligation 
but in a variety of other legal consequences associated with this status. The tax-
payer status entailed the possibility of corporal punishment, restricted freedom of 
movement and compulsory military service. Those not obliged to pay taxes, how-
ever, were exempt from such legal disadvantages. The difference between the 
two statuses was so significant that it was not considered as a mere status differ-
ence by anyone. For belonging to the taxpayer estates had many more other im-
plications. Taxpayers had every right to feel stigmatised. And it was as such, that 
they were looked upon by the privileged. Surely, the difference between the two 
categories could not be eliminated by simply abolishing serfdom. So much so, 
that the psychological barrier between these two groups had not disappeared even 
decades after the adoption of the emancipation laws. 
Even this artificially formed estate structure was endangered in the wake 
of the French Revolution. The collapse of the ancien régime brought about a new 
situation across Europe. The revolution raised concern among the rulers of both 
Eastern and Central Europe. So much so, that it was the revolution, and even more 
so by Napoleon’s army, that convinced the latter – once they recovered from their 
first frightened surprise – of the need to change their policies by all means. They 
had two alternatives: either do so voluntarily or be forced to. Recognising this, 
Prussia was the first country to introduce comprehensive reforms, including the 
elimination of serfdom in the early nineteenth century, establishing the first insti-
tutions of local self-governance introducing general compulsory military service. 
In Austria however, it was not until 1848 that serfdom was put an end to. In the 
same year the Austrian emperor provided his people with a parliament – only to 
dissolve it the next year. The institution of people’s representation, the Landtag, 
established in 1849, was permitted to continue functioning. 
By contrast, nothing of the sort happened in Russia. Apart from the first 
waves giving rise to some concern it took quite a while for the impact of the 
French revolution to reach the Russian Empire. Moreover, this belated impact 
immediately triggered two starkly opposed responses. On the one hand, it radi-
calised the views of part of the nobility’s elite and on the other hand it wiped 
away the central power’s inclination to continue adopting western models. The 
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conspiracy in 1825 of the Decembrists, claiming a constitution, was a conse-
quence of radicalisation. Their failure however, also meant that Nicholas I, the 
tsar then taking the throne, broke with the policy of predecessors – Peter I, Cathe-
rine II, Alexander I – policy of regarding Europe as a model to follow and tried 
to block his empire as much as possible from impacts coming from the west. This 
coincided with building up a new cult of monocracy, and the birth of the con-
servative concept of a Russian “special way”. His however, came in a number of 
different variants. One was represented by the Slavophiles. However, their idea 
was significantly freer and more open than the official doctrine based on the triad 
of “pravoslavie, autocracy and a form of folk nationalism”. Although the Slavo-
philes did not accept western constitutional systems but they also considered that 
there was a need for the restraining of autocracy. They saw not a constitution but 
freedom of speech and social autonomy as the means to achieve this. By a com-
munity keeping a distance from the state power however, they meant not the 
society as a whole but only part of it, made up of sufficiently erudite people with 
qualifications following western models. For them, the future of the country 
would be secured not by following western individualism but by creating a spir-
itual community of Russian people (sobornost). They held that the latter had 
already been achieved in the Pravoslav (Russian orthodox) church and in the vil-
lage communities (obstina), so a political system most suitable for the Russian 
character could be built up relying on these very traditions. 
Many disagreed with this idealised self-image, rather wittily referred to as 
“retrospective utopia” by Petr Chaadaev. The modest branch of the westernised 
segment of the elite of the intelligentsia formed the group most strongly disagree-
ing with this. What they wished was that top-down reforms in Russia should grad-
ually bring down the autocracy and free the serfs, and then a new constitutional 
system should bring the country as close to the West as possible. The modest 
followers of western ideas refrained from idealising Russia’s historical develop-
ment, which they referred to as the “haughty apotheosis of the Russian people” 
(CHAADAEV, P. 1989, p. 277).15 They saw nothing to be envied or followed in its 
peculiar nature. They thought that the only special feature of the “Russian way” 
lied in its belatedness, therefore they expected of the new constitutional system 
quite the opposite of what the Slavophiles were proposing. What they hoped was 
that the new system would enable Russia catch up with, and becoming similar to, 
the West. In fact, they – primarily: Boris Tsitserin and Konstantin Kavelin, as 
well as former Decembrist Nikolay Turgenev – were the ones who, as liberal 
thinkers, became the first proponents of the adoption in Russia of constitutional 
ideas. They hoped that Russia would manage to smoothly turn from an autocracy 

15 Chaetae’s letter to Friedrich Schelling (20 May 1842). 
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into a constitutional system. By contrast, the radical branch of the westernising 
camp did not trust reforms and saw only a revolution as the possible solution. 
Initially, even the radical wing was liberal but in the middle of the nineteenth 
century they began to become increasingly interested in revolutionary socialism. 
However, there were some complications in adopting in Russia the socialist ideas 
that had been born in the West. The reason for this was that they could not, in 
their original form, be adopted by Russia, a country lagging so much in terms of 
development, so they had to be adapted to the Russian conditions. This task was 
carried out for the most part by Aleksandr Herzen and Mikhail Bakunin. Having 
seen the failed revolutions of 1848 and disappointed in the course taken by the 
development of politics in Western Europe, they had already concluded by the 
middle of the century that socialism, the West’s most progressive ideology in 
their view, could be implemented in Russia than in Western and Eastern Europe. 
Their concept was based on the argument that Russia had an institution, that is, 
the (obstina) which they regarded, in essence, as “socialism itself”. There was no 
private property in the village communities and the lands owned by obstinas were 
regularly redistributed in accordance with the changing needs of the local 
peasants. 
Consequently, they argued, all it would take to fully implement “social-
ism” is sweeping away the autocracy in a revolution and then expropriate the 
estates of landowners. The undertaking seemed all the more promising because 
the radical camp considered that the tsar’s power enjoyed no support from the 
elite or the “people” (derided and stripped of dignity). And since the history of 
Russia was full of bloody peasant revolts, mobilising the masses did not seem to 
be much of a challenge either. They expected the intelligentsia to play a major 
role in the necessary mobilisation. That is, the special social group whose very 
existence was due to the process of Europeanisation, initiated by Peter I himself. 
The bulk of this group was made up by individuals of the gentry and those of 
mixed estates (raznochinetz). Their political views – if any – were not necessarily 
radical; only those held radical views who, as children of the enlightenment, 
could not accept the social inequalities of their age and their exclusion from 
political processes. This was because there had been no system of representation 
in place, and the press was not free either, in Russia before the reforms adopted 
by Alexander II. Therefore, members of the intelligentsia with an interest in pub-
lic matters could participate neither in political decision making, nor in the prepa-
ration of decisions to be made. Nonetheless, they were highly popular: with their 
propagation of social and political emancipation it did not take long for them to 
build up ideological control over much of the Russian society and culture. Prac-
tically nobody but the liberal or radical intelligentsia was dealing with politics, 
apart from the bureaucratic elite. And this remained so as long as dealing with 
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politics in opposition was treated as an illegal activity. The first substantial 
change in this was not introduced until as late as 1864, in the form of the zemstvo 
reform. The establishment of self-governments of a limited set of powers – the 
zemstvos – created the requisites for people to legally engage in politics, at least 
at a local level. This, however, still did not change the nature of politics at a na-
tional level or that of the political system. The latter continued as an autocracy in 
an unchanged form, in which there was still no room for any representative insti-
tution with nationwide powers, participating in the process of legislation. 
The zemstvo reform was one of the sweeping reforms that resulted in a 
profound transformation of Russia from the 1860s and 1870s. The reform process 
was triggered by a number of circumstances, besides the painful failure of the 
Crimean war (1853–1856). The most important among them may have been the 
recognition that without changing its politics Russia would never be capable of 
competing on an equal footing – in terms its military might or economic perfor-
mance – with Europe’s dominant powers. The Crimean defeat made it clear that 
the nearly three decades of Nicholas’s policy of turning away from Europe was 
no longer tenable. It also revealed an urgent need for quick and comprehensive 
changes to be adopted by the Russian Empire if it was to remain a dominant par-
ticipant in the European power games of the day. First of all, the serfs’ situation 
had to be sorted, without with there was no chance of catching up. But the aboli-
tion of serfdom was not the only thing to do. Major reforms were needed nearly 
everywhere. The reforms initiated by Alexander II affected society in a variety of 
way – from the abolition of serfdom to the development of an up-to-date judiciary 
system, along with the introduction of limited self-governance and general com-
pulsory military service – but left the foundations of the political system unaf-
fected. This then resulted among other things in a situation in which, in the 
absence of a central legislative body and a norm that would regulate the process 
of adopting laws in a standardised way, laws were adopted in private circles, ex-
posed to political skirmishes between different interest groups, in a sluggish and 
over-complicated manner. Politics – or at least its legally pursued form – was still 
a matter of a few, even if it were the “great reforms” themselves that launched 
the process whereby an up-to-date political publicity evolved in Russia and poli-
tics emerged from the world of court intrigues. 
The extensive and highly ambitious reforms affected a wide variety of 
areas and aspects, left the empire’s political system practically intact. The system, 
though modified in many ways since the early eighteenth century, retained its 
autocratic nature as long as until the early twentieth century, in spite of many 
proposals put forth concerning restrictions to be introduced to curb the absolute 
power. Not only the opponents of the central power, but also its proponents, ini-
tiated restriction of the autocracy (samoderzhavie). This idea however, failed to 
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meet the will of any Russian ruler, partly owing to the tsarist power’s special 
nature, starkly different from those of western monarchies, and partly for practi-
cal considerations. And when the political actually came to be transformed – in 
response to the bourgeois revolution of 1905‒1907 following the defeat at the 
hand of the Japanese – the dual system (Boris Mironov) or pseudo-constitutional 
monarchy (Max Weber) put in place was considered by the last Russian tsar to 
be a consequence of a decision made under duress, the withdrawal of which he 
never gave up. In his historic proclamation of 17 October 1905 Nicholas II prom-
ised to grant and respect civic rights – of religion, speech, association and assem-
bling – and to allow from that point the free establishment and operation of parties 
in the Russian Empire as well. As a consequence, the first national representative 
body, the State Duma with a right to consult, was established during the spring 
of the next year. This then also meant that the subjects of the empire were given 
political rights, even if in a rather limited form. 
The reforms introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century 
brought about substantial changes but the majority of them turned out to have 
been only partly successful, while some even produced rather contradictory 
results. The reasons for this were many and varied. First of all, the economy had 
difficulties in adapting to the new circumstances during the first decades follow-
ing the adoption of the reforms, while it continued to rely primarily on agricul-
ture. Owing to the “temporarily obliged” status of the freed peasants, the small 
sizes of the plots they were allocated, the heavy taxes and the costs to be paid for 
land ownership, their dependence on the landlord continued in many aspects. 
Even in villages in which peasants managed to pay off the allocated plots in good 
time, the economic interdependence continued to prevail, for example in various 
forms of tenancy. The peasants continued to depend on their landlords primarily 
because the rent continued to have to be paid, for the most part, by work, rather 
than money. The landlords had no problem in accepting this situation, for one 
thing because it was what they had been used to. However, many were misled by 
the availability of cheap labour, as only few felt compelled to seek for and use 
more up-to-date and efficient farming methods. An increasing number of land-
owners refusing to adopt innovations failed or were forced to sell their land. By 
the end of the nineties nearly half of all land owned by members of the nobility 
had been mortgaged. This was accompanied by an increasingly marked stratifi-
cation of the peasant class in terms of wealth despite the fact that both this and 
the propensity to invest, were significantly counteracted by the ownership of land 
by village communities. 
These were not, of course, the only reasons for the contradictory results of 
the reforms. Other reasons included the failure to introduce a constitution, the 
failure to enable people’s representation, as well as the fact that the Russian 
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society’s estate structure turned out to be extremely resilient in spite of the “great 
reforms”. The lack of information among the village communities and the tradi-
tions in which they were trapped also impeded progress. However, the state did 
not have the extensive and adequately qualified administrative apparatus with 
which it could have effectively intervened at the level of districts and villages and 
enforce its political will, as would have been required for changing this situation. 
These factors together formed such a strong opposite force that prevented the 
reforms from producing anything but limited and contradictory results. However, 
even in this form they managed to bring about substantial changes in that huge 
empire. 
And it was amidst this large-scale transformation process, by this time af-
fecting the political system as well, that Russia came to be involved in World War 
One. The Russian Empire was, however, too poor to bear the burdens of a pro-
tracted war. The signs of this were already evident, in major conflicts during the 
nineteenth century but, “luckily” for the tsarist system, both the Napoleonic and 
the Crimean war could be put an end to – by Russia as winner in the first one and 
defeated in the other – before its economic weakness became all too clear for all. 
The country managed to back out of the 1904–1905 war with Japan also before 
the complete collapse but by that time issues with the persistence and loyalty of 
peasants, who made up to bulk of the enlisted soldiers of the army, had become 
evident. Moreover, the unnecessary war generated some severe social discontent 
and played a substantial role in the break-out of a bourgeois revolution in Russia 
– decades later than in the rest of Europe –, triggering a process transforming the 
empire’s political system. Unlike before, however, Saint Petersburg could not 
quit the Great War in good time. The protracted war, placing increasing burdens 
on the country, lead to major supply problems and then a governmental, and 
finally a general political crisis. And all this culminated in another revolution in 
February 2017 for which it did not take long to sweep tsardom away. Not long 
after the resignation of Nicholas II the republic was proclaimed, political prison-
ers were freed, the death penalty was abolished, the ethnic and religious discrim-
ination which prevailed until the very last days of tsarist system was done away 
with and preparations were made for general, equal and direct election by secret 
ballot, to the Constitutional Assembly. Among its first actions the Interim Gov-
ernment then exercising power recognised the independence of the Polish terri-
tories and restored the autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Finland, which had been 
also part of the empire. But since the Interim Government wanted to carry on with 
the war and failed to recognise the importance of the land issue, it lost its political 
power at a dramatic speed. So much so, that hardly half a year after taking power, 
at the end of October they could no longer resist the Bolsheviks. 
Civilisations from East to West 
356 

And in the autumn of 1917 a new era began in Russia. However, it took 
years – of a bloody civil war of immense losses – for the Bolshevik-controlled 
new power to stabilise its position. The Soviet Union that was established at the 
end of 1922 made incredible efforts and sacrifices to overcome its economic 
backwardness and underdevelopment, and to rise again to be one of the great 
powers. This, however, was only partly achieved. Although the Soviet Union be-
came a military superpower, yet its economic performance could not come any-
where near to that of the United States of America, even during its heyday, in the 
mid-1970s. And after reaching its zenith, the dynamic of the Soviet economic 
growth began to weaken and slow down about a decade and a half before the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, preparing the collapse of the Soviet type social 
order and the Soviet state structure at the end of 1991. 
 
6.1.4. Chronological table 
 
Date Event 
859 Foundation of Veliky Novgorod
882 Kiev is capital city of the first eastern Slavic state, the Kievan Rus
988–989 The Kievan Rus formally adopts Christianity
1054 The great schism: Eastern Christianity splits from Western Christianity
1108 Foundation of Vladimir
1147 Foundation of Moscow
1223 The Mongolians’ first appearance at the borders of the Kievan state.
1237 The Mongolian forces cross the River Volga; occupation and forcing parts of the Kievan Rus into a dependent position commences
1300 Transfer of the metropolitan’s seat from Kiev to Vladimir
1321 Transfer of the metropolitan’s seat from Vladimir to Moscow
1380 Moscow takes control over Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal
1392 The Russian Orthodox church wins autonomy (not yet recognised by Constantinople)
1448 Ivan III storms Veliky Novgorod
1478 Ivan III puts an end to Tartar dependence
1480 Ivan III puts an end to Tartar dependence
1510 Vasily III occupies Pskov
1547 Ivan IV adopts the title ‘tsar’
1552 Ivan IV conquers the territory of the Khanate of Kazan
1556 Ivan IV defeats the Khanate of Astrakhan
1582 The conquering of West Siberia is completed
1589 The Moscow metropolitan bishop rises to the rank of patriarch
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Date Event 
1598 Last ruler of the Rjurik dynasty, Feodor I, dies
1605 Beginning of the “time of troubles”
1613 First Romanov ruler, Mikhail Fyodorovich, takes the throne
1652 Nikon elected Moscow Patriarch
1697–1698 “Grand embassy” of Peter I
1703 Peter I founds the city of Saint Petersburg
1709 Peter I defeats the Swedish king Charles XII at Poltava 
1721 Signing of Treaty of Nystad closing the “Great Northern War” waged since 1700 
1721 Peter I proclaimed imperator by Senate  
1721 Peter I dissolves the Patriarchate 
1722 Table of Ranks Law adopted 
1762 Nobility relieved from compulsory state service 
1772 First division of Poland 
1783 Crimea taken possession of by Russia 
1785 Catherine II issues the Charter to the Nobility 
1793 Second division of Poland 
1795 Third division of Poland 
1812 Napoleon’s army enters the territory of Russia  
1825 Decembrist revolt 
1830 Uprising in the Polish areas  
1853–1856 Crimean war 
1860 Founding of Vladivostok on the Pacific coast 
1861 Abolition of serfdom 
1864 Start of zemstvo reform and court reform 
1867 Russia sells Alaska to the USA 
1874 Introduction of general compulsory military service  
1891 Start of construction of the Trans-Siberian railway line 
1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War 
1905–1907 First bourgeois revolution in Russia 
1905 Nicholas II issues October manifesto respecting civil liberties 
1906 State Duma – the first national representative institution, with a 
consultative right – elected 
1917 
Revolution in February removes tsardom, revolution in October 
sweeps away the Interim Government that replaced tsardom 
Bolsheviks take power 
1918–1921 Bloody civil war in Russia  
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Date Event 
1922 Soviet Union established  
1991 Soviet Union breaks up, Commonwealth of Independent States 
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6.2. Western Christian Europe16 
 
LÁSZLÓ ZSINKA 
 
6.2.1. Conceptual bases 
 
Europe (or the West) has its individual rank in the last 500 years of the 
history of civilisations. It was the Europeans that started to “discover” the world, 
as the voyages of Columbus and Vasco de Gama drew attention. The European 
continent has played an extraordinary role on the way to the global world. The 
industrial revolution took place in Europe that created the environment for 
developing a civilisation where the majority of people found alternative sources 
of living to agriculture. The ideas of social contract, liberalism and democracy, 
that remodel the relationship of the state and the society, were established in 
Europe which in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have changed the political 
environment of states and nations globally. The values of individualism, against 
classical community centric societies, were also born in Europe and that allowed 
cultural modernity to develop. The European continent had economic, political 
and cultural “innovations” that did not only differentiate it from other 
civilisations but made the progression unique. One needs to find a response to the 
question why Europe became the centre of the modern world in order to discuss 
European civilisation in detail. 
This issue of “why Europe” has been studied by the Anglo-Saxon histori-
ography and sociology under “the rise of the West” expression over the last fifty 
years. Such results have significantly enhanced the better understanding of 
Europe’s civilisation characteristics. During the period of the western hegemony 
the matter of the unique development of the West/Europe has proven to be 
appropriate. Today, with the rise of the Asian region, it is clear that the age of 
western dominance covered only a few centuries of human civilisations and each 
society finds its own way to modernity. All this favoured the multilinear views 
against unilinear views and instead of the historical significance of the Atlantic 
period, that links Europe and North America, it pointed out the world historical 
role of the Eurasian region that covers great Asian civilisations, too. Post-modern 
waves also came to effect during the last decades, that aimed to convert the 
exceptionality (exceptionalism) of the West into relative (relativism). 

16 Certain parts of this paper are shortened sections of my book Európa felemelkedése 
[The rise of Europe], Budapest: Typotex, 2018, with special regard to the following 
chapters: The beginning of the western Christian culture and The first “take-off” of 
Europe in the High Middle Ages. 
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Sociological approach in the second half of the twentieth century, studying 
the rise of the West, aimed to find a better understanding of the dynamics of mo-
dernity. The word Europe was mostly associated with the European integration 
process and its spiritual and cultural background. However, the word “Europe” is 
rooted in earlier times than the word “West”. Europe has first appeared in Greek 
mythology, representing the Phoenician princess with whom Zeus fell in love and 
then took to Crete. The myth refers to the symbolic links between the ancient 
eastern civilisations and the developing European culture. What seem to be a sig-
nificant move, from the historical aspect of the concept, is that the concept of a 
mythological female figure had gone through significant changes between the 
eighth and the sixth centuries BCE. At the time of the creation of the Homeric 
Hymns (eighth century BCE) it could barely have had any geographical meaning, 
while at the age of Herodotus and the Greco-Persian wars (fifth century BCE) it 
had already been more or less located at its place which today’s geography also 
identifies. 
The antique geographical definition of Europe differs from the modern 
definition of geography, to a certain extent. According to the classic ancient era 
the edge of the European continent was by the Tanais River (today called Don), 
whereas by the modern-day definition the line is more to the east, all the way to 
the Volga. Ancient Greek and Roman people had very little knowledge of Scan-
dinavia or the northern part of the Eastern-European Plain. The modern geograph-
ical definition of Europe was created by Volger, the German geographer, in the 
nineteenth century, who considered the Mountains of Ural, Volga and the Cau-
casus as the eastern borders of the continent. 
Europe used to be a geographic category during the Greco-Roman 
antiques. The name was barely used in historical sources from the early medieval 
age, that also expresses the fact that cultural content had been in the process of 
changes during the end of the ancient times. As a result of the Christian state 
organisation this cultural content was reborn together with the Carolingian 
Europe and that was completed with the crowning of Charlemagne, (800). No 
wonder why, in sources of the times, the Frankish emperor was called the 
“lighthouse of Europe”. 
After the millennium the continent increasingly identified with 
“Christianity”. The word “Europe” was barely in use between the eleventh and 
thirteenth centuries. Instead “Europe”, “Respublica Christiana” became common, 
indicating that the European continent and Christianity are one. The word 
“Europe” came back in use from the late Middle Ages, along with the 
development of secularisation. Laicisation of the culture led to the fact that using 
the word “Christianity” faded out little by little by the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Intellectuals had been using the word “Europe” ever since when trying 
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to describe the characteristics of the continent. This expresses the intent to 
describe characteristics of the European civilisation, of which Christianity was an 
integral but not the only part. Voltaire, during the French Enlightenment, had 
already noticed the fact that there are many diverse nations and countries in 
Europe. On the other hand, there is a “European dimension” that does give a 
common base for national entities but cannot be identified exclusively with 
Christian belief. 
Unlike in ancient times, in the modern age the definition of Europe covered 
more than just a geographical concept, social and cultural content got added. 
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries its intellectual reflexion deepened 
gradually. Political theorists of the early modern history identified Europe with 
“freedom” compared to the eastern “despotism”. It was considered to be an 
exceptional scene in human history in the “long nineteenth century”, where 
people’s emancipation could come alive that also gives a guideline for the 
development of world history. Europe became a metaphor for Christian and civic 
humanist theorists during the first half of the twentieth century and incorporated 
the values of “freedom” and “Christianity” that can be opposed to left-wing and 
right-wing totalitarianism. This perspective continued during the cold war when 
the “free world”, now accompanied by the United States of America, confronted 
with the communist countries. These days the word “Europe” equals the 
technocrat connotations of the integration process. This involves that the cultural 
content that makes the European continent so different from others is fading. 
Certain intellectual groups consider this phenomenon as a “cultural/civilisational 
crisis”. 
Compared to Europe, with a great historical background, the West is a new 
category, used in sociology since the end of the nineteenth century to describe the 
Euro-American region, as the platform that serves the creation of the modern 
world. Europe is distinct from the West, not only with regard to the conceptual 
perspective but geographically too, as the latter covers North America. Europe 
involves values and ideas that are the subject of humanities’ interest, i. e. 
“freedom”, “Christianity’, “rationalism”, “humanity”, while the characteristics of 
the West are classical concepts of social sciences, i. e. “capitalism”, “market”, 
“private property”, “rational state”. With respect to the interpretation of the 
characteristics of western development Max Weber, the German sociologist, is 
eminently significant at the turn of the nineteenth century, who had a decisive 
influence on formulating the current basic categories of modernity. While Europe 
represents a cultural content, the West attempts to describe the rise, development 
and essential characteristics of an economic and social model. The West, 
geographically, links the dynamic western part of Europe and North America, yet 
the model it represents can be expanded universally, as it actually happened in 
Civilisations from East to West 
362 

politicians’ statements that proclaimed the universal demand of liberal 
democracy and free market after the end of the cold war. 
It is a must to clear the typical concepts of “modernity” and 
„modernisation” when introducing the West. In economic terms, modernity 
means rise of the market and capitalism instead of state-redistribution, 
formulation of industrial society and organisations instead of pre-industrial 
agricultural societies. Socially, modernity implied the development of class 
societies instead of hierarchic societies that is determined by equality by birth and 
individual achievements. Politically the community of the “governed” is not 
determined by the “governors” in modernity but the “society” wins priority 
against the “state”, and that is expressed in the definitions of social contract and 
representative democracy just as much as in the citizens’ freedom from the power 
and in their rights guaranteed. From the cultural point of view, individual-centred 
values (individualism) appear against community-centred and traditional 
societies. Modernity has multi-layer meanings and West can be interpreted as a 
realisation of such dimensions. 
The West is not only a universal economic and social model but during the 
past centuries it has even evolved into a hegemonic civilisation. Today we are 
facing the closure of this era. Therefore, the discipline of international relations 
is deeply concerned about the multipolar international system that took over the 
place of the western hegemony. The development, existence and fall of the 
hegemonic West has been analysed in many scientific studies during the last 
decades, even in greater theoretical aspects, of which the roots of western 
hegemony, Western European development characteristics and the matter of the 
western economic and social dynamics seem to be basic issues. 
Over the last one thousand and five hundred years, the western side of 
Europe has proven many differences from the eastern side of the continent. A 
major difference was that of western (Latin) and eastern (orthodox) Christianity, 
and more and more distinctive marks added to it over the centuries. Furthermore, 
the Latin West was part of the Protestant movement, the dynamism of the Atlantic 
world trade that came along with the great geographical explorations, the 
seventeenth century scientific revolution and the Enlightenment. The western 
expansion side, the United States of America, has gained economic and political 
power during the past two centuries that has reshaped power relations between 
Western European and North American civilisations. 
However, it seeded European ideas, the North American world was still 
different from European ideals. In contrast with the two-thousand-year past, 
North American settlers have three hundred years of history. North American 
civilisation also took over Christian principles, representative democracy, 
separation of powers, the ideas of citizens’ freedom and free market. Western 
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Christian Europe rather relied on catholic traditions, the balance between freedom 
and solidarity, autonomous communities, corporative social organisation and 
traditions of etatism. North American societies are characterised by 
Protestantism, laissez faire, free market, the minimal state idea, individualism 
and the governing role of individual initiatives.  Such factors clearly prove the 
boundaries of the distinction between Western European and North American 
civilisations. 
The West is identified with the Euro American world and its two branches: 
Western European civilisations and North American civilisations. Some 
interpretations put the emphasis on the differences and highlight their 
autonomous nature, while other understandings point out the similarities. In this 
paper Western European Christian civilisation and North American civilisation 
are considered to be two separate and independent phenomena. At the same time, 
Western Christian Europe is different from the Orthodox Christian world, too and 
that implies the acknowledgement of the essential differences between Western 
Europe and Eastern Europe. Western and Eastern Christianity were not only 
different in their dogmas and liturgics, but they contributed to the formation of 
autonomous Christian cultures. These, in relation with other historical factors, 
resulted in formulating civilisations of different characteristics in eastern and 
western Europe. 
 
6.2.2. Basic components and limitations 
 
Modern science of history often uses the expression “European 
civilisation” instead of “western Christian Europe” or “western Christian 
civilisation”. When determining the time frames of European civilisation, the 
question we are facing is whether the Greco-Roman antiquity is an integral part 
of the European civilisational inheritance. In case classic antiquity is considered 
to be part of the European civilisation, the roots of Europe reach back to the 
beginning of ancient Greek history i. e. the age of Homer (eighth century BCE). 
However, if one takes the view that the history of Europe began with Christianity 
and German invasions, the birth of European civilisation roots back to the second 
half of the first millennium CE. 
Germanic neo-humanists in the nineteenth century were for the first idea 
and Oswald Spengler was for the second, in his work called “The decline of the 
West (1918‒1922)”. Civic and Christian humanist theorists and historians 
between World War I and World War II, Gonzague Reynold, Christopher 
Dawson and Herbert W. Rüssel, emphasised the exceptional significance of 
Christianity with respect to the formation of Europe. At the same time the 
Christian-antique synthesis was still considered to be a key phenomenon that 
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represented the adoption and reshaping of the classic ancient legacy in the 
framework of Christian culture. In their perspective, although the history of the 
European civilisation started with Christianity, unlike Spengler, they did not 
consider antiquity being an “external” factor. 
Contemporary historiography movements have not proven specific interest 
in defining the beginning of “Europe” as a civilisation unit. However, it is true 
that the majority of European cultural historians consider Christianity to be a 
fundamental factor. Historians are divided over the role of classical antiquity, but 
the recognition of the role of Christianity is undoubted. Still, modern history and 
social sciences are divided on which aspect of Christianity is emphasised in 
European history. Recognition of the historical impact of Christian belief makes 
it possible to speak of “Western/Latin Christian Europe”, “Western Christian 
civilisation” or “Western European Christian civilisation” as synonyms for 
“European civilisation”. 
Certain aspects of Western Christianity allow us to define more precisely 
what is meant by the historical role of Christian belief. On the one hand, 
Christianity is not only a religion, but a faith and doctrine that has social 
consequences. Therefore, one can talk about a social dimension of the Christian 
belief, that had influence on the development of social structures and political 
institutions. The non-political movement attitude of Christianity, unlike 
Muhammad and his successors Jesus Christ did not establish a state, leads to a 
distinction between sacred and profane, which in long term leads to a distinction 
between religion and politics, and to secularisation and laicisation in European 
history. In contrast, in the scope of human civilisations formed by other world 
religions, the difference between sacred and profane as a problem makes less 
sense. On the other hand, although Christianity has the “social dimension”, unlike 
Hinduism, it did not fully identify with any social system, but proclaimed a 
universal mission and recognised the relative autonomy of the social sector. 
Christians applied Roman Law and unlike Islam, no autonomous religious law 
was created to rule social relationships. In the English language the difference 
between Christendom and Christianity illustrates the phenomenon. The former 
refers to Christianity as a religious, social and political universe, while the latter 
refers to the individual's faith. The coexistence of these two concepts in itself 
expresses the particular feature of Christianity that it did not want to identify with 
any socio-political or legal-ethical system but sought to define itself as the belief 
of the individual. In this perspective, it must also be pointed out that in European 
history one can never speak of a “perfect” Christian society, or of the so-called 
Christian “great middle ages” as its manifestation. Although the Middle Ages 
(twelfth ‒ thirteenth centuries) were a great era of Christendom, this does not 
mean that the faith of individuals (Christianity) was more or better, compared to 
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the preceding or following centuries. Even in the brightest times of the Christian 
Europe, we do not encounter a homogeneous Christian society free of contradic-
tions, which does not mean that the great achievements of the medieval Christian 
civilisation are questioned. 
Christian faith and Christian culture must be clearly distinguished. During 
the last two centuries, we can talk less about a “Christian Europe”, either in the 
sense of faith or as a social or ethical norm, but the attitudes of Christian culture 
still influence the development of contemporary European civilisation. Today, 
only ten percent of the European population are practicing Christian religion. Yet 
the reflexes of the Christian civilisation orientate secularised societies to some 
extent.  
It should also be pointed out that the social dimension of the Christian 
belief cannot be separated from the civilisation in which it effects. It was only in 
the Latin West that Christianity led to an increasingly distinct separation of sacred 
and profane spheres, while in the field of Orthodox Christianity the close link 
between religion and state remained. Throughout the history of the Byzantine 
civilisation, Caesaropapism always existed, which meant the political power had 
authority over the Christian Church. This phenomenon appears also in the history 
of Orthodox Russia. In the Latin West, for centuries after the fall of the Western 
Roman Empire (476), no emperor was crowned, and that resulted in the 
independent status of the papacy. The early Germanic kingdoms had no sufficient 
authority to question the autonomy of the papal power, while in Byzantium the 
power and continuity of the empire was available to limit the power of the 
Patriarch of Constantinople. Consequently, the increasing separation of the 
sacred and the profane sectors was not only due to the Christian doctrine but 
effected in special historical context. There is a reason for the fact that the 
Investiture Controversy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in support of the 
distinction between the sacred and the secular spheres, took place in Western 
Europe and not in Byzantium. 
Western Christian civilisation was not only shaped by Christian religion, 
but influence of other historical factors must be considered too. One of the most 
exciting phenomena in the first millennium CE is the profound mutual influence 
between Christian religion, antique culture and barbaric tribal traditions. The 
relevant views of Christian humanist historians (Dawson, Reynold) has already 
been mentioned, that says Greco-Roman antiquity may be defined as a separate 
cultural entity in relation to Western Christian civilisation, but its reception and 
transformation had been shaping European culture since the early Middle Ages 
to German neo-humanism. As a result, Classical Antiquity lost its “alterity” and 
became more and more integrated to Western Christian Europe, to the extent that 
some modern humanists, such as Humboldt, considered this phenomenon being 
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the essence of European civilisation. The “implantation” of antiquity into 
Western Christian civilisation draws attention to the fact that Greco-Roman 
antiquity is not only an outward antecedent of European culture but has become 
an effective factor for centuries. Nevertheless, Western Christian Europe has 
become much more than the mere accomplishment of classical antiquity. Based 
on all these considerations, Western Christian civilisation can be defined as a 
“second-generation” civilisation whose history was influenced by the ancient 
legacy, but it is far from an overall determination. Despite its ancient history, the 
Christian West can be regarded as a fundamentally novel civilisation.  
A similar phenomenon can be observed in barbaric tribal cultures. During 
the first millennium CE, the relationship with Christianity and antiquity and 
German peoples became stronger. Interactions could have evolved on a cultural 
level, that, for example, involved the adoption of antique culture within the frame-
work of a Christian school in barbarian areas. Social structures could also have 
merged, and the “transformation” of the late Roman estates into medieval feudal 
estates would be a good example. 
It is an established topos that the history of European civilisation is 
described as a combination of three fundamental factors, (1) Jewish and Christian 
religion, (2) Greco-Roman antiquity, and (3) tribal (then national) cultures. 
According to this, the essence of European civilisation is the profound interaction 
that has developed in the framework of these three basic elements. Such 
combination of basic elements of civilisation also point out that Europe is not a 
“uniform”, homogeneous civilisation, but a result of complex socio-cultural 
processes, where the extraordinary depth of interaction has created the special 
character of European culture. Some consider that “Europe” has been existing 
since the interaction among the three basic elements exists. Others suggest that 
we must consider the medieval “melting pot” as a key, where these fundamentals 
were so pervasive that they have radically transformed one another. The dialectic 
of the resulting tensions has become a shaping factor in European history, which 
has had an impact all the way until the modern age. 
Should one accept that the “essence” of Europe is the presence and organic 
interaction of these basic civilisation elements, the beginning of the European 
civilisation, in line with the above, would be the first half of the first millennium, 
when the evolution of the correlations was already noticeable in the age of Late 
Antiquity. This concept defines the Western Christian civilisation as a “complex 
civilisation” that had not been shaped by Christianity alone. However, Christian-
ity gained exceptional significance, as it was the foundation that clamped the rest 
together. The “umbrella-like” Christian culture influenced and “controlled” the 
takeover of the antique and barbarian legacy. In this sense, one can say that the 
“content” of European civilisation was shaped by Christian, antique, and national 
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components, but its “form” was shaped solely by Christianity. The Swiss histo-
rian, Gonzague de Reynold, also referred to this when talking about the Europe 
under “Christian roof”. The history of European civilisation until the end of the 
eighteenth century can be described as the interaction of the three basic civilisa-
tion elements. But, the rise of “modernity” has reshaped the image over the last 
two centuries, leading slowly to the decline of Christian faith and classical cul-
ture. In this light, it is understandable that the twentieth century cultural criticism 
prefers to speak of the “end” of Europe. Against pessimists, it should be noted 
that, despite the decline of the Christian faith lots of the Christian values continue 
to exist in secularised form in the modern society. Such is the idea of humanism, 
incorporated in the absolute value of human dignity, or the strong social expec-
tation of a desirable balance between freedom and solidarity. Although interest 
in classical culture has decreased, rational criticism and hermeneutical culture 
have remained. Based on these, we can still talk about Western Christian civili-
sation or European culture, although in a different aspect than before the modern 
age. 
Western Christian civilisation is a “second-generation” and “complex” cul-
ture, of several components, dating back to the late Roman world, where Christi-
anity first became a power to shape history and ancient societies encountered 
barbarian people. Opinions are divided on the “end” of Western Christian Europe. 
“Pessimists” emphasise the loss of old European values, while “modernists” point 
out that the universal model of Western modernity has been accomplished via 
market economy, capitalism, liberalism, democracy and individualism. The as-
sessment of the last century depends on the interpretation of modernity in the 
history of Europe. It is considered to be a phenomenon accomplishing the West-
ern European civilisation that roots in the Middle Ages or it can be the “antithe-
sis” of modern European civilisational values. In the latter case, talking about 
Western Christian civilisation in the twenty-first century is still questionable. 
 
6.2.3. The beginning of the western Christian culture (200‒1000) 
 
The cultural geographic boundaries of Western Christian Europe were con-
solidated in the early Middle Ages (between the seventh and eleventh centuries) 
to the north of the Alps. The prosperity of the antique civilisation, whose features 
formed from the eighth century BCE in the Mediterranean basin, prevented that. 
Classical antiquity was a coastal urban civilisation, whose economic and cultural 
consistence was ensured by the great maritime infrastructure of the Mediterra-
nean. Ancient Greek polis, after the great Greek colonisation (between the sev-
enth and sixth centuries BCE), not only covered the Aegean area but also the 
western basin of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Greek poleis were usually 
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located geographically near the coast. Ancient civilisation retained its maritime 
nature even after the establishment of the Roman Empire. In the days of Augus-
tus, Rome conquered the whole of the Mediterranean, which was called mare 
nostrum (“our sea”) for a reason. Greco-Roman antiquity became identical with 
the Mediterranean world, and this fundamentally influenced the character of an-
cient civilisation. 
 
The antique legacy 
 
In many aspects, the ancient legacy influenced the Western Christian civi-
lisation. Polis was an ancient Greek foundation, which, for the first time in Euro-
pean history, represented the idea of a self-governing autonomous community 
against the “up-bottom” states and empires. The antique liberty-topos has become 
one of the most prominent legacies of European civilisation that is barely found 
in pre-modern societies. Greeks were the first to formulate the idea of civic liberty 
against the despotic states of Asia. Although different from the liberal idea of 
freedom of the “moderns”, as a pattern it worked in medieval and renaissance 
city-states (classic republicanism), and in European political tradition in general. 
Also, despotism was morally condemned, and arguments were put forward for 
taking legal actions against it. Therefore, the idea of the accountability of the 
power dates back to significant past in European history. 
Due to their pioneering role in philosophy, education, literature, fine arts 
and professional sciences, the Greco-Roman legacy has fed Western Christian 
civilisation until modern times. Classical antiquity had the power of an aesthetic 
norm, which was interpreted differently throughout the periods of European cul-
tural history but was always effective. Only the debate between “ancients” and 
“moderns” in the context of French classicism in the seventeenth century led to 
the recognition that works of the modern age have their own value and may even 
be better than the values of Greco-Roman antiquity. The argument between the 
ancients and the moderns established the progressive approach of modernity, but 
before that the works of antiquity proved to be dominant. 
One of the great legacies of classical antiquity is captured in the develop-
ment of humanism. Humanism, as an anthropocentric concept, can be interpreted 
as a fundamental value of European civilisation, that even in modern times was a 
common denominator between Christians and atheists. But it has to be seen that, 
the expression of “anthropocentrism” was the result of a long process in ancient 
times and, despite its great achievements, was only marginally accomplished. 
They did not use the word “humanism”, this is a term of modern origin, first used 
by Niethammer on the part of German neo-humanists in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, but the word humanitas was used. 
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In the classical period of ancient Greek culture (fifth‒fourth centuries BCE), 
literary and philosophical texts had not yet invented a consistent image of human, 
placing it in the centre of the cosmos wilfully, although Greek literature expressed 
human feelings and thoughts in a more nuanced way than ancient Middle Eastern 
literature. In the classical age, Greek humanism was mostly embodied in fine art, 
when the beautiful human body was portrayed in harmonious and live 
proportions. Statues did not represent the idea of human dignity but sought to 
carve the beauty of the gods and the Olympians, while also testifying the 
greatness and beauty of man. Human dignity became a subject only after the 
conquests of Alexander the Great, in the Hellenistic age (third‒first centuries 
BCE), when the significance of school education increased. From this point on, 
the Greeks believed that human dignity can be achieved through the acquisition 
of literacy, the encyclios paideia, that is, through learning. The culture became 
known in the spirit of the valid educational ideal (paideia), which also orientated 
the material of education. According to the Greeks, school education will uplift 
and perfect a person and promote people’s dignity. 
The school humanism of the Hellenistic age was a late phenomenon and 
that is what Romans inherited. There is a reason why Cicero in the first century 
BCE translated the Greek word paideia into Latin humanitas, and the educational 
humanism he incorporated was inherited throughout the Middle Ages until the 
Renaissance. Despite its achievements, ancient humanism had its limitations, and 
even its survival would have been questionable unless it encountered Christianity, 
which had its own humanistic tendencies, biblical humanism, Christian human-
ism. By doing so, it embraced and reinforced antique humanist heritage. Antique 
works in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not popular because the 
original meaning of ancient humanism was accurately understood and expe-
rienced, but due to the fact that the modern bourgeoisie preferred to discover its 
own anthropocentric approach in antique sculptures and literary works. That is 
why Greek, Roman and Renaissance works of art gained enormous popularity in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
In the first centuries after Christ, during the early imperial period, a cultural 
geographic line was drawn with far-reaching consequences in the Mediterranean. 
When Rome conquered the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, many Greek-
speaking cities came under its control. The Roman Empire absorbed the Eastern 
Mediterranean, which used to be the core of Hellenistic culture. The eastern prov-
inces of the empire were areas of Greek culture, while Latin language and culture 
was spread in the western provinces like Western Europe and North Africa. The 
cultural differences between the Greek East and the Latin West were still ob-
scured by bilingual schooling throughout the empire (bilingual culture) through-
out the early centuries, but later the differences became more significant. When 
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in 395 the western and eastern empires finally split, the establishment of a polit-
ical boundary meant the separation of the Latin and Greek parts of the empire. In 
the early Middle Ages, the Greek identity of the Byzantine Empire got strength-
ened, as did the identity of the Latin West. The Greek East and the Latin West 
provided a cultural foundation for the differences between the Roman Catholic 
and Orthodox churches, which became one of the major separation lines of Euro-
pean civilisation. 
Despite the maritime nature of the Roman Empire, the conquest of western 
European provinces, Hispania, Gaul, Britain, took control of large areas of the 
mainland from the first century BCE until the first century CE. The Romanisation 
and Latinisation of the Western European region was largely rooted in Celtic cul-
ture, that led to the expansion of urbanisation and literacy. Romanisation evolved 
over centuries, Gaul was under Roman control for about four hundred years, and 
it proved to be profound by laying foundations for the formation of Neo-Latin 
languages. In the provinces, not only Roman civilisation but also Christianity 
spread rapidly during the first centuries of the empire. In the process of develop-
ing the cultural-geographical boundaries of Western Europe, areas that were un-
der Roman rule for a long time must be treated differently. In the Middle Ages, 
modern-day France and Spain had a different civilisation background than the 
areas east of the Rhine or England, where Anglo-Saxon immigration heavily 
overruled Roman presence. It is not a coincidence that France today, which had 
deep Romanisation and evangelisation bases, became the core area of medieval 
feudal society. 
 
Barbarian-Germanic legacy 
 
The encounter of antique and barbaric societies played a major role in the 
formation of Western Christian Europe. The Romans, in their conquest of West-
ern Europe, came into contact with the Celtic world when Julius Caesar occupied 
Gaul (58‒49 BCE). During the early Roman Empire, in the first and second cen-
turies, they also encountered the Germans while protecting the Rhine border.  
The Celts used to live in western Europe, parts of modern-day France, Bel-
gium, the British Isles, Germany and Austria. They were the first Iron Age popu-
lation of Western Europe, known by the name and led by armed aristocracy. On 
the eve of the Roman conquest their settlements had a rudimentary urban charac-
ter. The Germans and the Celts lived in a tribal organisation, although it had al-
ready begun to loosen when they encountered the Romans. None of them can be 
considered true nomadic people who lived in the Eurasian steppe corridor and in 
the grassy areas north of the Black Sea. Germanic and Celtic peoples were rural, 
farmer groups to whom the transition to peasant societies was easy. 
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In Western Europe, unlike in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, nomadism 
has never gained a foothold, but peasant life has played a key role since the be-
ginning. The difference between the barbarians and the settled Romans was not 
that they migrated for grazing of their animals, but in general they did not live in 
cities and literary and other civilisation achievements were less typical for them. 
The great migration of people that caused the fall the Western Roman Empire did 
not occur because the Germans sought new pastures for their animals, but gener-
ally looked for the more favourable climate and more prosperous south, and got 
oppressed by other ethnic groups, mostly the nomadic Huns. 
In Europe, during the “Great Invasions” (third‒sixth centuries), language 
boundaries were created which later influenced the continent's history consider-
ably. Romanisation on the Italian peninsula had been prevalent since the early 
conquests, so the Latin language spread at the end of the republic. From the first 
to the fourth centuries, Romanisation developed in Gaul and Britain too, but 
Celtic language islands had survived. The Germanic Franks from the Rhine 
settled down in the areas of Northern France at the time of the migration. On the 
southern part of France, the Romanised population preserved their language and 
culture, while in the north of France the Germanic influences were stronger. After 
the Roman legions left England, the Romanised Celtic (British) population even-
tually was weaker against the Germanic Anglo-Saxons attacking from the direc-
tion of Scandinavia. Thus, the Anglo-Saxon linguistic and cultural layer became 
dominant, and Celtic culture survived only on the Irish Island. 
After the end of the migration in the late ancient times, Germanic and Neo-
Latin languages shared the western half of Europe. Neo-Latin languages domi-
nated in Italy, in the Iberian Peninsula, in southern France, (later Occitania), while 
in Germany and England the Germanic language dominated. In the northern part 
of France today, Germanic and Latin elements were balanced in the early Middle 
Age. The Celtic population survived only in smaller language islands, mainly in 
Bretagne and Wales. One of the main features of the emerging language map is 
the dichotomy of the Germanic Northern Europe and the Neo-Latin Southern 
Europe. It is understood that Leopold Ranke, one of the greatest German histori-
ans of the nineteenth century, derived a characteristic feature of European civili-
sation from the coexistence of Germanic and Latin peoples. 
The western half of Europe is characterised by the coexistence of Celtic, 
Germanic, and Neo-Latin peoples and languages. If Eastern Europe were to be 
included in the study, we should mention the Slavic languages and the Turkish 
populations (Huns, Cumans) in the steppe corridor north of the Black Sea, as well 
as the Greek language in the Balkans. In the western direction, Greek cultural 
influences showed up mainly in southern Italy. 
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As far as the linguistic components of Europe are concerned, we must not 
forget the presence of the Jewish population who lived in diasporas in Christian 
Europe. The greatest cultural influence was exerted by the Sephardi Jews in the 
Mediterranean. Muslim populations also showed up in Western and Southern 
Europe, mainly as a result of the early medieval conquests. Some remained in the 
Iberian Peninsula, southern Italy and Sicily even after the Christians reoccupied 
these areas. The Jewish and Muslim minorities were never substantial, but their 
cultural significance was far greater than their number. 
Of the barbarians, the Germans played the greatest role in shaping the 
socio-cultural circumstances of the European continent. The German myths sur-
vived in medieval and then modern culture (Wagner operas). The ideal of a Ger-
man free warrior made it difficult to submit to personal dependence in emerging 
feudal societies and sustained the need for political participation. In medieval 
England, some institutions of political participation in local governance can be 
traced back to old Germanic legal customs. Regarding the success of nineteenth 
century Scandinavian modernisation, it is usually noted that the path was clear 
from “tribal democracy” to modern democracy in these societies. In addition to 
these examples of social history, some philosophers of history, such as Oswald 
Spengler, have called attention to the impact of the “Germanic spirit” on Euro-
pean civilisation. 
 
Formation of the Latin Christian cultural community 
 
The greatest change of the early Middle Ages (seventh‒eleventh centuries) 
is that the centre of the Mediterranean civilisation, that left antiquity behind, got 
shifted to the northwest. The formation of Western Christian civilisation took 
place on the territory of the Frankish Empire between the Rhine and the Loire, 
today north of France, between the sixth and the eighth centuries. In contrast to 
maritime and urban antique civilisation, Christian Western Europe was a conti-
nental agricultural civilisation controlled by the military landowner elite instead 
of urban middle classes. Along with the territorial shift, the consistence of the 
Mediterranean ancient civilisation also loosened.  
The unity of the ancient civilisation remained for some time after the fall 
of the Western Roman Empire (476). Although the political consistency of the 
Mediterranean was over, sea routes provided economic and cultural circulation 
for a century and a half. The coherence of the Mediterranean ceased when Muslim 
armies occupied the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean in the 
seventh century. From that point on, two opposing cultures, Christian and Mus-
lim, faced against each other in the Mediterranean, and significant territories of 
the ancient Eastern Christianity, (Syria, Egypt), had come under Muslim control. 
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All this contributed to reshaping the balance of power within Christianity, which 
led to the fact that the significance of the Roman and Byzantine churches in-
creased. Islam shifted the centre of Mediterranean Christianity to the north, facil-
itating the birth of Western Christian Europe. 
The Islamic threat also catalysed the outlining of the Latin Christian iden-
tity. When Charles Martel's heavy cavalry stopped the Muslim army heading to-
ward Tours in central France at Poitiers (732), the victory of the Frankish Mayor 
of the Palace became the “birthday” of the Christian Europe to the north of the 
Alps. Although historians do not agree on the significance of the Battle of Poi-
tiers, some believe that the Frankish army has protected the European Christian 
civilisation, others consider that the battle was a minor battle, it is certain that the 
victory of the central power of the Western Christian civilisation, the Frankish 
state, prevented Muslims from invading Western Europe. 
Other factors also pushed the disintegration of Mediterranean Christianity. 
The iconoclasm movement in Byzantium (eighth‒ninth centuries) played a major 
role in destroying the relationship between the Pope and the Byzantine ruler. 
Since the fall of the Western Roman Empire, no emperor had been crowned in 
the West. The popes recognised the Byzantine emperor as head of the entire 
Roman Empire. He was accepted as the formal ruler of the Western Roman 
territories, including Italy, although he could not exercise his jurisdiction due to 
the German kingdoms. In return, the emperors acknowledged that the Pope was 
the head of the entire universal church, which did not mean any intervention in 
the affairs of the eastern churches. In Christian antiquity, the five patriarchs, 
Constantinople, Alexandrian (Egyptian), Antiochian (Syrian), Jerusalem, and the 
Roman as the “Patriarch of the West”, jointly controlled Christianity. Although 
they had broad autonomy in governing their own territory, the pentarchy they 
represented, and the universal councils embodied the consistency of 
Mediterranean Christianity. 
There have been fractures in Mediterranean Christianity already in the fifth 
century. Assyrian and Egyptian Christians, being Monophysites and Nestorians, 
had expressed objection about the Christological dogma of Rome and Constan-
tinople since Chalcedonian Council in 451. In the long term, the Chalcedonian 
teaching promoted the option of Christian humanism interpreted broadly, since it 
considered the deity of Christ as complete as his humanity, and the two were 
closely linked. With regard to the Chalcedonian dogma, the Roman and 
Byzantine churches have, for the time being, found a common ground against the 
Eastern Monophysites and Nestorians. 
A few centuries later, the above-mentioned iconoclasm created fractures 
between Rome and Byzantium. The debate sought to force the will of Byzantine 
emperors into the Church, where the depiction of Christ, saints, and sacred images 
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was considered idolatry, similarly to Jewish and Muslim religions. The popes and 
the Latin West, in the view of Pope St. Gregory the Great (590‒604), were in 
favour of the iconography. Due to the deteriorating relationship, the Byzantine 
emperors did not pay enough attention to give the Pope proper protection against 
the attacks of the Italian Langobard princes. Among other things, this justified 
Pope Stephen’s decision, who travelled personally to Frankish territories north of 
the Alps in the mid-eighth century and asked Pepin the Short for support against 
the Langobards. 
The historical alliance between the papacy and the Frankish Kingdom 
significantly changed the internal power lines of Christianity. On the one hand, it 
expressed the growing power of the Western European region, that represented 
by the Frankish state. On the other hand, the popes’ attention, in the ecclesiastical, 
cultural and political sense, got increasingly directed towards Europe, north of 
the Alps. When in 800 Pope Leo III in Rome crowned Charlemagne to be 
emperor, the formation of Western Christian Europe seemed to be coming to be 
accomplished. After three centuries, an emperor reigned in the West again, 
leading to legitimacy disputes with Byzantium, who considered itself the sole 
representative of the Roman legacy. The growing self-confidence of the Pope and 
the Frankish rulers rests not only on the military victories of Charles Martel, 
Pippin the Short, and Charlemagne, but also on the successes of evangelisation 
of the preceding two hundred years, which allowed the Frankish Empire to be-
come a spiritual and intellectual focal point and centre of power for the expanding 
Western Europe. 
Major changes took place in Western Europe in the two centuries prior to 
the Roman emperor’s coronation in 800. Some historians duly called this era the 
“birth of Europe” (the making of Europe). This term refers to the birth of the 
religious and cultural unity of Latin Christian Europe in the seventh and eighth 
centuries. Such changes are linked to the success of Christian evangelisation. At 
the time of Muhammad’s activity (around 610), the heart of Christianity was in 
the Mediterranean, and the areas to the north of the Alps seemed remote. During 
the Roman control, Christianity was widespread in modern-day Italy, Spain and 
France, while English and German areas were still awaiting conversion. In the 
British Islands, Irish Christianity reached success since the fifth century, 
developing its own traditions yet isolated from Rome. In England, as a 
remembrance of the Roman authority, much of the Celtic British maintained their 
faith, but with the Anglo-Saxon conquest, Christianity seemed to recoil. As a 
result of the evangelisation, the Anglo-Saxon kings gradually converted to 
Christianity in the seventh century, and it was of great importance that the 
conversion took place in cooperation with the Roman Church. With the decline 
of isolated Irish monks, church traditions, liturgical customs, and school 
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education from Rome finally linked the British Isles into the stream of Western 
Christianity.  
Trends were similar to tendencies in Germany. The Germanic tribes to the 
east and south of Austria, the Franconian tribe of the Rhine, were still pagans in 
the fifth and sixth centuries. Although Christian monks were present in these 
areas, the true success of evangelisation was only achieved through the activities 
of St. Bonifatius in the eighth century. Bonifatius, of English descent, maintained 
excellent relationships with the popes and the Frankish court. In cooperation with 
Rome, he laid the foundations not only for evangelisation but also for church 
organisation and school education in German territory. There is a reason for him 
to earn the title “Apostle of Germany” in the tradition of the Catholic Church. 
Through his activities, much of Germany has become part of the Latin Christian 
cultural community. The evangelisation of the English and German territories 
expanded the dimensions of Latin Christianity north of the Alps. In about 600 
Christian faith and culture was present in Italian, Spanish and French territories, 
but by about 800 Christian kings ruled in England, and in Germany the only 
challenge left was the conversion of combative Saxons. François Guizot, a 
nineteenth-century French politician and historian, has written about the five 
“great nations” of (Western) Europe in his book on the history of European 
civilisation, mentioning the English, French, Spanish, German and Italian 
nations. With reference to Guizot, around the year 600 the future of English and 
German lands was still doubtful, but around the year 800 the five “great nations” 
became Christian. The success of evangelisation has proven itself in the co-
operation with the Roman Church, which allowed the culture of Latin Christianity 
to be consolidated. That is why we can talk about a “Latin Christian community” 
from the seventh‒eighth centuries. These changes have occurred with the 
territorial expansion of the Christian West. Christianity, which rejected Islam, 
had gained new ground and shifted its focus. The establishment of the Carolingian 
Empire only crowned this tendency. 
Along with this process, the disintegration of the unity of the 
Mediterranean was completed. When Emperor Justinian (527‒565) sought to 
restore the unity of the Roman Empire, his idea was still based on the idea of the 
consistence of Mediterranean civilisation. The fact that with the expansion of 
Islam in the seventh century, has already been mentioned, this civilisation unit 
was ceased. Since then, the maritime front line of conflicts between Christians 
and Muslims has been a significant component of the battles between the two 
religions. For some time, the Roman and the Byzantine Church maintained their 
co-operation, as evidenced by the so-called Greco-Syrian popes, Greek and 
Syrian church leaders, at the beginning of the eighth century, in Rome. This was 
broken by the iconoclasm, which, in Byzantium, eventually ended in victory for 
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iconophiles that was closer to the Roman Catholic position. Despite this, the 
growing religious and cultural distance between the two churches could not be 
reversed, although formally restored several times before the Schism of 1054. On 
the eve of the millennium, there were three civilisations already in the 
Mediterranean, Byzantine Orthodox, Muslim Arabic and Latin Christian cultures. 
In spite of the victory of the iconophiles, worded by St. John of Damascus, 
art in Byzantium was in strict boundaries, set by theological doctrines. Western 
Christian art, as St. Gregory the Great put it, served to tell holy stories, while in 
Byzantium it proclaimed divine glory, in its strict boundaries. Given that Western 
art had been seeking to tell narratives since the beginning, the artistic ways to of 
expression were much broader, enabling the Western Christian civilisation art to 
be open for verism, an increasingly true presentation of reality. As a result, Latin 
Christianity has, compared to other civilisations in a unique way, embraced the 
potential for change and development of styles and opened the way for the 
expression of anthropocentric (“humanist”) content. The broadest framework for 
this artistic progress was provided by the consequences of the early medieval anti-
iconoclast arguments. 
 
The historical role of the Carolingian Empire 
 
After the year 800, the Carolingian Emperor not only realised the 
possibilities of the development of the Latin Christian cultural community, but 
also constituted an exemplary experiment in Christian state organisation, which 
filled the unity it created with social and cultural content. The Frankish alliance 
with the Pope performed the unification of church liturgy, monasticism, school 
education, and social and political structures. All this took place in the universe 
of the early medieval kingdom ideal, where sacred and political functions were 
closely linked, although the two spheres had always been distinguished. On this 
basis, some historians considered Charlemagne (768‒814) to be the “founder” of 
Europe, though this is an ambiguous statement, since the Frankish state was not 
identical with the entire Latin Christianity (Map 31). Yet, the social and cultural 
transformations that emerged within the range of the Frankish Empire served as 
a model for the whole of Western Europe and later at the turn of the millennium 
for the Central and Northern European periphery. In the history of the European 
civilisation, Charlemagne became the only ruler of the unity of the Christian 
West, a great general and statesman who promoted the organisation of the 
Christian church and culture. 
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Map 31: Carolingian Europe 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The consequences of the Carolingian church and cultural reform had an 
impact on the entire European culture. Charlemagne and his counsellors sought 
to consolidate the texts of the Bible and the liturgy in the empire. The insufficient 
education of the priesthood and the monks carried the risk of deteriorating the 
texts due to the spread of vernacular languages against classical Latin that used 
to be the ground of sacred texts. Christianity, due to its widespread illiteracy, has 
faced the challenge of becoming a verbal culture, which can make it difficult to 
reproduce sacred texts accurately. Carolingian reforms sought to react to this by 
spreading the culture of literacy and by creating normative texts that underlie 
ecclesial and secular education. The main tool for this was using late ancient 
Latin, which generated far-reaching consequences until the Reformation. 
Generally speaking, Christianity is the religion of the “sacred text” and all 
people need to read and understand the evangel. In a larger historical perspective, 
the spread of Christianity has led to translating the Bible to native languages and 
to the rise of national literature, as is the case in Middle Eastern Christianity. 
Western Europe is rather the exception, where the supranational culture based on 
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Latin language prevailed until the Reformation. All of this is due to the 
Carolingian reforms, which have had significant consequences and have given 
the European culture its character for centuries. Carolingian reforms allowed to 
preserve the ecclesiastical tradition accurately, but they created a “universal” 
culture separate from the local societies, which determined the university 
education of the entire High Middle Ages (twelfth and thirteenth centuries), and 
even Renaissance humanism (fourteenth‒fifteenth centuries). The supranational 
Latin culture of the Middle Ages has become one of the most important 
components of the coherence of Western Christian Europe, that has no equivalent 
in the history of the Orthodox East. National languages began to develop 
relatively quickly from this initial state, and the Reformation catalysed this 
process in the early modern age. The universality of the Roman Church and the 
cultural role of Latin made it possible to interpret Western European civilisation 
in the dichotomy of supranational and national cultures. 
The territory of the Frankish state covered most of France, the Benelux 
states, Italy and Germany. Charlemagne occupied eastern German Saxony, 
Bavarian and Austrian territories, the Transdanubia and the northern part of and 
the Iberian Peninsula. Not only did the emperor's coronation lead to the fact that 
an emperor reigned in the Latin West, but it also expressed the need to unite Latin 
Christianity in a single empire. Although the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms have always 
remained independent, for the first time in European history Charlemagne 
established a Christian empire centred in Western Europe and not in the 
Mediterranean. 
The Carolingian Empire considered itself the successor of Rome. Until 
modern times, the idea of Rome can be regarded as the foundation of European 
political identity. Rome could be understood as a universal empire, which, in its 
height, incorporated all of Mediterranean antiquity under a single political 
umbrella. After its break and then the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the 
Byzantine East retained a “Roman” sense, which was well illustrated by the fact 
that Latin remained the language of administration and the army until the sixth 
and seventh centuries. When Charlemagne and Pope Leo III in 800 resettled the 
empire in the west, it was grounded on the idea of Rome, similar to the Saxon 
Otto the Great, who founded the Western Roman Empire in 962. In the modern 
age Napoleon could be mentioned, whose coronation to emperor (1804) reflected 
the political tradition of the idea of Rome, or Emperor Francis, who, once the 
Western Roman Empire ended in 1806, found it important to establish the 
Austrian Empire. As the empire itself adopted Christianity during the late 
antiquity, the demand for a political supremacy developed in the Roman idea 
within the scope of European Christian civilisation. 
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On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the medieval empire had 
turned into an empty fiction over time and instead of an “imperial model” it had 
become a political ideology. Although the greatest rulers craved to become 
emperor, historians tend to point out that no real empire was created after the fall 
of the Western Roman Empire. The empire of Charlemagne was a temporary 
formation that existed only for a short period. After the decline of the Frankish 
Empire, the Western Roman Empire, as even its name implies, was more attached 
to the German nation than to the idea of universality. After the turn of the 
millennium, one after another Christian monarchy was founded, of which the 
empire was the most prestigious, but bringing together the entire Western 
Christian civilisation under its sovereignty had never been an option. Since the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, we can speak of a Christian community 
(Respublica Christiana) rather than of the Roman Empire (Imperium Romanum). 
Despite the influence of the Roman empire idea, the direction of European history 
was pointing towards the strengthening of political particularism. While in non-
European cultures empires of entire civilisations have risen several times, in the 
Latin Christian Europe the emerging powers have gained greater influence. The 
absence of an empire is commonly referred to as a feature of European social 
development. In the long run, Charlemagne’s empire can also be seen as a 
temporary phenomenon, though his contemporaries may have experienced it 
differently. 
Historians point out that the borders of the Carolingian Europe show a 
striking identity with the Europe of the (Inner) Six after the Second World War 
(West Germany, France, Italy, Benelux States). In the history of the European 
civilisation, a “core Europe” can be located undoubtedly, where economic and 
cultural activity have been concentrated for the past thousand years. No argument 
that this area belongs to Western Europe, in other words part of the “West”, as it 
was claimed in the twentieth century with political overtones. The greater part of 
this region benefited from the blessings of Romanisation and the early successes 
of Christian evangelisation. The starting point of the twelfth‒thirteenth century 
agricultural revolution was here, in northern France, and the Rhine area, 
Champagne and Burgundy became one of Europe's major trading power in the 
late Middle Ages, characterised by high urban density. The Carolingian “Small 
Europe” becoming an economic core preceded the opportunities arising from 
great geographical discoveries and the development of the Atlantic world 
economy. It is also a good example of how long period tendencies (longue durée) 
can be maintained in history with stubborn persistence. After World War II, the 
economic growth lines of Western Europe also focused on the broader Rhine, the 
Benelux and Northern Italy, the former central areas of the Carolingian Empire 
(the so-called “Blue Banana” zone). 
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Europe under siege 
 
The Frankish Empire began to decline after the death of Charlemagne. The 
period between the disintegration of the Frankish Empire and the turn of the 
millennium was a period of confusion and misery in Western European history, 
which is well illustrated by the fact that the title of the chapter on the history of 
the ninth and tenth centuries in the French historian, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s 
book on European history, is called “Europe under siege”. The external weakness 
of Latin Christianity was linked to the difficulties of internal political division. 
The Frankish state was disintegrated by the development of feudalism. It 
weakened the ruler's power, and then the princes and the counties. As a result of 
feudal anarchy, control shifted from the princes into the hands of political society. 
The organisation of feudal relations and the development of relations between 
feudal lords and vassals became a factor in the organisation of Christian society 
throughout the West. 
In addition to the expansion of the feudal system, another major event was 
the division of the Frankish Empire, of which a milestone was the Verdun Treaty 
of 843. The western and eastern Frankish states formed the pre-states of the 
kingdom of France and the German Empire. The core of Latin Christianity was 
therefore not united under a single state but shared by the French and Germans. 
The fact that the centre of Western Europe is neither German nor French, but 
both, yet neither one is able to overpower the other, has become an important 
factor for centuries to come, influencing modern national development. This 
feature of European history began to emerge two centuries after the end of the 
Frankish Empire. 
Because of the internal division of Western Europe, it was unable to 
respond to the external (Viking, Hungarian, Muslim) attacks in the ninth and tenth 
centuries. The Vikings discovered the North and Baltic Seas. Many monasteries 
of the Irish monks in the British Isles got destroyed and there were many attacks 
against West Frankish lands. Heading south on the rivers of Eastern Europe and 
attacking the Byzantine Sea over the Black Sea, they reached the Mediterranean. 
Hungarian adventures were a danger from the east. The Hungarian tribes pillaged 
not only German territories but reached many areas of Italy and the Byzantine 
Empire. The weakness of the Latin Christian Europe was also reflected in the 
struggles with Muslims. Islam kept Sardinia and Sicily in its hands, and Saracen 
fleets dominated the Mediterranean. Muslim militants were robbing merchant 
caravans from Provence mountain settlements.  
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The significance of the first millennium 
 
The poor agricultural world of the early Middle Ages barely provided 
maintenance for low population density areas. Towards the turn of the 
millennium, few urban settlements in Western Europe could not compete with 
the glorious cities of the Byzantine or Islamic civilisations (Byzantium, Baghdad, 
Cairo, Córdoba). With respect to that, it was difficult to imagine that the Latin 
Christian Europe would soon become an expansive civilisation. Yet, over the 
decades around the first millennium, the changes expanding the boundaries of 
Western Christianity were forming surprisingly fast. At the turn of the 
millennium, Central Europe, within a few generations, joined Latin Christianity, 
which implied the completion of the Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and Croatian state 
foundations. The Central European region became a Christian world. The 
unfolding European changes accelerated the process of evangelisation and state 
foundation in Scandinavia, resulting that the northern periphery of Europe also 
joined Latin Christianity. 
The events of the turn of the millennium brought a significant expansion 
for the Carolingian’s “small Europe”. The ninth and tenth centuries brought a 
comprehensive political and cultural renewal to Byzantium that had survived the 
Muslim-Arab conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries and the argument on 
iconoclasm. The Byzantine Empire successfully evangelised Slavic peoples in 
the Balkans and Eastern Europe. At the turn of the millennium, the Russian state 
has also outlined. Although the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches had 
drifted apart, the Schism has not happened yet (1054), around the first millennium 
the outline of a Christian “great-Europe” had been glowing faintly that covered 
Western, Central and Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, Oscar Halecki, the well-
known Polish historian whose country was the subject of the break of the Western 
and Orthodox Europe, regarded the millennium “unity” as a significant event in 
European history and interpreted it in positive terms. 
Since the turn of the millennium, Latin Christian Europe included the 
Central European and Scandinavian states. Northern and central European 
countries not only joined the Roman Catholic Church, but also adapted the 
economic-social model that evolved in Western Europe during the High Middle 
Ages. As a result, in Central Europe, urban autonomies, assemblies, parliaments, 
and universities appeared, representing the essence of “Western social develop-
ment”. In the meantime, there are no assemblies, parliaments or western urban 
development with autonomies in Russian social development. 
Being part of the Latin Christian civilisation has had far-reaching cultural 
and historical implications. Roman Christian countries have common denomina-
tors, not only in social history but also in the history of art. In Central Europe, 
Civilisations from East to West 
382 

Romanesque style was followed by Gothic, Renaissance, then Baroque and 
Classicism, just like in Western Europe. In Russia or the Balkans, these styles 
prevailed within very limited frames. 
 
6.2.4. The first “take-off” of Europe in the High Middle Ages (1000‒
1500) 
 
Walt Rostow, a well-known economic theorist of the post-World War II 
decades, developed his “stages of growth theory” in the late 1950s, suggesting 
that sooner or later, all societies could reach the industrialised society and enjoy 
the blessings of abundance for consumers. Rostow identified the commencement 
of industrialisation after the stagnant pre-industrial agricultural societies as 
sustained economic growth, which he called take-off. He used the English word 
that means the moment an aircraft takes off and leaves the runway. He considered 
the first industrial revolution in Western Europe in the 1760s being the take-off 
period. 
Over the last half a century, economic historians have dealt a lot with the 
matter of how the preconditions for the economic growth between the great 
geographical discoveries and the Industrial Revolution in the early modern 
centuries (1500‒1800) have developed. The influence of Protestant ethics, the 
rise of the market, the role of the absolutist state and the consequences of 
colonisation are usually listed as antecedents of the take-off. However, a more 
important fact should also be pointed out, that Western European historiography 
began to reveal since the 1930s. Modern European development would have been 
inconceivable without the results of the great accumulation process of the 
twelfth‒thirteenth centuries. During the High Middle Ages (twelfth‒fifteenth 
centuries), a series of “revolutions” took place, agricultural, urban, demographic, 
technical, commercial, reshaping the very image of Latin Christianity. 
The historiography in the nineteenth century attached great significance to 
modern bourgeoise and industrial capitalism, the birth of nation-states, and 
rightly in a certain aspect, considered them to be the “essence” of Europe. By 
contrast, historians since the mid-twentieth century onward have become 
increasingly aware of the fact that while Western Europe has achieved enormous 
success since the discovery of America, European civilisation already existed in 
earlier centuries. Europe cannot be imagined without the results of modern 
civilisation, but the first great accumulation of European history was before the 
Renaissance and Reformation. The High Middle Age, in the words of Rostow, is 
rightly called the first take-off of Europe, as it has shown a strong dynamism that 
has had a lasting impact on the coming centuries. 
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The turning point in the eleventh century  
 
The events at the turn of the millennium not only brought the territorial 
expansion of the Latin Christian Europe, but also the first steps of a spiritual 
renewal and material growth. The eleventh century is the beginning of the take-
off, which then got realised in the twelfth to thirteenth centuries. After the turn of 
the millennium, Viking and Muslim adventures stopped. Western European 
feudalism has been consolidated and political anarchy has diminished in some 
kingdoms (Map 32). Since the beginning, Western Roman emperors were the 
head of the church reform and supported the renewal of papacy. This was 
accompanied by the Cluny movement, which restored the purity of religious life 
in hundreds of monasteries and suppressed the secular influence. The treuga Dei 
(peace of God) movement was trying to get the knightage to follow Christian 
morals. The revival of religious life was verified by pilgrimages, Rome, 
Compostela, becoming popular and the birth of Romanesque style, Europe's first 
sacred monumental art. The huge Romanesque churches, built of white stone, 
were in contrast with their surroundings, even for their contemporaries, and 
represented a new beginning in the history of European art compared to small 
pre-Romanesque churches. The financial background of the growing art was 
provided by the slow take-off of the agricultural sector. For the first time in the 
history of the Christian West, it has shown significant internal energies. 
Population growth created the demographic basis for the Western 
European expansion. Knightage also increased, and so gladly initiated military 
ventures, also Italian merchant towns in the western Mediterranean got constantly 
stronger. Before the turn of the millennium the sea was dominated by the 
Muslims. In the first half of the eleventh century, however, Venice succeeded just 
as well in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, as Pisa defeated the Muslim 
fleets in the Tyrrhenian Sea. Christians cleansed Provence too from Muslims, 
took back Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily, and got the western basin of the 
Mediterranean under their control. Such naval victories were supported by the 
growing commercial activity of Italian cities. By the turn of the eleventh century, 
Italian cities had already provided logistical assistance for the crusades that had 
begun. When Pope Orban called the knights to conquer the Holy Land in 1096, 
the first major population and economic boom in Western Europe was imminent. 
Due to the demographic and agricultural revolution in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, Europe “overflowed”. As a sign of this, it released the Crusader armies 
one after another. 
The influences of the Cluny movement reached Rome, and for the first 
time, made the Latin West theologically confident against the Greek Church of 
sophisticated reasoning. Thanks to the increasing militancy of the Latins and the 
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church policy interests of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael I Cerularius, 
the Schism took place that completed the process of separation between the 
Roman Catholic and Greek churches. In 1054, the two churches mutually 
excommunicated each other, and that became a source of mistrust and hostility 
for centuries to come. It is less known that since the Schism, Latins and Greeks 
have attempted to restore the unity many times, as during the Renaissance, when 
they sought to form a Christian alliance against the growing Ottoman Empire. 
The Schism deepened the civilisation differences between the western and 
eastern parts of Europe. In the long term, it has contributed to the formation of a 
religious “mixed zone” east of Central Europe, covering modern-day eastern 
Poland and western Ukraine. Roman Catholicism and the Orthodox Church were 
both active in this zone, and Western influences were also present, though weak, 
less than in western regions of Poland and Hungary. The Greek Catholic Church 
was formed in this particular area in the early modern age, which can be also seen 
as a compromise offered to the local Orthodox population by the Polish Catholics. 
Orthodox people, who accepted the Pope but retained the orthodox liturgy and 
traditions, became Greek Catholic. 
 
Map 32: Europe at the end of the eleventh century 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
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Concerning the 1054 Schism, it should be noted that its nature changed in 
the second half of the twentieth century, as at the great reform council of the 
Catholic Church, the Second Vatican Council (1962‒1965), a personal meeting 
between Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras took place and they mutually 
lifted the excommunication of the Churches. Although the union between the two 
Churches has not yet been established, Catholic and the Orthodox Church got 
engaged in an ecumenical dialogue. In the spirit of this dialogue and of a new 
Christian view of Europe, Pope John Paul II defined Catholic and Orthodox 
religion as the “two lungs” of the continent. In his apostolic letter dated on 
December 31, 1980, Cyril and Method were named co-patron saints along with 
Europe’s Catholic patron saint, Saint Benedict, as a gesture to orthodoxy. 
 
Western European “revolutions” in the High Middle Ages 
 
In the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, we have seen a rise in economic and 
demographic dynamics, which have doubled the European population. The 
source of the changes was the agricultural sector. Growing crop yields (one buried 
seed returning four to five instead of two or three) and agrotechnical innovations 
have opened up significant opportunities in terms of the limits of production. By 
applying so, Europe has closed an era of miserable agricultural conditions where 
starvation had been a constant problem. The “agricultural revolution” of the High 
Middle Ages developed in the northern French regions between the Rhine and 
the Loire and from there spread to Western and Central Europe. 
The agricultural revolution of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries led to the 
flourishing of cities (urban revolution). Cities never completely ceased to exist 
by the disappearance of antiquity, but many of them declined. From this period 
on, the booming agricultural sector provided that villages could feed the reborn 
cities. Compared to civilisations outside Europe, medieval urban development 
has resulted in exceptional urban density, deeper urban-village division of labour, 
and increasing industrial activity. European cities were generally small in size, 
but their intensive presence shaped economic conditions everywhere. In the most 
urban areas (northern Italy, Flanders) the first signs of an early industrial 
civilisation also appeared. In addition to the agricultural and urban revolution, the 
development of a technical and commercial revolution can also be witnessed. One 
of the most important inventions of the era is the water mill, estimated to be up 
to 200,000 pieces, replacing the work of about ten million people. The growing 
trade in goods has created the ground of European trade networks. The 
achievements of the High Middle Ages created the minimum preconditions for 
modern capitalist development. 
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The “revolutions” of the High Middle Ages led to fundamental economic 
development in Western Europe. The increased fertility of the earth allowed the 
population to grow. Along with the increasing agricultural productivity, the popu-
lation density limit was close to 30‒40 persons/km2, while the agricultural sector 
was able to feed around 10‒15 percent of the total population living in towns. 
These data were outnumbered only by the consequences of the agricultural inno-
vations in England, in the eighteenth century. Therefore, we can say that the eco-
nomic history of Europe relied on the potentials of the twelfth‒thirteenth century 
demographic and agricultural revolution until the “first industrial revolution” of 
the 1760s‒1780s. The proportion of the urban population in some regions of the 
Netherlands, England, northern France and Italy in the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries exceeded fifteen to twenty percent, but only in the industrialising Eng-
land did the percentage of urban population a fundamental “breakthrough” in the 
first half of the nineteenth century. As a result of the Industrial Revolution, half 
of the English population was already living in town by 1850. 
Despite the results of agricultural and population boom, Europe in the 
Middle Ages did not have the level of technical and industrial superiority that 
could have explained modern-day western hegemony. Therefore, the 
interpretation of European social development should be extended to the issues 
of religious attitudes, social structures, and political institutions, as those have 
allowed the development of a civilisation that has been able to evolve faster and 
faster since the early centuries of the Modern Age. In this perspective, special 
attention must be paid to the social and cultural consequences of the Christian 
religion. 
 
Basic characteristics of the Christian faith 
 
Before presenting the impact of Christianity on Western social 
development, Christian faith itself should also be characterised. Christianity was 
the successor of the radical version of Jewish monotheism proclaimed by Old 
Testament prophets. Jews and Christians believe since the beginning that God 
took part not only in the creation but also in history, and conducts a dialogue with 
His chosen people, first with the Jews, then with the Church, and through His 
Incarnation and Redemption, seeks to give opportunity to re-open the path of 
supranatural existence, to eternal life, that had been closed by the original sin, the 
sin of the first couple of human beings that affects the entire human race. 
Christianity professed the theism and personalism of Jewish monotheism, that is, 
the concept of a personalised god, separated from the world. Through the 
incarnation of Jesus Christ, the transcendent God became close and accessible to 
men. Compared to the Jewish religion and Islam, the charm of the Christian 
6.2. Western Christian Europe 
387 

religion was given by the simultaneous existence of transcendence and 
immanence. The distant image of God in West-Asian monotheisms became 
personal and experienceable. 
Since the beginning, Christians had supranatural perspectives on their 
eternal happiness. Their earthly actions were determined by the radical command 
of love. Even the first Christian communities sought to support their faith with 
actions and to expose the requirements of Christian ethics to the world. Ancient 
Christian communities received the body and blood of Christ (eucharist) and read 
the sacred texts proclaiming the Saviour's acts. For Christians, in addition to the 
praxis of Communion, the intellectual reflection of faith has proved secondary, 
which does not mean that intellect has ever been underestimated. 
Christianity, in comparison with the Hellenistic mystery religions, 
preached an “open tradition” and rejected the concept of esoteric knowledge 
accessible only to a narrow religious elite. According to Christians, two kinds of 
knowledge (one for the average believer and one the selected perfect ones) do not 
exist but everyone may get to know God’s commandments from the Bible. One 
of the most important aspects of the Christian teaching is the belief in the 
goodness of creation, which has not been overruled even by the original sin. The 
beauty of the created world, according to Christians, proves the greatness of God. 
The world is not a “vale of tears” but a wonderful product of the work of God’s 
hand. One of the essential teachings is about free will (liberum arbitrium), 
according to which humans have the choice between good and evil. Christians 
have, since the beginning, rejected any and every form of moral relativism. 
Catholics preached the need for the distinction between good and evil, and 
believed that due to divine grace, humans with free will are capable to do so, even 
though original sin resulted the weakening of human nature. 
Despite the fact that basic teachings are identical, Christianity in the Latin 
West developed different from the Orthodox East. During the late antiquity 
(fourth‒sixth centuries), the four Latin Fathers of the Church, Ambrose, St. 
Augustine, St. Jerome, and St. Gregory the Great, added a lot to the image of 
Latin Christianity. Thanks to St. Augustine, personal will in Western theology 
has an important role compared to intellect and emotions. The mainstream of 
theological thinking in the Latin West has shifted towards rational and intellectual 
thoughts over time ‒ development of scholasticism ‒ though it has also been 
stated that the truths of faith cannot be understood solely on intellectual grounds. 
Eastern theology emphasised God’s incomprehensibility and therefore preached 
“negative theology”, while Latins believed that based on intellect God could be 
known limitedly (“positive theology”). 
In Western Christianity, versions of monasticism open to the world became 
dominant. The Benedictine monastery of particular importance established 
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practically organised communities seeking to find balance between prayer and 
work. In the east, the primacy of deep prayer and mystical experience was 
emphasised, and it became the focus of monastic life. 
In the west, monks took up educational roles. The foundations of the alli-
ance of “church” and “school” were established already in the first millennium, 
while the Eastern monasticism did not identify with such tasks. In Latin Christi-
anity, rational thinking and working in the world had a greater role, which does 
not mean that the Latin Church did not recognise the need for mystical experi-
ences and isolation from the world. The attitude of Western Christianity in some 
ways anticipated the formation of the modern world.  
The role of the popes governing Latin Christianity was one of the deter-
mining features of European civilisation. Catholic tradition has always empha-
sised the exceptional position of the Roman Pope as successor of St. Peter with 
regard to the leadership of the universal church. In the churches controlled by the 
other four patriarchs, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Constantinople, Roman 
popes practically did not intervene during the first millennium. An exception was 
the dogmatic debates over Christianity, where the prestige of Peter's successor 
was greater than that of the other four patriarchs. In the Latin West, however, the 
popes gained special influence in their own patriarchate. This was due to the fact 
that there was no emperor in the West for centuries, so the papacy had no its main 
competitor in power. Amidst the confusion of the migrations, the popes were of-
ten forced to take on public roles, as their environment expected them to ensure 
a minimum of order and peace. Therefore, the early medieval papacy in the Latin 
West also undertook secular tasks that enhanced its power and authority.  
As the successor of the Latin-language ecclesiastical culture after the Car-
olingian reforms, the Roman Catholic Church, governed by the pope, expressed 
the cultural unity of the Western Christianity. Although it was confined to the 
Latin West after the Schism (1054), the name itself, “catholic” or “universal”, 
illustrates the universal self-interpretation of the papacy and its mission of all 
essential values. After the turn of the millennium, the popes took powerful cen-
tralisation measures in the Roman Catholic Church in the twelfth to the fifteenth 
centuries. This centralising tendency continued during the sixteenth century, as a 
counter-reaction to the Reformation, and later in the era of liberal nation-states. 
Thus, the Catholic Church was able to retain its autonomy against the challenges 
of the modern age, but the model of governance that emerged was considerably 
different from the customs of the Church in the first thousand years. Since the 
Second Vatican Council, the Roman Catholic Church has sought to mitigate the 
centralisation and to create decentralised organisational solutions. 
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The social dimension of Christian belief 
 
The influence of Christianity on Western social development was the sub-
ject of many interpretations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At the time 
of the French Revolution, an approach that regarded Christianity as the ideologi-
cal stronghold of the ancien régime became general. Most nineteenth century the-
orists believed that Christianity could only be the opposite of modernity. Reli-
gious sociology and historical science began to rethink this simplistic concept in 
the early twentieth century. While doing so, the specific characteristics of Chris-
tianity were taken into account, which in the broadest sense grounded the for-
mation of the modern world. The new history paradigm no longer considered the 
role of Christianity in European history as the antithesis of modernity, but as its 
antecedent. The changing theoretical framework also contributed to a better un-
derstanding of the socio-cultural phenomena in the High Middle Ages. 
In this perspective, the fact that Christianity carried on the radicalism of 
Jewish monotheism, which proclaimed the existence of a personal transcendent 
God separate from the world, where being “sacred” could only be manifested in 
God, as the prophets explicitly pointed that out. On this ground could Max Weber 
say that, compared to “magic”, Christianity facilitated “the desacralisation of the 
world” and that this desacralised world opened up to rational human activity. 
Therefore, we can say that the development of modern science and technology is, 
to some extent, due to Christianity. According to Christian teaching, God is com-
pletely different from the world. In contrast, the “world” as a profane sphere is 
immanent and distinguishable from the “sacred”. This leads to the separation of 
the “sacred” and “profane” spheres, the political consequences of which have led 
to the separation of sacred and secular powers. While in Islam, Mohammed and 
his successors, the Caliphs, are religious and political leaders, Jesus, as we have 
already mentioned, did not establish a state. The Christian Church has always 
distinguished itself from the state, even if in Byzantium the “caesaropapist 
model” provided much less room for the church than the state, while in the me-
dieval Latin West, where Pope Gelasius’s (492‒496) “two swords” theory that 
illustrates separation and balance between the two spheres, has become an in-
tegral part of political thinking and practice. In human history, it is usually either 
“theocracy” (= divine kingdom) or “caesaropapism”, the merger of sacred and 
profane spheres, for the benefit of one or the other. Only in the Latin West was 
the social model implemented that separated and balanced the sacred and profane 
areas. This got manifested in the dualism of power between the Pope and the 
Emperor, that became one of the political features of the High Middle Ages. 
The duality of the transcendent God and the immanent world proved to be 
an essential prerequisite for the development of modern science. The fact that the 
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“secular things” have a certain autonomy and work in accordance with the laws 
of the created world, has, broadly speaking, provided the framework for human 
and scientific thinking that was gaining independence. Thomas Aquinas’s thir-
teenth century philosophy and the professors at the University of Paris in the 
following two centuries greatly contributed to that since the end of the Middle 
Ages all the events of the world were no longer regarded as directly subject to the 
divine will, but as a consequence of autonomous natural law. All of this em-
bedded the formation of secularised philosophy and science in the early modern 
age Europe. Overall, this led to the modern scientific revolution that established 
the technological superiority of the Western world over the last three centuries. 
Christianity has enhanced the fulfilment of the personal dignity of the hu-
man. In addition to the Greek-Roman sources, European humanism has religious 
dimensions. According to Christian teaching, God created man in His own image 
and likeness, as the first pages of the Old Testament reads. As there are other 
statements on several pages of the Scriptures about the fact that man was created 
in God’s image, we can speak of “biblical humanism” or “Christian humanism” 
in European religious and cultural history. It is the mission of human with free-
will and open for the absolute to fulfil the potentials of creation as a companion 
of the Creator. Christian humanism emphasises that God does not restrict but 
completes people who turn to Him. A man created in God’s image is the ultimate 
proof of human dignity. In this spirit, Christianity embraced and gave new mean-
ing to antique humanism. The combined effect of classical and Christian human-
ism upgraded European civilisation to a culture of “anthropocentrism”. 
Christianity addressed the individuals and proclaimed a universal mission 
since the moment it existed. Jesus Christ brought the evangel to all people and 
gave his apostles the task of proclaiming the “good news” to all nations. Christi-
anity has created the concepts of “individual” and “universal” as compared to 
tribal-ethnic groups that are related to one another exclusively. With Christian 
belief, the walls among tribal-ethnic groups have fallen or at least become sec-
ondary, and the role of the individual has increased. Max Weber regarded this 
moment as a fundamental feature of Western development. No individualism and 
universal ideals of European modernity would have been possible without Chris-
tian grounds. Exceeding the tribal ties was also a requirement for the formation 
of modern society, as it is clearly demonstrated in comparison with other cultures. 
 
Western European societal characteristic 
 
The social dimension of Christian belief has added to the development of 
Western European society, but not all authentic characteristics can be explained 
with the influence of Christianity alone. Beyond the social aspects of the Chris-
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tian belief, some other basic features of medieval political development (particu-
larism, decentralisation) proved to be just as important as the role of Roman law 
or the exemplary value of the ancient municipal freedoms. 
The absence of an “empire”. It has already been pointed out that after the 
fall of the Roman Empire no empire in Western Europe had been established that 
would have covered the entire Latin Christian civilisation. Medieval state initia-
tives based on feudal relations became the ground for the later nation-states (Map 
33). A wide variety of territories were created, which were not, or only nominally, 
under the control of sovereign princes and feudal lords, for instance the Italian 
city-states and the German city associations. In the High Middle Ages, Latin 
Christian Europe had many political and power centres that were constantly com-
peting yet unable to defeat each other. Nowadays, historians believe that such 
polycentric structure is largely responsible for the dynamics that have become 
more and more perceptible since the second half of the Middle Ages. In contrast, 
civilisations outside Europe often reproduced the monolithic “imperial model”. 
Distinction between sacred and profane spheres. The commencement of 
Investiture Controversy was of great importance at the turn of the eleventh cen-
tury, which led to the determination of the differences between the sacred and the 
profane spheres. Eugen Rosentock-Huessy called the Investiture Controversy the 
“first revolution” of the West followed by others until the modern revolutions. 
The problem of investiture became special because it was located at the intersec-
tion of religion and politics. Whether the right to appoint ecclesiastical offices is 
vested in the church or the secular ruler, it has forced a more common reflection 
on the nature of sacred and secular power. It has already been mentioned that the 
lesson learned from the compromise of the Investiture Controversy was the fact 
that neither sacred nor secular power could be questioned in European history. 
One of the general features of the European Middle Ages was that no sphere was 
able to suppress the other permanently, and the distinction between the two areas 
became perpetual and doctrinally acceptable. In civilisations outside Western 
Europe, even raising the issue of Investiture Controversy itself would have been 
meaningless. 
Freedom institutions and autonomies. Not only economic and demo-
graphic growth took place in the High Middle Ages, but many new political 
institutions got established. Accelerating economic and social movements, 
brought to life, in the words of the political theorist, István Bibó, “circles of free-
dom” that transformed the network of society. At the end of the eleventh century, 
the church reform represented by Pope Gregory VII defended the “freedom” of 
the Catholic Church (libertas ecclesiae) against secular/profane society. In the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, the increase in the number of cities resulted in the 
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formation of city municipalities. By the thirteenth century, these autonomies had 
spread throughout Latin Christian Europe. 
 
Map 33: Europe in the fourteenth century 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
The High Middle Ages led to major transformations also in the functioning 
of political society. The system of ethical standards ruling feudal relationships 
provided a guarantee against one-sided forms of subordination for the vassals too. 
The relationship between the feudal lord and the vassal was not a patriarchal one, 
but contractual where not only the feudal lord had rights, but both parties made 
commitments. During the thirteenth century, the parliaments formed as institu-
tionalised forms of power-sharing between the ruler and the nobility. In the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries, universities of their golden age also enjoyed con-
siderable “freedom”. Such institutions were horizontal bodies or local communi-
ties. By contrast, there are no institutionalised autonomies, legally institutional-
ised to the same degree, in non-European societies. It should be noted that “free-
dom” did not represent a modern claim of individual legal rights but appeared as 
a collective right of a social group (city, order) that fit into a hierarchical society. 
Still, the modern idea of freedom could not have been implemented without the 
development of medieval freedoms. 
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The characteristic of Western European social development refers to the 
group of socio-cultural phenomena that emerged in between the eleventh and 
fourteenth centuries and made the Western Christian civilisation a successful pre-
condition for modernity. Ever since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries one can 
see the beginnings of a social dynamic that has been repeated in more and more 
intense forms over the following centuries. Renaissance and Reformation started 
this intensifying movement, and continued with great geographical discoveries, 
the seventeenth century scientific revolution, eighteenth century Enlightenment, 
civil and industrial revolutions, and the establishment of nation-states as Europe 
possessed the universal hegemony. 
 
6.2.5. At the turn of premodern and modern (1500‒1800) 
 
Renaissance 
 
The economic recovery of the High Middle Ages ended at the turn of the 
thirteenth century. The Gothic cathedrals in northern France was a good expres-
sion of the prosperity between 1100 and 1300. The huge Gothic temples, being 
built over generations, clearly expressed the available economic energies. How-
ever, the following two centuries were the era of economic, demographic crises 
and epidemics. With the great plague of 1348, Europe was hit by the greatest 
demographic disaster in history, in which the continent lost almost half its popu-
lation. There is a reason for the fact that the territorial expansion of Europe also 
broke during this period. The Holy Land had been lost for Christians and the 
topos of misera Europa (miserable Europe) became frequently used by humanists 
against the triumphantly advancing Ottoman Empire. 
Formerly, the consequences of the economic recession had been judged 
more pessimistic in historiography. Today it is considered that signs of economic 
activity reappeared in the second half of the fifteenth century. The great geo-
graphical discoveries starting in the late 1400s are great indicators of the fact that 
the Western European economy has found its legs. Historians used to presume 
that colonisation, that started with geographical discoveries, supported the eco-
nomic growth in early modern Europe. Without questioning the significance of 
colonisation today, it is believed that another economic take-off on the European 
continent had already been realised around year 1450. Therefore, colonisation 
was not so much the reason as the consequence of the recovery. The socio-cul-
tural structures formed in the Middle Ages that allowed greater freedom and 
autonomies in the Western European society have proven during the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries. Europe has given a creative response to the economic re-
cession, leading to economic recovery in the coming centuries. 
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Renaissance, as one of the most significant periods in European cultural 
history, dates back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Cultural historians of 
the bourgeois era referred to the nineteenth century as an outstanding period be-
cause they saw the revival of antique human-centred art in Renaissance art. 
Although historiography today is much more sophisticated and also points out 
many other aspects  (revival of the Latin language standard, development of 
ancient Greek and Hebrew learning, seeds of museology by the excavation of 
antique ruins, spread of oil painting, appearance of perspectives in painting and 
the humanistic renewal of the school education programme), the individualisation 
and secularisation of culture undoubtedly continued in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. 
European history reached a turning point at the turn of the fifteenth century. 
The verism of Renaissance art, having the works of Leonardo, Michelangelo, and 
Raphael, reached a peak that is barely reproducible, geographical discoveries that 
grounded the global role of the European continent began, the first modern states 
were forming, and had to face with the beginning of a balance of power within 
the European state system. On the other hand, this has taken place within the 
framework of traditional agricultural societies and thinking. In the early Modern 
Age, between 1500 and 1800, the phenomena of “premodern” and “premature 
modern” were present in European culture at the same time. 
 
Reformation 
 
Reformation, bringing new religious and cultural dynamism to European 
history, gained particular significance with regard to events in the modern age. 
The consistency of medieval Christianity got embodied in the hierarchical 
organisational model of the Roman Catholic Church. Not only did the 
Reformation, starting with Luther's figure, disrupt the consistency, it also 
challenged the hierarchy itself. There is a library of literature on the roots of 
Protestantism, that examine the causes of the revival of faith from various aspects, 
from the moral contradictions of the Catholic Church to the late medieval 
conversion of religious life. All Reformers were seeking the opportunity for a 
radical renewal of their faith. Their slogans, sola fides (faith only), sola scriptura 
(writing only), sola gratia (grace only), illustrate the fundamental orientation of 
the Reformation. Reformers believed that only faith could save, unlike Catholics 
who believed charity, asceticism or indulgence could too. Compared to church 
tradition, only the Bible should be accepted as authentic text. In the relation of 
divine grace and human freedom, the importance of grace at the expense of free 
will was appreciated greater, while the Catholic tradition emphasised the joint 
effect of freedom and grace. 
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Map 34: Religious congregations in early modern Europe 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
In the history of Protestantism, the constant fragmentation of religious 
groups and the tendency for increasingly radical groups appearing must be 
mentioned. In contrast, the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican churches were 
consolidated rapidly, but to this day new protestant tendencies are emerging, 
especially in the United States. In countries where the reformed religions have 
become state churches, rulers have become heads of church, such as England, 
Scandinavian countries and German principalities (Map 34). Breaking with the 
“dual power” of the Pope and the secular rulers, Protestants accepted the concept 
of state church and secularised church estates. 
Deprived of Catholic universalism, reformed churches got more rooted in 
local characteristics and gradually became national churches. This feature made 
them the antecedents of the emerging nation-states. In this sense, Protestantism 
has accelerated the process of nationalisation, which has become one of the 
cornerstones of the modern Europe. Compared to the Lutheran churches that 
accepted the prince’s ruling, the more radical Calvinist church built from 
grassroots communities. Its “democratic” structure also had influence on the early 
modern political development and promoted civil revolutions against absolute 
monarchies. 
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Reformation was considered by many religious historians to be a “modern” 
phenomenon due to the emphasis on individual forms of belief, the elimination 
of mysteries, the development of individual Bible reading and literacy. On the 
other hand, it is also worth to point out that Protestant radicalism was in many 
cases not free of contradictions. The doctrine of predestination has led Calvin to 
see human nature much darker (anthropological pessimism) than his Catholic 
debaters. Indeed, divine choice is of importance in salvation only if one's free will 
no longer implied. Calvin weighed the impact of the original sin on man in the 
defence of predestination much more dramatically than Catholics. In his view, a 
person, radically tainted, can be saved only by God and not by his own free 
choices, which is not exactly the theological doctrine that focuses on the freedom 
of the individual, that opens for “modernity”. Nonetheless, since Luther's 
appearance in 1517, Protestantism has brought a dialectic into European history, 
that has served as a basis for historical processes towards modernity. 
Reformation spread via passionate debates in sixteenth century Europe. 
Following the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a new 
fault line of religion/civilisation was emerging, the dichotomy of the Protestant 
North and the Catholic South. Due to Max Weber's famous thesis, economic 
history debated a lot about whether Protestantism really played a decisive role in 
the development of modern capitalism. Whether the economic increase in 
northern Europe and the decline of the Mediterranean was due to English, Dutch 
and German Protestant bourgeoise, or did the Atlantic world, economy coming 
with the discovery of America, put Northwest Europe in a better geographical 
position? 
Even today, differences between Catholics and Protestants continue to 
impact political relations and influence the process of European unification. 
Empirical studies confirm that after World War II the public opinion considered 
the European integration as a “Catholic creation”. The “statism” and 
“bureaucracy” of Brussels was more widely accepted by Catholic voters than the 
general Protestants on the north, who, in the spirit of the minimal state and 
Protestant national cultures, had an instinctive antipathy against officials and 
structures of the integration. 
 
Scientific revolution and Enlightenment 
 
After the Reformation, the next step in the development of modernity was 
the seventeenth century scientific revolution. Spinoza and Descartes opened the 
door to the novel use of senses and rationality. By establishing the principles of 
algebra and coordinate geometry, Viete, Descartes, and Euler laid the foundations 
of an exact scientific language, capable of expressing planar and spatial geometry 
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by using mathematical tools. In this way he provided modern physics with an 
apparatus which also benefited technical sciences. The heliocentric worldview 
created by the late Renaissance expertise, followed by Galileo’s and Kepler's 
observations on gravity and planetary motion, required the creation of the new 
concepts of “infinity” and cosmos. The transformation of the scientific worldview 
was accomplished by Newton's elaboration and systematisation of the laws of 
mechanics (physical motion). From the eighteenth century, Newtonian physics 
slowly replaced Aristotelian physics, and remained a dominating scientific 
paradigm until Einstein's theory of relativity. 
The great innovation of the seventeenth century scientific revolution was 
not only the creation of an exact mathematical language describing the laws of 
nature, but also the introduction of an experimental natural science method. 
Modern physics relied on experiments, measurements and models based on them, 
and then on testing and correcting them. Its standards were established in stages 
and formed an integral part of scientific methodology. Ancient Greek natural 
observations often led to brilliant conclusions, but neither exact scientific 
language nor experimental methods were applicable. The Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance surpassed ancient natural science in many areas, but the real turning 
point occurred only during the seventeenth century scientific revolution. By 
happening so, European civilisation has developed a scientific apparatus that has 
enabled it to achieve global industrial and technological superiority in the 
nineteenth century. Industrialisation in eighteenth-century England would have 
begun without the achievements of the scientific revolution, since the primitive 
machines were based on heuristic observation and the trial and error method. But 
the “second industrial revolution” that evolved in the last third of the nineteenth 
century, where the driving force was the chemical industry and electricity, could 
not have happened without the modern natural sciences that started with the early 
modern age scientific revolution. 
Historians tend to discuss the seventeenth century scientific revolution in 
combination with the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Together, these two 
phenomena were regarded by historiography as a key intellectual antecedent on 
the road to modern Europe. The scientific revolution has indeed been linked to 
the Enlightenment, but it should be noted that the latter has reformed the way of 
thinking about society and has made a lasting mark on human sciences. The 
Encyclopaedia of the French Enlightenment, on the one hand, summed up the 
results of the changing scientific perspective and the achievements of applied 
sciences (political economy, agricultural sciences, and social sciences) and, on 
the other hand, rethought the problem of political legitimacy radically by 
elaborating the concept of social contract. Enlightenment established the idea of 
Civilisations from East to West 
398 

monitoring “governors” and created the opportunity for the community of the 
“governed” to become the foundation of modern politics. 
Enlightenment was the first stream of ideas in the history of European 
Christian civilisation that criticised not only the church but also religion. 
Renaissance humanists have repeatedly made critical remarks on the functioning 
of the Church as an institution but doubting the basic teachings of the Christian 
religion has never been a question. By contrast, during the French Enlightenment, 
the first deists, materialists appeared, who drew new philosophical conclusions 
from the natural scientific perspective and reached to the rejection of Christian 
revelation. 
Enlightenment also reinterpreted Christian anthropology when it 
conceived man as an infinitely improvable and perfectible creature. Such 
anthropological optimism may have led to a “modernist” view of history focusing 
on “the principle of evolution”, that placed the potential of European civilisation 
in the concept of endless progress. The increasing distance between the stream of 
modern ideas coming with the Enlightenment and Christian teaching has become 
an important feature of modern European culture. At the same time, European 
bourgeoise not only fulfilled the philosophical programme of the Enlightenment 
but preserved many of the basic values of civilisation rooted in Christianity. 
 
6.2.6. Splendor and decline of Europe 
 
Europe in the “long nineteenth century” 
 
Eric Hobsbawm preferred to use the term “double revolution” to describe 
the changes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The notable English 
historian considered that the industrial revolution in England in the 1760s (the 
“first industrial revolution”) led to fundamental changes in the field of economy, 
while the French Revolution of 1789 led to fundamental changes in politics. Prior 
to this, the early modern centuries (1500‒1800) represented a long transitional 
period in European history, where pre-modern and modern elements coexisted in 
politics, society, and culture. Even at this time, the Reformation, the Scientific 
Revolution and the Enlightenment were well aware of Europe's growing 
dynamism, reinforced by economic and political trends, the development of the 
Atlantic world economy, accumulation of capital, early civil revolutions. With 
the “double revolution”, the achievements of the human spirit and science got 
realised in practice and became a “mass” phenomenon. In agreement with 
Hobsbawm, the “double revolution” can be seen as the boundary between early 
modernity and modernity, which has created a civil Europe and completed the 
idea and practice of modernity. 
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Historiography calls the period from the French Revolution (1789) to the 
First World War (1914) the “long nineteenth century”. This part of European 
history is characterised by well-defined features. Economically, the “long 
nineteenth century” was the era of industrialisation, when growth got stabilised, 
in Walt Rostow’s words take-off (see above). Thanks to industrialisation, Europe 
has gained a huge technical advantage over the rest of the world, that has 
grounded colonisation. The great powers of Europe became colonisers and 
controlled a significant part of the globe during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Thanks to its exceptional industrial capacity, the European continent has 
reached a kind of "global role", that Europeans explained with the superiority and 
universal mission of “white Christian civilisation”. The superiority of Europe left 
its mark also on the mentality of the “long nineteenth century”. In line with the 
intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment and the economic growth, philosophers 
of history (Herder, Condorcet, Hegel, Marx) approached the history of European 
mankind as a “grand narrative”, describing it as a model of human emancipation 
that reaches its “ideal” at the end of history. 
 
Map 35: Nation states in Europe in the last third of the nineteenth century 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
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In the “long nineteenth century” one can witness the completion of a 
bourgeois Europe, whose dominant ideologies were liberalism, democracy and 
nationalism. These ideas were born with the French Revolution and, with the 
spread of revolutionary ideas, became dominant ideologies over the European 
continent. Liberalism and democracy have focused on individual and citizens’ 
liberties, which have been implemented in more and more countries with the 
establishment of liberal states. Nationalism evolved along with one of the 
defining factors of European history, the establishment of modern nation-states 
(Map 35). National ideologies became the most effective vision of the “long 
nineteenth century” and all modern political ideologies realised their purposes 
within the framework of a bourgeois nation-state. The “dominant ideologies” of 
the nineteenth century, liberalism, democracy and nationalism, were closely 
linked. Their common feature was that the history of Europe and the world was 
approached in an optimistic and progressive framework. 
The “long nineteenth century” progressivism lied on the peace and 
prosperity of the European continent. During this period, not only economic 
development had effects, but the Vienna Congress ending the Napoleonic Wars 
(1815) created a system of states in Europe based on the balance of power and 
cooperation among the great powers. Therefore, relatively few military conflicts 
took place during the nineteenth century. Wars usually did not last long and did 
not get extended to the civilian population. Disagreements have often been 
resolved through international conferences and congresses. The civilian Europe 
seemed to be a unique scene in world history, where not only economic 
wellbeing, prosperity and peace among states got realised, but it was also able to 
enforce its values all around the globe. 
 
Europe in the “short twentieth century” 
 
The First World War brought fundamental changes in the history of 
European civilisation. Not only has it accelerated Europe’s economic loss against 
the rising United States, it has caused enormous human and material losses, that 
has shaken the faith in progress. As a result of World War I, “cultural pessimism” 
appeared in European intellectual circles, that took into account the continent's 
decline. The fact that the extreme right and left strengthened between the world 
wars resulted in the decline of liberalism and implied the development of 
authoritarian systems and dictatorships. This drew the line between the “long 
nineteenth century” and the “short twentieth century”. The former was linked to 
Europe's world domination, faith in the future, optimism, national liberalism and 
the results of industrialisation, and the latter to the territorial loss of the European 
continent, economic, political crises and aggressive mass nationalism. 
6.2. Western Christian Europe 
401 

The “short twentieth century” clearly illustrates that World War I was a 
turning point in both world history and European history. Compared to the ideas 
of the “long nineteenth century”, political ideology and practice have gone 
through a radical transformation between the two world wars. However, the 
“short twentieth century” is no longer suitable for describing the history of 
European civilisation in the decades following the Second World War. During 
the decades of the Cold War (1947‒1989), many colonially liberated countries 
outside the Western world were dominated by authoritarian regimes and 
dictatorships, in addition, tribal and ethnic nationalism, and bloody conflicts 
started. In contrast, democracies consolidated in Western Europe after World War 
II and extraordinary economic growth occurred between 1945 and 1973. The 
concept of the “short twentieth century” was originally interpreted by historians 
as the “cancellation” of the “long nineteenth century” values and ideas but unlike 
many countries in the world, Western European countries got consolidated after 
1945 by liberal democracies. 
Historians say the “short twentieth century” ended in 1989‒1990, when the 
communist dictatorships collapsed, and the Cold War ended. Many people 
believed that liberal democracies are now unstoppably spreading around the 
world. On this basis, world history can finally get back on the track that 
characterised the “long nineteenth century”. Others were more prudent and 
pointed out that the end of the Cold War would not necessarily lead to a 
worldwide victory of liberal democracies, but that the twenty-first century might 
be a period of bloody religious and ethnic conflicts. No matter how we interpret 
the events of the last few decades, a degree of ambiguity remains in the 
contemporary interpretation of the European civilisation. On the one hand, 
Europe is undoubtedly the scene of liberal democracies, economic and political 
freedoms, the development and preservation of individual and civil rights, and on 
the other hand, since the 1973 oil crisis, Western European countries have been 
facing a model crisis characterised by the uncertainty of civilisational values. 
Between the two world wars, civic and Christian humanists sought to save 
both Christian and liberal values in Europe. Christian tradition was considered to 
be an important part of the European legacy, as well as individual and citizens’ 
liberties. Contrary to irrational thoughts, the tradition of rationalism was 
upgraded to be the foundation of European culture. Far left and right were 
symptoms of the “barbarisation” of modern mass societies, that lead to the end of 
the “old” Europe. Against the extremes of nationalism and totalitarian ideologies, 
Europe was seen as the centre of individual and universal values that exceed the 
exclusivity nation-states. On this basis, after the Second World War, political 
elites in Western European democracies wanted to bring Christian and liberal 
values into line with the demands of industrial society and market efficiency. In 
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their view, “Christianity”, “freedom” and “modernity” are not ambivalent 
concepts but can be linked together. After 1945, Christian Democratic politicians 
began to build European integration and to adjust Western European democracies 
into the Atlantic community of values and interests against the communist threat. 
Over the decades after the Second World War, Western European societies 
proved to be a successful model, that was also attractive to Eastern European 
socialist countries. The exceptional economic growth gave room for spectacular 
social emancipation, that approved economic results and legitimised the 
economic and social model of “regulated capitalism”. The success of 
democracies rested on the balance between individual freedom and social 
solidarity, which could as well be seen as the realisation of European civilisa-
tional values in the spirit of Christian social teaching. 
Despite its successes, remember that the results of the period between 
1945‒1973 were enabled only by economic growth, which was achieved through 
the adoption of American business organisation methods and the adoption of a 
consumer model. The US security shield, capital imports, and international 
financial system guaranteed by US economic power only added to this. European 
intellectuals between the world wars were still critical about the United States 
because they saw it as a negative example of an industrial mass society. After 
World War II, the majority of Western European politicians and intellectuals 
already respected the solid liberal political culture of the American society. 
During the Second World War the US intervention proved decisive against the 
Nazi Germany and that Western European democracies found a firm support in 
the US during the Cold War. After 1945, US financial support seemed to be 
essential for launching the economic growth, that seemed to be the only effective 
way to increase prosperity, strengthen the middle classes, and confine political 
extremities. 
After World War II, Western European economic policies facilitated GDP 
increase and social well-being, but this was coupled with stronger and stronger 
“Americanisation”. Living standards have increased and consumer society 
developed, but Europe’s cultural identity kept decreasing. While economic 
growth proved to be steady, politicians and intellectuals accepted the benefits of 
the boom. But after the 1973 oil crisis, criticisms formulating doubts about the 
performance of Western European society grew. Since then, social sciences 
rightly represent the crisis of the European economic and social models. 
In the decades after the Second World War Western Europe has set up 
expensive welfare systems, that have become a difficulty since the recession, 
hindering economic development. Cancelling them would face serious resistance, 
as the welfare guaranteed has become an integral part of the social values. 
Maintaining welfare systems makes it difficult for Europe to compete in the 
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global economy, whether against American laissez faire capitalism or the Far 
East “developmental state”. Recently, it has become a fundamental dilemma for 
Western Europe to adapt the models of North American neoliberalism growing 
since the 1980s, that would accomplish its loss of identity. Or should it preserve 
the welfare achievements and keep alive a comfortable European “socialism”? 
Over the recent decades, European countries have struggled to find successful 
answers to the challenges of global neo-capitalism. Current policy debates on the 
institutional evolution of European integration seem secondary in contract to this 
model crisis. 
The European unity process should be mentioned in this perspective. The 
unity of Europe is an idea of the philosophical legacy of the Enlightenment. It is 
a “project” of modernity that could be embodied even in the creation of a 
cosmopolitan world state. European unity can be seen as the end point of a “grand 
narrative”, that assumes the history of “humanity”/“Europe” will reach an ideal 
still point by the creation of a federal state. Compared to the concept of “Founding 
Fathers”, the idea of European unity has recently evolved into a technocratic 
project that has hardly any contact with the general public. It suggests that the 
completion of the unity process can surpass all the weaknesses of Europe, while 
this is exactly that reveals us the fact it is an intellectual utopia. It is questionable 
whether the realisation of the European federation can solve the dilemmas of the 
economic and social model. Despite such issues, there is no doubt that the 
integration process has provided useful political solutions for the peoples of 
Europe over the past seventy years. 
Finally, let us discuss the issue of the “civilisational/cultural crisis”. This 
is not the same as the socio-economic model crisis, although apparently, there are 
overlaps between these two issues. “Cultural pessimism” has been engaging 
European intellectuals since the end of the First World War. Since the publication 
of Oswald Spengler's book, The Decline of the West (1918‒1922), huge literature 
has been produced in this field. The formation of modern societies has led to a 
crisis of traditional values throughout the entire Western world, of which the 
interpretation is divided. It is also an argument whether it is a real crisis at all. If 
so, what is its nature and what are the characteristics? Will the crisis lead to the 
final collapse of Western European Christian civilisation or will it promote its 
renewal? In this perspective, the increasing absence of social values are usually 
mentioned that make collective efforts impossible, as well as the disintegration 
of communities, atomisation and anomie. The disappearance of families and the 
decreasing number of children involve deep uncertainty about the basic attitude 
regarding “life”. A controversial issue is the result of the fading of Europe's 
“grand traditions”, Christianity and antiquity. 
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In this context, it should be pointed out that the tendency for the European 
continent of losing religiousness appears to be one of the most important 
(religious) sociological phenomena in the last half century. While in the United 
States we can speak of a “religious revival” within the neo-protestant churches, 
historic churches have not achieved a breakthrough in the field of evangelisation 
on the European continent. During the last decades, we see a further decline in 
the number of people practicing religion. Pope John Paul II (1978‒2005) 
formulated a programme of “re-evangelising Europe”, but success is still to come. 
A similar situation can be observed with regard to the classical heritage, as we 
have witnessed the decline of Latin language and literature over the last half 
century. The question arises whether, without “universal” Christian and classical 
content, national cultures can resist the temptation of nationalisms. 
Today, European civilisation is threatened on the one hand by the 
competition of global capitalism and the effects of consumer society, and on the 
other by the threat of religious, ethnic fundamentalism and “national closure”. To 
solve these problems, Europe must respond to how it can renew its “grand tradi-
tions” within a pluralistic society and fight the dichotomy of “fundamentalism” 
and “relativism”. Given the magnitude of the dilemmas outlined, it is not surpris-
ing that “cultural pessimists” fear the loss of European values and predict the end 
of European civilisation, whereas “modernists” emphasise that through the 
realisation of the Western universal model of market economy, liberalism and 
democracy the evolution of European civilisation has been completed in the best 
sense. Although our views are largely dependent on the philosophical 
preconditions for approaching the “civilisational crisis”, our ideologies cannot be 
an excuse when facing the problem. 
 
6.2.7. Chronological table 
 
Date Event
eighth century BCE Homer’s epics
fifth‒fourth centuries 
BCE “Classic” era of the ancient Greek civilisation
First half of fifth 
century BCE Greco-Persian wars
fifth‒first centuries 
BCE Roman Republic
third‒first centuries 
BCE Hellenistic Age
58‒49 BCE Julius Caesar occupies Gaul 
27 BCE – 14 CE Reigning of Augustus. Beginning of the Roman Empire
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Date Event
third‒sixth centuries The great invasions  
fourth‒sixth cent. Late antiquity 
313 Edict of Milan on religious freedom 
354‒430 Saint Augustine 
395 Roman Empire divided into West and East  
451 Council of Chalcedon 
476 Fall of the Western Roman Empire 
590-604 Saint Gregory the Great 
seventh‒eleventh 
centuries 
Early Middle Ages 
seventh‒eighth 
centuries 
Evangelisation of Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and Germania 
eighth‒ninth 
centuries 
Byzantine iconoclasm 
732 Battle of Poitiers 
800 Imperial crowning of Charlemagne 
843 Division of Frankish Empire  
962 Establishment of the Western Roman Empire 
c.1000 Foundation of the Polish and Hungarian states. Venetian and Pisan 
success on the Mediterranean Sea 
1054 Schism 
eleventh-thirteenth 
centuries 
Age of Roman arts 
1075 Pope Gregory VII: Dictatus Papae 
1096 Beginning of the Crusades 
twelfth -fifteenth 
centuries 
High Middle Ages 
twelfth - thirteenth 
centuries 
Investiture Controversy 
1054 Schism 
eleventh-thirteenth Age of Roman arts 
1075 Pope Gregory VII: Dictatus Papae 
1096 Beginning of the Crusades 
twelfth -fifteenth High Middle Ages 
twelfth - thirteenth Investiture Controversy 
twelfth- fifteenth 
centuries 
Gothic Age 
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Date Event 
1225‒1274 Thomas Aquinas 
fourteenth -sixteenth 
centuries 
Renaissance 
1348 The great plague 
1453 Ottomans occupy Byzantium 
1492 Discovery of America 
1500‒1800 The early Modern Age 
Turn of the fifteenth 
century 
Art of Leonardo, Michelangelo and Raphael 
1517 Beginning of Reformation 
1637 Descartes: Discours de la méthode 
1687 Newton: Principia (= Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica) 
1760‒1780 Beginning of the first industrial revolution 
1789 French revolution 
1789‒1914 “Long nineteenth century” 
1804 Imperial crowning of Napoleon 
1806 End of the Western Roman Empire 
1815 Congress of Vienna 
Last third of the 
nineteenth century 
The second industrial revolution 
1914‒1918 World War I 
1914‒1990 “Short twentieth century” 
1918‒1922 Oswald Spengler: The decline of the West was issued 
1939‒1945 World War II 
1949 Establishment of NATO 
1957 The Treaty of Rome. Establishment of the EEC 
1962‒1965 Vatican Council II 
1973 
Oil crisis. The edge of the economic growth in the developed industrial 
world 
1978‒2005 Pope John Paul II 
1989‒1990 
Annus mirabilis: The fall of central-eastern European communist 
dictatures 
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7.1. The North American Civilisation 
 
LÁSZLÓ ZSINKA 
 
At present the concept of North American civilisation mainly refers to the 
United States which has become the dominant pole of Western civilisation since 
the Second Industrial Revolution, although Anglo-Saxon colonial societies such 
as Canada, Australia, New Zealand show similar features. In this paper, we do 
not deal with the Indian societies, also known as pre-Columbian cultures, that had 
existed before the arrival of European people. In our study of Western Christian 
Europe, we have already pointed out that, compared to the at least two thousand 
years of European civilisation, the past 200‒300 years of colonial society in North 
America appear to be at most the last short chapter in a book on the history of the 
West. We also discussed that North American civilisation embraced Christian 
foundations, and the ideas of individual freedom and market. Contrary to 
European Catholic traditions, the Protestant heritage tradition has become more 
prominent in North America and, compared to the continental political ideas 
based on the balance between freedom and solidarity, in the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition the main stress was put on individualism and individual initiatives and 
the idea of a minimal state gained importance instead of etatism and corporate 
society organisation. The optimism, progressivism and pragmatism of the 
Americans, as well as many other “values of American civilisation” can also be 
mentioned in this context. For this reason, in this chapter, we describe North 
American civilisation, another “subsystem” of the West/Euro-American world. 
Because its history is essentially the same as the history of civilisation in the 
United States, from the brief two-hundred-year history of the United States of 
America we highlight aspects that have become effective civilisational values and 
attitudes today, and present the historical environment in which they were 
created. 
 
7.1.1. Basic features 
 
The first colonies in North America were largely founded in the seven-
teenth century by English Puritans who left the island because of the harassment 
of the Anglican Church and royal absolutism. The diligent Puritan communities 
grew rapidly in the new country and, despite their disputes with the English 
colonial authorities, were enjoying freedom. There is a lot of literature on the 
influence of Protestant work ethics on the development of American capitalism, 
even in the early period. These included some well-known opinions of historians 
about the way in which Puritan communities lived their way, as prominently 
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rooted in nineteenth century historiography, according to which North American 
Protestants were characterised by a degree of self-denial and asceticism, but their 
reservations about secular culture were far less powerful. The Puritans did indeed 
reject some “secular futilities” but did so within the framework of a sober and 
diligent family life, which, together with other circumstances, allowed for the 
accumulation of capital. This latter phenomenon was referred to in Max Weber’s 
famous study, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), which 
originally explored the relationship between the success of Western European 
capitalism and Protestant ethic. In addition to the findings of Weber’s thesis on 
European economic history, attention should be drawn to the basic layer of 
American self-interpretation that was emerging at the end of the eighteenth 
century, known as WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant). According to this, the 
United States was created as a Protestant country, long determined by the customs 
of the Anglo-Saxon middle class. 
This is still embodied in many customs, such as Thanksgiving. Some of 
the colonists who landed with the Mayflower around Plymouth in 1620 and 
arrived in the New World fell victims of starvation and harsh natural conditions. 
The colonists were said to have been helped by the Wampanoag Native American 
tribe to overcome the initial difficulties. After an abundant autumn harvest, the 
survivors held a celebration, sharing the harvest with the Indians. 
President George Washington (1789‒1797) was the first to call for a 
Thanksgiving celebration across the country. Thanksgiving itself was a Protestant 
custom that can be manifested to God for many reasons in the spirit of the Psalms. 
With the creation of the United States, it has become the responsibility of the 
Member States to determine the Thanksgiving Day(s). In October 1863, President 
Abraham Lincoln (1861‒1865) proclaimed to the whole nation the need to 
celebrate Thanksgiving. It was first celebrated on the last Thursday of November, 
and later on the fourth Thursday of November. The spread of Thanksgiving is 
related to the emergence of modern American identity. Its habits were formed at 
the end of the nineteenth century, when the consequences of the post-Civil War 
divisions and the large number of immigrants saw a growing need for a 
celebration of American national identity. Thanksgiving is good example of the 
close relationship between American national identity and Protestant traditions, 
whose living influence is still evident today. 
The Anglo-Saxon Protestant heritage remained exceptional despite the 
growing role of Catholic Irish, Italian, Latin American immigrants since the 
second half of the nineteenth century, and today the United States has become a 
multicultural society. The role of the WASP heritage is well illustrated by the 
controversy between those believing in Anglo-Saxon traditions or multicultur-
alism. These disputes have divided the American political and cultural elite over 
7.1. The North American Civilisation 
413 

the past decades. The strength of the debate is that Americans today value the 
historical role of the WASP tradition as much as the melting pot culture associ-
ated with high immigration. Nowadays, conservatives refer to the importance of 
the WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) in protecting “original” American 
values, just as Liberals regard cultural diversity resulting from immigration as a 
fundamental phenomenon of American history. 
In the thirteen colonies that make up the core of the United States, the 
number of settlers grew rapidly from the humble beginnings of the seventeenth 
century. By 1630, only a few thousand colonists had arrived, but by the early 
eighteenth century the population had reached a quarter of a million. Seventy 
years later, at the time of the outbreak of the War of Independence, at least two 
million people were living in North American English colonies. According to the 
census of 1790, the new republic had a population of 3.9 million. Ten years later, 
the 1800 census found that the United States had about 5.3 million people, 
compared to 15 million in the British Isles and 27 million in France. Throughout 
the eighteenth century, Europe’s population was estimated to have increased by 
one and a half times or doubled in size due to the economic boom and more 
favourable climatic conditions, while the size of the future US population in-
creased twentyfold. Comparing European and North American data, we are 
witnessing an extraordinary increase in the birth of the United States, which has 
proved to be extraordinary in later world population history. Significant growth 
rates continued throughout the nineteenth century. 
The rapid growth was due not only to newer immigrants but also to the 
large number of children. From the beginning, the fact that Protestant families 
had a commitment to God to “multiply” and “reproduce”, as well as the abun-
dance of land that enabled the growing population to find new cultivated areas, 
played a role in the high natural reproduction. Available land, populations of new 
territories, high levels of immigration and high fertility rate continued to be 
important components of American culture. 
As the American colonists moved westward, they were always able to 
acquire new lands, so no significant social differences were created. Initially, the 
English authorities sought to transpose solutions based on personal dependence 
in the medieval European agricultural economy, which would have allowed 
larger landlords to provide free labour. Historiography used to speak of an attempt 
to transpose “feudalism”, but today, for two reasons, we are unlucky to use this 
term. On the one hand, with regard to the Western European phenomenon, 
historiography nowadays rather uses the term “feudal society”, and since Alan 
Macfarlane’s much-debated study ‒ The Origins of English Individualism (1978) 
‒ it has been questionable whether we can even speak of “feudalism” or “peasant 
society” in the traditional sense for American colonists. Instead, it should be 
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pointed out that historical sources initially refer to farmers who cannot leave their 
master’s land without specific permission, and sometimes binding seems to be 
hereditary because the same applies to their children. Especially those who have 
already come from the motherland in debt are in a more difficult situation. It is 
also noticeable that in some cases attempts have been made to operate some sort 
of a “manorial court” because the landlord has ruled in tenants’ cases. It is no-
ticeable that in some areas the English Crown has attempted to create a kind of 
landlord aristocracy. However, these initiatives soon became overshadowed. In 
the eighteenth century, most landlords are already free owners or free tenants. 
Although not everyone had access to their own land, for colonists, the seven-
teenth-century agricultural economy of England, which was increasingly com-
mercialised, provided the benchmark, where most farmers were owners or ten-
ants. Ultimately, the abundance of land made it impossible for the Crown to strive 
for a landlord aristocracy or a system of personal dependence. 
Many of the features of the European agricultural system have been the 
result of the scarcity of land available since the economic boom and population 
growth of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The landlord elite and farming 
communities organised, or privileged land use based on scarcity. In Europe, at 
the beginning of the twelfth century agricultural expansion, plots of land were 
still available for cultivation ‒ which strengthened the possibilities of individual 
cultivation (hospes), but as a result of population growth solutions have been 
pushed into the background, and cultivations based on community regulations 
have generally spread (open field). In North American colonies, due to the 
seemingly endless prospects of abundance of land, this did not happen, but in-
dividual cultivations were consolidated. Although the English authorities at-
tempted to protect the territory of the Indian tribes, their military allies in the 
colonial wars, to prevent colonists from expanding westward in the eighteenth 
century, which would have ended the abudance of land, their efforts were not 
crowned with success. In fact, strong opposition to these plans ‒ among the richer 
landlords and colonists who want to expand ‒ contributed to the outbreak of the 
War of Independence, the victory of which finally secured expansion to the West.
The lack of European dependencies ‒ aristocracy, feudalism ‒ in the agricultural 
economy from the beginning promoted capitalist accumulation. American soci-
ety, on the eve of the struggle for independence, was characterised by a broad 
spectrum of free owners, small holders which later played a major role in shaping 
social and political characteristics.  
Not only the peculiarities of the social structure but also the rights of rep-
resentation of the colonists played a major role in the formation of the “American 
values”. The Puritans brought with them the bottom-up “democratic” ecclesias-
tical organisation of Calvinism from the Old World, and the lessons that could be 
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drawn from English political life on the basis of royal power and parliamentary 
debates. They took shape in the struggles of the English Civil War, partly in the 
Puritan army. The so-called Levellers formulated the principle of taxation linked 
to representation. The “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 provided valuable expe-
rience of the principles of a constitutional kingdom. When eighteenth-century 
colonists looked toward England, they encountered the practice of a parliamen-
tary monarchy that served as a point of reference for them. 
Even the first colonist communities expressed their need for representation 
in the seventeenth century. The king and his governors eventually accepted the 
need for colonies to form representative bodies. Different colonies applied dif-
ferent solutions, but the institution of representation gradually consolidated. It 
was true that members of the Puritan communities were empowered to elect 
representatives, otherwise simply “free people”. From the beginning, it was 
important for representative bodies to have their say on taxes. In some respects, 
the cause of the struggle for independence can be understood as a reaction to the 
reduction of colonists’ representation and tax rights. In the eighteenth century, 
towns and smaller settlements formed their local governments. The “self-
governing spirit” of American society, as Alexis de Tocqueville (1805‒1859) 
observed, is that the tradition of self-administration instead of administrative 
bureaucracy dates back as much to the pre-independence period as it did for 
decades after freedom was gained, when the establishment of self-governments 
was guaranteed by the Constitution. During the eighteenth century, the emerging 
elite of the East Coast had the opportunity to become acquainted with European 
culture and the ideas of the Enlightenment. When France lost to Canada in the 
Seven Years’ War (1756‒1763), the last link ‒ fear of the French Royal Army ‒ 
that tied the Americans to England was lost. The heirs of the Puritans were no 
longer afraid of the Catholic French and, against the Crown, they restored the old 
parliamentary ‒ Leveller ‒ slogan of the English Civil War that “there is no 
taxation without representation”. During the emerging War of Independence 
(1775‒1783), the American colonists not only won the battle, but also engaged 
in lively debates over the constitutional system. 
The formation and constitution of the United States is a fact that continues 
to stamp both Anglo-Saxon political thinking and American self-interpretation to 
this day. Not only did the American Constitution produce a legal document, but 
it also summed up the thinking of the European Enlightenment, and the 
conceptual debates surrounding the drafting were instructive. In addition to 
summarising the major trends of early modern political philosophy ‒ 
Montesquieu, Locke ‒ they also introduced far-reaching innovations that became 
important milestones in Anglo-Saxon political thought development. The close 
interplay between the constitution and American patriotism makes the history of 
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the United States just as exceptional, just as it is rare that the founding ideas of a 
political community so stamp their subsequent nature, and become a factor in the 
development of civilisation. 
 
7.1.2. “Establishing” freedom in the United States 
 
4 July 1776, in Philadelphia, at the Second Continental Congress, repre-
sentatives of thirteen colonies approved the Declaration of Independence. As a 
result of the declaration of independence, the constitutional order of the former 
colonies had to be established. To this end, a committee was set up with the task 
of preparing a draft of the confederation. As a result of protracted debates, the 
Articles of Confederation were adopted in November 1777. Its creators were 
moved by the intention that the colonial states should have the highest degree of 
autonomy over the institutions of the emerging confederation. The states trans-
ferred control of foreign policy and army, the appointment of military leaders, 
negotiations with the Indians, and the possibility of borrowing to the Confeder-
ation. In fact, the Confederation did not have the power to enforce military or 
financial contributions from the States when needed. The weaknesses of this 
constitutional structure were already apparent in the middle of the 1780s, 
prompting the leaders of the War of Independence to rethink the powers between 
state and federal levels. The draft of the new constitution was discussed by the 
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1787, and was sub-
sequently ratified by the states. The newly created federation gave federal leg-
islation and executive powers much broader powers than the Articles of Con-
federation. The founding debates show that initially the Confederation had a 
better chance, but the United States eventually became a federation with a strong 
centre. 
The legal disputes surrounding the American Constitution have evolved in 
balancing the advantages and disadvantages of the confederation which confers 
significant powers on each state, and the federation, which gives federal institu-
tions extensive powers. In addition to their views on the constitution, the politi-
cians involved in the debate ‒ Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander 
Hamilton ‒ expressed more general political philosophical ideas. The Federalist 
Papers the authors of which include Madison and Hamilton, dealt mainly with 
arguments for the federation, but also gave rise to theoretical dilemmas. The 
choice between federation and confederation was more than a simple constitu-
tional issue. On the one hand, it can be regarded as a power and state organisation 
problem, because only the effective federal organs of the United States could 
enable economic development and the defence of the country. On the other hand, 
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it was a question of operating a political community, because citizen participa-
tion-based governance was first established in a large republic in history. 
In constitutional debates, Hamilton became the strongest defender of 
strong federal powers, ahead of his time, because at the dawn of the Industrial 
Revolution he said that only industrial development, protective tariffs and a 
central bank could make his country a prosperous nation. He believed that the 
United States would be able to defend its interests if strong federal powers were 
created. Because Hamilton did not trust the people, he sought to remove gov-
ernment from direct forms of democracy. He was thinking of representative 
democracy because he did not consider the American average person, who put 
his own economic interests first, to be able to exercise his civil rights through 
direct participation. He thinks that people’s actions are driven by self-love, which, 
in addition to economic gain, includes a desire for glory. Unlike the 
representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment, Hamilton did not trust that the 
proliferation of “trading societies” would contribute to a peaceful public 
relationships, because the new “utilitarianism” instead of “honour” and “power” 
seeks to rule as well which also marks interstate relations. Therefore, he was 
concluded that the new republic should have significant industrial production as 
soon as possible. Hamilton’s thoughts are echoed in the practice of Republican 
federal governments after the American Civil War, which by all means focused 
on promoting industrialisation. His views preceded his time, but in the long run 
they became the starting point of a political and economic tradition which 
advance protectionism against liberal free trade practices, and the support to 
business activity by the federal government against spontaneous industrial 
development. The history of the last two centuries has abundantly provided 
examples of this practice. 
Jefferson’s political worldview can be seen as the opposite of Hamilton’s 
ideas. Jefferson believed in direct democracy and wanted to empower local 
communities as broadly as possible. He believed that the American states, should 
be divided into areas approximately the size of the ancient Greek city-states, 
where democratic participation is practicable due to the small size of the com-
munity. Unlike Hamilton, Jefferson was optimistic about civic virtues. In his 
view, “natural democracy” selects citizens who are committed to public life and 
who are capable of handling the affairs of their fellow citizens, and the leaders of 
the country must be chosen from among them. Jefferson would have given the 
federal powers a much narrower scope because he wanted to delegate as much 
power as possible to the local level, relying on the self-management ability of 
local communities. Compared to Hamilton’s sceptical utilitarianism, Jefferson’s 
approach reflected Aristotle’s view that man is by nature a social being (zoon 
politikon) and therefore a fundamental vocation of politics and public affairs. 
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Compared to Hamilton’s vision of the industry, landlord Jefferson was thinking 
of a society where the majority of people were farmers or urban small owners, 
shopkeepers and merchants. Jeffersonian democracy is founded on a broad 
spectrum of free owners. On the one hand, this was consistent with contemporary 
American conditions, and, on the other, the idyll of the traditional agricultural 
world came under increasing pressure as a result of the industrialisation of dec-
ades to come. Jefferson’s agrarian considerations later turned the populism of 
rural small-ownership groups suspicious of industrial capitalism, large organisa-
tions, and Laissez-faire practices into the American political tradition. In the last 
third of the nineteenth century, agrarian populists have gained a significant role 
in American domestic politics. 
Jefferson’s democratic tradition has survived in American politics in a 
broader sense. Jefferson himself was strongly sympathetic to the plebeian ideas 
of the French Revolution, while federalist disputants were elitist in their thinking, 
and rather they regarded England after the “Glorious Revolution” as their model. 
They were remotely sympathetic to the idea of popular domination and were 
sympathetic to England in foreign policy after the end of the War of Independ-
ence. The Jeffersonian tradition expressed the fullest possible political and eco-
nomic involvement of the whole people, and the need for it in public affairs 
against the prevailing establishment, the capitalist interest groups, or state regu-
lation and restrictions. The Jeffersonian principles became the reference point 
when they wanted to make free enterprise and democratic participation accessible 
to a wider audience. In this respect, the Jaksonian liberalism relied on Jefferso-
nian tradition in the first half of the nineteenth century, as did Progressivism at 
the turn of the century or the Roosevelt New Deal in the 1930s, although the latter, 
unlike the older American ideals, strove to secure the fullest possible economic-
social emancipation after the Great Depression by increasing federal powers. 
Compared to Hamilton and Jefferson, Madison’s political ideas proved to 
be more complex and more difficult to place in the dichotomy of local or federal 
powers. As a committed Republican, Madison has studied extensively the ancient 
and modern republics. His general scepticism about achieving the best govern-
ment did not stop him from expressing his position as one of the authors of The 
Federalist Papers. Madison was fully aware of the exceptional novelty of the 
emergence of the United States as a large-scale republic compared to the ancient 
city-states, whose governance required new conditions. For him, antique polis 
was a form of direct popular rule, dominated by either the stupidity or tyranny of 
the majority. Madison argues that a large republic makes it inevitable to use a 
system of representation other than direct participatory democracy. In the case of 
a large-scale republic, there is a greater chance that talented representatives will 
be in office, as larger constituencies have more capable people to choose from. 
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On the other hand, interests and interest groups themselves are more diverse in 
large republics. This reduces the possibility of a single aspiration to power that 
prevents the rule of the tyranny of the majority. In this way, Madison’s not only 
distanced himself from the Rousseau and Jefferson principles of direct democ-
racy, reminiscent of antique polis, but also became the forerunner of modern 
pluralism theories. 
However, the benefits of representative government and federal powers did 
not make Madison such a committed spokesman for the central power as 
Hamilton. He even elaborated the principle of power sharing by separating the 
roles of the three branches of power (legislation, executive, and justice) and the 
lower and upper branches of the legislation, and by separating states and federal 
powers he intended to transform the American Republic into a constitutional 
system that protected individual rights. Madison opposed the model of direct 
democracy based on local communities for indirect governance, and on the other 
hand he wanted to protect his country from alienated representative government 
and over-executive power can prevail over the people. 
In his classic study of the emergence of the United States, Richard Hof-
stadter highlighted the circumstances surrounding the formation of the American 
Constitution. In his view, nothing was farther from the “Founding Fathers” than 
revolutionary radicalism. They were all prosperous, educated people and com-
mitted Republicans. As wealthy landlords in the East Coast, they were in close 
contact with European spiritual and intellectual currents. The drafting of the new 
constitution was intended to guarantee the power of the people, but by no means 
that the people themselves should take direct responsibility for governance. 
Therefore, they all considered representative democracy to be the best solution. 
Even Jefferson considered it right that the choice of Republican representatives 
should follow an indirect procedure following a natural selection process in local 
self-governing communities. Representative governance provides control, and 
the powers of the legislative and the executive are limited by guarantees of power 
sharing. The United States was born out of such a compromise: by exercising 
effective federal powers but by counteracting the separation of power. This 
solution was eventually accepted by all parties to the dispute. All with different 
emphases, they were all federation parties, but they respected individual freedom 
and rights. That is why Jefferson, in the early years, was able, without much 
compromise, to assume the office of president of the new federal republic, 
although he had previously held a minimalist view of federal powers. 
To this day, this dual legacy of the constitutional tradition still influences 
American citizen identity, although its historical forms have changed over time. 
In the first decades of US history, the “Federalist” party represented the concept 
of a strong federal state, and against it were the “Democrats” (Republican 
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Democrats) who insisted on Jefferson’s local autonomy. Later, this changed, with 
Democratic parties taking over social programmes and the welfare state in the 
1930s seeking to give federal legislation and executive powers more power, while 
Republicans explicitly defended state rights. Contrary to the policies of Roosevelt 
New Deal, which significantly expanded federal powers and the policies of 
Johnson’s Great Society that emerged in the 1960s, Republicans, who had been 
in opposition until the 1980s, sought to provide economic laissez faire, low taxes, 
and a reduction in the power of the federal government. 
In Hannah Arendt’s famous book, On Revolution (1963), the United States 
described the emergence of the United States as “the foundation of freedom”. 
Arendt drew a distinction between “political revolution” and “social revolution”. 
She believed that during the French Revolution social-shaping ideas eventually 
took precedence, while at the founding of the United States they did not want to 
change social relations at all, but rather created new political institutions. That is 
why the United States avoided revolutionary radicalism and became a solid 
liberal democracy. Arendt’s argument also suggests that the idea of American 
representative democracy developed in the same direction as Jeremy Bentham’s 
or Benjamin Constant’s ideas of freedom and democracy in nineteenth-century 
versions of European liberalism. There was no turning back to the “simple soci-
ety” of antique polis but guarantees of freedom had to be created within “complex 
societies” and larger territorial states. Just as Adam Smith left behind the antique 
virtue in political economy in The Wealth of Nations (1776) and formulated 
market laws within the framework of a “complex society”, politically the 
American constitution implemented the civil principle of modern representation 
instead of ancient participatory democracy. 
Neo-conservative thinkers such as Irving Kristol, in the second half of the 
twentieth century, considered the central value of the American constitutional 
system ‒ like Hannah Arendt’s line of thoughts ‒ to avoid revolutionary radi-
calism and formulated a conservative (or “old liberal”) interpretation of the 
American “constitutional revolution”. In this perspective, the American “revo-
lution” was completely different from the French Revolution and other conti-
nental European revolutions, because it did not confront Christian traditions, did 
not radicalise, did not lead to elite change, and there was no revolutionary terror 
but the institutions of freedom. The War of Independence and the Constitution of 
1787 created the American “demos”. The American nation was not born of some 
common blood-folk descent, but through constitutional rights, that is, enjoyment 
of freedom. In this respect, the political identity of the United States can be 
compared to antique Greek polis created by synoikismos (co-settlement or co-
location) or to ancient Rome, where the city was established as a political-legal 
structure while the Roman tribe or people never existed. This purely political 
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structure was united by the enjoyment of rights, which was extended several times 
throughout Roman history. To be “Roman” was not a tribal blood relation or 
cultural group identity, but a legal relationship with the Roman state. The Populus 
Romanus, the “Roman demos” was created as a result of the acquisition of 
common rights. The identity of the political communities where common blood-
tribal origin forms the basis for belonging to a territorial state is markedly 
different. Such is the case with most of the modern European nation states, which 
are based on historically developed forms of national identity. By contrast, the 
American demos could not rely on a common myth of folk descent but regarded 
the acquisition of “freedom” ‒ civil and political rights ‒ as a fundamental point 
of reference. As a result, American “nationalism” has become a kind of civic 
patriotism, where participation in constitutional rights has brought together 
immigrants from a wide range of linguistic and ethnic backgrounds. 
Contrary to the historical-legal tradition of English liberalism, the authors 
of the American Constitution relied on John Locke’s (1632‒1704) conception of 
the “foundation of freedom” derived from natural law. When it was considered 
that the Creator gave everyone equal rights, not only the aspect of idealism, but 
also the prospect of universalism was included in the constitution. Contrary to 
English conservative liberalism, which regarded British institutions as an ex-
ceptional result of unique historical development (exceptualism), American 
thinking has always been tempted by universal missionary consciousness. At the 
same time, it became common for English and American thought that freedom 
itself became a tradition, both with the historical development of the English 
institutions of liberty and the constitutional “founding” of American freedom. 
This fact clarified the spiritual position of neo-conservative/neoliberal thinkers, 
such as Irving Kristol and Friedrich August von Hayek, who could rightly argue 
in the second half of the twentieth century that the preservation of political tra-
ditions implied the aged “old liberal” principles in the Anglo-Saxon world. Un-
conditional respect for the individual’s political rights ‒ whether from the English 
habeas corpus or the American Constitution ‒ has created convergence between 
the English and American liberal traditions, even if there are significant differ-
ences between philosophical anthropological foundations ‒ the empirical-
historical foundations of the English or rational ‒ natural law background of the 
Americans ‒ were perceptible. Contrary to the tradition of English society, 
American thinking has always tended to be a kind of progressive optimism. The 
progressivism and optimism of the Americans significantly redefined the Anglo-
Saxon liberal tradition, and then its internationalist version, during the twentieth 
century. 
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7.1.3. American myth ‒ American values 
 
The “Founding Fathers” were considered by Hofstadter to be “conservative 
revolutionaries”, but their political heirs were able to make significant in-
novations. In the decades following independence, the spirit of American de-
mocracy manifested itself in several important measures. In the United States, the 
state and the religion/church were separated. As early as 1786, Virginia secured 
free religious practice and abolished the State Church license of the Anglican 
Church, and more and more states followed it. The last one in 1833 was Mas-
sachusetts. The principle of John Locke on religious tolerance was taken seriously 
in the United States, but this did not lead to an anti-religious atmosphere. A 
prominent French political thinker, Tocqueville, reported in the first half of the 
nineteenth century that the United States is home to a large number of different 
churches and religious groups, and that their lively activities are an important part 
of civil society. In European societies, the separation of religion/church and state 
was the result of a long and arduous process in the nineteenth century, while 
Americans considered it almost natural from the beginning. 
Another notable statement by Tocqueville concerned Americans’ religi-
osity. The French political thinker travelled to the United States in 1831, mar-
velling at the strong influence of the Christian Bible in the young republic. It is 
remarkable that Tocqueville strongly argued that, in the US, unlike the conti-
nental political tradition that followed the French Revolution, religiosity and 
enlightenment were not opposed, but rather support and complement each other. 
The religiousness and religious diversity of the United States has passed 
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and remained an important feature 
of the American middle classes to this day. Religious tolerance in the Tocqueville 
era concerned both Protestant churches and then Catholics, and only the atheist 
considered “morally suspicious”. In recent decades, the tendency for secularisa-
tion in the US has been less pronounced than in Europe, mainly due to the “re-
ligious revival” of neo-protestant groups, and the virulence of American religi-
osity can be linked to significant historical antecedents. 
In addition to the separation of religion and state, another early political 
change was the extension of voting rights in the young American republic. In 
European liberal societies there was a censorship of voting rights in the nineteenth 
century, and as a result of electoral reforms, the voting rights were gradually 
extended. This is why Fareed Zakaria, in The Future of Freedom (2003), rightly 
stated that in modern Europe, initially, it was not democracies but liberalising 
autocracies. Universal suffrage is not a liberal but a democratic achievement that 
has been prevalent in more and more countries since the last third of the 
nineteenth century. By contrast, American political practice is rightly called 
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“revolutionary”, as male voting right was introduced in more and more states in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. In the United States, civil “freedom” and 
democratic “equality” ‒ the former Hamiltonian and Madisonian and the latter 
Jeffersonian ‒ have developed from the outset in close unity. The extension of 
the voting right expressed the “democratism” of the American political system, 
which was reflected not only in the political system but also in the American spirit 
as a whole. The “democratic spirit” of American society was sharply different 
from that of contemporary England, which, as Tocqueville pointed out, remained 
an aristocratic society despite the constitutional arrangements that followed the 
“Glorious Revolution”. 
European liberals relied on census suffrage because they felt that pure 
judgment over interest could be guaranteed in the political debate if the manipu-
lated poor could not participate in the decisions. In general, liberals sought to 
prevent the narrow circle of wealthy people from buying the votes of the poor, 
avoiding the negative experiences of ancient Greek-democracies and the French 
Revolution. In the United States, the democratic extension of voting rights was 
promoted by the fact that a society based on a broad spectrum of free owners 
made these reservations unjustified. 
The “democratic spirit”, and the work-centred way of thinking of Ameri-
cans, were associated with Protestant ethics. According to Calvin’s teaching, the 
predestination presupposes the importance of divine choice, so a Calvinist be-
liever continually seeks the mundane signs of the afterlife for salvation. The 
hardworking Puritan communities wanted to experience the signs of divine 
choice by creating the “kingdom of God” on this earth, which released great 
energies for action. Moreover, all of this happened in the “Promised Land”, a 
country to which the Puritans had migrated for a better future and where infinite 
perspectives preceded the construction of the “kingdom of God”. The possibility 
of populating American territories represented a historical analogy for immigra-
tion to the “Promised Land” (i.e., “Israel”) for Protestant colonists. All this was 
possible only through confidence in the future. Americans’ optimism can be 
deduced from their Protestant views as well as their work-centred “decent mate-
rialism”. The activities of the Protestant citizens of “America” are not only 
“there”, but “will be” most (but by no means “were”). American optimism was 
tied to a strong belief in the future and trusted that there was an infinite progres-
sion in things. This progressive concept of time was consistent with the approach 
of the European Enlightenment, but in the United States it also formed a sense of 
everyday life. 
During the nineteenth century, it became evident that the United States was 
providing opportunities for hard-working Americans and immigrants. The 
American dream ‒ an expression by James Truslow Adams in his book The Epic 
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of America in 1931 ‒ also meant the experience that, after decades of decent work, 
the poor in the Old World could enjoy the fruits of their work as a middle class 
citizen in America. All of this was possible because the work-centred “American 
values” were associated with exceptional economic growth, a scale that surpassed 
all previous historical experience. The “progressivism” and “optimism” of the 
Americans also stemmed from the fact that socio-economic processes in the 
nineteenth century supported positive expectations for the future. 
The “democratism” of American society did not mean equality of wealth, 
only equality of conditions. Because most Americans had some form of private 
property ‒ land, business, etc. ‒ the starting conditions were about equal. Relying 
on this, we can witness from the first half of the nineteenth century a successful 
emergence of broad participatory-based capitalism, which has been scarcely 
tempted by the risk of “proletarianisation” or “pauperising”. In this context, we 
must also look at Jackson’s concept of liberalism, which deepens Jefferson’s 
democratic heritage. Andrew Jackson, as President of the United States (1829‒
1837), was no longer an East Coast elite like the “Founding Fathers” but was born 
west of the Appalachian Mountains. As a successful soldier, he gained 
widespread social acceptance and wanted to use his power to extend “people’s 
rule” over the “elitism” of the founders. His attempts to suppress the old estab-
lishment may seem plebeian, but we must not forget that Jackson was not a social 
revolutionary for the people. 
Jacksonian liberalism primarily sought to abolish government monopolies 
and make free business accessible to everyone. According to Jacksonian liber-
alism, the government should not favour any entrepreneur over another and 
should not offer any advantage to any businessman that it denies to the others. 
Jacksonian liberalism did not seek to reduce social disparities, but to promote the 
success of widespread popular capitalism. In doing so, he laid the foundation for 
the much-cited component of the American political tradition, the idea of the 
fruitful consequences of free enterprise and market freedom for the whole people, 
and the blessing of a government that actively supports business. Jacksonian 
liberalism clearly demonstrates that, in American political culture, extending 
democracy was not about equalising wealth, but about equal sharing of oppor-
tunities.  
In addition to “progressivism” and “democratism”, we must mention an-
other feature of American development, the constant shift of the “moving fron-
tier” to the west. In 1893 Frederic Jackson Turner published a powerful thesis on 
the role of the “frontier” in American history. According to Turner, the American 
people were born in a constant struggle with the wild, which significantly in-
fluenced the evolution of the folk character. Although some of the conclusions of 
the American historian were controversial, few theses have resulted in such a 
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diverse discourse on American identity. The importance of Turner’s ideas in 
American historiography illustrates that the Americans themselves attached great 
importance to the frontier, which became a symbol of infinite possibilities. As a 
result, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, 
when the frontier in the Pacific was “closed”, a crisis broke out and many 
commented that the exceptional development of the United States had “come to 
an end” (Map 36). The concept of “frontier” clearly illustrates positive judgments 
about the infinite perspectives of nineteenth century American rise. The frontier 
has shaped Protestant expectations of a “Promised Land” into concrete oppor-
tunity and fuelled American optimism. 
 
Map 36: US territorial growth between 1776 and 1853 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
 
Turner’s reasoning seems to be instructive about the nature of history-
making forces. Concerning the relationship between geography and human 
society, representatives of milieu theory (Montesquieu) and geographic deter-
minism (Ratzel) emphasised the direct social effect of the natural environment, 
while geographical possibilism (Vidal de la Blanche) focused on the impact of 
geographical factors on opportunities that society either exploits or does not use. 
From the point of view of American ideals, the mainstream approach emphasised 
the importance of Anglo-Saxon institutions rather than geographical influences. 
These were created through human effort and were able to establish political 
values, while Turner’s much debated, and somewhat overwhelming thesis re-
ferred to the primacy of the environment as he attempted to explain the emergence 
of individualism and democracy. 
Civilisations from East to West 
426 

7.1.4. The rise of the United States 
 
After the War of Independence, the United States in the early nineteenth 
century can be considered a factory-free capitalism or a society of free owners 
that not only resembled Jefferson’s ideal of democracy, but also provided an 
example of Adam Smith’s “commercial society”. Smith in The Wealth of Nations 
considered the ownership economy based on market exchange to be ideal, where 
state interventions are kept to a minimum so that the idea of “invisible hand”, that 
is, market self-regulation, can prevail. In a world of pre-factory capitalism, the 
commercialised agricultural economy, the broad ownership strata that determine 
the social structure, and the lack of etatism allowed Smith’s economic idea to 
come close to fruition in the United States In Europe, extensive economic regu-
lation from the traditions of royal absolutism could only be dismantled in a long 
struggle, while the United States from the outset provided a good example of 
unrestricted market and capitalism, where property and incomes were equally 
distributed among economic operators. Factory capitalism later reshaped original 
conditions, but the importance of the countryside, agriculture, and its associated 
small-ownership strata has long prevailed in the history of the United States. 
Despite the industrial development at the turn of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth century, the agricultural sector also played an important role, which was also 
reflected in the role of agricultural exports. Only after World War I did the urban 
population exceed the rural population, while in England about half of the pop-
ulation lived in cities by 1850. When the US became an industrial power in the 
early twentieth century, in terms of exports, agricultural products still accounted 
for a very large share, compared to other industrialised countries. The importance 
of “rural America” was also reflected in the specifics of political culture. Com-
pared to the vast industrial areas and major capitalists of the East Coast and the 
Great Lakes ‒ and later the second half of the twentieth century California ‒ the 
Midwest represented/represent the world of farmland and small towns, from 
where farmer “populism” may have originated, as well as the WASP con-
sciousness of urban middle classes. 
In spite of the promising beginnings of industrialisation, in the early 
nineteenth century, much of the capital investment did not promote industrial 
plant development but flowed into canal and railroad construction. In a country 
as large as the United States, in the pre-rail era, canals made it possible to 
transport large volumes of agricultural goods, which accounted for most of the 
goods surplus. The canals contributed to a drastic reduction in freight rates ‒ 
compared to land transport, water transport accounts for about one fifth ‒ which 
ensured the commercial character of agriculture and, in the long run, had an 
exceptional impact on nation building. The United States, as an enormous 
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republic, was a unique phenomenon at the end of the eighteenth century, and 
many doubted whether a country of this size could last forever. The canals that 
were built in the first half of the nineteenth century, and a few decades later the 
railways not only facilitated the transport of agricultural and then industrial 
products, but also became an essential element of the unity of the country. 
As industrialisation unfolded in the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
notion that tariffs were not primarily about increasing budget revenues, but about 
protecting young American industry from increased competition, was reinforced. 
The idea of defensive tariffs was not only endorsed by Hamilton, but also by 
economic interest groups and publicists. Protectionism was an integral part of 
American foreign economic practice. Although, after gaining independence, the 
principle of free international trade became one of the foundations of US foreign 
policy, the interests of industry often proved stronger. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, the US sought to secure its industrial and agricultural products through 
customs protection. It is no coincidence that the German Friedrich List, whose 
European economic theory owes its notion to a protective tariff and seclusion 
with defensive tariffs, stayed longer in the United States and was influenced by 
American foreign trade practices. Contrary to English trade policy, which is 
moving towards free trade, which has created competition for its own agriculture, 
the United States has been jealous of its industry and agriculture even at the turn 
of the century. Although Democrats have repeatedly attempted to create a mul-
tilateral free trade system in the twentieth century, the demands for protectionism 
have persisted in the middle-class ownership of Republicans. 
It was only in the decades following the Civil War (1861‒1865) that the 
United States became a true industrial country. By the 1880s, more people were 
working in industry and services than in the agricultural economy. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, the US had become an industrial nation, where industrial 
production exceeded the value of agricultural commodities. In 1890, the United 
States became the world’s largest industrial power. During the period of eco-
nomic development from the Civil War to the World War I, the value of manu-
facturing production increased twelve times and that of industrial capital in-
vestments increased twenty times. The number of workers in the manufacturing 
industry has increased at least five times. In 1830, the United States had 2.4 
percent of the world’s industrial output, England 9.5 percent and France 5.2 
percent. In 1900, the United States had 23.6 percent, England 18.5 percent, 
France 6.8 percent. By 1914, American national income had already exceeded 
the sum of British, German, French and Russian national income. Industrialisa-
tion per capita was also well above the European average. These results were 
made possible by the exceptional industrial development of the last third of the 
nineteenth century. It is remarkable, that the United States became the world’s 
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first industrial power in a very short period of time, about four decades. Its rise 
took about the same amount of time as the period from the 1973 oil crisis to the 
present. During these decades, the standard of living also increased steadily. 
The decades after the end of the civil war between the industrialised North 
and the slave-laboured South, based on free movement, are referred to as the 
reconstruction era and the period up to the turn of the century is called gilded age 
by historiography. The latter designation, also referring to Mark Twain’s ironic 
vocabulary, illustrates well the contradiction of the era. The US economy has 
achieved rapid growth in industrial performance, and living standards among 
strong economic fluctuations, and large income disparities. This nature of 
American capitalism has survived to this day. From the middle of the nineteenth 
century onwards, the momentum of economic development illustrates the 
uniquely dynamic and hectic nature of American capitalism. 
The post-Civil War economic policy of the federal governments greatly 
contributed to the recovery of the US economy. The Republican government, 
which embodies the “northern heritage”, has sought, in the spirit of the Hamil-
tonian legacy, to make a positive contribution to the development of capitalism 
through the creation of a business-friendly environment and active measures ‒ 
mainly through the promotion of railway construction. The resolution supporting 
business also meant that the right to strike was banned by the courts as an initia-
tion restricting the freedom of entrepreneurs, and for a while serious tensions 
between work and capital developed. Despite the conflicts, there were no labour 
parties in the United States, but wage fighting remained primarily a matter for the 
trade unions, who were pragmatic about enforcing wage increases and did not 
formulate political goals. American practice did not try to support the victims and 
losers of industrialisation and urbanisation with so much “etatist” budgetary 
means, but Protestant church and civil society, which sought to help the poor, 
gained a prominent role in the growing world of cities. 
One of the key factors in American economic growth was that in the 
nineteenth century, some 60 million people left the Old World to try their luck 
outside their home country. About two-thirds of them have found a home in the 
United States. Population growth has allowed for a steady expansion of the labour 
market. From the 1870s to the present, the country’s population has risen from 
just under 40 million to about 300 million. In an era of exceptional economic 
growth, the United States had a population of 70 million in 1896 and nearly 100 
million in 1914. Immigration proved to be strong during the turn of the century, 
when both skilled and unskilled labour contributed significantly to the dynamics 
of the prosperity. 
As a result of the waves of immigration, WASP identity is facing in-
creasing challenges. In the middle of the nineteenth century, German and Irish, 
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in the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries immigrants from the Mediter-
ranean region, mainly Italy, and Central Eastern Europe made the language of the 
great country more colourful. With the turn of the century immigration, the 
United States also had an increasing Catholic population. During the nineteenth 
century, assimilation tendencies became even more pronounced, largely due to 
the fact that most immigrants wanted to become American themselves. Sociology 
and history have highlighted the experiences of this period when they created the 
concept of the “melting pot”, although research in recent decades has also pointed 
out that assimilation has not been so widespread in the “classic” era of 
immigration as previously assumed. Yet, despite increasing challenges, the An-
glo-Saxon Protestant middle classes were able to integrate immigrants in their 
own values until the second half of the twentieth century. These tendencies have 
been permanently interrupted by the black civil rights movement of the 1960s 
and the Ibero-American immigration to the West Coast states and are still an 
insoluble problem. 
The extraordinary dimensions of railway construction also contributed to 
economic growth in the nineteenth century. In the second third of the century, 
50,000 kilometres of railway tracks were built, doubling in the early 1870s. At 
the turn of the century, the length of railroad tracks built in the United States 
exceeded 300,000 kilometres, overtaking the entire European rail network. By 
1914, the same figure was 400,000 kilometres, when the huge Russia had a total 
of 75,000 kilometres of railways. The construction of transport infrastructure has 
stimulated GDP growth and promoted the integration of western regions’ re-
sources into the economic circulation. The growing population, the abundant 
supply of raw materials and the ever-expanding railway network were the three 
basic pillars of economic development, among which we must count on positive 
feedbacks. The American economy has proven to be a “expanding universe”, 
where a significant number of players have found their way. 
Thanks to the steady rise in the standard of living, consumer societies were 
emerging at the turn of the century, ahead of Europe. Because of the high wages, 
American workers could afford the consumption habits that took place in Europe 
only three or four decades later. The reason for the high wages is partly due to 
the consequences of the frontier. In continental Europe, industrialisation was pro-
moted by the high hidden unemployment in the underdeveloped agricultural 
economy. After the emergence of factory capitalism, this workforce moved to 
industrial cities and contributed to wage cuts, allowing it to increase the profits 
of the capitalist entrepreneur. Therefore, there is no shortage of labour in 
European countries during the Industrial Revolution. By contrast, in the United 
States, industrial workers in the East Coast may have migrated to the West at any 
time if wages were not appropriate for them. There was plenty of land in the 
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frontier, while labour was scarce. In addition, the modern labour organisation of 
farms producing for the market was not aware of hidden unemployment. All this 
led to attractive wages in the agricultural economy, which indirectly kept 
industrial wages high. Although historians have argued that migration to the West 
was no more of a theoretical opportunity for many, the “frontier” itself proved to 
be a deterrent to wage-reduction efforts. 
High wages have encouraged entrepreneurs to mechanise because they 
have tried to replace expensive labour. Mechanisation has increased productivity 
and, in many cases, required skilled labour, which has further increased the value 
of the workforce, which again has promoted the use of labour-replacing ma-
chines. In the United States at the time of the “Second Industrial Revolution” ‒ 
the last decades of the nineteenth century ‒ not only the size but also the mech-
anisation of factories proved to be unique, contributing to the increasing com-
petitiveness of US exports against European rivals. 
Strong economic growth contributed to the fulfilment of the American 
dream. In the era of the “Founding Fathers”, US society consisted of a wide range 
of owners. The frontier made it possible for the property to be acquired and the 
federal government supported colonists to have access to land at affordable prices 
(Homestead Act). Ownership and high industrial wages have prevented signifi-
cant social groups from being declassified. By the turn of the century, the United 
States had a large middle class of owners, well-paid employees and working 
classes. The structural features of economic growth ensured the preservation of 
the “original features”, that is, the success of broad-based capitalism. 
Impressive economic growth has taken place under exceptional structural 
conditions. American corporate and bank sizes far exceeded their European 
rivals. The Morgan, Carnegie, and Rockefeller families became key entrepre-
neurs in the US banking, steel and petroleum industries. The enormous size of 
the company has enabled it to produce more efficiently and to be the birthplace 
of professional corporate governance, management techniques and engineering, 
and, as monopolies capable of exerting political influence, have induced intense 
social debate. The United States has entered the twentieth century by gaining 
experience of the tensions between big capital and the middle classes, which have 
shaped American political culture ever since. 
The enormous economic development at the turn of the century barely 
made it possible for the United States to stay out of world politics. The US sold 
most of its products on its huge domestic market but expanding exports of manu-
factured products had a growing impact on European national economies. US 
foreign trade asset vis-à-vis Europe no longer relied on agricultural exports. The 
capital import from the United Kingdom made it possible to raise additional funds 
and accelerated economic growth. The economic vitality of the United States at 
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the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is well illustrated by a 
combination of export surplus and capital imports. While the recent foreign trade 
deficit is more indicative of the increasing vulnerability and competitiveness 
problems of the US. Cycle fluctuations of the US economic have affected 
European markets since the turn of the century. American speculators were able 
to disrupt the financial markets of European capitals. It was almost time for the 
United States to be forced to pursue global foreign policy if it wanted to protect 
its financial and export interests. European great powers and capital groups were 
increasingly fearful of the US becoming a world economic power. 
The business with the greatest consequences of the American rise was the 
attempt to “internationalise” American liberal ideology. During World War I, the 
Wilson Principles formulated a kind of creed of liberal internationalism and 
sought to make them a principle of international life. In the nineteenth century, 
the United States pursued a largely isolationist foreign policy. The Americans did 
not want to become involved in the European state system based on balance of 
power. In their view, the United States, created by the “Founding Fathers”, was 
also a new beginning in a moral sense, as it sought to transcend the Machiavellian 
power policy of the Old World. On the other hand, the Americans could afford 
the isolation, as no European power posed a threat that forced them to seek an 
alliance with another European state. In addition, the huge US domestic market 
has for some time led to the export of only a negligible amount of US products. 
This fact made it possible to preserve a receding foreign policy, even though, as 
a result of industrial development at the turn of the century, US export sectors 
began to expand. It seems that American isolationism was not only based on ideas 
but also on economic factors. 
American “isolation” is not only the opposite of spreading American 
values around the world and the missionary consciousness of it, but it is about 
two sides of the same phenomenon. Conscious of its higher morality, the United 
States distanced itself from interest oriented “Old World” politics. But with the 
same morality, it might even have come to the conclusion that it should share its 
political and ethical principles with the world. The American myth included the 
possibility of a worldwide mission, just as the French Revolutionary nation had 
become a “torch” for Europe, at least according to some nineteenth-century 
thinkers. Not only did the Americans have an optimistic belief in progress, but 
they also learned, based on their frontier experience, that the lifestyle they rep-
resented could extend to larger areas, so it is not surprising that it overflows with 
America over time. While the United States did not have significant interests 
abroad and the frontier allowed expansion on the North American continent, 
American foreign policy idealism embodied in isolationism. But by the turn of 
the century, the frontier had ended ‒ the colonists had reached the west coast ‒ 
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and on the other hand, American goods had appeared on the world market in 
greater quantities. When the United States showed its interest in the Pacific in the 
case of the Philippines and by proclaiming the principle of “open gates” that it is 
not indifferent to the Asian continent, and President Theodore Roosevelt (1901‒
1909), demonstratively sending the American navy fleet around the world, the 
public opinion in the world is beginning to understand that a new era is emerging. 
On the eve of World War I, the Americans were well on their way to 
economically overtaking the European continent. It is estimated that by the 
middle of the 1920s this would have happened, but the consequences of the World 
War I accelerated the transformation of economic power. The United States, in 
the name of the Anglo-Saxon community of interests and values, gave Great 
Britain huge loans during the World War I. Creditors’ points of view also 
contributed to the Wilson administration’s lack of pride in its principles of not 
going to war and entering the war with strictly moral arguments of international 
law. 
14 points of President Woodrow Wilson (1913‒1921) announced at a joint 
meeting of the Senate and House of Representatives on 8 January 1918, for the 
first time, in the spirit of American idealism, attempted to create a radically new 
liberal world order. Wilson’s ideas were born in a Kantian spirit when they de-
clared the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations. They demanded just 
peace without annexation, evacuation of areas occupied during the war, national 
self-determination and consideration of the interests of the colonial populations. 
Freedom of the sea shipping and the principle of unhindered international trade 
have been expressed. A proposal has been made to set up a community of nations 
capable of settling disputes peacefully. The novelty of Wilson’s endeavour was 
not that the Americans were idealistic in their international relations, but rather, 
for the first time, an attempt to put their ideas into practice throughout the world. 
 
7.1.5. Progressivism and the New Deal 
 
The Second Industrial Revolution, from the last third of the nineteenth 
century, resulted in the emergence of an “industrial society” that was very dif-
ferent from the primitive factory capitalism of the First Industrial Revolution. The 
organisation of production has played an increasingly important role in shaping 
social relationships, and the manufacturing and production systems themselves 
have become increasingly complex. The conditions of the emerging urban-
industrial mass societies increasingly influenced everyday life, and the expanding 
technical civilisation manifested itself as a kind of “second nature”. The 
emblematic theorist of large-scale capitalism is German Max Weber (1864‒
1920), who no longer spoke of free enterprise and laissez faire as representatives 
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of classical political economy in the first half of the nineteenth century, but of 
rational economic action and a bureaucratic state. He outlined a multi-factor 
model describing the emergence of modern capitalist mass production, where the 
market was only one factor. Since Weber, besides the (neo)classical market 
theories, we have to take into account the theories of industrial society, which 
have grown into a significant line of social science thinking in the twentieth 
century. It is indicative that the classic case of industrial societies created by the 
Second Industrial Revolution is not the Western European countries, but the 
United States. 
The contradictions of urban mass societies resulting from the Second In-
dustrial Revolution led to the emergence of a new social movement in the United 
States. At the turn of the century, the progressive era wanted to respond to social 
and political tensions in a unique American way. While in Europe the new demo-
cratic mass parties sought to get as many representatives into the parliament as 
possible and the Left announced a programme of progressive taxation and nation-
alisation, in the United States progressivism was seen as a civil movement, gain-
ing a national political role. Highly capable presidents identified themselves with 
political goals like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Progressives at 
local level fought against corruption in local governments and sought to counter-
balance the increasing political influence of monopolies and large-cap groups. 
They supported federal anti-monopoly legislation, worker protection against the 
employer, women’s voting right, and expansion of education. Through its ideas 
for broadening political participation, progressivism can be considered a continu-
ation of the Jeffersonian heritage, but its specific goals were greatly influenced 
by the crisis of the frontier in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the 
fact that industrial size and capital concentration in the United States are unique 
in the world. At the turn of the century, many felt that the “nation” was not mov-
ing in the right direction and that the “land of opportunity” had become a country 
of narrow economic interest groups that buy into the political and civil spheres. 
Progressivism sought to restore faith in American values to the conditions 
of the industrialised world, to restore the ethos of broad participatory-based 
capitalism, and to expand opportunities for civic and social emancipation. Pro-
gressives have formed rather broad casual coalitions in both national and local 
politics, gaining support from a significant portion of urban middle classes 
against corrupt economic lobbyists. In the spirit of the “social gospel”, many 
Protestant groups have also caught up. One of the emblematic figures of pro-
gressivism is John Dewey (1859‒1952), whose philosophy of education has 
contributed to the reform of school education. By announcing a programme of 
pedagogical pragmatism, he wanted to suppress the teaching of classical lan-
guages, and his students developed a practical project method. Through his 
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pedagogical views, Dewey became a modern apostle of American democracy, 
who believed in a progressive mindset with a strong belief in a better future.  The 
progressive era pre-empted the measures of the New Deal in many areas but did 
not proclaim the welfare state programme and had only a loose connection with 
the artistic modernity of the turn of the century. It is a peculiarly “American” 
phenomenon where, with respect for constitutional values, it advocated on eco-
nomic and social progress, and, unlike populist farmer groups who had an 
agrarian nostalgia for “old America”, undertook to confront the problems of 
urban industrial mass societies. 
In the 1920s, the progressive movement lost its momentum, and, on the 
other hand, its goals were partially realised. The decade after the World War I 
was the last time in American history when US citizens could still believe that 
they could hold the influence of the outside world beyond their borders. This was 
not only expressed in isolationist counter-reaction to the promulgation of Wil-
son’s internationalist principles, but also in restricting immigration and intensi-
fying anti-foreign views. However, the 1920s was a period of marked, but surging 
economic activity, which allowed the recruitment of new workers to the industry. 
Extremely large-scale plants (economies of scale) created by Fordist-Taylorist 
industrial organisation have given way to durable consumer goods ‒ automobiles, 
household appliances ‒ and could be bought by the average American family. In 
the 1920s, not only did American workers’ real wages undergo significant 
growth, largely relieving social tensions at the turn of the century, US industrial 
production reached about 40 percent of the world share. In the 1920s, the ever-
expanding middle class of consumers emerged, which already included a 
considerable portion of urban workers. New habits of cultural consumption have 
evolved as household appliances have increasingly allowed women to afford 
reading, cinema and other forms of entertainment. In this regard, the United States 
overtook Western Europe, where the same consumer habits did not develop on a 
massive scale until after World War II. 
The 1920s, on the one hand, fulfilled the potential of the industrial-
consumer society and, on the other, preserved the past (old liberal) American 
principles of free enterprise. Republican presidents Harding, Coolidge, and 
Hoover all represented the traditional view of the limited role of the state. This 
perception is well illustrated by the public remarks of President Calvin Coolidge 
(1923‒1929), who summarised “old” American values a few years before the 
New Deal was announced. These thoughts seemed a thing of the past between the 
New Deal of the 1930s and the Great Society of the 1960s and returned vigorously 
to domestic politics in the 1980s under the presidency of Ronald Reagan. 
Considering Coolidge’s principles, we understand why his friend and 
successor in the presidential chair, Hoover believed in the early years of the Great 
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Depression, that state intervention was not necessary, and we should wait pa-
tiently for the recession to end. In addition, Hoover was convinced that Roosevelt 
and his Democrats, who proclaimed a broad public intervention programme, 
would win the presidential election by fundamentally destroying the values of 
“Americanism”. Yet, when Roosevelt, with the deepening of the crisis of 1929‒
1933, won an overwhelming victory and began to realise his ideas, a single 
president was not forgotten so quickly by American public opinion as Hoover, 
who appeared helpless at the outset of the great crisis. The doctrinarian realisation 
of “American values” has been overridden by the material and social needs of the 
economic crisis. 
Through his family and his education, President Franklin Delano Roose-
velt (1933‒1945) could have become a spokesman for the interests of the 
American upper classes, yet, as an exceptionally popular president, he has 
launched an unprecedented “revolution” in US history. Roosevelt was more of a 
willing and pragmatic politician and a humanist than a doctrinarian revolutionary 
when he sought to save the American man from hunger and seize the country 
from the unprecedented collapse of capitalism. In his own interpretation, Roo-
sevelt, like Keynes, sought to save and not eradicate freedom and “free society”, 
but his argument was never accepted by his political opponents. They saw the 
end of the economic laissez faire in radical social policy measures, which could, 
at least according to its critics, lead to decline in civil and political freedom. Roo-
sevelt’s exceptional power in the crisis made him a “radical” overriding old 
American values, though in his view he wanted nothing more than to transform 
the United States into a broad participatory-based society, where the average 
American can once again feel like a land of opportunity. In this respect, its pro-
gramme may be conceived of as a continuation of the Jeffersonian heritage, 
though in a form significantly altered from its original ideals. 
The interventionist measures of the Roosevelt administration ‒ agricultural 
subsidies, social security, the introduction of unemployment benefits, regulation 
of banks and the financial sector, job creation, etc. ‒ are well known and need not 
be presented. A more controversial topic is the effectiveness and awareness of the 
measures. It is questionable whether the recovery from the crisis was a conse-
quence of the New Deal, or the natural movement of the market cycle, or of the 
military boom in the 1940s. Orthodox liberals considered the socialising results 
of the reforms too radical, while the (New Left) considered them too small. More 
important than that, the New Deal has provided hope and livelihood at the bottom 
of the crisis, which has restored confidence in American values and institutions. 
The measures in the early years were rather a series of practical ideas. Although 
Keynes paid a visit to American leaders who listened to his views with interest, 
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it was only from the last third of the 1930s that we can talk about the beginnings 
of conscious Keynesian economic policy practice. 
The early 1940s marked a turning point in the emergence of American 
macroeconomic thinking. From this time on, we could talk about the creation of 
national resource planning, analysis groups and national statistics, which not only 
optimised efforts during the World War II, but also created the economic policy 
approach and econometric analysis framework which led to Keynesian econo-
mists’ monarchy after 1945 at the universities of the East Coast. More important 
was the impact of the New Deal on public thinking. The American citizen has 
since considered the state’s helping presence on social and welfare issues to be 
an integral part of his life. The toughness of these views is illustrated by the fact 
that Reagan’s economic policy did not dare to break down the fundamental 
achievements of the New Deal in the 1980s. 
Roosevelt’s successes served as a starting point for the “liberal progres-
sion” of the coming decades, where social emancipation was closely linked to 
etatist solutions. Roosevelt’s concept was inspired by, but went beyond, Jeffer-
son’s notion of democracy, by focusing not only on broader political participation 
and equal opportunities, but on the distribution of wealth. 
 
7.1.6. American civilisation values in the second half of the twentieth 
century 
 
After World War II, Roosevelt’s successor, Truman (1945‒1953), due to 
the increasing congressional influence of the Republicans, was only partially able 
to pass the Fair Deal, called the continuation of New Deal ‒ conservative criti-
cism referred to “stealth socialism” ‒, but for decades Democrats have retained 
their leading role in economic and social policy in public life. After the World 
War II, the programme of democratic governance in the United States became 
similar in many respects to the objectives of the Western European Social 
Democratic and Socialist parties, proclaiming the necessity of stronger state 
intervention (Keynesian etatism) against the economic laissez-faire, and it iden-
tified with the programme for the creation of a social-welfare state and later with 
the values of the “cultural left”. The politicians and voters who represented this 
viewpoint in the twentieth century are called liberals in the United States, while 
opposed to the “limited government” advocates of the Republicans, called con-
servatives in American terms. The term “liberal” was given new meaning by the 
turn of the century artistic and then by the cultural modernity of 1968, while the 
word “conservative” implies that republican traditions include the protection of 
the constitutional “old liberal” principles of free enterprise, economic laissez 
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faire, the separation of powers, and the unconditional respect for a federal state 
with limited powers. 
The “liberal” political public discourse not only promoted welfare pro-
grammes but also the emancipation efforts of blacks and supported capitalist 
entrepreneurs to pay attention to the social costs of their activities. To that extent, 
Democrats can also be seen as carrying on the Jeffersonian heritage because they 
wanted to promote broader political and social participation for the American 
man. Another important aspect that both liberals and conservatives had to bear in 
mind was that the emergence of industrial society changed the original nature of 
capitalism, which also influenced the conditions of governance. It is no coinci-
dence that, compared to the traditional figure of the “capitalist entrepreneur” 
idealised by the Republicans, the Democrats were more open to the work of 
technocratic “social engineering” and even demanded their involvement in 
politics. 
In the decades after 1945, the Democrats accepted without doubt the con-
tinuation of the New Deal heritage. For Republicans, the same was only possible 
with some restrictions, but they themselves felt that the Keynesian social engi-
neering and social welfare programme was so popular that it was impossible to 
gain the confidence of voters by proclaiming the old laissez faire principles. 
Therefore, Republicans also used the Keynesian recipes to sustain economic 
growth and did not touch upon the basic achievements of the welfare state, but, 
in the case of the Eisenhower presidency (1953‒1961) or in the case of a majority 
in Congress, they tried to prevent an increase in the budget redistribution. In the 
United States, because of the power of the “old liberal” tradition, the state’s 
regulatory and welfare spending expansion programme has met greater resistance 
than in post-World War II Western Europe. 
The Democrats’ programme for federal regulation, the social state, and the 
emancipation of disadvantaged groups developed in its entirety in the second half 
of the 1960s. Already President Kennedy (1961‒1963) had faith in the Big 
Government when he said that expanding governmental competences does not 
necessarily have negative consequences, but that the federal government can 
effectively contribute to solving people’s problems. His successor, Johnson 
(1963‒1969), went ahead with the announcement of the Great Society pro-
gramme, which was to regulate the activities of large companies, increase welfare 
and education spending, fight against poverty and support the civil rights 
movement of blacks. Johnson was renowned for achieving these goals by sig-
nificantly expanding the responsibilities and staffing of federal agencies, and 
sincerely believed that federal bureaucracy measures could reach social issues. 
Johnson’s situation was made more difficult by the fact that, during his 
presidency, the United States was first confronted with the limitations of its 
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economic and power capabilities and the confusing domestic politics created by 
student movements in the late 1960s. Two decades earlier, in 1945, the US still 
had half of the world’s industrial production and unique military capabilities ‒ 
the nuclear bomb monopoly, an exceptional strategic air force and a navy. 
Building on this economic and power superiority, President Roosevelt made an 
attempt to reorganise the international order after the World War II. The Roo-
sevelt Foreign Policy Concept (Grand Design), after decades of isolationism 
between the two world wars, heralded a return to Wilson’s liberal idealism and 
global engagement. Rethinking Wilson’s principles, Roosevelt and his consult-
ants sought to establish international institutional guarantees for the operation of 
the liberal world order through the United Nations and its specialised agencies. 
Liberal internationalism after 1945 was more than a mere conception of princi-
ples, since it had well-organised institutional structures. 
The United States did not return to isolationism after World War II. 
Although its economic and political interests ‒ its growing exports, its extensive 
oil interests ‒ motivated it to pursue an active foreign policy, it wanted to 
reconcile its international obligations with liberal idealism, that is, the role of the 
“torch”. Due to its role as a world power, it has undertaken such a task that it has 
barely been able to meet the ethical expectations of the “American mission”. It is 
not by accident that historians emphasise that, in the eyes of the American public, 
there has been a constant conflict between foreign policy ideas and international 
power realities because of the role played by the United States after 1945. Be-
cause American values suggested an “idealistic” attitude in foreign policy, the 
general public reacted sensitively when faced with the opposite, as reflected in 
the aftermath of the Vietnam War. 
In the two decades after World War II, the United States still had the 
economic and military capabilities that allowed it to maintain its superpower role. 
During the Korean War, the United States responded firmly to the communist 
bloc's power aspirations in defence of the free world. The US power was perhaps 
greatest under Eisenhower in the bipolar world, when through the creation of the 
“enclosing crescent”, he concluded agreements with its allies on the southern 
borders of the Soviet Union from Japan to Turkey. In the 1950s, hundreds of 
thousands of soldiers stationed outside the United States to defend American 
interests. 
In spite of its seemingly limitless possibilities, the United States faced an 
insoluble contradiction in the second half of the twentieth century, as the relative 
decline of its economic power began after the World War II. Although the signs 
of this became apparent only from the mid-1960s, the US showed more moderate 
economic growth than Western Europe, Soviet bloc countries, or Japan and East 
Asian countries. The United States was at the peak of its economic performance 
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at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the late 1920s and 1945. 
However, due to its isolationist principles, at the turn of the century and between 
the two world wars, it did not want to make significant international commit-
ments. Compared to this, the decline in economic power was observed the day 
after the announcement of the global role, Grand Design. 
In the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration was well aware that in-
ternational economic power relations were changing due to the rebuilding and 
rapid economic development of Western Europe. Global public opinion has been 
aware since the mid-1960s that the US economy is facing increasing competi-
tiveness problems. This was also reflected in the slowing of the US GDP growth 
rate and the lack of a foreign trade balance. President Johnson was burdening the 
federal budget with Great Society spending at a time when there was a great need 
to reduce the tax burden on companies. Further issues were raised by the military 
spending of the Vietnam War, which peaked in the second half of the 1960s. Not 
only did the Vietnam War become unacceptable to the domestic public, but the 
popularity of the United States began to decline worldwide. In the 1970s, the 
United States was repeatedly accused by the UN under pressure by developing 
countries. It was an unusual situation for a superpower who, on the basis of the 
values of “Americanism”, believed that its involvement in international affairs 
could only bring good for the world. 
The United States’ competitiveness problems also made Johnson’s situa-
tion more difficult, as well as the university student movements that emerged in 
the second half of the 1960s. The Great Society proved to be oversized for the 
budget, and the New Left, on the other hand, underestimated its efforts to eradicate 
poverty. Student organisations under Neo-Marxist and Maoist influences 
criticised the Vietnam War sharply, where Johnson was trying to get out of the 
conflict with “keeping the face” of US, which required even greater military 
efforts in the short term. The black civil rights movement, which was embraced 
by the Liberals, reached an active stage during these years and was no free from 
atrocities against the majority society. Growing domestic and foreign policy 
difficulties have led Johnson to no longer be a candidate for the next presidential 
term. Despite his retirement, his actions against the Great Society provoked 
Republican aversion. Above all, Conservatives blamed Johnson for the decline of 
the American superpower. On the one hand, because he has weakened the 
competitiveness of the US economy through massive government spending, 
instead of promoting corporate prosperity through tax cuts, on the other hand, the 
failure of the Vietnam War has also eroded the international image of the United 
States, thirdly, the Democratic-backed civil and social emancipation has let go of 
the social valves. The rebellion of the poor and minority groups was violently 
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directed against the “white middle class” (WASP), which threatened to upset 
public order. 
In the 1970s, the United States also faced new international problems. The 
oil crisis of 1973 not only adversely affected American economic performance, 
but also created insoluble situations in foreign policy. The US has been con-
fronted with the fact that in the world of interdependence, it is no longer capable 
of effectively influencing events. In the alliance with the Soviet Union, the in-
ternational New Left has maintained a “blockade” of the United States in inter-
national organisations. And US foreign policy in support of Israel made it un-
popular in the Arab world. The economic recession has brought years of bad 
domestic politics. Not surprisingly, by the mid-1970s, declinism (= a spiritual 
trend announcing the decline of the United States) already held prominent posi-
tions among American intellectuals when it celebrated the two hundredth anni-
versary of the United States. 
The declinists became aware of the limitations of the American super-
power and analysed the causes and nature of its decline. As the 1973 oil crisis 
marked the end of economic growth throughout the world economy, which raised 
major concerns, their perception also fit in with the global intellectual trend. This 
decade saw the emergence of “European pessimism” in Western Europe, and the 
first reports on the limits of the natural resources available to the world economy 
were published by the Club of Rome. Declinism was the American version of this 
broader trend, of which the crisis of the superpower was an important part. It was 
in this intellectual context that neo-conservative cultural criticism also appeared, 
seeking to redefine American values in the spirit of conservative values. 
Since the appearance of the New Deal, intellectuals and social engineers in 
the Democratic sphere have dominated American intellectual life. They had in 
common that they believed in the possibility of social progression, they wanted 
to achieve social emancipation through state intervention, and they were 
convinced of the benefits of Big Government. Referring to the Jeffersonian 
branch of the American political heritage, they represented a peculiar version of 
the pursuit of happiness for the people that employs the toolbar of etatism.  Until 
the 1960s, the conservatives were unable to build a powerful stockpile of 
intellectual weapons against them, as economic growth made it possible to extend 
social measures, which were extremely popular with significant sections of 
society. Domestic disturbances in student movements, the overthrow of US 
power and international competitiveness problems required neo-conservatives to 
form consistent views that were endorsed by the Republican political elite and 
the general public. 
Neo-conservatives (Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, etc.) preached the need to 
return to “original” American values. In their view, the successful capitalism of 
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the United States rested on the entrepreneurial spirit of the WASPs, which pro-
vided the appropriate framework for the political institutions of the young 
American republic. The Protestant middle classes were the proponents of capi-
talist accumulation made possible by the political freedom guaranteed by the 
federal state. Emerging capitalism rested on the merits of entrepreneurs, as the 
state refrained from favouring some in economic life. Protestantism, as a religious 
pre-requisite, has become the driving force behind it, not only promoting 
economic development, but also creating meritocratic capitalism. As a result, 
successful entrepreneurs have been highly regarded for their performance. These 
religious and socio-cultural factors have made the United States a “land of op-
portunity”. 
According to neo-conservatives, as opposed to the “old liberal” or “con-
servative liberal” interpretation of American values, liberals have been increasing 
their role in the state since the 1930s, with devastating consequences for society 
as a whole. On the one hand, welfare expenditures can only be financed by rising 
taxes that drain energy from businesses that are the foundation of successful 
American capitalism. On the other hand, the growing redistribution had a det-
rimental effect on meritocratic capitalism because it also provided material goods 
to those who did not show individual performance. Third, the swelling of state 
bureaucracy has led to the emergence of a regulatory culture that has, in the long 
run, damaged social pluralism and cultural diversity. 
According to neo-conservative criticism, etatism promoted homogenisa-
tion, which involved atomisation and dismantled the community forces. In this 
way, the cultural drivers and motivational mechanisms on which the success of 
traditional capitalism was based were weakened. Jefferson and Jackson still 
believed in broad participatory-based capitalism as they sought to expand the rule 
of the people. However, in the second half of the twentieth century, the Demo-
crats gave a new interpretation to social progression. Instead of equal share of 
chances, the focus was on material equalisation and in a spiritual sense, they 
adopted the position of the 1968 cultural Left, which proclaimed value relativism. 
At the same time, neo-conservative criticism recognised the causes of the eco-
nomic downturn and criticised the weakening of cultural drivers. 
From the early 1980s, neo-conservative views became a defining element 
of the Republican argumentation system, which was tested when President 
Ronald Reagan (1981‒1989) came to power. At the same time, Reagan sought to 
restore US superpower and boost US economic performance. This was to be 
achieved through tax cuts and deregulation. The Reagan era can be considered a 
successful foreign policy, as the United States eventually won the Cold War and 
strengthened US authority worldwide. From an economic and social policy point 
of view, however, it had mixed consequences. 
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The suppression of the Big Government was in line with “old liberal” 
principles, the demands of urban middle classes and farmers. To that extent, it is 
considered a return to “original” American values. From the beginning, it has 
been disputed that the market-oriented transformation of the insurance system has 
brought many people to the point of being excluded from quality healthcare. 
Fortunately for Reagan, there has been an economic boom since the mid-1980s, 
but its benefits have not spread evenly across society. Income disparities between 
the richer and the poorer have not narrowed, but rather widened. As a result of 
deregulation of the financial system, vigorous stock market activity has con-
tributed to the accumulation of significant wealth without any real performance, 
drawing attention to the contradictory nature of emerging global new capitalism. 
The United States made tremendous progress towards competitive high-
tech sectors in the 1980s, but it is difficult to determine whether the federal 
government’s tax reduction programme or increased military spending during the 
eighties facilitated the structural change. The private sector received large federal 
orders for military development, which had a positive impact on technical de-
velopment. Tax cuts and large-scale armament could not be successfully pursued 
at the same time, and so the United States accumulated enormous debt in the 
Reagan era. Looking at the 1980s balance sheet, foreign policy achievements are 
obvious, but economic results and social consequences are contradictory. It is 
questionable whether the Reagan government’s economic policy can really be 
considered as revolutionary as the Republicans have stressed, since there has been 
no radical reduction in budget redistribution. 
To this day, the Reagan era has set the course for public debate in American 
society. Most of them are closely related to the interpretation of American values 
of civilisation. By winning the Cold War, the United States, as a superpower, 
remained alone on the international stage. This situation was described by 
renowned journalist and political analyst Krauthammer as an “unipolar mo-
ment”. His argument was placed in a broader context by Fukuyama in his famous 
book The End of History and the Last Man (1992) when he came to the conclu-
sion that by the end of the Cold War, liberal democracies had no alternative and 
would irreversibly spread throughout the world. Both ideas well illustrate the 
optimism of US foreign policy circles about US capabilities and the potential role 
of the “torch” in the early 1990s. However, since the turn of the millennium, 
international changes have become more and more evident, making it clear today 
that the slow loss of space of the US is irreversible and that a multipolar system 
is emerging. 
In contrast to the rising powers of the international system, we can at most 
speak of a “relative decline” of the US. Undoubtedly, despite the dynamism of 
the American economy, it has shown volatile performance over the last three 
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decades. Recently, there has been a perception of renewed power as well as 
structural weaknesses. The US economy has an exceptional potential for inno-
vation but is increasingly dependent on foreign resources. The future rate of 
decline in the United States is not exactly predictable, nor is the rate at which its 
rivals are rising. The United States needs to become accustomed to its changing 
environment and is highly dependent on global processes. Since the role of the 
superpower and the belief in the universality of “American values” have been 
closely linked since 1945, and have become an integral part of American identity, 
it is not excluded that the loss of the US international space may traumatise 
American nationalism. Relying on historical traditions, this can lead to isola-
tionist reactions as well as exaggeration in the push for power. 
The “American values” have also been subject to multiple pressures in 
domestic politics. On the one hand, it is noticeable that Reagan-era “casino capi-
talism” had its mark on the 1990s, as noted economist Stiglitz pointed out in his 
studies. The deregulation and hectic operation of the US financial system is a 
serious risk factor for society as a whole. Slow erosion of the middle classes, 
widening income disparities, the emptying of public procedures and the “oli-
garchisation” of democracy are also problems. These tendencies call attention to 
the crisis of broad participatory-based capitalism, which has been at the heart of 
the “American dream” for two hundred years in the United States.  
Finally, it must be pointed out that the deepening conflict between the con-
servatives and the liberals has been insoluble since the Reagan era. Republicans 
have developed a unique interpretation of the American tradition as well as 
Democrats. Today, however, it is not just about the former arguing for The 
Federalist and the latter arguing for Jeffersonian principles. Since 1968 and since 
the Great Society, etatism, progressivism, and cultural leftism have been closely 
united and opposed in all areas by the values established by neo-conservatives 
and their allies. Although pluralism of opinion is a natural phenomenon in a 
democracy, the disagreement these days is such that it transforms American 
domestic politics into a stationary warfare and undermines the minimum con-
sensus needed to make the institutional system work. 
At the dawn of American independence, Jefferson took over the presi-
dency, though his ideas were poorly embodied in the federalist constitution. He 
did so because he thought the same issues as his political counterparts about 
fundamental issues, people’s rule, freedom and citizens’ rights. Despite their 
differences of opinion, the “Founding Fathers” had similar views on the essential 
values that formed the basis of American democracy. It is questionable what 
remains of this consensus to date and, in the absence of minimal agreement, how 
long the US political system is operational. American democracy must respond 
not only to problems of economic performance and foreign policy power, but also 
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to these issues if it wants to remain attractive to the peoples of the world. The 
history of the United States has experienced several crises when the crisis of 
American values threatened and was able to respond well to the challenges. It is 
to be trusted that the ability of American society to renew itself, as in the past, 
will continue to help the country through the difficulties that it is facing. 
 
7.1.7. Chronological table 
 
Date Event 
1492 Columbus reaches America 
1763 The French lose Canada in the Seven Years’ War 
1773 Boston Tea Party 
1776 The Declaration of Independence 
1783 Peace in Paris ends the War of Independence 
1789‒1797 George Washington is the first president of the United States 
1803 Napoleon sells Louisiana to the US 
1829‒1837 Andrew Jackson’s presidency 
1850 California becomes a US state 
1861‒1865 Abraham Lincoln’s presidency 
1861‒1865 The American Civil War 
1867 Russia sells Alaska to the US 
1869 The first transcontinental railway line is completed 
1898 The beginning of the war against Spain 
1901‒1909 Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency 
1913‒1921 Woodrow Wilson’s presidency 
1914 Opening of the Panama Canal 
1917 The US enters World War I 
1923‒1929 Calvin Coolidge’s presidency 
1929 Black Friday stock market, the beginning of the global economic crisis 
1933‒1945 Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency 
1933 The beginning of the New Deal economic programme 
1941 The US enters World War II after Pearl Harbour 
1945 End of World War II, Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
1945‒1953 Harry Truman’s presidency 
1947 Beginning of the Marshall Plan to help Western Europe 
1950‒1953 The Korean War 
1953‒1961 Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency 
1961‒1963 John Kennedy’s presidency 
1963‒1969 Lyndon Johnson presidency, Great Society programme 
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Date Event 
1981‒1989 Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the US “wins” the Cold War 
1991 In the first Gulf War, the US defeats Iraq 
2001 September 11, Demolition of the World Trade Center 
2009‒2017 Obama is the first African-American president of the United States 
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7.2. Latin America: 
An Interactive System of Civilisations 
 
BERNADETT LEHOCZKI 
7.2.1. Introduction 
 
The main dilemma with regard to Latin American civilisation stems from 
the fact that what we today call Latin America (the Romance-speaking sovereign 
states of the American continent) is actually the result of the meeting, 
intertwining, and centuries-old interaction of three civilisations. On the arrival of 
the European Conquistadors led by Christopher Columbus (died in 1506) in the 
Caribbean, Latin America was born at the "moment" of their encounter with the 
indigenous people and spread (geographically) with the European invasion into 
Central America and the South American subcontinent over the next centuries. It 
should be noted, however, that South America is a geologically autonomous 
continent, contrary to, for example, India, which is indisputably part of Asia. 
The borders of Latin America are still changing, e.g., the states of the 
southern United States, which were attached to US after the end of the Mexican-
American War of 1846‒48. The population of the territories thus acquired was 
already using Spanish and/or native Indian languages. The rise of English in the 
area began then; one result of this procedure was the development of the Chicano 
(English-Spanish-Nahuatl mixture) language, also called Spanglish, which has its 
own literature. Then, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the 
Hispanicisation of other US states has continued. Thus, before the arrival of the 
European (Spanish and Portuguese) conquerors, Latin America did not exist. It 
was created by the meeting of the two worlds, and then millions of black slaves 
brought in from Africa further enriched Latin America’s character, adding a new 
dimension to the coexistence of natives and white Europeans. 
Thus, an important feature of Latin American civilisation is that it cannot 
be considered an "original" civilisation, such as Western, Islamic, or Chinese 
civilisation, which (may) also exhibit important internal heterogeneity, but have 
common roots, religion, and values. The question, then, is whether a “new” 
civilisation could emerge from a meeting and already centuries of cohabitation of 
civilisations that had been evolving in parallel and separated from each other. 
And if it could, did it happen in Latin America? Is it a true "common civilisation" 
or is it a special hybrid system in which the members of the "original" civilisations 
continue to live in minimal integration, rather alongside each other in a difficult 
to dissolve social hierarchy? Can a Buenos Aires banker with Spanish, Italian and 
German ancestors, a Black shoe cleaner in the slums of Sao Paolo, and a Mayan 
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Indian living in the rural areas of Guatemala be considered members of the same 
civilisation? What is Latin American? What are the links that unite and bind the 
people of the region? Do they exist at all, and are they “enough” to talk about 
Latin American civilisation? 
In terms of civilisation, it is important to distinguish between two perspec-
tives of Latin America: first refers to the 20 countries that historians classify as 
Latin America, while the second covers all the territories south of the United 
States border; thus, the English and Dutch-speaking Central American and 
Caribbean territories are also included. The “divergent areas” of the two interpre-
tations do not only display linguistic differences, more importantly, the English 
and Dutch-speaking areas were independent only in the second half of the 
twentieth century and the closer political-economic ties with former colonists set 
these areas in a different path of development. Their “affiliation” is an interesting 
question with regard of civilisation, but it goes beyond the focus of this chapter, 
so I am basically dealing with Latin America in the historical sense – the first 
perspective described above. 
The name of the region, Latin America, clearly evokes the colonial past of 
Europe, ignores the native heritage and the impact of the black slave culture, 
which have both played an important role in shaping today’s Latin America and 
in meeting its cultural characteristics. Although alternative (otherwise one-sided 
and inaccurate) names existed (Indo-America, Afro-America, Ibero-America, 
Ibero-Indo-America), in the end (with the help of French (!) writers) the term 
Latin America remained and spread in public consciousness. 
The one-sidedness of the term Latin America, with its strong European-
centricity, represents one of the major challenges to the historical development of 
the region, a dilemma which has been regularly recurring since independence: is 
it right to follow the European, Western route, is it a guarantee of catching up or 
would it be worthwhile to “invent” an own Latin American model? A recurring 
obstacle on Latin American political-economic development is that members of 
the Creole political-economic elite view the region as Western and European (as 
the term “Latin America” also implies), disregarding the continued existence of 
non-Western, or pre-modern elements, structures in the societies, and also adapt 
modernisation strategies to this assumption. Of course, the question also arises 
whether Latin America, like the United States, can be interpreted as a subsystem 
of Western civilisation? Or is it just the dream of the Creole elite? In order to 
answer the above questions, or at least outline the main features of Latin Ameri-
can civilisation and place it in a system made up of other civilisations in the 
world, I will now consider the linguistic, ethnic, religious characteristics of the 
Latin American region. Then I will outline the major milestones in the history of 
Latin American civilisation, from the arrival of Europeans to the end of the nine-
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teenth century, and finally will try to analyse whether in the twentieth century 
Latin America tends to be moving towards unity or diversity from a civilisational 
perspective. 
 
7.2.2. Pre-Columbian cultures 
 
For a long time, the science of history on the American continent has not 
been consistent but it has now been proven that the continent was largely inhab-
ited during the Wisconsin Ice Age (40000‒7000 BCE), when the Bering Strait 
provided an approximately 90 km dry passage between the Western Hemisphere 
and Asia. 
 
Figure 80: Pyramid of the Niches, El Tajín (Veracruz, Mexico). This edifice which was 
probably built in the twelfth century is rich in symbolism. 
Source: Photograph by LÁSZLÓ CSICSMANN 
 
The history of pre-Columbian Central and South America can be divided 
into four major periods: archaic (7000‒2500 BCE), pre-classical (2500 BCE‒1 
CE), classical (1‒1000 CE), and post-classical (1000‒1500 CE). At the end of the 
archaic period, the first villages appeared that carried the novelty of settled life, 
and in the pre-classical era tribal organisation and agriculture-based rural lifestyle 
became widespread in Central America and the Andes (Map 37). In the classical 
era, with the strengthening of these two poles, we see entities already adminis-
tered by the ruler, cities and stone-built sacred centres (Figure 80). Warfare be-
came more common, the social status of the soldiers became stronger, and the 
first signs of empire building appeared. We know the most about the post-classi-
cal era, as this period is closed by the arrival of the Spanish conquerors. The major 
innovations of this era were the centralisation of power, the territorial growth of 
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emerging empires through warfare, and a stronger social stratification than 
before. 
 
 
Map 37: Location of major pre-Columbian cultures 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA  
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Olmecs 
 
In the pre-classical era (1500‒400 BCE), people living on the Gulf of Mex-
ico were already able to trade in surplus food and the objects they made. There-
fore, their craft objects are spread throughout Central America (Figure 81). Stone 
tools were used to erect huge buildings, including pyramids. The image of their 
rulers was captured on large basalt heads. Their culture influenced the Mayan 
culture that followed them. The cause of their decline is still unknown. 
 
Figure 81: Olmec altar (La Venta, Tabasco, Mexico) 
Source: Photograph by LÁSZLÓ CSICSMANN 
 
Mayans 
 
In today’s southern Mexico, as well as Guatemala, Belize, Honduras and 
El Salvador have seen the emergence of Mayan civilisation, one of its character-
istics being its existence throughout the classical and post-classical eras. Unlike 
other post-classical cultures, the Mayans did not build a centralised empire, 
rather, it is a collection of cities with intensive trade relations between them. The 
Mayans are known for their outstanding mathematical and astronomical 
knowledge, as well as their monumental architecture and pyramids (Figures 82‒
83). Their calendar system and hieroglyphic writing were adopted by several so-
called Mesoamerican cultures. While they did not realise that the Earth was 
orbiting the Sun, they could calculate the cycles of the Moon and Venus, they 
also knew when the eclipse was due to the tables made by the priests. 
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Their worldview was cyclical (they were thinking in 52 years), this is why 
they believed in the end of the cycle at the beginning of another cycle and in the 
coming of the end of the world. 
 
Figure 82: Step pyramid in Tikal, Guatemala, the largest city of Mayan civilisation 
Source: Photograph by LÁSZLÓ CSICSMANN 
 
Figure 83: Mayan Toltec step pyramid, Chichen Itza (Yucatan Peninsula, Mexico) 
Source: Photograph by LÁSZLÓ CSICSMANN 
 
Aztecs 
 
North of the Mayan territories, in what is now Mexico, the Aztec Empire 
was built from the so-called Triple Alliance between the cities of Tenochtitlan 
(today’s Mexico City), Texcoco and Tlacopán in 1428. The relatively rapid 
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territorial expansion provided the basis for the empire in the following decades 
and the Aztecs became the dreaded rulers of the region. The Aztec rule was based 
on the taxation and labour of the enslaved peoples, and the conquered territories 
were divided among the Aztec nobles loyal to the centre. The Aztec was a very 
well organised, structured society, and the existing order was guaranteed by so-
cial hierarchy and strict law. Over the past centuries, Aztec beliefs have been the 
source of much controversy and has had an impact on the encounter with the 
Spaniards, and indirectly influenced the nature of later colonisation. The general 
polytheism was prevalent in the area, and today we know more than one hundred 
and twenty Aztec deities, but their attributes and the system of relationships 
between them are very complex and have not yet been fully explored. The reli-
gious, cultural, political and economic background of the large number of Aztec 
human scarifies has been the subject of considerable debate for centuries and 
there is still no consensus on their true motivations.  What is certain, however, is 
that incoming Spaniards were exposed to the barbaric act of a heart sacrifice, 
which was regularly practiced by the Aztecs ‒ when the victim’s head was cut off 
and then his heart was taken out and offered to the gods. When Hernan Cortés 
landed in the Gulf of Mexico in 1519, the Aztec Empire stood at the peak of its 
glory, and even expanded. Nevertheless, by 1521 the empire had collapsed, and 
Tenochtitlan was in ruins. 
 
Incas 
 
The Inca Empire was located in the Andes and was an extremely well or-
ganised, highly centralised unit with a headquarters in Cuzco (today Peru). The 
Incas could not write, but they were outstanding in road construction, crafts, 
weaving and medicine. The absolute ruler at the head of the empire was the Inca, 
who was considered to be of divine descent as the descendant of the Sun God, 
but also the political legitimacy of the Inca nobility, who was related to his kin-
ship by the divine origin. Like the Aztecs, the Incas built a vast empire in just 
over a hundred years and, during the conquests, imposed regular taxes on the 
enslaved tribes. The Inca beliefs and worldviews reflect the environmental char-
acteristics of the Andes region: the close relationship with nature, respect for the 
sun, mountains, rivers, forests, etc. is deeply embedded in the Andean world of 
thought and continues to influence those who live there. At the same time, the 
Incas had a strong engineering background: during their conquests, new lands 
were always surveyed, plans were made to improve the land to increase taxation, 
and new irrigation systems, river regulation, swamp drainage, etc. specific plans 
have been developed.  In contrast to Mesoamerican cultures, the Inca’s worldview 
was chronological ‒ in that sense it was closer to the incoming Europeans. With 
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the arrival of the Spaniards, the Inca Empire, like the Aztecs, was at the peak of 
its power, but Europeans ended the Inca rule by the 1580s. 
It is important to emphasise that, in addition to the most well-known Pre-
Columbian empires described above, many indigenous groups are present in to-
day’s Latin America, with little organisation. In terms of central governance, ad-
ministration, social structure, production methods, the heterogeneity of Pre-
Columbian Latin America cannot be sufficiently emphasised. At the same time, 
it is worth noting that the Spaniards from Europe occupied primarily the territo-
ries of the organised empires ‒ the first two vice-royalties (New Spain and Peru) 
were built on the ruins of the Aztec and Inca empires. Areas considered to be 
“underdeveloped” and often inhabited by fishing and hunting peoples will only 
be “discovered” and integrated into Latin America, known to Europeans, during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 
7.2.3. Components of civilisation 
 
The Latin American region appears to be united in both linguistic and reli-
gious terms, but as we shall see, along these dimensions we find almost as col-
ourful a picture as it is of ethnic composition. 
 
Language features 
 
Despite the fact that Latin America, apart from the European colonial past, 
also refers to the Latin languages used in the region (Spanish, Portuguese and 
French), the region has a much more colourful picture. There are around 400 mil-
lion Spanish speakers in eighteen states of Latin America, while Portuguese is 
spoken in Brazil with more than 200 million inhabitants. In the Caribbean Haiti, 
the official language is French. Since the colonisation, European languages 
spoken in Latin America have been in constant interaction with the languages of 
indigenous peoples and immigrants from Africa, Asia and Europe. The result of 
this process is the widespread use of the so-called pidgin or creole languages 
(English, French, Dutch and Spanish) in the Caribbean, or the Spanish-Italian mix 
(cocoliche) in Argentina, or Palenquero (a hybrid of African languages and 
Spanish) related to Colombia. 
Research on indigenous languages in Latin America has shown a complex 
but sometimes contradictory picture. In Latin America, there are five-six hundred 
different indigenous languages and even more dialects. In many states of the re-
gion, such as Peru, Bolivia, there is an official native language besides Spanish, 
such as Quechua, Guarani or Aymara. 
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Ethnic composition 
 
In Latin America, the result of the meeting of these three civilisations and 
their active interactions for centuries, is that the people of the region display one 
of the most colourful/broader skin colour palettes in the world. Asian and Arab 
immigration has further strengthened/coloured this process. This extraordinary 
ethnic diversity is a distinct Latin American feature. This is referred to by the 
Mexican writer-philosopher José Vasconcélos’ book ‒ Minister of Education dur-
ing and after the Mexican Revolution (1910‒1917) ‒ published in 1925, entitled 
Cosmic Race (La raza cósmica) according to which, after hundreds of years of 
mixing, a new fifth species was born in Latin America, Latin American. 
There are widely varying estimates of the number of ethnicities in Latin 
America in the literature. The sources are basically based on Latin American cen-
suses, i.e., they reflect the individual identity (or, if you prefer, the desired iden-
tity) of the people living in the region. It is difficult to show an accurate result 
that, given the centuries of racial mixing, the Latin American ethnic map is diffi-
cult to simplify into the categories most commonly used in the questionnaires 
(white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto); the complexity of the issue is illus-
trated by the fact that, for example, hundreds of(!) terms are used in Brazil to 
describe different skin colour groups. This is compounded by the fact that, 
according to sociologists, individuals from different ethnic backgrounds see and 
welcome themselves in certain social spaces. For example, depending on the 
individual’s place of residence or social embeddedness, whether they are afraid 
of indigenous, blacks’ negative social perceptions, discrimination, or “whitening” 
themselves, or, in the sense of being positively discriminated against by the state, 
perhaps in the name of sympathising with the indigenous people or strengthening 
their indigenous/black identity, they are labelled themselves “more colourful”. 
Below I refer to the figures of Ádám Anderle from 2002 regarding the ethnic 
division of Latin America. 
The ethnic distribution of the Latin American region is mosaic-like; 
according to the proportion of the total population, the literature distinguishes 
Mestizo America (e.g., Mexico, Paraguay, Panama, Nicaragua), Mulatto America 
(e.g., Brazil, Cuba, Haiti), White America (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica) 
and Native America (e.g., Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala). The total population of 
Latin America is approx. 40 percent of the Mestizos (230 million), 35 percent of 
Blacks and Mulattoes (190 million), native Americans and Whites are similar (8‒
10 percent), but we also need to mention the seven million Asian population for 
completeness. 
The geographical distribution of the indigenous people of Latin America 
shows a varied picture; the vast majority (90 percent) of the indigenous popula-
tion is concentrated in only five Latin American countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, 
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Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. The largest Indian population in Latin America is 
made up of the Quechuas living in the Andes (10 million people), and the Mexi-
can and Central American Mayans also make up millions of blocks, followed by 
the Aymara (Andes) and Nahua people (Mexico). In addition, in Latin America, 
we find approx. 150 native peoples. In social terms, the indigenous population 
can be divided into two groups: those integrated into the national economy 
(mainly in the Andes, Mexico, and Central America) and the natural peoples liv-
ing primarily through hunting, fishing, and gathering. The proportion of the latter 
group decreased sharply during the twentieth century as a result of accelerated 
globalisation and urbanisation. 
Similarly to indigenous populations, the distribution of African descend-
ants is concentrated geographically in Latin America: Brazil has the highest num-
ber of blacks and mulattoes (according to some estimates, after all, Brazil has the 
highest number of blacks after Nigeria), and they also have a significant share in 
Ecuador and the Caribbean. 
 
Religion: the most Catholic continent? 
 
Regarding Latin America the term “most Catholic continent” is often men-
tioned. Indeed, about 75 percent of Latin Americans identify themselves with 
Catholicism, which is the highest compared to other Catholic regions in the 
world. 
However, three important aspects of religious affiliation shade this picture. 
The first is the extent to which Latin American Catholicism is equivalent to 
“European” Catholicism. This aspect is also of paramount importance as to 
whether Latin American civilisation can be interpreted as part of the West. In the 
era of colonisation, Catholicism, “coming from Europe” was the folk Catholicism 
of the Iberian Peninsula interwoven with superstitions and beliefs. The process 
of Catholicisation by violent means has produced widespread religious syncre-
tism in the Latin American region; just as the frequent depiction of animals in 
Latin American Catholic churches is an imprint of indigenous cultures, the Cath-
olic faith of Latin Americans has diverse indigenous and African influences. 
Another important aspect that may shape the region’s Catholicism in the 
long run is the advancement of Protestant churches in recent decades. While Cath-
olics are in a significant position in terms of numbers, on the one hand there is a 
(relatively) rapid change in the proportions and the passivity of Catholic believ-
ers, as opposed to the active participation of Protestants in the Church. Behind all 
this is the hundreds of years of the erosion of the Latin American Catholic 
Church. 
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Finally, the third important point is that in many cases the practice of the 
Catholic faith is not exclusive in Latin America, meaning that in addition to de-
claring an individual Catholic, they may occasionally participate in ceremonies 
reflecting the faith of the indigenous people or blacks from Africa, most often 
blended with Catholicism. This Latin American practice is reflected in the saying 
that 80 percent of the Haitian population is Catholic, 15 percent Protestant and 
100 percent voodoo. 
 
7.2.4. History of Latin American Civilisation 
 
Discovering America? 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the birth of Latin America is linked to 
the arrival of the Spaniards. The memory of the discovery of the New World and 
its interpretation illustrate the inner challenges of Latin American civilisation. 
While for the European conquistadors and their descendants, Columbus’s journey 
is an important event in the glorious past, for the indigenous people, the time of 
their submission and the origin of their exploitation. Thus, for the indigenous 
people, the “discovery” of the American continent is not only not a positive 
charge, but not even a discovery, since the American continent was discovered 
by their ancestors. (In addition, of course, the American continent was introduced 
to Europe by the Spaniards.) The discovery of the American continent was simi-
larly negative for the black population of the Latin American region, for just a 
few years after the arrival of Columbus their ancestors began to be sailed to the 
continent as slaves. 
Historically, the discovery of the New World can be interpreted as a con-
tinuation of the Reconquista. The Reconquista (re-conquest) marks the centuries-
long process of recapturing the Iberian Peninsula from the Arabs, the final stop 
of which was in 1492 the Spanish re-occupation of Granada with the help of other 
European troops. Following the recovery of the Iberian Peninsula as a whole, the 
so-called Catholic kings (Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon) intended 
to unify their empire with the help of the Catholic Church, developing effective 
central government. The discovery of America was an excellent opportunity to 
spread the Catholic faith and, after the Reconquista, for the derivation of the re-
mained so-called Hidalgo nobility “unoccupied”. 
An important feature of colonial Latin America’s nearly 350-year history 
is that  “encounter” between the natives and the  Europeans was the earliest (and 
“smoothest”) in organised post-classical empires (Aztec, Mayan, Inca), and the 
indigenous hunter-fishing lifestyle later (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), 
or during the colonial period they did not meet the conquistadors at all; that is, 
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certain territories of Latin America will be “discovered” only after achieving in-
dependence. Thus, colonisation was not “complete”, basically extending to or-
ganised empires; that is, the diversity of Pre-Columbian cultures has led to colo-
nisation of different geographic intensities. In addition, there is an important dif-
ference between the Spanish and Portuguese colonial practices: the more active 
presence of the Spaniards enabled the establishment of a centralised colonial ad-
ministration, while Portuguese colonisation was rather a series of sole proprietor-
ships, with the result that only decentralised structures could be created. 
Demographically, the biggest catastrophe in colonial Latin America was 
the drastic decline in the indigenous population. Estimates of this range are ex-
tremely wide, with most sources showing a population decline of between 50 and 
90 percent. In today’s Mexico, it is estimated that eleven million Indians lived at 
the time of the arrival of the Spaniards, of whom two million remained by 1607. 
And of the estimated 3.5 million inhabitants of the Inca Empire, 1.5 million re-
mained forty years after Francisco Pizarro’s arrival. 
In social terms, the colonial period in Latin America is characterised by 
two apparently opposite processes. On the one hand, mixing (mestizaje) was the 
main demographic feature. In this respect, Latin American territories are different 
from other European colonies, and there is nowhere near else the same regularity 
and volume of mixing between indigenous, captive black slaves and Europeans, 
resulting in the ethnic diversity discussed above. This is due to the fact that, on 
the one hand, the conquistadors were predominantly young, single men, and, on 
the other, the arrival of European women in the region was rare for decades after 
the discovery of the American continent. On the other hand, colonial societies 
organised into Spanish-controlled viceroyalties (Map 38) were hierarchically di-
vided by skin colour: The Creoles provided the upper class, underneath the Mes-
tizos, then the indigenous, the Mulattoes, and finally the blacks. The Spanish 
crown tried to enclose the colonial Latin American population in well-defined 
“castes”, in practice, however, it has not been possible to prevent the indigenous 
mixing. For a long time only young men from Europe arrived in the New World, 
and the first conquistadors arrived in today’s Latin America, inspired by the triple 
motivation of God, gold, glory. They did not come with their families, they came 
with no intention of settling down, rather, they were driven by adventure and 
hoped to become rich.  
From the point of view of civilisation, the most significant and defining 
phenomenon of the colonial period is the meeting of two, or rather three, worlds 
on the new continent and the accompanying “civilisation shock” from virtually 
all three sides. Conquistadors, who were infiltrated by folk superstitions and ex-
ported zealous Catholicism, were astonished by the barbaric habits of the indige-
nous people, such as blood sacrifice, human sacrifice, or the consumption of 
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human flesh (purely for sacred purposes). Europeans deeply despised and dis-
dained the indigenous polytheist religion, idolatry. Throughout the centuries of 
colonialism, whites have always held a moral and civilising supremacy over in-
digenous people and blacks. With papal approval and a kind of (not very serious) 
missionary consciousness, they began to civilise the indigenous people, and to 
the convert them to the Catholic faith. With this activity they legitimised their 
conquest, and by doing so, the Catholic Church was able to establish positions 
similar to those of the Iberian Peninsula in the Spanish colonies. 
Civilisation, or conversion to Catholicism, took place in different areas of 
the colonies with varying degrees of intensity, with different actors, and with 
varying means. The conquerors began to force the indigenous peoples to recap-
ture them in the first areas they discovered, resulting in the destruction of much 
of the material and written memories of the indigenous culture. An important tool 
of civilisation was the encomienda system, in which the conquistadors were given 
a group of indigenous people from the Spanish crown to a piece of land to be used 
in forced labour and tax, but in return, they had to educate their labourers (i.e., 
educate them on how to be European). With regard to that the conquistadors who 
arrived in the New World were less educated and had objective to get rich, they 
were not prepared, nor committed to support the conversion of the natives. 
Most of the Catholic Church’s conversion activities were ineffective: they 
celebrated spectacular masses and often performed mass baptisms, which in most 
cases provoked the indigenous people to misunderstand. The transfer of the Span-
ish inquisition to the colonies did not produce the expected results. 
The most effective actors in converting to the Catholic faith were the mon-
asteries coming from Europe. Franciscan, Dominican, and Jesuit monks made 
serious efforts to pass Catholic doctrines to the natives. Language proved to be 
an important aspect: monks played an important role in overcoming linguistic 
difficulties, and they were the ones trying to communicate with the indigenous 
by learning the language of the natives. Their activities quickly highlighted con-
ceptual challenges that transcended language, such as the absence of central con-
cepts of Catholic practice, like confession or sin, in the language (i.e. among the: 
concepts) of the indigenous people. Similar efforts were made to try to consecrate 
the indigenous priests: the practice of celibacy proved incomprehensible and in-
conceivable to the indigenous people. The importance of Jesuit monks in colonial 
Latin America must be emphasised; representatives of this order played a prom-
inent role in the geographical discovery of the South American sub-continent, in 
addition to their conversion activities, they also ventured into areas where “wild” 
Indians lived, which made the conquistadors not consider the exploration of these 
territories as a profitable investment. 
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Dominican monk was also Bartolomeo de Las Casas, the most prominent 
Indian defender of colonial Latin America, who raised his voice in the mid-six-
teenth century against the brutal treatment of indigenous people and the thesis of 
their born slavery. His A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies was pub-
lished in 1552, in which he presents the indigenous people as wise, benevolent, 
loyal peoples, and seeks to draw the attention of the Spanish crown to abuses in 
the colonies. Las Casas deduced the rights of the indigenous people from Chris-
tian doctrines on a religious basis, so it is interesting why he did not mention the 
situation of the black slaves at all. Otherwise, the Indian cause, the inhumane 
treatment of them, was one of the most prominent subjects of the European En-
lightenment. 
In any case, Europeans’ conversion activity in the indigenous population 
has proven to be much more sophisticated than in the case of blacks. Although in 
the framework of plantation farming (as opposed to the indigenous population), 
blacks were almost exclusively under the control of the Creoles, but their educa-
tion for the Catholic faith was progressing slowly. It is interesting, however, that 
blacks learned the language of their masters sooner, as it was a conscious Spanish 
and Portuguese policy to “confuse” members of certain African tribes in the col-
onies, to communicate poorly with each other and maintain their cultural tradi-
tions ‒ it was primarily for economic reasons, planters considered it to be more 
effective for slaves. 
From the very beginning, both the indigenous and the blacks had various, 
many forms of resistance. Escape, violent uprisings, widespread child and suicide 
practices were common, but the colonial period also has the problem of Indian 
alcoholism. The shock of civilisation was under severe psychological pressure in 
the lives of the coloured people: the indigenous people were deprived of their 
lifestyle, lands, idols and habits by the conquest of serious human sacrifices, 
while black slaves, after also inhumane "cruising", claiming serious human sac-
rifices, were forced to enter the lowest level of society on a new continent. These 
conflicts made life difficult for colonial Latin American societies and led to the 
emergence of serious stereotypes and revulsions among the various ethnicities 
living in the region. 
The colonial period in Latin America was thus accompanied by the physi-
cal supremacy of the European conquistadors, which is also reflected in the social 
system; cultural life is fundamentally dominated by whites seeking to civilise and 
convert the indigenous and blacks to Catholic faith. This endeavour could only 
be partially fulfilled: on the one hand, because of the mode and means of mis-
sionary activity, and, on the other, because of the fundamental differences be-
tween the civilisations involved and the religious and cultural divides. 
  
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Map 38: Colonial Latin America 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA   
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Achieving independence: common goals and aspirations? 
 
The wars of independence in Latin America took place in the first third of 
the nineteenth century. The independence movements had internal and external 
origins. As an internal reason, we must mention the strengthening creole nation-
alism; for the wealthier and more and more frequently visited by the world-class 
Creole elite, the Spanish authorities have become increasingly burdened. They 
wanted to control their own destiny as newer generations born on the American 
continent felt less and less Spanish-born but became increasingly attached to the 
American continent. As an external cause, we should mention the Enlightenment 
of Europe and its infiltration, the independence of the United States (1776) and 
the decline of the Spanish Empire. After Napoleon’s troops occupied the Iberian 
Peninsula, the Latin American Creoles, fearing a more violent colonial action on 
behalf of the French, saw it as time to step up their own path, and that the Span-
iards occupied in Europe would not be able to resist effectively. 
The struggles for independence were under the control and direction of the 
Creoles. Simón Bolívar (1783‒1830), the main hero of the South American war 
of independence, was also a Creole educated in Europe. His personality is central 
to Latin American civilisation, because it symbolises the unity, if you will, “Latin 
American”, which has returned to the minds of the Latin American intellectuals 
and politicians over and over again, but its practical realisation seems to be de-
layed. But this is not alone in the significance of Bolívar and the Bolivarian idea: 
one of the most important documents in Latin American history is the 1815 
Jamaican letter. In this, Bolívar provides guidance for the future of the region: it 
considers democracy based on racial equality as the basis of post-independence 
Latin America, i.e., apart from Latin American unity and collaboration, inter-
ethnic partnership and balanced relations are a precondition for moving forward. 
This political agenda for nineteenth century Latin America set out a vision that 
seemed desirable, but reality did not allow it to materialise. 
The independence wars rescued the power of the Creole elites, and the so-
cial structure/hierarchy did not change much. Independence from the ex-colonis-
ers did not bring about the abolition of slavery everywhere in Latin America, only 
in the second half of the nineteenth century; most recently in Brazil (1888), where 
the economy was heavily dependent on slave labour. Although the constitutions 
of the newly independent Latin American states, as in the United States and 
Europe, enshrined fundamental human rights protection, the non-European de-
scendant strata still did not enjoy full citizenship (as is the case in the United 
States and Europe). Historians call “conservative revolutions” the Latin Ameri-
can War of Independence, suggesting that it did not bring new life to Latin 
American social life beyond its formal independence; the highly hierarchical, 
skin-coloured division of the colonial age continued to exist, whereas the ruling 
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creoles did not want revolutionary changes in social organisation. For them, the 
main objective was to preserve, more specifically, strengthening their political, 
economic, and social position, and more precisely, they had no model or idea how 
the non-white groups within the society could be involved in political and eco-
nomic power. 
The decades following independence were a painful period for Latin Amer-
ica; armed struggle continued to establish final state borders (Map 39), new eco-
nomic partners had to be sought instead of Spain and Portugal, and there was 
intense competition in the political life for the new states’ domestic and foreign 
policy formation. The Creole elite was basically divided into liberals and con-
servatives, that is to say, they were trying to steer the future of the new states 
based on ideas imported from Europe, despite the fact that Latin America did not 
have an industrial revolution, no middle class and the conditions for a united na-
tion state, in the European sense, did not develop. Thus, just as during the colonial 
period the Spanish conquerors wanted to force the patterns of the Iberian-penin-
sula on their colonies, after independence the Creole elite wanted modernisation 
and convergence based on Western ideas and experiences. 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the aforementioned liberal-
conservative struggle ended with the victory of the liberals, resulting in the sup-
pression of the position of the Catholic Church and, in general, a departure from 
the colonial past. For the first time in Latin American history, Creole elite had the 
perception of “lagging behind”, and as a response, liberal Creoles believed that 
“catching up” was possible by rejection of the colonial past and forced Euro-
peanisation. 
This endeavour and line of thought was represented by the civilisers of the 
age, also known as the romantic generation, whose members were primarily 
Argentine writers, poets, and philosophers. In their view, the cause of Latin 
American backwardness and the main obstacle to development are the presence 
of non-White strata in society; removing them, a European blood refresh is 
needed to catch up with the West. The strong political influence of civilisers is 
illustrated by the fact that during these decades, many Latin American countries 
have come to form the official programme of blanquear (whitening), which es-
sentially sought to promote European immigration. This openly racist idea was 
detrimental to the future of Latin America in many ways: on the one hand, it 
brought deeper prejudices against indigenous people and blacks, and on the other, 
it refused to face the region’s historical heritage, the colonial past, and that Latin 
America is not equal to the descendants of the conquistadors. The perception of 
non-White people as a “bother” or an “obstacle” has led to a strong alienation of 
certain groups in society, which excluded and placed in the distant future the 
possibility of joint development. 
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Map 39: The countries of Latin America today 
Source: Edited by ÁGNES VARGA 
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Helping and supporting European immigration triggered a major wave of 
migration from the 1870s, which declined in the 1930s, and resulted in millions 
of Europeans (mainly German, Italian, Spanish and Central European) arriving 
in Latin America. The main destinations were the countries on the Atlantic coast 
(Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay), so this European immigration had an uneven 
impact on the countries of the region. 
The nineteenth century thus represented an important turning point in Latin 
American history in several respects, but its yield and legacy were dual: on the 
one hand, the path to autonomous Latin American development was opened, and 
on the other, the way of independence and the events of the following decades 
worked against the Latin American unity and common social goals, influenced, 
strengthened, deepened internal social, ethnic divisions; making the twentieth 
century journey of Latin America difficult and full of challenges. 
 
7.2.5 Twentieth century dilemmas: A Western or Latin American 
way? 
 
By the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were many fun-
damental changes in the future of Latin America. The final state borders were 
established (Panama was the last independent state in 1903), which provided an 
opportunity to start the process of nation-building. With the emergence of the 
liberal political elite, by the turn of the century, the church had been displaced 
from political life (separation of state and church). And in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the role of the dominant European powers was gradually but 
surely taken over by the United States. 
The process of nation-building in Latin America lasts till today and its most 
defining and striking feature is the constant struggle of outsiders, those on the 
periphery of society, the marginalised for “inclusion”, social integration, equal 
rights, social advancement, and genuine citizenship. That is what populism in the 
1930s targeted, and later on, the overwhelming majority of revolutionary efforts 
and guerrilla movements also attempted to accomplish these changes, with little 
success. Frequent coincidences of wealth and ethnic divisions are still a major 
obstacle to Latin American growth and the development of unified Latin Ameri-
can nation-states and Latin American civilisation. 
The decline of the Catholic Church at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury brought with it a weakening of Catholicism, which was further boosted by 
the powerful urbanisation that swept through Latin American countries. How-
ever, the Protestant advance of the last decades, which continues to this day, can 
also be rooted in providing active participation for its followers and fulfilling 
many social functions (supporting education, healthcare, helping alcoholics, the 
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unemployed, etc.). The popularity of the Pentecostal movement, which embraces 
the poor and promises a way out for them, is becoming increasingly widespread. 
The growing influence of the United States, initially primarily in economic 
and then in political-military terms, has a significant impact on Latin American 
civilisation. The size and richness of the “Northern Colossus” has created deep 
contrasts and asymmetry on the American continent. During the twentieth cen-
tury, in Latin American self-definition and identity building, relationship with the 
United States became an essential element. Separation from the United States, the 
opposition of Latin Americanism to the culture of the Yankees (poor in Latin 
American reading) were basic components of Latin American self-perception. 
One of the first representatives of this attitude was José Enrique Rodó of 
Uruguay, whose much-quoted essay, Ariel published in 1900 is still a defining 
work in thinking and contemplating Latin America. A prominent figure in the 
modernismo movement, Rodó, in his work for the “American youth”, Ariel sym-
bolises emotive, passionate Latin America, while Caliban symbolises the selfish, 
materialistic, individualistic United States. 
According to Rodó, the United States, based on the moral principle of prof-
itability, is the main rival of Latin America, and Latin American youth will be the 
main player in the resistance to US influence, so he recommends them his work 
Ariel because he considers the preservation of regional cultural identity as the 
responsibility of Hispanic-American youth. 
Reducing US influence, independence from outside powers, is a recurring 
theme for Latin American writers, poets, philosophers and thinkers, and has be-
come an important reference point in the definition of Latin Americanism 
throughout the twentieth century. All this does not mean, of course, that the 
purely conflicting nature of relations between the Americans will return to every 
thinker, but it seems fundamental to the attitude towards the United States in re-
lation to the definition of Latin America.  
After World War II, as a result of decolonisation, Latin American self-
definition was extended by another element: it could define itself as part of the 
Third or developing world by engaging with the then independent African, Asian 
countries. Although these world regions have little affinity with Latin America in 
terms of civilisation/culture, similar political-economic challenges, structural dif-
ficulties and the independence of some Caribbean islands at this time activated 
the region’s relations with a group of developing countries from the 1960s. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, accelerating globalisation also 
reached the Latin American region. Its impact and results, like other developing 
regions of the world, are both the emergence and spread of technological innova-
tion and the widening of income disparities in Latin American societies. Latin 
America’s internal social and ethnic divisions are further strengthened by mod-
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ernisation as a result of globalisation, the take-over of Western production struc-
tures, financial institutions, and political arrangements, which, however, do not 
reach all societies; its positive benefit is enjoyed only by the upper, predominantly 
white strata of society. 
The situation of indigenous people and blacks is twofold: on the one hand, 
as a result of urbanisation intertwined with globalisation, the assimilation of non-
white people intensifies from the 1960s to the 1970s, indigenous languages and 
customs are on decline, while generations growing up in cities lose touch with 
their rising culture. At the same time, a more natural and automatic response to 
the trends of globalisation is the more organised presence and wider demands of 
the native movements. Similar processes are occurring among the black popula-
tion in Latin America. An important novelty in recent decades has been the emer-
gence ‒ and rapid development ‒ of endeavours that, for the first time in Latin 
American history, indigenous and blacks themselves have claimed their rights, 
demanded greater recognition, autonomy, and respect for their cultural rights. 
Hence, the centuries-old practice of representing the Creole elite in thinking about 
and disposing, social inclusion or elimination of non-white people seems to be 
transforming. The rise of the indigenous and black movements can certainly be 
regarded as a positive process in the search for identity and social advancement 
of these groups. However, experience so far has shown that increasingly articu-
late demands are pushing for further fragmentation of previously less unified 
Latin American societies, generating serious internal social conflicts such as 
those seen in Bolivia among different ethnic groups. 
In the 1980s, the process of democratisation swept through the Latin Amer-
ican region, which, in addition to building democratic institutions, also brought 
about the end of censorship, the promotion of human rights and the proliferation 
and professionalisation of social movements and non-governmental organisa-
tions. Wider political participation and the introduction of universal suffrage are 
certainly positive developments in the political life of Latin American societies. 
At the same time, as a result of democratisation, they are gaining ever greater 
opportunities, building stronger networks and bringing together, in a more organ-
ised manner, social groups such as indigenous people, descendants of slaves, 
women or landless agricultural workers. This raises sensitive issues within Latin 
American societies and, in many cases, intensifies internal conflicts focusing on 
internal, never solved social fragmentation. 
Thus, the twentieth century was targeting unity, finding Latin American-
ism and social cohesion, defining Latin American characteristics, while on the 
other hand, the twentieth century also brought fragmentation, disintegration, and 
internal challenges. The question is whether in the coming decades, globalisation 
and technological development, as well as the strengthening of the democratic 
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political system and the civil sphere, will be able to influence the process of social 
harmony, will the next generation become closer to each other in this coordinate 
system or local responses, a return to identity seeking the roots, which is expected 
to exacerbate existing internal social conflicts. 
 
7.2.6. Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from the foregoing, the existence of Latin American civili-
sation, and most of all its peculiarities, are far from clear. We can answer the 
question whether there is a Latin American civilisation, depending on the inter-
pretation of the concept of civilisation. If civilisation means “the widest cultural 
entity” or the common historical, religious, cultural background, roots, Latin 
America is difficult to interpret as an independent civilisation. At the same time, 
however, Latin Americans’ “common” hundreds of years of history, or more pre-
cisely, their cohabitation (coexistence?), only give us a sense of belonging, a com-
mon identity. The question, then, is whether the interaction of three civilisations, 
as stated in the title, is acceptable as a separate civilisation: its interacting system, 
its coexistence? Is there a longing for unity, togetherness, a common future? 
The presence of the descendants of the Iberian conquerors and their deci-
sive role in the political, economic organisation and managing of the states in the 
region, their centuries-long leadership in devising (adopting) and implementing 
catching-up strategies, could make Latin America part or a branch of Western 
civilisation. However, we have to argue with this approach. On the one hand, 
because the majority of Latin Americans are of Mestizo origin, the centuries-old 
mixing, even if it has not created a new “cosmic race”, the clear predominance of 
“mixed” (Mestizo, Mulattoes, Zambos) separates Latin America from the West. 
On the other hand, because the West does not consider Latin America to be part 
of it, it does not enter into community with it (the regular Ibero-American sum-
mits are seen as an element of the Spanish foreign policy toolkit rather than as an 
expression of civilisational unity), and although in Latin Americans’ self-defini-
tion, in their quest for identity, the West and reaching the West in terms of devel-
opment  is constantly present, self-definition is, by contrast, articulated in relation 
to it, too. 
At first glance, Latin America may seem a bit Western (or similar), since 
the vast majority of the population in the region declare themselves Catholic, and 
in all of these countries, the official language is European. One step closer, how-
ever, the picture is more mosaic-like: we see syncretism rather than “pure” Ca-
tholicism, while in European languages, if not everywhere, we find many 
indigenous languages and linguistic elements brought from Africa. The picture 
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only becomes more complex when we consider the ethnic diversity that lies be-
hind these fractures.  
The above ideas are based on the idea that Latin America is treated as one, 
but another aspect of Latin American civilisation may be to disregard the “Latin 
American” category. In this case, the question is: where and what boundaries do 
we draw? Can the states of the southern cone (Cono Sur), namely Chile, Argen-
tina and Uruguay, which are the “whiter” and most homogeneous countries in 
Latin America, be classified as Western civilisation? Even if the answer is yes, 
and if these countries (or the Catholic whites in the region) are elevated (raised 
to the West), we are stuck here: what do we have to do with the rest of the Latin 
American population ‒ the Mestizo and Mulatto part ‒ since they cannot be clas-
sified as any civilisation? 
All this leads us to the dilemma that just the fact that the Latin American 
states cannot be categorised as the West and not as other civilisations make Latin 
America an autonomous civilisation? If so, its specificity is precisely the hybrid-
ity, variety and diversity not seen elsewhere, whose unity and common path is 
one of the region’s primary, major challenges. 
 
7.2.7. Chronological table 
 
Date Event
6000‒3000 BC The emergence of agricultural activity in Mesoamerica and the Andes
150‒900 AD Mayan classic period
1300‒1500 The rise of the Aztec and Inca empires
1492 Spaniards recapture the Iberian Peninsula (reconquista) and Christopher Columbus discover America
1494 The Treaty of Tordesillas
1524 Establishment of the Council of Indies in Spain
1535 Establishing the first viceroyalty in Spanish America under the name of New Spain on the ruins of the Aztec Empire
1537 Sublimus Deus, Pope Paul III declares that Indians are human
1655 The English acquire Jamaica
1767 Expulsion of Jesuits from Spanish America
1804 Independence of Haiti
1810‒1824 Wars of Independence in Latin America
1864‒1870 Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) wars against Paraguay
1888 Abolition of slavery in Brazil
1898 Spanish-American War
1903 Independence of Panama
1910 The outbreak of the Mexican Revolution and the creation of the Pan-American Union
Civilisations from East to West 
470 

Date Event
1932‒1935 Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay
1948 The Organisation of American States is established and the military institution in Costa Rica is abolished
1952 Beginning of the Bolivian Revolution
1959 Victory of the Cuban Revolution
1964 Military takeover in Brazil
1967 Miguel Ángel Asturias wins Nobel Prize for Literature, Gabriel García Márquez announces One Hundred Years of Solitude
1973 Military coup ends Salvador Allende presidency in Chile, new presi-dent is Augusto Pinochet
1979 Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua
1982 Beginning of the debt crisis in Latin America, Mexico announces insolvency
1991 The Southern Common Market is established (MERCOSUR)
1992 Rigoberta Menchú, Guatemalan human rights activist receives a Nobel Peace Prize
2001‒2002 Political, economic and social crisis in Argentina
2003 The Hispanic population in the United States is greater than that of African Americans
2006 Inauguration of democratically elected politician of Aymara descent from Evo Morales in Bolivia
2010 The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is established
2015 Historical meeting between Raul Castro and Barack Obama at the Pan American Summit
 


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66. The tiles on the facade of the Abdullah Khan Madrasa covered with inscriptions, 
Bukhara, sixteenth century 282 
67. Modern street art in Cairo making use of calligraphy 282 
68. Mistrels (griot) from King Sambala’s court (Medina, Mali) 304 
69. First page of a nineteenth-century family chronicle from Northern Ghana 305 
70. Book written in the script of the Bamum people of Cameroon, c. 1910 306 
71. Ethiopian manuscript including gospel extracts and prayers in Ge’ez language. 
Archangels Michael and Gabriel on the right 307 
72. Local commanders of the Tijaniyyah Sufi Order in the town of Kiota, SW Niger  312 
73. Dutch image of the city of Benin (today in Nigeria), 1668 316 
74. Three warriors, c sixteenth-century Yoruba bronze plaque from Benin 318 
75. Yoruba bronze portrait from the city of Ife, today in the British Museum 319 
76. Ashanti copper figurines from Ghana, for weighing gold, in the British Beaney House 
of Art and Knowledge (Canterbury) collection 320 
77. Bete Giyorgis (Church of St. George) in Lalibela (Ethiopia)  321 
78. Part of the Great-Zimbabwe Buildings 322 
79. Great Mosque of Djenne, one of the greatest architectural gems of the Sudanese-Gothic 
style  323 
80. Pyramid of the Niches, El Tajín (Veracruz, Mexico). This edifice which was probably 
built in the twelfth century is rich in symbolism 449 
81. Olmec altar (La Venta, Tabasco, Mexico) 451 
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82. Step pyramid in Tikal (Guatemala), the largest city of Mayan civilisation 452 
83. Mayan Toltec step pyramid, Chichen Itza (Yucatan Peninsula, Mexico) 452 
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Afrocentrism Literary and scholarly movement among Afro-American intellectuals, 
supporting a return to supposed African cultural roots. 
Agama (Sanskrit) Religious texts of devotional Hindu schools. There are Shaiva, Vaishnava 
and Shakta Agamas, the latter are also called Tantras. 
age set Institutionalised social category encompassing people of roughly the 
same age and having its specific social role. 
ahimsa (Sk. “non-
harm”) 
The principle of non-violence and respect for every way of life in Indian 
religions. 
Ahl al-Bayt “People of the House”, meaning the Prophet Muhammad’s family. 
Ajami Writing that uses Arabic fonts to record various African languages. 
aladura “Praying” sects; a unique type of south Nigerian Christianity, blending 
African traditions and Christian doctrines. 
allodial title Generally speaking, it is property free of feudal services that equals the 
land estate inherited from father to son, called votchina in Russia. 
anomie Weakening of the guiding role of social values and norms, that usually 
evolves in modern societies or as a result of major social changes. 
Aranyaka (Sk. “forest 
book”) 
Commentaries on the Vedas explaining the secret symbolism of the 
sacrifices. 
arhat (Sk. “worthy”, 
“respectable”) 
The highest rank in Buddhist hierarchy. 
artha (Sk. “wealth”, 
“property”) 
One of the life goals in Hinduism. 
Aryan (Sk. “noble”) Self-designation of ethnic groups belonging to the Indo-Iranian branch of 
the Indo-European language family. 
Ashkenazi Jewish people who originally settled in Germany or Northern France and 
their descendants. 
atman (Sk.) The inner self or soul of the individual. 
audiencia The principal apparatus and governmental unit of the Spanish-American 
colonial period that managed jurisdiction, administration and finances 
and supervised the church too. 
 
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autarchic development A development model based on self-sufficiency. States going through 
such development usually turn away from world trade and have low 
foreign trade traffic. 
autocephalic church Independent churches in Eastern or orthodox Christianity. 
avatara (Sk. “descent”) Incarnation of a deity, primarily those of Vishnu. These are Matsya (Fish), 
Kurma (Tortoise), Varaha (Boar), Narasimha (Man-lion), Vamana 
(Dwarf), Parashurama (Rama with an axe), Rama, Krishna, Buddha (or 
Balarama) and Kalki. 
axis mundi (Latin 
“world axis”) 
The centre of the world in certain religions, a passage between Heaven 
and Earth. It is also related to the world tree idea 
bakufu The → shōgun’s government. 
Bantu A group of the Niger-Congo language family that consists of 250 
languages, spoken in the entire southern half of Africa. 
bar mitzvah A boy reaching the age of thirteen who is given the responsibilities and 
duties of Jewish religion (mitzvahs). The term also denotes the ceremony 
in which the boy first time performs a commandment he was not obliged 
to perform before (like reading the weekly portion of the Torah in the 
synagogue service). 
beneficium Generally, it is the land tenure or benefice for feudal services that equals 
the pomesztye in Russia, to render the service to the state. 
bhakti (Sk. “devotion”) Ardent, unconditional love of a god, typical for medieval Hindu 
religiousness. 
Bharat Mata (Sk. 
Mother India) 
A national symbol evolving during the Indian independence movement, 
personification of India as a mother goddess. 
bodhisattva (Sk. 
“enlightenment being”) 
Compassionate, merciful beings in →Mahayana Buddhism. The Buddha 
himself was a bodhisattva in his earlier births as well as in his last birth 
before his enlightenment. 
Brahman (Sk.) The absolute reality. 
Brahmana (Sk.) 1. Members of the priestly class (→varna). Their primary task was to 
perform sacrifices, studying, explaining and passing on sacred texts. 
Later, they gained dominance over all kinds of intellectual occupations. 2. 
Commentaries on the →Vedas, which contain the rules and explanations 
of sacrificial rites. 
Brahmi Ancient Indian writing system identified on inscriptions from the third 
century BCE. Modern Indian alphabets evolved from this script. 
bushi →samurai 
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caesaropapism Merger of the Church and the state with the leading role of the state. Cae-
saropapism is most commonly used with regard to the Greek church and 
Russia in the medieval and modern history. Historians share different 
opinions on the usage of caesaropapism as a concept. 
caliph (Arabic 
“successor”) 
Religious and secular ruler of the Muslim community after Muhammad’s 
death, later called God’s vicegerents and God’s shadow on Earth. 
caste A word of Portuguese origin to denote the occupation units of Indian 
society (→ jati). 
caudillo Military leader in Spanish America who typically strengthened its position 
during the independence wars that and afterwards was capable of 
controlling a given region with his army and retinue of clients, often 
affecting domestic politics in new-born Latin American states. In 
twentieth-century Spain and Latin America the word means strong 
political leader. 
chakra (Sk. “wheel”, 
“discus”) 
Solar symbol; in Buddhism, it refers to the wheel of law (dharmachakra); 
in Hinduism, it is a symbol and weapon (discus) of Vishnu. 
chakravartin (Sk.) Universal ruler, emperor. 
christology dogma The Church’s teaching about the interpretation of Christ’s divine and 
human natures and their relationship. 
Congo velvet Velvet-like, embroidered fabric made of the raffia palm fibres that is a 
unique type of the Congo Basin art. 
cultural pessimism All the negative feedbacks on the present and future of a culture or 
civilisation. The phenomenon is part of a rather broader category of 
cultural criticism that particularly appeared in the western cultures and 
among intellectuals, mostly phrased pessimistic value judgement on the 
European civilisation in the twentieth century for example on the 
descendance of the culture and communities falling apart etc. 
Cushitic A subgroup in the Afro-Asian language group, spread in the North East 
region of Africa. 
daimyō Landholding →samurai magnate in the fourteenth–nineteenth centuries. 
darshana (Sk.) Ancient Indian philosophical system, school. The six orthodox darshanas 
are →Sankhya, →Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, and Vedanta. 
 
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desacralisation On one hand these words are synonyms, on the other hand they have 
their individual meanings, too. They incorporate many layers of mean-
ings, in the modern age, mostly the elimination of the sacral 
orientation, nature of social norms, values and institutions. 
deus otiosus A creator God that, after having created the world, withdraws from 
governing the affairs of the created world. 
deva (Sk.) Vedic god. 
devanagari (Sk. 
“divine city”) 
A syllabic alphabet in which Sanskrit, Hindi, Marathi etc. are written. 
It evolved from → Brahmi. 
devaraja (Sk. “god-
king”) 
Cult of the deified monarch in Southeast Asia. 
Dhamma (Pali) The Teachings of the Buddha. 
dharma (Sk.) Religion, religious duty, standard of conduct, law; one of the life goals 
in Hinduism. 
dhimmi (Arabic 
“protected person”) 
Legal status of Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians in the Islamic 
Empire. 
diarchic system A system based on two influences or powers, just like Russia before 
Peter I., Russian czar, where the shared rules of secular power and 
church power, not subject to each other, were applied.  
diaspora Ethnicity living away from their motherland. 
Diffidatio/diffidation Right to renunciate allegiance, “revocation of allegiance”. 
Digambara (Sk.  
“sky-clad”) 
A monastic order in Jainism that follows rigorous asceticism.  
dravida (Sk.) The southern style of Hindu temple architecture. 
egungun The most important spirit type for the Yoruba of South Nigeria: the 
spirits of the ancestors manifesting themselves to their offspring during 
masquerades. 
emir (Arabic) Military commander ruling a territory independently accepting the 
authority of the caliph, primarily in religious matters. 
endogamy Marriage only between members of the same group. 
ethnic religion A religion practiced by a single ethnicity that does not seek to spread 
its beliefs among other groups. 
fatwa (Arabic) A nonbinding legal decision in Islam, response to questions of 
individuals about criminal law, religious ceremonies or ordinary life.   
felony Treason, breach of feudal homage. 
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fiqh (Arabic) Jurisprudence elaborated by jurists (faqih, plural fuqaha) using their 
individual effort based on the detailed study of the sources of the divine 
law (→sharia) concerning general principles and details. 
first emigration  
(al- hijra al-ula) 
An important episode of early Muslim history when (during the lifetime 
of the Prophet Muhammad) a group of the early Muslim community in 
Mecca emigrated (→ hijra) to Ethiopia. 
foquismo A theory, formed by Regis Debray French philosopher, based on the ideas 
of Ernesto Che Guevara, trying to give a solution for the guerrilla warfare 
against the existing order, motivated by the victory of the Cuban revolu-
tion, namely it says that armoured attacks should be started from small 
centres (foco), that would mobilise the entire society and convince them 
to stand on the guerrilla side due to gaining more support from the general 
dissatisfaction. 
frontier The western (“fuzzy”) border of the United States that has been moved 
westward in the nineteenth century, thanks to the expansion of the settlers. 
Turner, who worked out the classical frontier thesis, says that it truly 
facilitated the establishment of civilisation characteristics that pertain to 
America. 
garbhagriha (Sk. 
“womb chamber”) 
The sanctuary of Hindu temples. 
gerontocracy Rule by the elders: a type of social organisation in which the cohort of old 
men or a council of elders governs the community. 
gilded age Mark Twain used this expression for the American society of the last third 
of the nineteenth century, characterised by rapid economic growth, the 
rise of monopolies, as well as corruption and holder groups influencing 
political life. 
Great Society A set of political and welfare measurements in the United States, starting 
in the mid 1960’s during the presidency of the democrat Johnson, mostly 
for the total elimination of poverty and the expansion of health care. The 
Great Society sought to complete social emancipation and was seen as an 
attempt to create an American version of the post-World War II welfare 
state. 
griot French word, for the →endogamous caste that exists in many West 
African societies which is in charge of memorising, passing on, and 
performing historical traditions (often to musical accompaniment). 
gullah Dialect and culture, showing strong African influence on the coast and 
islands of South Carolina (USA). 
 
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hacienda Self-sufficient estate on Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the Americas, 
usually sustaining itself from agriculture and husbandry, it is home for the 
owner’s family and the staff at the same time. 
hadith (Arabic) The tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, his oral communication trans-
mitted by those who heard it. It has two parts, one is the isnad, that is the 
chain of narrators who have transmitted the report and the other one is the 
matn, the actual text. 
halal (Arabic) The method of any compulsory act, as prescribed by the rules of Islam, 
e.g. the way of slaughtering animals 
han The greatest ethnic group, 92 percent of the population in China. Although 
it can be divided into many smaller language and customs subgroups, they 
are still the core of the Chinese civilisation and the people of China. 
haram (Arabic 
“forbidden”) 
A major sin in Islam that must be judged by the court of the qadi. 
haveli Large traditional townhouse in India, sometimes a palace, built around a 
courtyard. In most cases, it is a type of building of architectural and 
cultural significance. 
heterodoxy Different or foreign belief. 
high level equilibrium 
trap 
Thanks for the effective trade and production system, the supply and 
demand reached the equilibrium in the Chinese Empire, local shortages 
could be balanced by surpluses from other regions and labour was 
extremely cheap. All these factors together resulted that capital 
investment in technological development and indirectly in improving 
efficiency was no longer profitable and therefore no industrial and 
technological revolution was accomplished in China. 
hijra (Arabic) The Prophet Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622, 
which is also the beginning of the Muslim calendar, i.e. the first lunar 
year. 
Hinayana (Sk. “Lesser 
Vehicle”) 
Buddhist schools, teaching that enlightenment is only available only to an 
exceptional few. The number of Hinayana schools once reached eighteen, 
but of these, only the →Theravada school has survived to this day.  
hsiung nu (xiongnu) Nomadic tribal confederation once living north of China, also called Asian 
Huns, who used to be at war against the state of China, so they have had 
a substantial role in building the Great Wall. Some Chinese consider that 
they are ancient relatives of Hungarians therefore the Chinese word for 
Hungary (Xiongyali) also indicates that. 
 
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hudud (Arabic) ‟Limits” defined by God, the crossing of which means deadly sins. The 
punishments for committing hudud crimes ‒ e.g. murder, theft, adultery, 
defamation ‒ are clearly described in the Quran. 
huppah, chuppah Jewish canopy for weddings. 
ijma (Arabic 
“consensus”) 
Agreement of jurists in a school of law concerning a certain ruling, in a 
given age or territory. 
ijtihad (Arabic 
“individual effort” 
When Muslim religious scholars, thanks to divine grace, are absorbed in 
the study of the texts of divine revelation, trying to determine God’s will 
(→Quran and →hadith). 
ie →Bushi family pattern. Japanese patriarchal, hierarchic family where the 
surname and the property or land are inherited. 
imam (Arabic) In Sunni Islam, one who leads the prayer, in Shi Islam, members of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s family who are descendants of Ali’s sons, 
appointed by God to lead the community. 
inquisition Court of judgement to abolish heresy, starting its duty in 1478 in Spain, 
and appeared in the sixteenth century in Spanish-America, closely 
intersecting with the state apparatus. 
isolationism A unique nature of American foreign policy that, in different historical 
situations, has been a recurrent theme in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Instead of applying an active world policy the U.S. prefers and 
expresses its restraint against international obligations and the outside 
world. There are variations and extents as it has never been applied clean 
and it describes the American foreign policy with serious doubts. 
Jain  Follower of Jainism. Today there are about 4.5 million Jains in India, but 
their number exceeds 7 million including the diaspora. 
jati (Sk. “birth”) Hereditary occupational groups in Indian society, characterised by intra-
group marriage (endogamy) and a common ritual tradition. 
jatidharma (Sk.) Religious obligations and requirements of conduct for an individual’s 
birth group (→ jati) in the Indian society. 
jihad (Arabic) “Effort” for the sake of God and Islam. The “greater jihad” is a fight for 
strengthening faith while the “lesser jihad” is a fight against external 
enemies. 
Jina (“Conqueror”) Vardhamana Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, who lived between 599-
527 or 540-468 BCE. He considered himself the 24th →tirthankara 
(spiritual leader) in the ascetic sect founded by Parshvanatha 200 years 
earlier.  
jiva (Sk.) Soul. 
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kakadoxia Misbelief 
kalpa (Sk.) In Indian mythology, it is a cosmic cycle from the creation to the dis-
solution of the universe, corresponding to a day of the god Brahma. Its 
duration is equal to 4,320,000,000 earth years. 
kama (Sk. “lust”) Love, pleasure; one of the Hindu goals of life. 
kami Gods in the Japanese belief. There is nearly an uncountable number of 
gods, they reside in natural phenomena, but even human beings may 
evolve into a kami after death. Human life is dependent on them, kamis 
can aid and get angry but can be pleased via ceremonies, sacrifices and 
prayers. Every community, family has had their own patron deity who 
was often a proud ancestor. 
karkhana Courtly arts and crafts workshops that manufactured their products to 
meet the needs of the Sultans in Delhi and the Mughal court. 
karma (Sk. “action”) Destiny determined by a person’s actions in previous lives. 
Kaurava Descendants of Kuru, a royal family opposed to the Pandavas in the → 
Mahabharata. 
kavya (Sk. “poetry”) Epic poetry written by a single author in ancient Indian literature. 
Kharosthi Writing used in ancient Gandhara. 
Kofun Tumulus, in Japanese “ancient grave”. It is similar to kurgan that are all 
around North Asia. In third to six century Japan, graves and burial 
chambers of nobles were covered with earth mound, similar to the 
traditions in Korean kingdoms at the time. 
kosher Corresponding to the requirements of Jewish law. 
kowtow (koutou) Ancient rite for greeting the Chinese emperor. It implies getting down on 
both knees and the forehead must touch the floor 9 times. 
Kshatriya (Sk.) The order of warriors in Indian society. Traditionally, kings came from 
this class.  
Kumbh Mela  Mass pilgrimage of Hindus to the Ganges River, which takes placed every 
four years on a rotating basis in Allahabad (Prayag), Haridwar, Nashik 
and Ujjain. As the largest peaceful religious gathering in the world, it was 
added to the UNESCO List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2017. 
kuraka Indian noble that facilitated the internal order and collected tax from 
Indians for privileges, integrated into the Spanish American colonial 
system 
laicisation →desacralisation 
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legalism A key branch of Chinese philosophies in which law is an essential part, 
as the word legalism also proves, that is a social order based on rules and 
law. An important factor is morality, that is an approach that mergers 
social norms and legal norms. Law and ethics were not severable while 
judicial and administrative powers were united, so it is not surprising that 
individual vs. state disputes got settled pro state based on authoritarian 
customs. 
levellers “Equalisers”. A movement during the English Civil War (1640–1649), 
denying the priority of nobles and claimed equal rights and extension of 
the right to vote. 
liberation theology A movement strengthening in the 1960’s Latin America, that appoints the 
protection of the poor and oppressed as the main task for the Catholic 
Church, based on the definition of evangelical poverty, focusing on 
ending social injustice, while moving the emphasis from teaching to 
practice; its main representative was Gustavo Gutiérrez, Peruvian 
philosopher-theologian. 
linga (Sk. “sign”) Male genitalia, phallus, fertility symbol; in Hinduism it is associated with 
Shiva. 
lost-wax technique 
(cire-perdue) 
A technique of metal sculpture in which a wax model of the final metal 
product is made and enclosed in clay, and its place is finally filled with 
molten metal. It can be found in the Indus Valley civilisation and in 
African (Yoruba) metalworking. 
machismo The word macho in Portuguese and Spanish means a man’s role that fits 
the community or societal expectations, basically in terms of strength, 
courage and wisdom as values; the expression machismo was first used 
by Latin American feminists in the 1960–1970’s, that is a strong critique 
against the Latin American patriarchal systems. 
madhhab (Arabic) Legal and ritual school in Sunni Islam that unites the jurists’ individual 
activities which does not require clear rules to be followed but leaves 
jurists to think independently. The four recognised schools, Hanafi, 
Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali were established by the tenth century with a 
purpose to provide the independence of jurisprudence against external 
intervention, mainly against the state. 
magic realism Art movement that got better known through the prosperity of the Latin-
American literature in the twentieth century. The point is using legends, 
folk tales and myths in the epic, so reality is mixed with magic and fiction. 
In Latin-American literature One hundred years of solitude from Gabriel 
García Márquez is considered to be the fundamental work in magic 
realism. 
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Mahabharata (Sk. 
“Great War of the 
Bharata Dynasty”) 
Indian epic that recounts the struggle of the two branches of Bharata clan, 
the Pandavas and the Kauravas, for the throne of Hastinapura, interwoven 
with side stories, legends, religious and moral teachings and philosophical 
material. 
mahajanapada (Sk. 
“great kingdom”) 
Buddhist sources from before the Maurya period tell about sixteen 
significant states (Mahajanapada) that existed from the sixth to fourth 
centuries BCE in North India. 
Mahayana (Sk. “Great 
Vehicle”) 
A branch of Buddhism that spread north of India. An important role is 
played by the →bodhisattvas who, as helpers and protectors of the 
Doctrine, represent the ideal of Mahayana Buddhism. 
Mahdi (Arabic, 
“the guided one”) 
In Islam, guided to the right path by God who will come to Earth as the 
redeemer before the Day of Judgement. Shiis believe that the twelfth 
missing imam will return as the Mahdi. Many in history claimed to be the 
Mahdi, last time the leader of a revolt in Sudan at the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
mandala (Sk. “circle”) A circular diagram with magical or symbolic meaning; a visualisation aid 
used in meditation in Indian religions. 
mantra (Sk.) Charm, spell; a mystical syllable or series of syllables suitable for 
summoning a deity. 
maritime nature Coastal nature 
mask In its African sense: a metallic or wooden object that covers the face, 
replete with a covering for the full body, and representing a spirit during 
rituals and ceremonies. 
matrika (Sk. “mother”) Divine mother, mother goddess. Their number may differ, but it is often 
seven (saptamatrika, “Seven Mothers”). 
maya (Sk. “illusion”, 
“magic”) 
Supernatural power, witchcraft, magic, one of the nine energies of 
Vishnu; it also refers to the illusionary nature of the phenomenal world. 
Mayor of the Palace Office in the Frankish Empire in the early middle ages. Mayor of the 
Palace is the first man at the king’s court, guardian of the royal lands and 
leader of the army. During the weakening of the Merovingians the office 
gradually took over the state control in the seventh–eighth centuries. 
mezuzah A small case fixed to the doorpost of Jewish homes with a small 
parchment scroll having passages from the Torah written on it. 
 
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minimal state State approach primarily related to liberal and libertarian views in western 
political views of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, aiming to tighten 
the role of the state, mostly economically and politically. In this view, the 
State is not primarily responsible for “public good” but a guarantee of 
individual freedom. 
Mishnah The first major collection of Jewish religious law. The traditions and laws 
contained in it had been transmitted orally until they were collected and 
redacted in the second century CE. See also → Talmud. 
Mita (“forced labour”) Quechua word for the labour duties of adult men, reaching back to pre-
Columbian times. In the colonial period it mostly covers the forced labour 
in Indian mines. 
mitzvah Jewish religious commandment. 
moksha (Sk. “release”) Liberation in Hinduism when the soul leaves the chain of rebirths and 
unites with the transcendent reality (→brahman). One of the four life 
goals in Hinduism. 
Monophysitism Christological doctrine in early Christian era. It had significant influence 
on the Egyptian and Syrian churches. The doctrine teaches that Christ has 
only one nature as the divine nature has absorbed human nature. The 
churches of Rome and Constantinople rejected Monophysite teaching. 
mufti (Arabic) Islamic jurist qualified to make decisions, and ready to give a religiously 
authentic response (→fatwa) to the questions asked, based on his own 
efforts. 
multilinear  →unilinear vs. multilinear view 
murid (Arabic “one 
who desires/seeks”) 
1. A name for the disciples of the Sufi masters in Islam (→Sufi) who wish 
to reach God on the mystical path. 2. Islamic mystical (Sufi) order in 
Senegal, mostly followed by the Wolof people. 
nagara (Sk. “city”, 
“related to the city”) 
The northern style of Hindu temple architecture. 
Nataraja (Sk. “King 
of Dance”) 
Shiva as a lord of dance. 
négritude Literary and cultural movement of French-speaking Black intellectuals, 
stressing solidarity and cultural unity among Black people. 
 
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Nestorians Christology teaching of Nestorius in the fifth century, stressing the 
independence and separation of the divine and human natures of Christ. 
Although the majority of the church disagreed with this teaching in the 
fifth century, dogmatic history today sees it as an inconvenient wording 
rather than a faulty teaching (heresy). The mission of Nestorian Christians 
developed on the Asian continent in the first millennium. 
New Deal A set of measurements taken in the U.S. during the presidency of F.D. 
Roosevelt after the great economy crisis (1929-1933), attempting to 
support social groups in difficulties and stabilise their income via 
expanding the state’s intervention. New Deal was an economy and social 
policy representing great involvement of the state, exceeding the practices 
of →laissez faire and →minimal state. It was striving to create jobs, state 
investments, and to stabilise the demand side via social benefits. 
nirvana (Sk., nibbana in 
Pali, “blow out”) 
The attainment of enlightenment in Buddhism, extinction of →karma, 
liberation from the constraints of existence. 
Nitishastra (Sk.) Treatises on political ethics. 
ōkimi Name of the ruler in ancient Japan (“High King”) until the seventh-
century reforms based on the Chinese model. 
Old Believers Orthodox Christians that did not adopt the church reforms of Patriarch 
Nikon in 1650 and therefore got excluded from the official church. 
orisha Deities (or spirits) worshipped among the Yoruba of Nigeria and Benin 
and their Brazilian descendants. 
Pandavas Descendants of Pandu, one of the royal families competing for power in 
the →Mahabharata. The Pandava brothers are Yudhisthira, Bhima, 
Arjuna, Nakula and Sahadeva, their common wife is Draupadi. 
patriarch 1. Ancestor, in the Old Testament Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. 2. Catholic 
church leader. 
pauperising Social phenomenon, pauperisation of individuals, groups or social classes. 
pentarchy Perception in the early Christian era and the middle-age that lived on to a 
certain extent in orthodox Christian practice after the Schism of 1054. It 
means that the Christian church is governed by five patriarchs, Rome, 
Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Constantinople, whose particular 
prestige is based on the ancient foundation of their church. 
peon Spanish-American day-labourer or farm worker. 
Pesach Jewish Easter. 
 
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pinyin Chinese writing officially converted into Latin letters, developed in the 
1950’s and internationally accepted. 
pir →sheikh 
populus Romanus Roman people. All citizens with rights in ancient Rome. 
possession cults Religious cults for the placating and peaceful removal of spirits that take 
possession of a human body (e.g. zar in the Arab world, voodoo in the 
Caribbean, etc.). 
pradakshina (Sk. 
“to the right”) 
Clockwise movement or circumambulation; the auspicious direction of 
the ritual circumambulation in Indian religions. It also denotes the 
passageway for circumambulation surrounding a sacred object or temple. 
Pravoslav Slav translation of the Greek word “orthodox” that means true believer. 
preindustrial society Society before the industrialisation (manufacturing industry, industrial 
capitalism) where the majority works in agriculture and is characterised 
by high numbers of live births and deaths, also there was no permanent 
economic growth. 
progressivism A group name for social reform movements developed at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century in the United States. 
Progressivism, in the context of old American ideals, i.e. capitalism based 
on wide participation, aimed to confine the infiltration of great capital and 
monopolies into domestic and local politics. It strived to reach integrity of 
the public life, ruling monopolies, women’s suffrage, educational reforms 
and the extension of their accessibility and minimising the negative 
impacts of industrial modernisation in general. 
puja  The acts performed to honour a deity, e.g. the offering of flowers, food, 
water. 
Puranas (Sk. “old”) Encyclopaedic prose works, collections of Indian mythological and 
historical tradition. 
Putonghua The official state language in China based on the Beijing dialect. 
qibla (Arabic) The direction of the prayer in Islam, indicated by a niche (mihrab) that 
needs to be oriented towards the Kaaba, “God’s house” in Mecca. 
qiyas (Arabic 
“analogy”) 
A method applied by Muslim jurists, deducing laws on matters not 
explicitly covered by religious texts. 
Quran (Arabic 
“recitation”) 
The holy book of Islam that, according to Muslim belief, is literally God’s 
words in Arabic which God sent to Earth via the Prophet Muhammad to 
strengthen and finalise the books sent with former prophets. 
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rajadharma (Sk.) Duty of the rulers in Hinduism. 
Rajput From the Sanskrit word rajaputra, meaning “son of a king”. Western 
Indian kshatrya clans who played major role in the resistance against 
Mongolians. 
Ramayana (Sk.) Ancient Hindu epic about the exile of prince Rama, abduction and rescue 
of his wife Sita and then their return and Rama’s crowning to be king of 
Ayodhya. The author is considered to be Valmiki. 
rasa (Sk. “juice”, 
“taste”) 
The essence or character, dominant emotions of an artwork. Their number 
is usually eight or ten: sringara (love, affection), vira (heroism), vibhatsa 
(disgust), raudra (fury), hasya (laughter), bhayanaka (terror), karuna 
(compassion), adbhuta (wonder), shanti (peace), vatsalya (parental love). 
The last two may be omitted. 
Rastafari A unique religious movement and community developed in Jamaica and 
promoting the resettlement in Africa. 
Requerimiento 
(“requirement”) 
A document worded by the Council of Castile in 1513 read as an 
ultimatum by the Spanish conquerors to the conquered Indians, with no 
interpreter, demanding to accept the Spanish authority. The document has 
confirmed the Spanish conquest on legal and religious bases and declared 
a “just war” against indigenous peoples in case of resistance. 
restitution period This is how the decade after the American civil war (1861-1865) was 
called in the U.S. history but even more in the conquered southern states, 
when these southern were integrated into the federal state system with 
special regard to the management of freed slaves. 
restricted literacy A specific type of the use of writing wherein writing is monopolised by 
specialists and utilised only for certain social and religious purposes. 
Ritsuryō Lawbook issued in 701 introducing a legal system and government based 
on the Chinese model. 
romanisation Disperse of elements of the Roman civilisation and Latin language in 
conquered provinces. It firstly evolved in the imperial age in the first‒
fourth centuries in the long term, accompanied by the domestication of 
Latin language and school system and the spread of Roman urbanisation 
achievements  
Rosh ha-Shanah  Jewish New Year. 
Sahel (region) Dry savanna zone just south of the Sahara. 
salaf (Arabic “pious 
predecessors”) 
Members of the first three generations of Muslims. Their words and acts 
reflect the Prophet’s norms and help Muslims follow the religious path. 
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samsara (Sk.) The chain of rebirths, transmigration. 
samskara (Sk.) Rites of passage in Indian religions. Twelve (sixteen or forty according to 
some sources) such ceremonies are prescribed for the twice born. 
samurai (bushi) Japanese warrior caste, evolved from local elite gunmen, mostly in the 
countryside since the ninth century. Originally, the warrior troops were 
organised on a family basis with a strong dependency system. The 
warriors soon picked up the term saburai, samurai originated in the word 
saburau (“serving someone”) as well as the term bushi (“warrior knight”). 
Their society was based on a system of feudal dependency. 
Sanatana Dharma (Sk. 
“eternal law”) 
A term used for Hindu religion that emphasises its eternal spiritual aspect 
over the differences in the religious practices of castes and sects. 
Sangam (Sk.) Ancient Tamil literature. 
sangha (Sk.) The community of Buddhist monks. 
Sankhya (Sk.) A dualistic philosophical system in ancient India, based on the duality of 
purusha (consciousness) and prakriti (matter); one of the six orthodox 
→darshanas. 
secularisation →desacralisation 
Sephardi Descendant of the Jews who lived in the Iberian Peninsula. 
Shaiva (Sk. “relating to 
the god Shiva) 
Follower of Shiva; a collective term for Hindu religious trends that focus 
on Shiva. 
Shakti (Sk. “energy”, 
“power”) 
Female creative power; in personalised form it is identical with the 
Goddess Devi. 
Shakyamuni (Sk. “Sage 
of the Shakya clan”) 
One of the titles of the Buddha. It indicates that he was born into the 
Shakya clan near today’s Nepalese border. 
Shakyasimha (Sk. “Lion 
of the Shakya clan”) 
One of the titles of the Buddha. 
Sharia (Arabic “path”) The divine law in Islam, the pathway to be followed, designated by God 
to Muslims for all areas of life. The divine guidance and instructions are 
in texts (→Quran and →hadith) explained and interpreted by 
jurisprudence (→fiqh) 
sheikh (Arabic “old 
man”) 
1. The leader of a tribe. 2. Teacher in a traditional Islamic school. 3. Sufi 
master (equivalent to pir in Persian). 
 
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Shii The followers of the Shii Islam, which evolved from the party (Shia) of 
Caliph Ali, the Prophet’s cousin, and brother in law. They have never 
accepted elected caliphs, only Ali’s successors, called →imam. 
Depending on the number of imams they recognise, there are Twelver or 
Imami Shiis, Sevener or Ismaili Shiis and the Fivers or Zaydis. 
Shintō (Japanese) “Gods’ path” is an archaic, naturist mythology, ceremonies, sorcery, a 
mass of local cults originally without moral teachings and metaphysical 
message. The respect of the ancestors, the adoration of natural pheno-
mena, and the belief in the immortality of the spirit, were characterised by 
millions of →kami. 
shōgun (Japanese) The supreme feudal lord of →samurais Japan, with the authority from the 
emperor (militarily enforced), has built a nationwide enforcement and 
control system since 1192 with his vassals. His power was built on land 
ownership and the feudal hierarchy built upon it, where personal loyalty 
linked the feudal lord and the vassal. 
shramana (Sk.) An ascetic, a monk, follower of heterodox sects in the first millennium 
BCE. 
Shudra (Sk.) The lowest class of the ancient Indian society (→varna system). Servants 
belonged here who did not receive ritual initiation. 
Shvetambara (Sk. 
“white-clad”) 
A Jainist sect. 
slavophilism Russian ideology developed in the 1840s, a stream of the European 
romantic nationalism. Followers stood by the unique Russian 
development that was different from Western European. 
soma (Sk.) A narcotic fermented drink used in Vedic sacrifices. 
stele Large, upright stone slab, stone or wooden pillar, erected as a monument. 
stridharma (Sk.) Religious precepts for women in Hinduism. 
stupa (Sk. “crest”, 
“summit”) 
Buddhist monument, reliquary. The first stupas were erected to 
accommodate the corporeal relics of the Buddha. Later, its symbolic 
nature became more prominent.  
Sudanic Gothic A unique style of West and Central African mud architecture in which the 
wooden scaffolding is part of the huge mud buildings and towers, 
facilitating the yearly re-plastering of the construction. 
Sufi (Arabic) Follower of Islamic mysticism. 
 
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sunna (Arabic 
“custom”) 
The entirety of the Prophet Muhammad’s acts and words that God 
inspired, and that Muslims must follow in all areas of life. 
Sunni Follower of the customs of the Prophet Muhammad and the so-called 
orthodox Islam, although the Shiis also say they follow the →sunna of the 
Prophet. 
sutra (Sk. “thread”) Textbook or manual consisting of aphoristic thoughts or rules. 
svadharma (Sk.) The individual’s own life tasks and religious duties in Hinduism. 
swastika (Sk.  
“of good fortune”) 
A cross with bent legs. It is an ancient sun symbol referring to prosperity 
and good luck in Indic religions. 
syncretism A religious phenomenon where religious traditions of different origins are 
merged and united, a common feature of common religion. In China, this 
is to pursuit reconciliation of different views. One of its typical 
manifestations is that Chinese (Eastern) people consider that there can be 
multiple truths simultaneously. All this makes Eastern cultures receptive 
in spiritual terms, as they are able to adapt other spiritual tendencies to 
their own image, not merely adhere to a particular philosophy or religion, 
but use the doctrines useful to them in a pragmatic way. In Latin America 
it means the ‛interaction’ of Spanish Catholicism with native American 
and African religious beliefs and traditions. 
synoikismos In the history of ancient Hellas, the "settlement" of villages and small 
settlements “gathering” into a single city-state, which is typical mainly in 
the first centuries of Greek history (eighth‒sixth centuries BC). As a result 
of the synokismos, the inhabitants became citizens of the one polis, which 
might have led to the elaboration of political rules of coexistence (a 
"constitution") 
tallit Cloth for prayer in Jewish religion. 
Talmud The most important source of Jewish religious law redacted in the fifth 
century CE. See also →Mishnah. 
tefillin Phylacteries used in Jewish religious practice. 
tennō The title of Japanese chief of state since the seventh century derived from 
the Chinese (“heavenly emperor” or “lord of the heaven”). 
tetragrammaton The Hebrew name for God consisting of four consonants which is 
prohibited to be pronounced according to Jewish law. 
theocracy A form of government in which secular power is derived from a deity of 
the given culture, states of such form are called theocratic governments. 
 
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Theravada (Pali, 
“speech of the elders”) 
The only surviving →Hinayana Buddhist school today, the dominant reli-
gion in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South 
Vietnam. 
tianxia A significant component of the “under heaven” holistic concept, 
providing philosophical grounds and explanation for the →tributary 
system. In traditional Chinese thinking the meaning of “under heaven” is 
more than physical world, it truly is a cultural idea that implies morality 
and how the world works. 
tirthankara (Sk. “path-
maker”, “ford-finder”) 
Teachers of Jainism. According to tradition, Vardhamana Mahavira, con-
sidered the founder of Jainism, was the 24th tirthankara. 
Torah “Law” or “teaching”, the five books of Moses from the Bible. 
tributary system The core of the Chinese tributary system is the inequality however it is 
pervaded by the → tianxia and the endeavour to reach “great harmony” – 
ta-tung (datong). The point of the system is that existing things (in this 
case: people, clans, lands) are not equal, China is in the centre surrounded 
by other lands in concentric circles. However, everything under heaven is 
part of a big, hierarchical system where antagonisms, by definition, do not 
exist as every country is part of a world lead by China. 
trimurti (Sk. “triple 
form”, “triple image”) 
Hindu triad of the supreme godhead in which Brahma is the creator, 
Vishnu the maintainer and Shiva the destructive deity. 
tsunami A tsunami created by seaquake (earthquake at the seabed) or underwater 
volcanic eruption (in Japanese “harbour wave”). 
uji Clan or tribe in ancient Japan. Being a warrior aristocracy, they owned 
lands cultivated by common workers and taxpayers. Their leader was 
called “patriarch” and the members were his “family”. The head was 
called “head of the clan” and members were “family members”. The clan 
was supposed to be ceased in the seventh century when taking over the 
Chinese government system however it remained during the ancient 
times. 
umma (Arabic) The community of all the Muslims around the world, irrespective of where 
they live. It used to be a kind of “super tribe”. 
unilinear vs. multilinear 
concept 
 
Unilinear theory is an evolutionary social theory of the twentieth century. 
It represents that there is only one way to reach modernity and western 
modernisation gives the example. Whereas multilinear theory represents 
that there are many ways to reach modernity and individual civilisations 
provide different funds for that. 
Upanishads (Sk.) A body of ancient Indian esoteric texts related to the Vedas that contain 
philosophical speculations. 
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Urdu (Urdu, “camp”) Urdu is an Indo-Aryan language with a mixed North Indian and Arabic-
Persian vocabulary. It is spoken in India and Pakistan and has a rich 
literary tradition. 
Vaishnava A follower of Vishnu. 
Vaishya (Sk.) The third →varna of Indian society. The Vaishyas were commoners 
associated with agriculture, cattle rearing and trading. 
Vajrayana (Sk. 
“diamond carriage”, 
“diamond path”) 
A tantric version of →Mahayana Buddhism. It is an esoteric system 
where manifestations of gods impersonate the psychic stages of 
meditation. 
varna (Sk. “colour”) Traditional units in the hierarchically ordered Indian society. There were 
four varnas, the → Brahmana, → Kshatriya, → Vaishya and → Shudra 
varna. The first three varnas comprised the so-called "twice-born", who 
underwent a ritual initiation ceremony while the members of the lowest 
class were obliged to serve the upper three varnas. 
varnashrama dharma 
(Sk.) 
Obligations and ritual rules for social classes (→varna) and life stages 
(ashrama). 
Vastu Shastra (Sk.) Manuals of architecture in the Indian tradition. 
Vedanta (Sk. “end of the 
Vedas”) 
A Hindu philosophical system based on the →Upanishads; one of the six 
orthodox schools of ancient Indian philosophy (→darshana). Its most 
significant representative is Shankara who lived in the eighth century and 
professed monistic views. 
Vedas (Sk. 
“knowledge”) 
The oldest and most sacred religious books of the Aryans. Their number 
is four: Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda and Atharvaveda. The core of the 
Vedas consists of collections of hymns. 
verism Emphasising truth and reality in art. 
WASP (White 
Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant) 
An Anglo-Saxon Protestant middle class whose characteristics played a 
great role in the historical evolution of the United States and contributed 
significantly to the development of American civilisational values. 
yoga (Sk.) Exercises and meditation techniques, with the aim of uniting with the 
divine spirit. 
Yom Kippur (Hebrew) Jewish holiday, “Day of Atonement”. 
 
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yuga (Sk.) An age of mankind. One day of the god Brahma (→kalpa) is divided into 
four Yugas (Satya, Treta, Dvapara and Kali Yuga), which are of 
decreasing duration and are characterised by a gradual deterioration of 
morals. According to this view, humanity currently lives in the 432,000-
year-old Kali Yuga, of which five thousand years have passed. 
zebu A variety of cattle originating in South Asia (scientific name: Bos taurus 
indicus). Presumably it was domesticated in the Indus Valley Civilisation. 
It is characterised by a large hump over the shoulder. 
 

